Skip to main content
U.S. flag
An official website of the United States government
Dot gov
The .gov means it’s official. 
Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.
Https
The site is secure. 
The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.
Federal Register Publications

FDIC Federal Register Citations



Home > Regulation & Examinations > Laws & Regulations > FDIC Federal Register Citations




FDIC Federal Register Citations

[Federal Register: May 16, 2006 (Volume 71, Number 94)]

[Notices]

[Page 28326-28334]

From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]

[DOCID:fr16my06-76]

=======================================================================

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

[Docket No. 06-06]

Office of Thrift Supervision

[No. 2006-20]

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

[Docket No. OP-1254]

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION

[Release No. 34-53773; File No. S7-08-06]

Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Elevated Risk

Complex Structured Finance Activities

AGENCIES: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Treasury (OCC);

Office of Thrift Supervision, Treasury (OTS); Board of Governors of the

Federal Reserve System (Board); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

(FDIC); and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (collectively, the

Agencies).

ACTION: Notice of revised interagency statement with request for public

comment.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: On May 19, 2004, the Agencies issued and requested comment on

a proposed Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Complex

Structured Finance Activities (``Initial Statement'') of national

banks, state banks, bank holding companies, Federal and state savings

associations, savings and loan holding companies, U.S. branches and

agencies of foreign banks, and SEC registered broker-dealers and

investment advisers (collectively, ``financial institutions'' or

``institutions''). The Initial Statement described some of the internal

controls and risk management procedures that may help financial

institutions identify, manage, and address the heightened reputational

and legal risks that may arise from certain complex structured finance

transactions (``CSFTs''). After reviewing the comments received on the

Initial Statement, the Agencies are requesting comment on a revised

proposed interagency statement (``Revised Statement''). The Revised

Statement has been modified in numerous respects to address issues and

concerns raised by commenters, clarify the purpose, scope and effect of

the statement, and make the statement more principles-based. These

changes include reorganizing and streamlining the document to reduce

redundancies and to focus the statement on those CSFTs that may pose

heightened levels of legal or reputational risk to the relevant

institution (referred to as ``elevated risk CSFTs''). In addition, the

Agencies have modified the examples of transactions that may present

elevated risk to make these examples more risk-focused, and have

recognized more explicitly that an institution's review and approval

process for elevated risk CSFTs should be commensurate with, and focus

on, the potential risks presented by the transaction to the

institution. As discussed below, the Revised Statement will not affect

or apply to the vast majority of small financial institutions, nor does

it create any private rights of action.

DATES: Comments on the Revised Statement should be received on or

before June 15, 2006.

ADDRESSES:

OCC: You should include OCC and Docket Number 06-06 in your

comment. You may submit comments by any of the following methods:

Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.

Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

OCC Web site: http://www.occ.treas.gov. Click on ``Contact

the OCC,'' scroll down and click on ``Comments on Proposed

Regulations.''

E-mail address: regs.comments@occ.treas.gov.

Fax: (202) 874-4448.

Mail: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 250 E

Street, SW., Mail Stop 1-5, Washington, DC 20219.

Hand Delivery/Courier: 250 E Street, SW., Attn: Public

Information Room, Mail Stop 1-5, Washington, DC 20219.

Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name

(OCC) and docket number or Regulatory Information Number (RIN) for this

notice of proposed rulemaking. In general, OCC will enter all comments

received into the docket without change, including any business or

personal information that you provide.

You may review comments and other related materials by any of the

following methods:

Viewing Comments Personally: You may personally inspect

and photocopy comments at the OCC's Public Information Room, 250 E

Street, SW., Washington, DC. You can make an appointment to inspect

comments by calling (202) 874-5043.

Viewing Comments Electronically: You may request e-mail or

CD-ROM copies of comments that the OCC has received by contacting the

OCC's Public Information Room at: regs.comments@occ.treas.gov.

Docket: You may also request available background

documents and project summaries using the methods described above.

OTS: You may submit comments, identified by No. 2006-20 by any of

the following methods:

Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.

Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

E-mail: regs.comments@ots.treas.gov. Please include No.

2006-20 in the subject line of the message, and include your name and

telephone number in the message.

Fax: (202) 906-6518.

Mail: Regulation Comments, Chief Counsel's Office, Office

of Thrift Supervision, 1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552,

Attention: No. 2006-20.

Hand Delivery/Courier: Guard's Desk, East Lobby Entrance,

1700 G Street, NW., from 9 a.m. to 4 p.m. on business days, Attention:

Regulation Comments, Chief Counsel's Office, Attention: No. 2006-20.

Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name

and document number. All comments received will be posted without

change to http://www.ots.treas.gov/pagehtml.cfm?catNumber=67&an=1,

including any personal information provided.

Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or

comments received, go to http://www.ots.treas.gov/pagehtml.cfm?catNumber=67&an=1.

In addition, you may inspect comments

at the Public Reading Room, 1700 G Street, NW., by appointment. To make

an appointment for access, call (202) 906-5922, send an e-mail to

public.info@ots.treas.gov, or send a facsimile transmission to (202)

906-7755. (Prior notice identifying the materials you will be

requesting will assist us in serving you.) We schedule appointments on

business days between 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. In most cases, appointments

will be available the next business day following the date we receive a

request.

Board: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. OP-1254,

by any of the following methods:

Board's Web site: http://www.federalreserve.gov Follow the instructions for submitting comments at http://.

http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm.

Federal eRulemaking Portal: http//http://www.regulations.gov.

Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

[[Page 28327]]

E-mail: regs.comments@federalreserve.gov. Include docket

number in the subject line of the message.

Fax: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.

Mail: Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary, Board of Governors

of the Federal Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue,

NW., Washington, DC 20551.

All public comments are available from the Board's Web site at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as

submitted, unless modified for technical reasons. Accordingly, your

comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact

information. Public comments also may be viewed electronically or in

paper form in Room MP-500 of the Board's Martin Building (C and 20th

Streets, NW.) between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. on weekdays.

FDIC: Written comments should be addressed to Robert E. Feldman,

Executive Secretary, Attention: Comments/OES, Federal Deposit Insurance

Corporation, 550 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429. Comments may

be hand delivered to the guard station at the rear of the 550 17th

Street Building (located on F Street), on business days between 7 a.m.

and 5 p.m. (Fax number: (202) 898-3838; Internet address:

comments@fdic.gov.) Comments may be inspected and photocopied in the

FDIC Public Information Center, Room 100, 801 17th Street, NW.,

Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. on business days.

