

October 17, 2012

Jennifer J. Johnson
Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System
20th St. and Constitution Ave, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20551

The Honorable Martin J. Gruenberg
Acting Chairman
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
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250 E. Street
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Ladies and Gentlemen:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comment on the Basel III proposals that were recently approved by the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. I represent the interests of State Savings Bank, a \$95 million bank headquartered in West Des Moines, Iowa. I am writing this letter today to express concerns about both the Basel III proposal as well as the "Standardized Approach" proposal. I understand the overall goal in the Basel III proposals of strengthening capital requirements so banks can weather the storms of downturns economic cycles inevitably bring, but these rules in their entirety are more appropriate for large complex financial institutions competing in a global marketplace than for the business practices of our local bank.

We respectfully ask that both the Basel III and the Standardized Approach proposals be repealed for the following specific reasons:

Basel III Comments

- 1. Increased risk weighting for residential loans.** Under this proposal, the Federal agencies can assign risk weights to residential mortgages based on whether the mortgage is a "traditional" category 1 mortgage or a "riskier" category 2 mortgage. Risk weights under the proposal run from 35% up to 200%. Under current law, most prudently underwritten residential mortgages are risk weighted at 50%.

These proposed residential mortgage rules raise several issues. **First, the cost to banks our size to develop accurate data to comply with this provision would be excessive and far outweigh any possible benefit to the banking system.** The proposal has no grandfather provision, so all residential mortgage loans on the bank's books would be subject to the new capital requirements — forcing our bank to review all existing files to determine the appropriate category and LTV for each loan file (current total is 339). Further complicating the issue, we will not be able to just "assign" a weighting when the loan is booked, but would have to continually re-evaluate the risk weightings

based on changes in collateral values, past due status and other risk factors. This "granular" approach is going to put enormous pressure on us to implement systems for calculating these new reporting requirements. I also have concerns whether our software vendors could possibly even implement this new requirement in a timely manner. Moreover, I question whether the regulatory agencies can ensure that all banks are consistently and accurately applying the new risk percentages without increasing their hours significantly even in small, well-capitalized banks.

In addition, mortgages, with the exception of HAMP loans, must be re-assessed after a loan structuring or modification. Therefore a "category I" mortgage could become a "category 2" mortgage if the bank does not modify the loan under HAMP. Many banks, including ours modify loans under non-HAMP methods and have a very successful track record for those borrowers who qualify by keeping them in their homes. Why should we be penalized from a capital standpoint for offering these modifications?

Finally, similar to the agencies proposal for a "Qualified Residential Mortgage" (QRM) the proposed rules do not recognize private mortgage insurance (PMI) at all to reduce loan to value requirements — so mortgages may be subject to higher risk weights even if PMI reduces the risk on these loans. This will have an enormous negative impact on purchase loans particularly purchase loans to first time homebuyers. PMI has been used successfully by banks in Iowa for decades with hardly any resulting losses for prudently underwritten loans.

Because our bank's strong underwriting has led to a very small loss history on residential real estate loans, this new re-evaluation approach on an asset by asset basis is completely unnecessary and should be eliminated from the proposal. I strongly believe that the cost to both small banks and the public to implement this residential mortgage provision far outweighs any perceived benefit.

- 3. Credit enhancing representations.** The proposed rules would require banks to hold capital for assets with credit enhancing representations and warranties, including for "pipeline" mortgages in the process of being sold. Under the existing capital rules, banks are not required to hold capital against assets with such representations and warranties. This new requirement would affect any mortgage sold with a representation or warranty containing (1) an early default clause, and/or (2) certain premium refund clauses that cover assets guaranteed, in whole or part, by the U.S. government or government sponsored entity.

Early default clauses or premium-refund clauses are very common on third party sales of mortgages. They are largely intended to protect the purchaser by providing some recovery in the event of extremely early or unanticipated pay off or refinancing, and are usually targeted at 120 days or less. They are meant to reimburse the purchaser for the expense of acquiring a loan which subsequently did not perform long enough for any expected return on investment. Instances of enforcing this pay off protection are an extremely small percentage of the overall population of loan transactions, and in any event exist to recoup perceived losses and offer some investor protection. These clauses are tied closer to operational transmission of the loan more than any risk protection as it relates to the underlying collateral.

Requiring off-balance sheet guarantees at 100 percent credit conversion during this initial time period seems onerous in that there is little evidence that these temporary and expiring representations and warranties pose any significant financial exposure. In addition, in many cases the reps and warranties referring to early default and premium refund clauses do not automatically subject the bank to the repurchase of the loan. Often the only liability to the bank would be to refund the servicing premium and any other earned fees on the loan. To require capital reservation for 100% of the loan is not at all commensurate with the amount of risk we are assuming.

Any credit enhancements or representations that exist outside of this initial prepayment protection, whether as part of the contractual agreements between the parties, would amply represent the overwhelming amount of any risk on behalf of the seller. Requiring additional balance sheet guarantees for this transitional period would be a significant increase in capital needs that would be much greater than the actual risk that it is designed to represent. Our bank originates a large volume of loans for the secondary market and has experienced only insignificant losses related to these loans including those related to temporary representations or warranties. Moreover, there is little evidence that temporary representations and warranties have resulted in significant losses for regulated banking organizations, even during financial crisis. **This rule if implemented would literally drive many Iowa community banks out of the secondary market and possibly out of the residential mortgage business altogether. We would respectfully ask that it be eliminated from the proposal.**

5. **Change in risk weighting for home equity and second lien loans. This proposal will cause our bank to seriously limit our home equity loan programs. We ask that this portion of the proposal be eliminated.** This part of the proposal classifies all junior residential liens, such as closed-end home equity loans and HELOC's, as "category 2" exposures with risk weights ranging from 100-200%. More importantly and as is the case most often in our bank, if we hold both the 1st and 2nd mortgages on the same property we would be required to treat both mortgages (even the 1st mortgage) as category 2 exposures (much higher risk weight). The exception where both mortgages could be placed into a category 1 mortgage – where the combined exposure meets all of the requirements of a category 1 mortgage, is far too narrow and most of our home equity loans and their accompanying 1st mortgage would likely fall into category 2 classifications.
6. **Proposal to increase risk weights on delinquent loans.** This rule, which drastically increases the risk weights for past due loans, causes concerns as our bank already sets aside reserves for delinquent loans. By proposing to also increase capital we hold on past due loans, we are basically being required to set aside capital twice. Risk regarding past due loans should continue to be managed through loan loss reserve guidance and not by layering on an additional capital requirement. This rule if finalized would require us to increase our aggressiveness in moving loans past 90 days delinquent off of our balance sheet – and make us much less likely to pursue loan workout strategies and instead proceed directly to foreclosure sale.

Conclusion

In conclusion, our bank has no way to completely ascertain the full impact of this massive proposal because of the amount of work it will take to understand the rules and how they apply to our balance sheet. We will likely be required to hire a team of consultants to implement the re-assessment of each individual loan in our portfolio with the new risk weights, re-program our core processing software to handle the new coding requirements and then create the necessary reports to analyze the data.

As I stated above, while I support the overall goal of strengthening the financial system by increasing the level and quality of capital that banks hold, these rules are designed much more for large multi-billion dollar global financial institutions than the business practices of Iowa banks. We urge the agency to repeal this proposal so we may continue serving our communities and help strengthen our local economies.

Sincerely yours,

Tim Wolf
President & CEO