Center for Financial Research
Senior Financial Economist
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
550 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20429
- Working Papers
Haelim Anderson is a Senior Financial Economist at the FDIC Center for Financial Research in the Division of Insurance and Research. Her research interests include banking and financial intermediation, macroeconomics, monetary economics, and economic history, and econometrics. Before joining the FDIC, Haelim was a Research Economist at the Office of Financial Research. She received a PhD in Economics from the University of California, Irvine, and a BA in Economics from the University of California, Davis.
Anderson, Haelim, Charles Calomiris, Matthew Jaremski, and Gary Richardson. 2018. “Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Fed” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. Vol. 50, 173-201.
Anderson, Haelim, Thierry Tressel and Claudia Ruiz Ortega. 2017. “Determinants of Long Versus Short-term Bank Credit in EU Countries” International Journal of Finance and Economics. Vol. 22, 274–295.
Anderson, Haelim, and John Bluedorn. 2017. “Stopping Contagion with Bailouts: Micro-Evidence from Pennsylvania Bank Networks During the Panic of 1884” Journal of Banking and Finance. Vol. 76, 139-149.
Anderson, Haelim, and Patrick Van Horn. 2015. “Did the Reserve Requirement Increases of 1936-1937 Reduce Bank Lending: Evidence From A Quasi-Experiment” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. Vol. 47, 791-818.
Anderson, Haelim, and Gary Richardson. 2010. “Retail Trade by Federal Reserve District, 1919 to 1939: A Statistical History,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking. Vol. 20, 151-231.
Anderson, Haelim, Mark Paddrik and Jessie Wang. “Bank Networks and Systemic Risk: Evidence from the National Banking Acts”.
Anderson, Haelim, Gary Richardson and Brian Yang. “Deposit Insurance and Depositor Monitoring: Quisi-Experimental Evidence from the Creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation”.
Anderson, Haelim, Daniel Barth and DongBeom Choi. "Reducing Moral Hazard at the Expense of Market Discipline: The Effectiveness of Double Liability before and during the Great Depression”.