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 CONSUMER BANKERS ASSOCIATION
 
 
 April 6, 2004
 Communications DivisionOffice of the Comptroller of the Currency
 250 E Street, SW
 Washington, DC 20219
 Regs.comments@occ.treas.gov
 Ms. Jennifer J. JohnsonSecretary
 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
 20th St. and Constitution Avenue, NW
 Washington, DC 20551
 Regs.comments@federalreserve.gov
 Robert E. FeldmanExecutive Secretary
 Attention: Comments
 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
 550 17th Street, NW
 Washington, DC 20429
 comments@fdic.gov
 Regulation CommentsChief Counsel’s Office
 Office of Thrift Supervision
 1700 G Street, NW
 Washington, DC 20552
 Regs.comments@ots.treas.gov
 Re: Proposed Revisions to the Community Reinvestment Act RegulationsOCC:	Docket No. 04-06
 FRB:	Docket No. R-1181
 FDIC:	12 CFR 345
 OTS:	No. 2004-04
 Dear Sir or Madam: The Consumer
              Bankers Association (CBA)1 appreciates the opportunity to comment
              on the joint notice
              of proposed rulemaking (“the
            Proposal”) of the above-named agencies (“the Agencies”)
            to amend the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). CBA commented on the
            Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) that the Agencies issued
            on July 19, 2001. In our comments
              on the ANPR, we stated our view that a whole new CRA “reform” process
              of the type undertaken a decade ago would be counterproductive,
              as it would lead to a major disruption
            in the operations of financial institutions and that any resulting
            benefits would be at too great a cost. The Agencies have clearly
            paid close attention and are limiting the proposed changes to a few
            discrete areas.  In our comments on the ANPR we also suggested that much of what
            was under consideration could be better addressed through the exam
            process and the performance context and amending the exam guidelines,
            rather than in a rulemaking. Again, we are gratified that the Agencies
            have listened and will be seeking ways to improve the guidelines
            and the examination process to fine-tune the regulation.  We will limit our comments to the following proposed changes:
 (1) Credit Terms and Practices. Evidence that an institution, or
              any affiliate whose loans are included for CRA consideration, has
              engaged in specified discriminatory, illegal or abusive credit
              practices in connection with certain loans, will adversely affect
              that institution’s CRA evaluation;
 
 (2) Public Performance Evaluations. Change the public disclosure
            of data in the CRA public evaluations and disclosure statements related
            to providing information on loan originations and purchases, HOEPA-covered
            and HMDA “high cost” loans, and affiliate loans.
 Our comments on these proposed changes follow: Credit Terms and Practices The CRA regulations
              provide that discriminatory or other credit practices may affect
              an institution’s CRA rating. The Agencies
            are now proposing to amend the regulations to “enhance how
            the CRA regulations address credit practices that may be discriminatory,
            illegal, or otherwise predatory and abusive.”  The Proposal
                    would identify, in the regulations, examples of certain violations
                    of law that
                    will adversely affect an agency’s evaluation
                  of an institution’s CRA performance. The regulations
                  would provide a list, deemed to be illustrative and not exhaustive,
                  of
            such practices. The list would be the following: 
                (i) Discrimination against applicants on a prohibited basis in violation,
                    for example, of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act or the Fair Housing
                    Act;(ii)	Violations of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act;
 (iii)	Violations of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act;
 (iv) Violations of section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
                    Act; and
 (v) Violations of the Truth in Lending Act provisions regarding
                    a consumer’s right of rescission.
