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Speeches and Testimony

Remarks by Acting Chairman Martin J. Gruenberg at the CNMV Conference on Recovery and Resolution of Central Counterparties

Last Updated: June 21, 2022

Thank you for inviting me to speak with you today. I welcome this opportunity to share my views as Chairman of the Resolution Steering Group (ReSG) of the Financial Stability Board.

I would like to thank CNMV for hosting this important conference on the Recovery and Resolution of Central Counterparties. CCP Resolution is a top priority of the ReSG.

I would also like to thank Maria Jose Gomez Yubero, the Head of Resolution and Financial Stability Issues for CNMV and the organizer of this conference. In addition to her role at CNMV, Maria co-chairs the ReSG subgroup that focuses on central counterparty (CCP) resolution. I would like to acknowledge her leadership on this critical financial stability issue.


The ability of authorities to manage the orderly resolution of systemically important financial institutions is a foundation of financial stability.

The 2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis made this lesson clear. At that time, authorities lacked the capabilities to manage the orderly failure of systemically important financial institutions. They had to resort to disorderly wind-down or public support to mitigate the risks that failure of those institutions presented to the financial system.

There was a global commitment in the aftermath of that experience to develop the capabilities to deal with this issue.

The Financial Stability Board (or FSB) was created to address these types of cross-border risks and the Resolution Steering Group of the FSB is the primary global forum for the development of standards and guidance for resolution regimes, and for recovery and resolution planning and execution for systemically important financial institutions.

Post-Crisis Reforms and CCPs

As a result of the experience of the Global Financial Crisis, G20 Leaders agreed in 2009 on a comprehensive reform agenda for over-the-counter derivatives markets, with the objectives of improving transparency, mitigating systemic risk, and protecting against market abuse. This included an expectation for clearing all standardized contracts through Central Counterparties - CCPs.1

Progress in implementing the G20 regulatory reforms has dramatically increased the share of derivatives cleared at CCPs. As a result, it has also greatly increased their systemic importance and brought greater attention to their resolvability.2

FSB Work on CCP Resolution Issues

As CCPs have grown in importance for the functioning of financial markets, the FSB has taken on - and continues to work on - core issues relating to CCP resolvability. We are focused on deepening the FSB’s resolution policy framework in order to avoid or mitigate serious adverse effects on financial stability.

The continued work by ReSG seeks to strengthen the implementation of the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions to enhance the prospects for CCP resolvability without resorting to a government bailout and without resulting in contagion to other parts of the financial system.3 This work by ReSG complements the work undertaken by the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI) and the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on the resilience and recovery of CCPs. Our cooperation across these groups is essential to making progress on these issues.

The FSB’s Guidance on CCP Resolution and Resolution Planning, adopted in July 2017,4 was an important step forward. Since 2017, the FSB, in coordination with CPMI and IOSCO,5 has published the list of CCPs identified as systemically important in more than one jurisdiction. This encouraged regulators to take steps to enhance resolvability of CCPs domiciled in their jurisdictions, including setting up Crisis Management Groups with Cooperation Agreements to support resolution planning and resolvability assessments.6 The list of CCPs that are systemically important in more than one jurisdiction, as of today, includes thirteen CCPs from ten jurisdictions.

In November 2020, the FSB published guidance7 to help authorities as they assess the adequacy of financial resources for CCP resolution and the treatment of CCP equity in the context of resolution. The guidance provides direction for assessing the adequacy of a CCP’s financial resources and the potential financial stability implications of their use. It also provides a framework for resolution authorities to evaluate the exposure of CCP equity to losses in recovery, liquidation and resolution and potential treatment of CCP equity in resolution.

Authorities completed in 2021 a first round of resolvability assessments for CCPs that are systemic in more than one jurisdiction and now are continuing this analysis on an annual basis. The resolvability work has shown progress in applying the 2020 Guidance.8 However, our work is far from done.

ReSG Focus on Alternative Financial Resources for CCP Resolution

The focus for ReSG at this point is on resources to support CCP resolution. We are undertaking a careful and thorough review of potential alternative financial resources to support resolution, including an analysis of associated costs and benefits. ReSG is expected to produce a status report by the end 2022.9

This current ReSG work draws on a previous initiative, undertaken in 2021, at the direction of the Chairs of the FSB, CPMI, IOSCO, and ReSG. The report of that previous initiative was finalized and published in early March 2022,10 with an invitation for stakeholder feedback.

From my perspective as ReSG Chair, that report was a helpful contribution to our consideration of these issues and a guide for next steps. It concluded that ensuring an adequate set of resolution tools to cover both default and non-default losses in case of a need continues to be important.

The ReSG is committed to following through on this work and making a contribution to addressing the challenge of CCP resolution.

Let me conclude by once again thanking CNMV for hosting this conference, for inviting me to participate, and for focusing attention of this issue. I have no doubt that we will benefit and learn from your discussions today. Thank you very much.

1 See Financial Stability Board, Review of OTC derivatives market reforms: Effectiveness and broader effects of the reforms (June 29, 2017), at; citing the Pittsburgh Summit Leaders’ statement, paragraph 13 of body (Sept. 24-25, 2009), at

2 See Statement by Martin J. Gruenberg, Member, FDIC Board of Directors, regarding Final Rule: Standardized Approach for Calculating the Exposure Amount of Derivative Contracts (Nov. 19, 2019), at; citing, BCBS, CPMI, FSB, and IOSCO, Analysis of Central Clearing Interdependencies (Aug. 9, 2018), at

3 See Financial Stability Board, BCBS, CPMI, and IOSCO, 2015 CCP Workplan (April 15, 2015), at (; and see, Chairs’ Report on the Implementation of the Joint Workplan for Strengthening the Resilience, Recovery and Resolvability of Central Counterparties (July 5, 2017), at

4 See Financial Stability Board, Guidance on Central Counterparty Resolution and Resolution Planning (July 5, 2015), at

5 See Financial Stability Board, CCPs that are systemically important in more than one jurisdiction (SI>1 CCPs) (Accessed May 27, 2022), at

7 See Financial Stability Board, Guidance on Financial Resources to Support CCP Resolution and on the Treatment of Equity in Resolution: Final Report (Nov. 16, 2020), at

8 See Financial Stability Board, Guidance on Central Counterparty Resolution and Resolution Planning (July 5, 2015), at

9 See Financial Stability Board, 2021 Resolution Report: "Glass half-full or still half-empty?" (Dec. 7, 2021), at:

10 See Financial Stability Board, CPMI, and IOSCO, Central Counterparty Financial Resources for Recovery and Resolution (March 10, 2022), at