SEC: Comments may be submitted by any of the following methods:

Electronic Comments

Use the Commission's Internet comment form (http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy.shtml.

;) or Send an e-mail to rule-comments@sec.gov. Please include

File Number S7-08-06 on the subject line.

Paper Comments

Send paper comments in triplicate to Nancy M. Morris,

Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F Street, NE.,

Washington, DC 20549-1090.

All submissions should refer to File Number S7-08-06. This file number

should be included on the subject line if e-mail is used. To help us

process and review your comments more efficiently, please use only one

method. The Commission will post all comments on the Commission's

Internet Web site (http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy.shtml). Comments are

also available for public inspection and copying in the Commission's

Public Reference Room, 100 F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549. All

comments received will be posted without change; we do not edit

personal identifying information from submissions. You should submit

only information that you wish to make available publicly.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

OCC: Kathryn E. Dick, Deputy Comptroller, Credit and Market Risk,

(202) 874-4660; Grace E. Dailey, Deputy Comptroller, Large Bank

Supervision, (202) 874-4610; or Ellen Broadman, Director, Securities

and Corporate Practices Division, (202) 874-5210, Office of the

Comptroller of the Currency, 250 E Street, SW., Washington, DC 20219.

OTS: Fred J. Phillips-Patrick, Director, Credit Policy,

Examinations and Supervision Policy, (202) 906-7295; Deborah S. Merkle,

Project Manager, Credit Policy, Examinations and Supervision Policy,

(202) 906-5688; or David A. Permut, Senior Attorney, Business

Transactions Division, (202) 906-7505, Office of Thrift Supervision,

1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552.

Board: Sabeth I. Siddique, Assistant Director, (202) 452-3861,

Virginia Gibbs, Senior Supervisory Financial Analyst, (202) 452-2521,

Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation; or Kieran J. Fallon,

Assistant General Counsel, (202) 452-5270, Anne B. Zorc, Attorney,

(202) 452-3876, Legal Division, Board of Governors of the Federal

Reserve System, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue, NW., Washington,

DC 20551. Users of Telecommunication Device for Deaf (TTD) only, call

(202) 263-4869.

FDIC: Jason C. Cave, Associate Director, (202) 898-3548; Division

of Supervision and Consumer Protection; or Mark G. Flanigan, Counsel,

Supervision and Legislation Branch, Legal Division, (202) 898-7426,

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street, NW.,

Washington, DC 20429.

SEC: Mary Ann Gadziala, Associate Director, Office of Compliance

Inspections and Examinations, (202) 551-6207; Catherine McGuire, Chief

Counsel, Linda Stamp Sundberg, Senior Special Counsel (Banking and

Derivatives), or Randall W. Roy, Branch Chief, Division of Market

Regulation, (202) 551-5550, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100 F

Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

Financial markets have grown rapidly over the past decade, and

innovations in financial instruments have facilitated the structuring

of cash flows and allocation of risk among creditors, borrowers and

investors in more efficient ways. Financial derivatives for market and

credit risk, asset-backed securities with customized cash flow

features, specialized financial conduits that manage pools of assets,

and other types of structured finance transactions serve important

purposes, such as diversifying risks, allocating cash flows, and

reducing cost of capital. As a result, structured finance transactions,

including the more complex variations of these transactions, now are an

essential part of U.S. and international capital markets.

When a financial institution participates in a CSFT, it bears the

usual market, credit, and operational risks associated with the

transaction. In some circumstances, a financial institution also may

face heightened legal or reputational risks due to its involvement in a

CSFT. For example, a financial institution involved in a CSFT may face

heightened risk if the customer's regulatory, tax or accounting

treatment for the CSFT, or disclosures concerning the CSFT in its

public filings or financial statements, do not comply with applicable

laws, regulations or accounting principles.

In some cases, certain CSFTs appear to have been used in illegal

schemes that misrepresented the financial condition of public companies

to investors and regulatory authorities. Those cases highlight the

substantial legal and reputational risks that financial institutions

may face when they participate in a CSFT that is used by the

institution's customer to circumvent regulatory or financial reporting

requirements or further other illegal behavior.\1\ After conducting

investigations, the OCC, Federal Reserve System and the SEC took strong

and coordinated civil and administrative enforcement actions against

certain financial institutions that engaged in CSFTs that appeared to

have been designed or used to shield their customers' true financial

health from the public. These actions involved significant financial

penalties on the institutions and required the institutions to take

several measures to strengthen their risk management

[[Page 28328]]

procedures for CSFTs.\2\ The complex structured finance relationships

involving these financial institutions also sparked an investigation by

the Permanent Subcommittee on Governmental Affairs of the United States

Senate,\3\ as well as numerous lawsuits by private litigants.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\1\ For a memorandum on the potential liability of a financial

institution for securities laws violations arising from

participation in a CSFT, see Letter from Annette L. Nazareth,

Director, Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange

Commission, to Richard Spillenkothen and Douglas W. Roeder, dated

December 4, 2003 (available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2004/ and http://www.occ.treas.gov).

\2\ See, e.g. In the Matter of Citigroup, Inc., Securities

Exchange Act Release No. 48230 (July 28, 2003), Written Agreement by

and between Citibank, N.A. and the Office of the Comptroller of the

Currency, No. 2003-77 (July 28, 2003) (pertaining to transactions

entered into by Citibank, N.A. with Enron Corp.), and Written

Agreement by and between Citigroup, Inc. and the Federal Reserve

Bank of New York, dated July 28, 2003 (pertaining to transactions

involving Citigroup Inc. and its subsidiaries and Enron Corp. and

Dynegy Inc.); SEC v. J.P. Morgan Chase, SEC Litigation Release No.

18252 (July 28, 2003) and Written Agreement by and among J.P. Morgan

Chase & Co., the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and the New York

State Banking Department, dated July 28, 2003 (pertaining to

transactions involving J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and its subsidiaries

and Enron Corp.).

