| FIRST CENTRAL STATE BANK From: Brian Holst 
        [mailto:BHOLST@FIRSTCENTRALSB.COM] Sent: Friday, April 02, 2004 6:02 PM
 To: Comments
 Subject: SPAM::EGRPRA Comments
 
 Brian Holst 119 S 1st St
 Long Grove, IA 52756
 
 April 2, 2004 Dear FDIC:
 I am writing on behalf of First Central State Bank, a state-chartered 
        bank located in DeWitt, Iowa. Our customer base is primarily 
        agricultural and suburban with lending activities including commercial, 
        consumer and real estate lending. Our current asset size is 
        approximately $140 million. We appreciate the efforts of the Office of 
        Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit 
        Insurance Corporation and Office of Thrift Supervision, “the Agencies”, 
        in reviewing the current consumer regulations to identify outdated, 
        unnecessary, or unduly burdensome regulatory requirements pursuant to 
        the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA). 
        We also appreciate the Agencies’ recognition and understanding of the 
        challenges faced by community banks in meeting the requirements of the 
        ever-growing number of compliance regulations. I would like to offer the following comments regarding the current 
        regulatory rules and environment:
 Equal Credit Opportunity Act (Reg. B)  The spirit and intent of Reg. B is to prohibit discrimination based 
        upon one of the nine prohibited basis. The current requirements under 
        Reg. B are far broader and create numerous challenges for creditors.
 The recent revisions to Reg. B which prohibit lenders from assuming 
        the submission of a joint financial statement constitutes a request for 
        joint credit and now requires whenever more than one individual applies 
        for credit, those applicants sign a separate statement of intent to 
        apply for joint credit creates additional documentation for creditors 
        and is often very difficult to manage, particularly in commercial and 
        agricultural transactions involving two or more borrower who are 
        operating the business jointly but have not legally organized; for 
        example a husband and wife or father and son operating a farm together. 
        Many of these borrowers consider themselves a “partnership” although 
        they are not legally organized as such. Rather than evidencing intent 
        for each application, creditors should be given the latitude to evidence 
        intent for a specific purpose, such as 2004 agricultural operating 
        expenses. Many times business borrowers have unanticipated credit needs 
        and time is of the essence in filling those needs. If a creditor 
        determines the borrowers are creditworthy and the purpose of the loan 
        meets the intent statement previously affirmed, it seems redundant and 
        burdensome for both the applicant and creditor to obtain an additional 
        statement of intent for each application/loan for that intended purpose.
 The revisions to the model credit applications in order to comply 
        with the requirements to evidence intent to apply for joint credit are 
        appreciated. In early September the FRB published revisions in the 
        Federal Register relating to Fannie Mae’s Uniform Residential Loan 
        Application. At that time we assumed that the changes made to the URLA 
        were done to facilitate by the Reg B revisions as well as CIP mandates 
        to collect date of birth and Reg. C changes for collection of government 
        monitoring information.  Now the indication we are receiving from federal regulators is that 
        the revised URLA does not meet the requirements for evidencing joint 
        applications for credit and that creditors must have residential real 
        estate applicants sign a separate statement. This seems redundant given 
        the number of disclosures and authorizations a home loan applicant 
        already signs at the time of application.
 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (Reg. C) 
 The new definition of “refinance” which removes the purpose test will 
        undoubtedly result in the added reporting of many loans whose purpose 
        has nothing to do with home purchase or home improvement. Commercial and 
        agricultural loans will now be reportable at that time they are 
        refinanced and retain a security interest in a dwelling. Another example 
        would be a farm loan, which is exempt from HMDA reporting when the farm 
        is being purchased, becomes reportable if the farmland (which contains a 
        dwelling) is refinanced. Obviously, business purpose loans are priced 
        very differently from residential real estate loans. In all likelihood, 
        the data collected on these loans will not be useful to the Agencies 
        during a fair lending review, thus all of the banks efforts to collect 
        and report the data are wasted – a true burden! This is also burdensome 
        for regulators, as they will have to “sort” through the data submitted 
        on the LAR and loan files to determine loan purpose and explain LAR 
        variances. Rate spread is now required to be reported on the HDMA LAR if the APR 
        on the loan is above a certain threshold over a comparable Treasury 
        yield. The rate spread calculation determination date for HMDA purposes 
        is not consistent with the way the rate spread index is determined for 
        HOEPA purposes. This too leads to confusion and errors. Rate spread 
