





101 East Union ■ PO Box 77 ■ EDGEWOOD, IA 52042-0077 ■ 563,928,6425 ■ Fax: 563,928,6240

October 10, 2012

Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20551

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 250 E Street, SW Mail Stop 2-3 Washington, DC 20219

Robert E. Feldman **Executive Secretary** Attention: Comments/Legal ESS Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20429

Re: Basel III Capital Proposals

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comment on the Basel III proposals that were recently issued for public comment by the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

We, the Board of Directors of Community Savings Bank, wish to voice our concern that the Basel III proposals need to be reconsidered. The undue burden this proposal places on our financial institution is unnecessary and extremely restrictive to the conduct of community banking in general.

Community banks should be allowed to continue using the current Basel I framework for computing their capital requirements. Basel III was designed to apply to the largest, internationally active, banks and not community banks. Community banks did not engage in the highly leveraged activities that severely depleted capital levels of the largest banks and created panic in the financial markets. Community banks operate on a relationship-based business model that is specifically designed to serve customers in their respective communities on a long-term basis. This model contributes to the success of community banks all over the United States through practical, common sense approaches to managing risk. The largest banks operate purely on transaction volume and pay little attention to the

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customer relationship. This difference in banking models demonstrates the need to place tougher capital standards exclusively on the largest banks to better manage the ability to absorb losses.

Inclusion of accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) in capital for community banks will result in increased volatility in regulatory capital balances and could rapidly deplete capital levels under certain economic conditions. AOCI for most community banks represents unrealized gains and losses on investment securities held available-for-sale. Because these securities are held at fair value, any gains or losses due to changes in interest rates are captured in the valuation. Recently, both short-term and long-term interest rates have fallen to historic lows generating unprecedented unrealized gains for most investment securities. Additionally, demand for many implicitly and explicitly government guaranteed securities has risen due to a flight to safety and government intervention in the capital markets. This increased demand has caused credit spreads to tighten further increasing bond valuations.

Implementation of the capital conservation buffers for community banks will be difficult to achieve under the proposal and therefore should not be implemented. Many community banks will need to build additional capital balances to meet the minimum capital requirements with the buffers in place. Community banks do not have ready access to capital that the larger banks have through the capital markets. The only way for community banks to increase capital is through the accumulation of retained earnings over time. Due to the current ultra low interest rate environment, community bank profitability has diminished further hampering their ability to grow capital. If the regulators are unwilling to exempt community banks from the capital conservation buffers, additional time should be allotted (at least five years beyond 2019) in order for those banks that need the additional capital to retain and accumulate earnings accordingly.

The proposed risk weight framework under Basel III is too complicated and will be an onerous regulatory burden that will penalize community banks and jeopardize the housing recovery. Increasing the risk weights for residential balloon loans, interest-only loans, and second liens will penalize community banks that offer these loan products to their customers and deprive customers of many financing options for residential property. Additionally, higher risk weights for balloon loans will further penalize community banks for mitigating interest rate risk in their asset-liability management. Community banks will be forced to originate only 15 or 30 year mortgages with durations that will make their balance sheets more sensitive to changes in long-term interest rates. Many community banks will either exit the residential loan market entirely or only originate those loans that can be sold to a GSE. Second liens will either become more expensive for borrowers or disappear altogether as banks will choose not to allocate additional capital to these balance sheet exposures. Community banks should be allowed to stay with the current Basel I risk weight framework for residential loans. Furthermore, community banks will be forced to make significant software upgrades and incur other operational costs to track mortgage loan-to-value ratios in order to determine the proper risk weight categories for mortgages.

We object to the proposed ten year phase-out of the tier one treatment of instruments like trust preferred securities (TRUPS) because it is reliable source of capital for community banks that would be very difficult to replace. We believe it was the intent of the Collins amendment of the Dodd-Frank Act to permanently grandfather tier one treatment of TRUPS issued by bank holding companies between \$500 million and \$15 billion. Phasing out this important source of capital would be a particular burden for many privately-held banks and bank holding companies that are facing greatly reduced alternatives in raising capital. [Insert what the impact would be to your bank if TRUPS were phased out, as proposed.] While we applaud the fact that TRUPS issued by bank holding companies under \$500 million would not be impacted by the proposal, consistent with the Collins Amendment, we urge the banking regulators to

continue the current tier one treatment of TRUPS issued by those bank holding companies with consolidated assets between \$500 million and \$15 billion in assets.

Penalizing the existing mortgage servicing assets under the proposal is unreasonable for those banks that have large portfolios of mortgage servicing rights. Any mortgage servicing rights existing on community bank balance sheets should be allowed to continue to follow the current risk weight and deduction methodologies.

Community Savings Bank is a Subchapter S bank. Imposing distribution prohibitions on community banks with a Subchapter S corporate structure conflicts with the requirement that shareholders pay income taxes on earned income. Those banks with a Subchapter S capital structure would need to be exempt from the capital conservation buffers to ensure that their shareholders do not violate the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. We recommend that the capital conservation buffers be suspended during those periods where the bank generates taxable income for the shareholder.

We, the Board of directors of Community Savings Bank, thank the respective agencies for allowing us the opportunity to comment on the proposal.

Respectfully submitted,

Steven A. Brady, President & CEO

Jacqueline A. Johnson, Executive VP

Brett W. Nagel, Senior Vice President

Kevin J. Perrinjaquet

Jeffrey D. State

Daniel H. Swift

Madonna J. Brady

¹ The proposals are titled: Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, and Transition Provisions; Regulatory Capital Rules: Standardized Approach for Risk-weighted Assets; Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements; and Regulatory Capital Rules: Advanced Approaches Risk-based Capital Rules; Market Risk Capital Rule