\3\ See Fishtail, Bacchus, Sundance, and Slapshot: Four Enron

Transactions Funded and Facilitated by U.S. Financial Institutions,

Report Prepared by the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations, Comm.

on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, S. Rpt. 107-82

(2003).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Following these investigations, the OCC, Board and SEC also

conducted special reviews of several large banking and securities firms

that are significant participants in the market for CSFTs. These

reviews were designed to evaluate the new product approval, transaction

approval, and other internal controls and processes used by these

institutions to identify and manage the legal, reputational and other

risks associated with CSFTs. These assessments indicated that many of

the large financial institutions engaged in CSFTs already had taken

meaningful steps to improve their control infrastructure relating to

CSFTs. The Agencies also focused attention on the complex structured

finance activities of financial institutions in the normal course of

the supervisory process.

II. Initial Statement

To further assist financial institutions in identifying, managing,

and addressing the risks that may be associated with CSFTs, the

Agencies developed and requested public comment on the Initial

Statement.\4\ As a general matter, the Initial Statement provided that

financial institutions engaged in CSFTs should have and maintain a

comprehensive set of formal, firm-wide policies and procedures that are

designed to allow the institution to identify, document, evaluate, and

control the full range of credit, market, operational, legal, and

reputational risks that may arise from CSFTs. The Initial Statement

also described the types of policies and procedures that financial

institutions should have for CSFTs in the following specific areas: (1)

Transaction approval; (2) approval of new complex structured finance

products; (3) identification and management of the potential

reputational and legal risk associated with CSFTs; (4) review of the

customer's proposed accounting and disclosures for CSFTs; (5)

documentation of CSFTs; (6) management reporting for CSFTs; (7)

independent monitoring and analysis of the institution's compliance

with its internal policies regarding CSFTs; (8) role of internal audit;

and (9) training of personnel involved in CSFTs.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\4\ See 69 FR 28980, May 19, 2004.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Among other things, the Initial Statement provided that financial

institutions should establish a clear process for identifying those

CSFTs that may create heightened legal or reputational risk for the

institution, and included a list of transaction characteristics that

may indicate that a CSFT (or series of CSFTs) creates elevated levels

of legal or reputational risk for the institution. The Initial

Statement also provided that an institution should ensure that

transactions identified as being elevated risk CSFTs are thoroughly

reviewed by the institution's control functions and management during

the institution's transaction or new product approval processes. As

part of this review, the Initial Statement indicated that the

institution should obtain and document complete and accurate

information about the customer's business objectives for entering into

the transaction, as well as about the customer's proposed accounting

treatment and financial disclosures relating to the transaction.

III. Overview of Comments

The Agencies collectively received comments on the Initial

Statement from more than 40 persons, although many commenters submitted

multiple comments or submitted identical comments to multiple Agencies.

Commenters included banking organizations, trade associations,

investment banks, consulting firms, public accounting firms, law firms,

an association of state officials, and individuals. In addition to

submitting written comments, some commenters also met with Agency

representatives to discuss their views of the Initial Statement.

Commenters generally supported the Agencies' efforts to describe

the types of risk management procedures and internal controls that may

help financial institutions identify and mitigate the legal and

reputational risks associated with CSFTs. In this regard, many

commenters recognized that financial institutions need a robust risk

management and control framework to help institutions avoid becoming

involved in CSFTs that are used for illegal or abusive purposes and to

manage the risks associated with CSFTs.

Virtually all of the commenters, however, recommended changes to

the Initial Statement. For example, many commenters argued that the

characteristics of CSFTs in general and of elevated risk CSFTs in

particular identified in the Initial Statement were too broad and would

encompass many structured finance products that are not novel or

complex and that do not present heightened legal or reputational risks

for participating financial institutions. These commenters argued, for

example, that the Initial Statement could be read as requiring

financial institutions to identify any structured finance transaction

that involves a special purpose entity (``SPE'') or cross-border

elements as an elevated risk CSFT.

Many commenters also asserted that the internal controls and risk

management processes described in the Initial Statement for CSFTs and

elevated risk CSFTs were overly prescriptive and burdensome. For

example, many commenters expressed concern that the Initial Statement

could be read as requiring a financial institution to conduct a

detailed and extensive pre-transaction review of all CSFTs regardless

of the role that the institution played in the transaction, and

regardless of whether the transaction's characteristics suggested that

it may create significant legal, reputational or other risks for the

institution. Similarly, many commenters argued that the Initial

Statement imposed new and inappropriate obligations on financial

institutions to confirm the validity of a customer's financial

disclosures or accounting or tax treatment for a CSFT, and would

establish new and extensive documentation requirements for CSFTs.

Commenters asserted that, in light of these and other concerns, the

Initial Statement had the potential to increase the legal risks faced

by financial institutions participating in CSFTs. In addition,

commenters argued that the Initial Statement, if implemented, would

disrupt the market for legitimate structured finance products and place

U.S. financial institutions at a competitive disadvantage in the market

for CSFTs both in the United States and abroad.

As a general matter, commenters recommended that the Agencies

modify the Initial Statement to make it more

[[Page 28329]]

principles-based and focused on transactions that may create elevated

risks for a participating financial institution. For example, many

commenters recommended that the Agencies modify the list of

characteristics of elevated risk CSFTs to focus on factors that are

likely indicators that a transaction may, in fact, create heightened

legal or reputational risks for a participating institution. In

addition, commenters recommended that the Agencies provide financial

institutions greater flexibility to design internal controls and risk

management procedures for CSFTs that are tailored to the size,

activities and general internal control framework of the institution.

Finally, many commenters recommended that the Agencies republish a

revised statement for a new round of public comment.

IV. Overview of Revised Statement

The Agencies have substantially revised the Initial Statement in

light of the comments. In particular, the Revised Statement has been

shortened and reorganized to be more principles-based and to focus on

elevated risk CSFTs. Because these revisions are substantial, and the

Revised Statement is an important explanation of the key principles and

best practices governing CSFT activities, the Agencies invite public

comment on the Revised Statement.

