| FISHBACK FINANCIAL CORPORATION July 26, 2004The Honorable Donald Powell Chairman
 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
 550 17th Street, NW
 Washington, DC 20429-9990
 Re: Proposed Revisions to the Community Reinvestment Act  Dear Chairman Powell:  The recent decisions by the Office of the Comptroller of the 
          Currency ("OCC") and the Federal Reserve Board ("FRB") to withdraw 
          proposed revisions to their respective regulations implementing the 
          Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") are obviously troubling for 
          community banks across the nation. Fishback Financial Corporation ("FFC") 
          is no exception. Our holding company is comprised of two national 
          banks and two state, nonmember banks, with combined total assets of 
          $800 million. While we are disappointed with the OCC's decision to 
          ignore the unnecessary regulatory burden that our national banks are 
          saddled with by the CRA, we hope that the FDIC will still consider 
          revisions to 12 C.F.R. 345 similar to those announced by the Office of 
          Thrift Supervision ("OTS").  Press releases by the OCC and FRB, along with articles appearing in 
          the American Banker, seem to indicate that the decision to withdraw 
          the proposal was based on the concern that rural communities would 
          somehow suffer by converting more "large" banks to "small" banks. As 
          the regulator of over 4,000 community banks, many of which are "small" 
          banks chartered in rural communities, I trust that your agency's 
          experience is quite different.  The underlying problem with the CRA is that the definition of 
          "large" bank is ill-suited for too many banks that are large by CRA 
          standards only. As a result of being wrongfully defined as "large", 
          these same banks are then subjected to a three-part test focusing on 
          their efforts to lend, invest, and provide services that meet an 
          overly restrictive definition of "community development". The end 
          result is that the 503 banks with total assets between $250 million 
          and $1 billion that operate exclusively in nonmetropolitan areas of 
          the country are subjected to a test that requires resources and 
          expertise that many lack, as well as opportunities and needs that may 
          not be present. Evidence of this disproportionate regulatory burden can be seen 
          when looking at the inequity in examination ratings. Since the 
          regulation was last revised in the mid-1990's, only 13% of "large" 
          banks with assets of $1 billion or less received an Outstanding 
          rating. Whereas, 31% of banks with assets greater than $1 billion have 
          received an Outstanding rating. Results from the other end of the CRA 
          ratings spectrum are even more alarming. Five times as many "large" 
          banks with assets of $1 billion or less have received Needs to Improve 
          ratings when compared to banks with assets of $1 billion or more.
           The same discriminatory effect is experienced by banks with assets 
          of less than $250 million that meet the definition of "large" solely 
          because they are part of a holding company with assets of $1 billion 
          or more. Nationwide, 345 evaluations of these institutions have taken 
          place, with only 35 Outstanding ratings assigned (10%). If these banks 
          were appropriately defined as "small" banks, their opportunity for an 
          Outstanding rating increases 64%.1 Our opponents argue that this data supports that a void exists and 
          banks are not meeting the needs of our rural communities. However, 
          they seem to ignore the fact that no bank is exempt from the CRA, and 
          a "small" bank evaluation exists. In fact, over 98% of CRA 
          examinations for these institutions have resulted in Satisfactory or 
          Outstanding ratings. These ratings cannot be discounted and support 
          the fact that for many rural communities, their bank is the catalyst 
          for community development. The data used by community activists (and 
          apparently the FRB and OCC) to advance their theory that rural 
          communities will suffer if the regulations are revised, actually 
          demonstrates the CRA' s more fundamental problem.2 The perceived lack 
          of investments taking place in rural America that meet the CRA 
          definition of "community development" is not a result of a lack of 
          action by community banks. Rather, it is a result of an unworkable 
          definition of community development that ignores much of the 
          activities undertaken by community banks, and results in 
          disproportionately lower ratings for those institutions wrongfully 
          defined as "large".  Nonetheless, for these institutions compliance is still required. 