 These are described
              as being the “types of illegal and discriminatory
            credit practices” that will be considered. In addition, according
            to the Supplementary Information, “[e]vidence of violations
            of other applicable consumer protection laws affecting credit practices,
            including state laws if applicable, may also adversely affect the
            institution’s CRA evaluation.” These practices
              would adversely affect an institution’s evaluation
            in connection with home mortgage lending, small business and small
            farm lending, consumer lending (whether or not the institution elects
            to have it considered in its evaluation) and community development
            lending. The practices would be considered regardless of whether
            they involve loans in the institution’s assessment area(s)
            or in any other geographical location. They would also be considered
            if engaged in by any affiliate (whether an operating subsidiary or
            a subsidiary of the holding company) provided that any loans of that
            affiliate have been considered for CRA evaluation. Such practices
            by an affiliate, however, would only be considered within the institution’s
            assessment area(s). According to
              the Supplementary Information, “[t]he agencies
            will consider all credible evidence of discriminatory, other illegal,
            or abusive credit practices that comes to their attention. Such information
            could be obtained from supervisory examinations …, CRA comments
            in connection with applications for deposit facilities, and public
            sources.” We are certainly mindful of the need to protect consumers from abusive
            and predatory lending practices. We are very supportive, for example,
            of the steps that the OCC has taken to adopt rules and guidance that
            assists national banks and their operating subsidiaries in maintaining
            lending products and practices that are in all ways responsible and
            above reproach. We also believe that efforts to promote better financial
            literacy can help shield the more vulnerable consumers from the worst
            forms of financial abuse. CBA has surveyed our members for the past
            several years, and the results demonstrate a strong commitment to
            education in finance. It is appropriate that CRA consider these practices,
            as well as the other positive steps being taken by financial institutions
            to provide affordable loan products and other innovative ways of
            bettering the communities they serve. Nevertheless,
              we believe that the approach being proposed here is not appropriate
              for CRA
              and is fraught with problems. The use of
            CRA for this purpose, though obviously well-intentioned, is a continuation
            of the tendency we have witnessed over the years since its enactment
            to employ CRA as a compliance vehicle rather than an opportunity
            to promote community development. CRA is intended to determine whether
            financial institutions are helping to meet the credit needs of the
            communities they serve, including low- and moderate-income communities,
            consistent with safe and sound banking. The original idea was to
            ensure that low- and moderate-income communities, in particular,
            not be used as a source of deposits for financial institutions that
            would fail to provide their credit needs. It was not Congress’s
            intention to have the regulatory agencies download the entire consumer
            compliance examination process into CRA, making CRA, in effect, a
            super-compliance oversight review process. Under the Proposal, every
            product and practice of the institution that has already been subject
            to a thorough audit for compliance (as well as safety and soundness)
            would become part of the CRA process. It would move from a bird’s
            eye view of each institution’s quantity and distribution of
            lending and investments to a microscopic analysis of each individual
            loan product. It is but a short step from this Proposal to a determination
            of whether each and every loan meets the needs of the individual
            customer—i.e. whether it is suitable for the customer.  In principle,
              we have no objection to the Agencies finding fault with institutions
              that
              engage in a pattern or practice of mortgage
            or consumer lending based predominantly on the foreclosure or liquidation
            value of the collateral, where the borrower cannot be expected to
            be able to make the payments required under the terms of the loan.
            As you have noted, both HOEPA and the recent OCC regulations have,
            in one form or another, prohibited this practice, and we assume that
            the other bank regulatory agencies would similarly frown on this
            form of “equity stripping.” Our concern is rather with
            the inclusion of this as an element of CRA. This practice is already
            subject to scrutiny and enforcement as either a safety and soundness
            violation or a compliance violation. There is no additional benefit
            to including it in CRA as well.  We have the same
              basic objection to the inclusion of numerous compliance violations
              under
              the CRA umbrella. We do not endorse or support a
            single one of the compliance violations listed in the Proposal; however,
            each is already identified with a regulation or statute that already
            assesses penalties, whether civil or criminal, and is subject to
            administrative enforcement. When HOEPA, RESPA, TILA, and the rest
            were enacted, Congress established the penalties for violations that
            it viewed as appropriate for each. If they are also CRA consequences
            because of the impact on the ratings—which may even include
            loss of powers under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act—the penalties
            substantially increase. If a creditor fails to provide the correct
            notice regarding the 3-day right of rescission under TILA, for example,
            the consumer already has the right to rescind, pay nothing and be
            made whole for up to 3 years! Why is it necessary also to include
            it as part of CRA?2 Civil liability and the possibility of criminal
            liability for willful and knowing violations; regular examination
            for compliance and the prospect of administrative enforcement with
            cease and desist orders, restitution and monetary penalties; are
            all lying in wait for those who engage in violations of most of the
            compliance laws that would now become part of the CRA review as well.