The Agencies continue to believe that it is important for a

financial institution engaged in CSFTs to have policies and procedures

that are designed to allow the institution to effectively manage and

address the risks associated with its CSFT activities. These policies

and procedures should, among other things, be designed to allow the

institution to identify during its transaction and new product approval

processes those CSFTs that may present elevated legal or reputational

risks to the institution. In addition, an institution's policies and

procedures should provide that CSFTs identified as potentially having

elevated legal or reputational risks are reviewed by appropriate levels

of control and management personnel at the institution, including

personnel from control areas that are independent of the business

line(s) involved in the transaction. The level and amount of due

diligence conducted by an institution for an elevated risk CSFT should

be commensurate with the transaction's potential risk to the

institution. In conducting this due diligence, the institution may find

it useful or necessary to obtain additional information from the

customer or to obtain specialized advice from qualified in-house or

outside accounting, tax, legal or other professionals.

If, after evaluating an elevated risk CSFT, a financial institution

determines that its participation in the CSFT would create significant

legal or reputational risks for the institution, the financial

institution should take appropriate steps to manage and address these

risks. Such steps may include modifying the transaction or conditioning

the institution's participation in the transaction upon the receipt of

representations or assurances from the customer that reasonably address

the heightened risks presented by the transaction. A financial

institution should decline to participate in an elevated risk CSFT if,

after conducting appropriate due diligence and taking appropriate steps

to address the risks from the transaction, the institution determines

that the transaction presents unacceptable risks to the institution or

would result in a violation of applicable laws, regulations or

accounting principles.

With these broad principles in mind, the Agencies have made a

number of changes to the Initial Statement to address the issues and

concerns raised by commenters, to clarify the purpose, scope and effect

of the Revised Statement, and to make the document more risk-focused.

The Agencies believe that, with these changes, the Revised Statement

promotes sound risk management principles while providing an individual

financial institution greater flexibility to develop implementing

policies, procedures and systems that are appropriately tailored to the

nature, scope, complexity and risks of its CSFT activities and to the

institution's general internal control framework. In particular, the

Agencies have, among other things:

Focused the statement more clearly on those CSFTs that may

present heightened legal or reputational risks to a participating

institution;

Clarified that the statement does not apply to structured

finance transactions, such as standard public mortgage-backed

securities transactions, that are familiar to participants in the

financial markets and have well-established track records and, for this

reason, will not affect or apply to the vast majority of small

financial institutions;

Modified the examples of CSFTs that may warrant additional

scrutiny by an institution to focus on transactions that are more

likely to present elevated levels of legal or reputational risk to an

institution (e.g., transactions that raise concerns that the client

will report or disclose the transaction in its public filings or

financial statements in a manner that is materially misleading);

Clarified that the due diligence conducted by a financial

institution for an elevated risk CSFT should focus on those issues

identified by the institution as potentially creating heightened levels

of legal or reputational risk for the institution;

Recognized that the role a financial institution plays in

a CSFT may affect both the amount of information it has concerning the

transaction and the level of legal or reputational risks presented by

the transaction to the institution;

Streamlined and modified the documentation and general

control portions of the statement to focus on the proper goals of an

institution s policies and procedures in these areas; and

Provided that a financial institution operating in foreign

jurisdictions may tailor its policies and procedures as appropriate to

account for, and comply with, the applicable laws, regulations and

standards of those foreign jurisdictions.

Because many of the core elements of an effective control

infrastructure are the same regardless of the business line involved,

the Revised Statement continues to draw heavily on controls and

procedures that the Agencies previously have found to be effective in

assisting a financial institution to manage and control risks and

identifies ways in which these controls and procedures can be applied

effectively to elevated risk CSFTs. Moreover, as noted above, many of

the large financial institutions that are actively involved in CSFT-

related activities have taken steps in recent years to bolster and

improve their risk management and internal control processes for CSFTs.

Based on the Agencies' supervisory experience, the Agencies believe

that the Revised Statement generally is consistent with the controls

and processes used by large financial institutions to manage the risks

arising from their CSFT activities.

The Agencies propose to adopt the Revised Statement as supervisory

guidance (in the case of the Federal banking agencies) or a policy

statement (in the case of the SEC) and to use the Revised Statement in

reviewing the internal controls and risk management systems of those

financial institutions that are engaged in CSFTs as part of the

Agencies' supervisory processes. Accordingly, the Revised Statement

does not create any private rights of action, nor does it alter or

expand the legal duties and obligations that a financial institution

may have to a customer, its shareholders or other third parties under

applicable law. The

[[Page 28330]]

Agencies have added a statement to this effect in the Revised

Statement.

The Agencies request comment on all aspects of the Revised

Statement.

V. Paperwork Reduction Act

The Agencies have determined that certain provisions of the Revised

Statement contain collection of information requirements as defined in

the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) (PRA). An

Agency may not conduct or sponsor, and a respondent is not required to

respond to, an information collection unless it displays a currently

valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number.

OMB has reviewed and approved the proposed information collections

for the FDIC, OTS, and OCC; the SEC is submitting their proposed

information collection to OMB for review and approval; and the Board

has reviewed the Revised Statement under the authority delegated to the

Board by OMB (5 CFR 1320, appendix A.1).

OMB control numbers:

OCC: 1557-0229.

OTS: 1550-0111.

FRB: 7100-0311.

FDIC: 3064-0148.

SEC: 3235-0xxx (to be assigned).

Comment was requested on the proposed information collections

contained in the Initial Statement published for comment on May 19,

2004. As discussed above, many commenters asserted that the Initial

Statement in general, and its documentation provisions in particular,

were unduly burdensome and prescriptive. For this reason, some

commenters asserted that the estimates of the burden (100 hours per

respondent) were too low.

In light of this and the modifications made to the Initial

Statement, the Agencies have reconsidered the burden estimates

previously published and are once again requesting comment before

finalizing this statement. In response to the comments, the Agencies

have made significant modifications to make the Revised Statement more

principles-based and risk-focused than the Initial Statement, and to

provide an individual institution greater flexibility in developing

policies, procedures, and systems that are appropriate and tailored to

the nature of the institution's CSFT activities and general internal

control framework. The Agencies believe that the information collection

requirements contained in the Revised Statement, as discussed earlier

in the notice, are generally consistent with the types of policies and

procedures that the large financial institutions actively involved in

CSFTs have already developed and implemented as a matter of usual and

customary business practices. Therefore, the information collections

contained in the Revised Statement are significantly less burdensome

than those estimated in the Initial Statement and, thus, the Agencies

have revised the hourly estimate down from 100 hours per response to an

average of 25 hours per response.