        indexes and calculations methods should be consistent in order to 
        promote greater accuracy.
 Truth-in-Lending Act (Reg. Z) 
 The purpose behind the Truth-in-Lending Act, to provide consumers 
        with disclosures regarding the total cost and terms of their credit 
        extension, is necessary. However the current approach and disclosure 
        requirements often leave consumers more confused than informed.
 Most consumers want to know three things: (1) their interest rate; 
        (2) their monthly payment; and (3) the total closing cost amount. The 
        most common comment/question that occurs after sending out an early TIL 
        to a consumer is “I thought your said my interest rate was x%; this 
        disclosure states the APR is y%.” The annual percentage rate does not 
        fulfill its intended educational purpose – it confuses both consumers 
        and loan officers alike. Provide consumers with the information they 
        need to know to make an informed decision: the interest rate, the loan 
        term, the monthly payment and total of all payments. Once consumers have 
        this information along with the closing cost information provided on the 
        GFE, let’s give them the benefit of the doubt that they can figure out 
        which loan product best fits their financial needs. The recent revisions to Section 32 of Reg. Z have been more 
        problematic than helpful to consumers and have also caused confusion 
        among creditors. If a loan falls into coverage of a “high cost mortgage 
        loan” as defined by this section, the consumer must be provided a 3-day 
        notice prior to consummation. Consummation, however is not defined in 
        Reg. Z and often is not defined by state law either. Is consummation 
        considered the point at which the borrower signs the note? Or in a 
        rescindable transaction, is it the point at which the transaction is 
        funded? Can a borrower be considered legally obligated on a transaction 
        when they do not have receipt of the funds? Consummation needs be 
        clarified under this section to ensure compliance. 
 Section 32 mortgages are generally rescindable transactions. If the 
        Section 32 disclosure is to be provided three days prior to signing the 
        note, then the borrower at best has a time period of seven days from 
        application to closing. The extended waiting period often time has 
        adverse effects on the borrower for the time period they cannot access 
        their loan proceeds such as overdraft fees, loss of purchase 
        opportunities, etc. If the Section 32 three-day time frame ran 
        concurrent with the rescission 3-day timeframe, the consumer is still 
        afforded a “cooling off” period and would still have the opportunity to 
        change their mind and rescind the transaction.
 Currently the three-day time frames for the Section 32 is not counted 
        in the same manner as the rescission three-day time frame. The Section 
        32 three-day time frame expires on the third business day, whereas the 
        rescission time frame expires on midnight following the third business 
        day. The inconsistency is confusing for both consumers and creditors.
 If a loan is determined to be a high-cost loan under Section 32 of 
        Reg. Z, the creditor has to provide the borrower with an additional 
        disclosure which warns the borrower they could lose their home if they 
        default on the loan and also provides additional information including 
        the loan amount, the APR, the monthly payment amount, the fact the rate 
        may go up following closing (if applicable), and whether a balloon 
        payment will occur. These disclosures are also provided in the final 
        Truth-in-Lending statement provided at closing, the note itself and many 
        times as mortgage clauses as well. Simply put, the disclosure is 
        duplicative. Also, in regard to HOEPA loans, the explanation for the calculation 
        for “total loan amount” is not clear. Could there not be a simpler 
        definition or amount used for this calculation?
 Many of today’s consumers are quite savvy and seek out home equity 
        loans and lines of credit as a tax reduction tool. They fully understand 
        that a security interest that is being taken in their personal 
        residences but prefer the product due to the tax deductibility of the 
        interest paid and preferable rates and terms often associated with it. 
        These consumers consider the three-day waiting period a nuisance, not a 
        consumer protection device, and would much prefer to waive their right 
        rather than wait three days for their funds. Given that the rescission 
        rules were intended to protect consumers from unscrupulous financers, 
        the greater majority of which are unregulated, would it not make sense 
        to allow consumers borrowing from a federally-regulated financial 
        institution have the ability to waive their right to rescission in 
        instances other than a personal bona fide emergency? Once again, thank you for the opportunity to comment on these very 
        important issues. I appreciate your serious consideration of my concerns 
        over the above-mentioned regulatory burdens currently facing America's 
        community banks. Sincerely,
 Brian HolstFirst Central State Bank
 DeWitt, IA
 
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