            This is well beyond anything Congress could have envisioned when
            it enacted CRA or the consumer compliance laws.  In fact, the
              language of the Proposal suggests that a single violation of one
              of these
              compliance laws “will affect” the performance
            evaluation under CRA (since the asset-based lending provision mandates
            a pattern or practice, but the other enumerated violations do not).
            A typical large financial institution with tens or hundreds of thousands
            of mortgage or consumer loans will generally have many such inadvertent
            violations, notwithstanding procedures in place to prevent them.
            The Proposal does not offer any flexibility to find such violations
            de minimus or technical in nature, nor to allow for an acceptable
            rate of error. In short, if this is adopted, CRA could well evolve
            into the strictest and least forgiving compliance regulation, and
            CRA examiners become super-compliance auditors. The Proposal
              also raises serious questions about the expansion of CRA outside
              of the financial
              institution’s assessment area.
            The Proposal does not seek to extend the coverage of affiliate activities
            outside of the assessment area, even where the affiliate’s
            loans are being considered. This is appropriate. Yet it is prepared
            to consider compliance violations by the financial institution wherever
            they might occur, even if it is only loans within the assessment
            area that are being considered. In their own discussion of assessment
            areas in the Supplementary Information accompanying the Proposal,
            the Agencies rightly point to the important historical relationship
            of CRA to assessment areas. The proposal is one more step toward
            the undoing of that relationship. Although the
              Supplementary Information states that this is not intended to be
              a substantive
              change in CRA, we cannot agree. The impact of
            the Proposal would be considerable. If violations of these enumerated
            laws, at least, will adversely affect CRA performance, numerous troubling
            questions will arise that the Agencies will need to address. For
            example, what constitutes “evidence of a violation” such
            that it will impact CRA performance evaluations? What is the relationship
            of a violation of any particular compliance law to the CRA rating?
            Do different violations have a different impact on the evaluation?
            What other illegal credit practices are of the same “type” as
            those in the illustration? Can an institution find, retroactively,
            that some other consumer compliance violation will affect its CRA
            performance? What state laws will also affect CRA and how is an institution
            supposed to know (the Proposal says state laws will affect CRA “if
            applicable”)? These are but a few of the serious questions that are raised by
            the Proposal. We doubt that it is the direction the Agencies wish
            to go and we respectfully request that this portion of the Proposal
            be reconsidered.  If the Agencies choose
              to go forward notwithstanding these objections, it is critical
              that the consideration of illegal activities be more
            limited and defined. Compliance management and CRA management (merged
            as they will inevitably become) will be impossible without limits
            such as the following: 
 • The
                violations that are considered must be restricted to the activities
                of the financial institution
                itself or an affiliate
              whose loans are
                being considered; • They must have occurred during the period of time under consideration;
 • They must have occurred within the assessment area(s) of the financial
                institution.
 • Mere evidence of violations should not be sufficient, but rather
                a determination made pursuant to an examination; and
 • 
                There should be a finding that a pattern or practice of such violations
                has occurred sufficient to affect the institution’s overall
                impact on the community it serves.
  Public Performance Evaluations In order to make
              it “easier for the public to evaluate the
            lending by individual institutions,” the Agencies propose to
            draw new distinctions in the public performance evaluations. These
            include identifying those loans that are subject to HOEPA, those
            that are over the reporting threshold for rate spread information
            under HMDA, as revised, and those that are purchased versus those
            that are originated by the institution. The Agencies seek comment
            on the extent to which these enhancements of the public information
            will make the evaluations more effective in communicating to the
            public an institution’s contribution to meeting community credit
            needs.  We oppose this change because we believe that the distinctions being
            drawn create the impression that the Agencies view purchased loans,
            HOEPA loans, and loans over the HMDA threshold for data spread reporting
            to be in some way less favorable than others. Although the Proposal would not give less weight to these types of
            loans, we believe such a change would inevitably follow, as the public
            display of the distinction would lead to a difference in perception
            and ultimately a difference in treatment.