New Estimates

OCC

Number of Respondents: 21.

Estimated Time per Response: 25 hours.

Total Estimated Annual Burden: 525 hours.

OTS

Number of Respondents: 5.

Estimated Time per Response: 25 hours.

Total Estimated Annual Burden: 125 hours.

Board

Number of Respondents: 20.

Estimated Time per Response: 25 hours.

Total Estimated Annual Burden: 500 hours.

FDIC

Number of Respondents: 5.

Estimated Time per Response: 25 hours.

Total Estimated Annual Burden: 125 hours.

SEC

Number of Respondents: 5.

Estimated Time per Response: 25 hours.

Total Estimated Annual Burden: 125 hours.

Comments continue to be invited on:

(a) Whether the collections of information contained in the Revised

Statement are necessary for the proper performance of the Agencies'

functions, including whether the information has practical utility;

(b) The accuracy of the estimates of the burden of the information

collection, including the validity of the methodology and assumptions

used;

(c) Ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the

information to be collected;

(d) Ways to minimize the burden of the information collection on

respondents, including through the use of automated collection

techniques or other forms of information technology; and

(e) Estimates of capital or start up costs and costs of operation,

maintenance, and purchase of services to provide information.

Comments on the information collections contained in the Revised

Statement should be addressed to:

OCC: You should direct your comments to:

Communications Division, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,

Public Information Room, Mailstop 1-5, Attention: 1557-0229, 250 E

Street, SW., Washington, DC 20219. In addition, comments may be sent by

fax to (202) 874-4448, or by electronic mail to

regs.comments@occ.treas.gov. You can inspect and photocopy the comments

at the OCC's Public Information Room, 250 E Street, SW., Washington, DC

20219. You can make an appointment to inspect the comments by calling

(202) 874-5043. Additionally, you should send a copy of your comments

to OCC Desk Officer, 1557-0229, by mail to U.S. Office of Management

and Budget, 725, 17th Street, NW., 10235, Washington, DC

20503, or by fax to (202) 395-6974.

You can request additional information or a copy of the collection

from Mary Gottlieb, OCC Clearance Officer, or Camille Dickerson, (202)

874-5090, Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division, Office of the

Comptroller of the Currency, 250 E Street, SW., Washington, DC 20219.

OTS: Information Collection Comments, Chief Counsel's Office,

Office of Thrift Supervision, 1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552;

send a facsimile transmission to (202) 906-6518; or send an e-mail to

infocollection.comments@ots.treas.gov. OTS will post comments and the

related index on the OTS Internet site at http://www.ots.treas.gov. In

addition, interested persons may inspect the comments at the Public

Reading Room, 1700 G Street, NW., by appointment. To make an

appointment, call (202) 906-5922, send an e-mail to

public.info@ots.treas.gov, or send a facsimile transmission to (202)

906-7755.

To obtain a copy of the submission to OMB, contact Marilyn K.

Burton at marilyn.burton@ots.treas.gov, (202) 906-6467, or fax number

(202) 906-6518, Chief Counsel's Office, Office of Thrift Supervision,

1700 G Street, NW., Washington, DC 20552.

Board: You may submit comments, identified by Docket No. OP-1254,

by any of the following methods:

Agency Web site: http://www.federalreserve.gov. Follow the

instructions for submitting comments at

[[Page 28331]]

http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm Federal eRulemaking Portal: http://www.regulations.gov.

http://www.regulations.gov. .

Follow the instructions for submitting comments.

E-mail: regs.comments@federalreserve.gov. Include docket

number in the subject line of the message.

Fax: (202) 452-3819 or (202) 452-3102.

Mail: Michelle Long, Federal Reserve Board Clearance

Officer (202) 452-3829, Division of Research and Statistics, Board of

Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington, DC 20551.

Telecommunications Device for the Deaf (TDD) users may contact (202)

263-4869, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Washington,

DC 20551.

All public comments are available from the Board's Web site at

http://www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/foia/ProposedRegs.cfm as

submitted, unless modified for technical reasons. Accordingly, your

comments will not be edited to remove any identifying or contact

information. Public comments may also be viewed electronically or in

paper in Room MP-500 of the Board's Martin Building (20th and C

Streets, NW.) between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. on weekdays.

FDIC: Interested parties are invited to submit written comments to

the FDIC concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act implications of this

proposal. Such comments should refer to ``Complex Structured Financial

Transactions, 3064-0148.'' Comments may be submitted by any of the

following methods:

http://www.FDIC.gov/regulations/laws/federal/propose.html.. E-mail: comments@FDIC.gov. Include Complex

Structured Financial Transactions, 3064-0148 in the subject line of the message.

Mail: Steven F. Hanft (202) 898-3907, Federal Deposit

Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20429.

Hand Delivery: Comments may be hand-delivered to the guard

station at the rear of the 17th Street Building (located on F Street),

on business days between 7 a.m. and 5 p.m.

SEC: You should direct your comments to: Office of Management and

Budget, Attention Desk Officer of the Securities and Exchange

Commission, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Room 10102,

New Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20503, with a copy sent

to Nancy M. Morris, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, 100

F Street, NE., Washington, DC 20549-1090 with reference to File No. S7-

08-06.

The proposed Revised Statement follows:

Interagency Statement on Sound Practices Concerning Elevated Risk

Complex Structured Finance Activities

I. Introduction

Financial markets have grown rapidly over the past decade, and

innovations in financial instruments have facilitated the structuring

of cash flows and allocation of risk among creditors, borrowers and

investors in more efficient ways. Financial derivatives for market and

credit risk, asset-backed securities with customized cash flow

features, specialized financial conduits that manage pools of assets

and other types of structured finance transactions serve important

business purposes, such as diversifying risks, allocating cash flows,

and reducing cost of capital. As a result, structured finance

transactions now are an essential part of U.S. and international

capital markets. Financial institutions have played and continue to

play an active and important role in the development of structured

finance products and markets, including the market for the more complex

variations of structured finance products.