          Regrettably, this reality forces many community banks to seek 
          investments that have less benefit to their local communities but meet 
          the stringent definitions of the regulation. Such a reallocation of 
          investment dollars was never the intent of Congress when the CRA was 
          enacted, nor is it desirable today. "Community development" should 
          include any project, loan, investment, or service that will improve 
          the welfare and overall quality of life of residents in the assessment 
          area, including (but not exclusively) low- and moderate-income 
          residents and areas. Loans, investments, or services that improve 
          healthcare, infrastructure, or education; expand job opportunities; 
          and promote economic development are just some of the examples of 
          projects that community bankers take leadership roles in every day. 
          These activities should not be assessed based on their innovativeness 
          or complexity as required by the regulation. Rather, they should be 
          assessed based on the community need that they fulfill. More 
          importantly, these true community development activities should no 
          longer be sifted out during CRA evaluations because they do not meet a 
          definition that lacks the flexibility to take into account the 
          divergent needs of our rural communities.
 Community activists and some within the regulatory agencies 
          wrongfully assume that the reinvestment that takes place in rural 
          communities is a result of the CRA. To the contrary, community bankers 
          reinvest locally because the long-term viability of their institution 
          and the economic prosperity of the community depends upon it. Ideally, 
          the CRA rating would be a reflection of these efforts.  Unfortunately, the opposite is true, and revisions are still 
          necessary for the subset of community banks impacted by the current 
          debate. These institutions are considered "large" only when it comes 
          to defining them for CRA. purposes. As a result, they continue to 
          expend disproportionate resources to collect government-mandated data 
          to demonstrate their compliance with an overly restrictive three-part 
          test that is unsuited to a community bank's expertise, resources, and 
          opportunities.  Meanwhile, their local, mainstreet competitors in many rural 
          communities do not experience such a burden. In many parts of rural 
          America, community banks that are wrongfully defined as "large" 
          compete for customers with credit unions, branches of nationwide, mega 
          banks, and the government sponsored enterprises such as the Farm 
          Credit System — all of which devote few or no resources at the local 
          level to CRA compliance.3 As a community banker, I am sure you 
          understand that these competitors have enough advantages already.  I trust that a majority of the members on the Board of Directors at 
          the FDIC recognize that community reinvestment is the business model 
          for viable community banking, and regulatory burden that only detracts 
          from the efforts of community banks to serve their communities is poor 
          public policy.  Sincerely, Van D. FishbackPresident & Chief, Executive Officer
 Fishback Financial Corporation
 2220 Sixth Street
 Brookings, SD 57006
 Cc: The Honorable Tom Daschle Minority Leader
 United State Senate (South Dakota)
 The Honorable Tim JohnsonRanking Member, Subcommittee on Financial Institutions
 United States 
          Senate (South Dakota)
 The Honorable Stephanie HersethUnited States House of Representatives (South Dakota)
 
 1 Source: FF EC CRA Ratings Database (www.fficc.gov/cra).2 Claims by community groups that banks are not meeting expectations 
          when it comes to community development can also be at least partially 
          explained by the lack of information. Because many rural communities 
          are served by "small" banks, community development activity is seldom 
          part of the CRA evaluation (see Appendix A of the CRA regulation). 
          Therefore, Public Evaluations are often silent on the many worthwhile 
          activities undertaken by "small" banks, telling only a portion of the 
          overall story and excluding worthwhile and needed projects that 
          communities have come to rely on their local community banks to 
          provide.
 3 I have not touched on the question of cost associated with the 
          "large" bank test. The OCC's and FRB's press releases question whether 
          such cost exists. Such a notion is contrary to empirical data reported 
          by Grant Thornton as part of a study commissioned by the Independent 
          Community Bankers of America ("ICBA") and feedback the agencies have 
          consistently received since the revision to the regulation in 1995. 
          The Grant Thornton/ICBA study found that costs more than double when 
          they transition from the "small" bank to the "large" bank category, 
          with personnel costs increasing 36.5% alone.
 
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