 Purchased loans
              are as valuable in their own way as originated loans. As we stated
              in
              our comments on the ANPR, where the Agencies first
            suggested that purchased loans might be given less weight: “Not
            only is there no statutory basis for making this distinction, but
            we maintain that the public benefits of purchasing loans may be under-appreciated.
            There is little doubt that the availability of capital for secondary
            market purchases of mortgages has vastly enhanced their availability
            and affordability.” By distinguishing in the public performance
            evaluation between originations and purchases, the Agencies would
            be implying—without actually stating—that the distinction
            is significant to the manner in which CRA is or ought to be evaluated.
            We can see no other reason to make a point of separating the categories
            in the public evaluation. HOEPA loans and loans over the new HMDA threshold are becoming de
            facto measures of subprime lending, in the absence of other clear
            delineations. Subprime lending, in turn, is often mistakenly treated
            as a surrogate for predatory or abusive lending. They are both merely
            categories of loans that meet a threshold test based on pricing,
            which is tied to risk. By drawing distinctions in the public evaluation,
            we believe the Agencies would only be encouraging this mistaken characterization
            and therefore a lesser CRA weighting, either objective or subjective,
            of this category of loans. The data are already available as part
            of HMDA reporting, and to break them out here as well is to suggest
            falsely that there is some significance to the information for CRA
            purposes.  Review of Interagency Guidance Specific places in the regulations where the Agencies indicate they
            may undertake additional review of the interagency guidance include: --How qualitative considerations should be employed and balanced
            against quantitative measures.--Clarifying that the Investment Test is not intended to be a source
            of pressure on institutions to make imprudent equity investments.
            Such guidance may also discuss (1) when community development activities
            outside of assessment areas can be weighted as heavily as activities
            inside of assessment areas; (2) that the criteria of “innovative” and “complex” are
            not ends in themselves, but means to the end of encouraging an institution
            to respond to community credit needs; (3) the weight to be given
            to investments from past examination periods, to commitments for
            future investments, and to grants; and (4) how an institution may
            demonstrate that an activity’s “primary purpose” is
            to serve low- and moderate-income people.
 --The appropriate weight to be given to brick and mortar versus alternative
            delivery systems in the Service Test.
 --The appropriate treatment of assessment areas, particularly for
            nontraditional institutions.
 Many of these
              are areas we have encouraged the Agencies to address further in
              the context of the examination guidance. CBA and the CBA
            Community Reinvestment Committee would be very pleased to work with
            the Agencies as they consider these issues. As we have stated before,
            we believe that industry should be more involved in providing technical
            advice and support as the Agencies develop the guidelines that will
            become part of the examination process. Thank you once again for the opportunity to present our views. If
            you have any questions or would like additional comment on any of
            these issues, please do not hesitate to contact us.
 Very truly yours,
 Steven I. ZeiselSenior Counsel
 Consumer Bankers Association
 
 ______________________________________
 
 1 The Consumer Bankers Association is the recognized
            voice on retail banking issues in the nation's capital. Member institutions
            are the leaders in consumer financial services, including auto finance,
            home equity lending, card products, education loans, small business
            services, community development, investments, deposits and delivery.
            CBA was founded in 1919 and provides leadership, education, research
            and federal representation on retail banking issues such as privacy,
            fair lending, and consumer protection legislation/regulation. CBA
            members include most of the nation's largest bank holding companies
            as well as regional and super community banks that collectively hold
            two-thirds
 of the industry's total assets.
 
 2 It is particularly hard for us to understand why violations
of RESPA’s section 8 and the TILA right of rescission were sufficiently
relevant to CRA
or “predatory lending” to be chosen for inclusion in the short list
that will affect CRA. Since these are intended to be representative examples
of violations that would be of concern, it would be helpful to understand what
they have in common and what bearing they have on  lender’s efforts to
meet community credit needs.
 
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