When a financial institution participates in a complex structured

finance transaction (``CSFT''), it bears the usual market, credit, and

operational risks associated with the transaction. In some

circumstances, a financial institution also may face heightened legal

or reputational risks due to its involvement in a CSFT. For example, in

some circumstances, a financial institution may face heightened legal

or reputational risk if a customer's regulatory, tax or accounting

treatment for a CSFT, or disclosures concerning the CSFT in its public

filings or financial statements, do not comply with applicable laws,

regulations or accounting principles. Indeed, some financial

institutions have incurred significant legal costs and liability and

suffered reputational harm due to their role in certain transactions

that were used by customers to misrepresent the customers' financial

condition to investors, regulatory authorities or others. Reputational

risk poses a significant threat to financial institutions because the

nature of their business requires them to maintain the confidence of

customers, creditors and the general marketplace.

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Office of Thrift

Supervision, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Securities and Exchange

Commission (the regulatory Agencies) have long expected financial

institutions to develop and maintain robust control infrastructures

that enable them to identify, evaluate and address the risks associated

with their business activities. Financial institutions also must

conduct their activities in accordance with applicable statutes and

regulations.

II. Scope and Purpose of Statement

The regulatory Agencies are issuing this Statement to describe the

types of risk management principles that we believe may help a

financial institution to identify CSFTs that may pose heightened legal

or reputational risks to the institution (``elevated risk CSFTs'') and

to evaluate, manage and address these risks within the institution's

internal control framework.\5\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\5\ As used in this Statement, the term ``financial

institution'' or ``institution'' refers to national banks in the

case of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency; federal and

state savings associations and savings and loan holding companies in

the case of the Office of Thrift Supervision; state member banks and

bank holding companies (other than foreign banking organizations) in

the case of the Federal Reserve Board; state nonmember banks in the

case of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation; and registered

broker-dealers and investment advisers in the case of the Securities

and Exchange Commission. The U.S. branches and agencies of foreign

banks supervised by the Office of the Comptroller, the Federal

Reserve Board and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation also are

considered to be financial institutions for purposes of this

Statement.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Structured finance transactions encompass a broad array of products

with varying levels of complexity. Most structured finance

transactions, such as standard public mortgage-backed securities

transactions, public securitizations of retail credit cards, asset-

backed commercial paper conduit transactions, and hedging-type

transactions involving ``plain vanilla'' derivatives and collateralized

loan obligations, are familiar to participants in the financial

markets, and these vehicles have a well-established track record. These

transactions typically would not be considered CSFTs for the purpose of

this Statement.

Because this Statement focuses on sound practices related to CSFTs

that may create heightened legal or reputational risks--transactions

that typically are conducted by a limited number of large financial

institutions--it will not affect or apply to the vast majority of

financial institutions, including most small institutions. As in all

cases, a financial institution should tailor its internal controls so

that they are appropriate in light of the nature, scope, complexity and

risks of its

[[Page 28332]]

activities. Thus, for example, an institution that is actively involved

in structuring and offering CSFTs that may create heightened legal or

reputational risk for the institution should have a more formalized and

detailed control framework than an institution that participates in

these types of transactions less frequently. The internal controls and

procedures discussed in this Statement are not all inclusive, and, in

appropriate circumstances, an institution may find that other controls,

policies, or procedures are appropriate in light of its particular CSFT

activities.

Because many of the core elements of an effective control

infrastructure are the same regardless of the business line involved,

this Statement draws heavily on controls and procedures that the

Agencies previously have found to be effective in assisting a financial

institution to manage and control risks and identifies ways in which

these controls and procedures can be effectively applied to elevated

risk CSFTs. Although this Statement highlights some of the most

significant risks associated with elevated risk CSFTs, it is not

intended to present a full exposition of all risks associated with

these transactions. Financial institutions are encouraged to refer to

other supervisory guidance prepared by the Agencies for further

information concerning market, credit, operational, legal and

reputational risks as well as internal audit and other appropriate

internal controls.

This Statement does not create any private rights of action, and

does not alter or expand the legal duties and obligations that a

financial institution may have to a customer, its shareholders or other

third parties under applicable law. At the same time, adherence to the

principles discussed in this Statement would not necessarily insulate a

financial institution from regulatory action or any liability the

institution may have to third parties under applicable law.

III. Identification and Review of Elevated Risk Complex Structured

Finance Transactions

A financial institution that engages in CSFTs should maintain a set

of formal, firm-wide policies and procedures that are designed to allow

the institution to identify, evaluate, assess, document, and control

the full range of credit, market, operational, legal and reputational

risks associated with these transactions. These policies may be

developed specifically for CSFTs, or included in the set of broader

policies governing the institution generally. A financial institution

operating in foreign jurisdictions may tailor its policies and

procedures as appropriate to account for, and comply with, the

applicable laws, regulations and standards of those jurisdictions.\6\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\6\ In the case of U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks,

the institution should coordinate these policies with the foreign

bank's group-wide policies developed in accordance with the rules of

the foreign bank's home country supervisor. In addition, the U.S.

branches and agencies of foreign banks should implement a control

infrastructure for CSFTs, including management, review and approval

requirements, that is consistent with the institution's overall

corporate and management structure as well as its framework for risk

management and internal controls.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A financial institution's policies and procedures should establish

a clear framework for the review and approval of individual CSFTs.

These policies and procedures should set forth the responsibilities of

the personnel involved in the origination, structuring, trading,

review, approval, documentation, verification, and execution of CSFTs.

Financial institutions may find it helpful to incorporate the review of

new CSFTs into their existing new product policies. In this regard, a

financial institution should define what constitutes a ``new'' complex

structured finance product and establish a control process for the

approval of such new products. In determining whether a CSFT is new, a

financial institution may consider a variety of factors, including

whether it contains structural or pricing variations from existing

products, whether the product is targeted at a new class of customers,

whether it is designed to address a new need of customers, whether it

raises significant new legal, compliance or regulatory issues, and

whether it or the manner in which it would be offered would materially

deviate from standard market practices. An institution's policies

should require new complex structured finance products to receive the

approval of all relevant control areas that are independent of the

profit center before the product is offered to customers.

A. Identifying Elevated Risk CSFTs

As part of its transaction and new product approval controls, a

financial institution should establish and maintain policies,

procedures and systems to identify elevated risk CSFTs. Because of the

potential risks they present to the institution, transactions or new

products identified as elevated risk CSFTs should be subject to

heightened reviews during the institution's transaction or new product

approval processes. Examples of transactions that an institution may

determine warrant this additional scrutiny are those that (either

individually or collectively) appear to the institution during the

ordinary course of its transaction approval or new product approval

process to:

Lack economic substance or business purpose;

Be designed or used primarily for questionable accounting,

regulatory, or tax objectives, particularly when the transactions are

executed at year end or at the end of a reporting period for the

customer;

Raise concerns that the client will report or disclose the

transaction in its public filings or financial statements in a manner

that is materially misleading or inconsistent with the substance of the

transaction or applicable regulatory or accounting requirements;

Involve circular transfers of risk (either between the

financial institution and the customer or between the customer and

other related parties) that lack economic substance or business

purpose;

Involve oral or undocumented agreements that, when taken

into account, would have a material impact on the regulatory, tax, or

accounting treatment of the related transaction, or the client s

disclosure obligations; \7\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\7\ This item is not intended to include traditional, non-

binding ``comfort'' letters or assurances provided to financial

institutions in the loan process where, for example, the parent of a

loan customer states that the customer (i.e., the parent's

subsidiary) is an integral and important part of the parent's

operations.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Have material economic terms that are inconsistent with

market norms (e.g., deep in the money options or historic rate

rollovers); or

Provide the financial institution with compensation that

appears substantially disproportionate to the services provided or

investment made by the financial institution or to the credit, market

or operational risk assumed by the institution.

The examples listed previously are provided for illustrative

purposes only, and the policies and procedures established by financial

institutions may differ in how they seek to identify elevated risk

CSFTs. The goal of each institution's policies and procedures, however,

should remain the same--to identify those CSFTs that warrant additional

scrutiny in the transaction or new product approval process due to

concerns regarding legal or reputational risks.

Financial institutions that structure or market, act as an advisor

to a customer regarding, or otherwise play a substantial role in a

transaction may have more information concerning the

[[Page 28333]]

customer's business purpose for the transaction and any special

accounting, tax or financial disclosure issues raised by the

transaction than institutions that play a more limited role. Thus, the

ability of a financial institution to identify the risks associated

with an elevated risk CSFT may differ depending on its role.

B. Due Diligence, Approval and Documentation Process for Elevated Risk

CSFTs

Having developed a process to identify elevated risk CSFTs, a

financial institution should implement policies and procedures to

conduct a heightened level of due diligence for these transactions. The

financial institution should design these policies and procedures to

allow personnel at an appropriate level to understand and evaluate the

potential legal or reputational risks presented by the transaction to

the institution and to manage and address any heightened legal or

reputational risks ultimately found to exist with the transaction.

Due Diligence. If a CSFT is identified as an elevated risk CSFT,

the institution should carefully evaluate and take appropriate steps to

address the risks presented by the transaction with a particular focus

on those issues identified as potentially creating heightened levels of

legal or reputational risk for the institution. In general, a financial

institution should conduct the level and amount of due diligence for an

elevated risk CSFT that is commensurate with the level of risks

identified. A financial institution that structures or markets an

elevated risk CSFT to a customer, or that acts as an advisor to a

customer or investors concerning an elevated risk CSFT, may have

additional responsibilities under the federal securities laws, the

Internal Revenue Code, state fiduciary laws or other laws or

regulations and, thus, may have greater legal and reputational risk

exposure with respect to an elevated risk CSFT than a financial

institution that acts only as a counterparty for the transaction.

Accordingly, a financial institution may need to exercise a higher

degree of care in conducting its due diligence when the institution

structures or markets an elevated risk CSFT or acts as an advisor

concerning such a transaction than when the institution plays a more

limited role in the transaction.

To appropriately understand and evaluate the potential legal and

reputational risks associated with an elevated risk CSFT that a

financial institution has identified, the institution may find it

useful or necessary to obtain additional information from the customer

or to obtain specialized advice from qualified in-house or outside

accounting, tax, legal, or other professionals. As with any

transaction, an institution should obtain satisfactory responses to its

material questions and concerns prior to consummation of a

transaction.\8\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\8\ Of course, financial institutions also should ensure that

their own accounting for transactions complies with applicable

accounting standards, consistently applied.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In conducting its due diligence for an elevated risk CSFT, a

financial institution should independently analyze the potential risks

to the institution from both the transaction and the institution's

overall relationship with the customer. Institutions should not

conclude that a transaction identified as being an elevated risk CSFT

involves minimal or manageable risks solely because another financial

institution will participate in the transaction or because of the size

or sophistication of the customer or counterparty. Moreover, a

financial institution should carefully consider whether it would be

appropriate to rely on opinions or analyses prepared by or for the

customer concerning any significant accounting, tax or legal issues

associated with an elevated risk CSFT.

Approval Process. A financial institution's policies and procedures

should provide that CSFTs identified as having elevated legal or

reputational risk are reviewed and approved by appropriate levels of

control and management personnel. The designated approval process for

such CSFTs should include representatives from the relevant business

line(s) and/or client management, as well as from appropriate control

areas that are independent of the business line(s) involved in the

transaction. The personnel responsible for approving an elevated risk

CSFT on behalf of a financial institution should have sufficient

experience, training and stature within the organization to evaluate

the legal and reputational risks, as well as the credit, market and

operational risks to the institution.

The institution's control framework should have procedures to

deliver the necessary or appropriate information to the personnel

responsible for reviewing or approving an elevated risk CSFT to allow

them to properly perform their duties. Such information may include,

for example, the material terms of the transaction, a summary of the

institution's relationship with the customer, and a discussion of the

significant legal, reputational, credit, market and operational risks

presented by the transaction.

Some institutions have established a senior management committee

that is designed to involve experienced business executives and senior

representatives from all of the relevant control functions within the

financial institution, including such groups as independent risk

management, accounting, policy, legal, compliance, and financial

control, in the oversight and approval of CSFTs identified as having

elevated risks. While this type of management committee may not be

appropriate for all financial institutions, a financial institution

should establish processes that assist the institution in consistently

managing its elevated risk CSFTs on a firm-wide basis.\9\

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\9\ The control processes that a financial institution

establishes for CSFTs should take account of, and be consistent

with, any informational barriers established by the institution to

manager potential conflicts of interests, insider trading or other

concerns.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

If, after evaluating an elevated risk CSFT, the financial

institution determines that its participation in the CSFT would create

significant legal or reputational risks for the institution, the

institution should take appropriate steps to address those risks. Such

actions may include declining to participate in the transaction, or

conditioning its participation upon the receipt of representations or

assurances from the customer that reasonably address the heightened

legal or reputational risks presented by the transaction. Any

representations or assurances provided by a customer should be obtained

before a transaction is executed and be received from, or approved by,

an appropriate level of the customer's management. A financial

institution should decline to participate in an elevated risk CSFT if,

after conducting appropriate due diligence and taking appropriate steps

to address the risks from the transaction, the institution determines

that the transaction presents unacceptable risk to the institution or

would result in a violation of applicable laws, regulations or

accounting principles.

Documentation. The documentation that financial institutions use to

support CSFTs is often highly customized for individual transactions

and negotiated with the customer. Careful generation, collection and

retention of documents associated with elevated risk CSFTs are

important control mechanisms that may help an institution monitor and

manage the legal, reputational, operational, market, and credit risks

associated with the transaction. In addition, sound

[[Page 28334]]

documentation practices may help reduce unwarranted exposure to the

financial institution's reputation.

A financial institution should create and collect sufficient

documentation to allow the institution to:

Document the material terms of the transaction;

Enforce the material obligations of the counterparties;

Confirm that customers have received any required

disclosures concerning the transaction; and

Verify that the institution s policies and procedures are

being followed and allow the internal audit function to monitor

compliance with those policies and procedures.

When an institution's policies and procedures require an elevated

risk CSFT to be submitted for approval to senior management, the

institution should maintain the transaction-related documentation

provided to senior management as well as other documentation that

reflect management's approval (or disapproval) of the transaction, any

conditions imposed by senior management, and the reasons for such

action. The institution should retain documents created for elevated

risk CSFTs in accordance with its record retention policies and

procedures as well as applicable statutes and regulations.

C. Other Risk Management Principles for Elevated Risk CSFTs

General Business Ethics. The board and senior management of a

financial institution also should establish a ``tone at the top''

through both actions and formalized policies that sends a strong

message throughout the financial institution about the importance of

compliance with the law and overall good business ethics. The board and

senior management should strive to create a firm-wide corporate culture

that is sensitive to ethical or legal issues as well as the potential

risks to the financial institution that may arise from unethical or

illegal behavior. This kind of culture coupled with appropriate

procedures should reinforce business-line ownership of risk

identification, and encourage personnel to move ethical or legal

concerns regarding elevated risk CSFTs to appropriate levels of

management. In appropriate circumstances, financial institutions may

also need to consider implementing mechanisms to protect personnel by

permitting the confidential disclosure of concerns.\10\ As in other

areas of financial institution management, compensation and incentive

plans should be structured, in the context of elevated risk CSFTs, so

that they provide personnel with appropriate incentives to have due

regard for the legal, ethical and reputational risk interests of the

institution.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\10\ The agencies note that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

requires companies listed on a national securities exchange or

inter-dealer quotation system of a national securities association

to establish procedures that enable employees to submit concerns

regarding questionable accounting or auditing matters on a

confidential, anonymous basis. See 15 U.S.C. 78j-1(m).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Monitoring Compliance with Internal Policies and Procedures. The

events of recent years evidence the need for an effective oversight and

review program for elevated risk CSFTs. Financial institutions should

conduct periodic independent reviews of their CSFT activities to verify

that their policies and controls relating to elevated risk CSFTs are

being implemented effectively and that elevated risk CSFTs are

accurately identified and receive proper approvals. Such monitoring may

include more frequent assessments of the risk arising from elevated

risk CSFTs, both individually and within the context of the overall

customer relationship, and the results of this monitoring should be

provided to an appropriate level of management in the financial

institution.

Training. An institution should identify relevant personnel who may

need specialized training regarding CSFTs to be able to effectively

perform their oversight and review responsibilities. Appropriate

training on the financial institution's policies and procedures for

handling elevated risk CSFTs is critical. Financial institution

personnel involved in CSFTs should be familiar with the institution's

policies and procedures concerning elevated risk CSFTs, including the

processes established by the institution for identification and

approval of elevated risk CSFTs and new complex structured finance

products and for the elevation of concerns regarding transactions or

products to appropriate levels of management. Financial institution

personnel should be trained to identify and properly handle elevated

risk CSFTs that may result in a violation of law.

Audit. The internal audit department of any financial institution

is integral to its defense against fraud, unauthorized risk taking and

damage to the financial institution's reputation. The internal audit

department of a financial institution should regularly audit the

financial institution's adherence to its own control procedures

relating to elevated risk CSFTs, and further assess the adequacy of its

policies and procedures related to elevated risk CSFTs. Internal audit

should periodically validate that business lines and individual

employees are complying with the financial institution's standards for

elevated risk CSFTs and appropriately identifying any exceptions. This

validation should include transaction testing for elevated risk CSFTs.

Reporting. A financial institution's policies and procedures should

provide for the appropriate levels of management and the board of

directors to receive sufficient information and reports concerning the

institution's elevated risk CSFTs to perform their oversight functions.

IV. Conclusion

Structured finance products have become an essential and important

part of the U.S. and international capital markets, and financial

institutions have played an important role in the development of

structured finance markets. In some instances, however, CSFTs have been

used to misrepresent a customer's financial condition to investors and

others, and financial institutions involved in these transactions have

sustained significant legal and reputational harm. In light of the

potential legal and reputational risks associated with CSFTs, a

financial institution should have effective risk management and

internal control systems that are designed to allow the institution to

identify elevated risk CSFTs, to evaluate, manage and address the risks

arising from such transactions, and to conduct those activities in

compliance with applicable law.

Dated: May 4, 2006.

John C. Dugan,

Comptroller of the Currency.

Dated: May 8, 2006.

By the Office of Thrift Supervision.

John M. Reich,

Director.

By order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve

System, May 9, 2006.

Jennifer J. Johnson,

Secretary of the Board.

Dated at Washington, DC, the 9th day of May, 2006.

By order of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

Robert E. Feldman,

Executive Secretary.

Dated: May 9, 2006.

By the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Nancy M. Morris,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 06-4510 Filed 5-15-06; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4810-33-P


 


Last Updated 05/16/2006 Regs@fdic.gov

Last Updated: August 4, 2024