via emailAmerica's Community Bankers
November 3, 2003
Public
Information Room
Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency
2520 E Street, SW
Mailstop 1-5
Washington, D.C. 20219
|
Robert E. Feldman
Executive Secretary
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
550 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20429
Attention: Comments/OES |
Ms. Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System
20th Street and Constitution Ave, NW
Washington, D.C. 20551 |
Regulation Comments
Chief Counsel's Office
Office of Thrift Supervision
1700 G. Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20522 |
Re: Risk-Based Capital Guidelines; Implementation of New Basel
Capital Accord
68 FR 45900 (August 4, 2003)
Dear Mesdames and Sirs:
America’s Community Bankers (ACB)1 is pleased to comment
on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) addressing the
implementation in the United States of the new Basel Capital Accord (New
Accord) being developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
at the Bank for International Settlements.2 The New Accord
would replace, for some financial institutions in the United States, the
risk-based capital requirements adopted by the BCBS in 1988.
ACB Position Summary
ACB agrees with the approach of the New Accord in trying to more
closely link minimum capital requirements with an institution’s risk
profile. We believe that the New Accord may offer some institutions the
potential for increased flexibility in determining capital levels, which
could enable certain institutions to deploy capital more efficiently.
However, the objectives of any capital requirement should be to promote
stability by requiring that sufficient capital be available, ensure
competitive equality, and enable interested parties such as banking
supervisors, bank management, and investors to effectively monitor
capital levels and intervene when necessary. ACB does not believe that
the New Accord yet meets these goals and continues to have serious
concerns about the cost and complexity of the New Accord and the ability
of institutions to understand and implement Pillar I and of supervisors
to adequately administer and enforce the minimum capital requirements.
Most importantly, ACB is concerned about the potential of the New
Accord to create competitive inequities since only the largest financial
institutions will have the ability to adopt a more risk-sensitive
capital framework under the proposal. Although there have not been
enough reliable studies conducted to determine the effects of the New
Accord, the studies to date show that the New Accord could result in
significant capital savings for some of the largest banks and savings
associations in the United States and other countries. ACB does not
believe that the New Accord should be implemented in the United States
until more information is gathered about its competitive effects.
ACB believes that the complexity of the New Accord and the
significant obstacles to opting in to benefit from more risk-sensitive
capital requirements are not warranted. While most will agree that the
current risk-based capital requirements are outmoded and need to be
revised, this can be done with a simplified approach that provides the
benefits and incentives of the New Accord to all financial institutions
operating in the United States. While ACB is providing some ideas on how
to develop a more streamlined approach, we believe that such a task
needs to be a collaborative effort by banking supervisors and the
banking industry.
ACB has the following recommendations on specific aspects of the
proposal to implement the New Accord in the United States:
• Revise the treatment of residential mortgage loans and home
equity loans, including the removal of the ten percent loss given
default floor in Pillar 1.
• Capital requirements for acquisition, development and
construction (ADC) loans should be more closely aligned with risk.
• We support the recent proposal by the BCBS that will change the
treatment of expected losses. However, the proposed adjustments to
capital to account for differences between expected losses and loan
reserves should be reconsidered.
• The operational risk charge should be moved to Pillar II.
• We agree with the agencies that U.S. banking institutions should
continue to be subject to a leverage ratio requirement.
• The required disclosures should be further refined to ensure that
the information is of a type that investors will understand and find
useful.
The underlying arguments for these recommendations are developed and
summarized in this letter. Additional analysis in support of these
recommendations, drawn from the framework of ongoing academic research
on bank risk management, is presented in Appendix B, "Inter-bank
Competitiveness, Safety, and Soundness Issues Raised by The New Basel
Capital Accord," by Professor Theodore M. Barnhill, Professor of Finance
and Chairman, Department of Finance, The George Washington University.
Background
The current risk-based capital framework imposed on U.S. banks and
savings associations was agreed to by the BCBS and endorsed by the G-10
Governors in 1988. The framework strengthened capital levels at
financial institutions and fostered international consistency and
coordination. The current requirements, however, have not kept up with
changes in the financial industry and the increasingly complex nature of
the banking business.
The BCBS has been working on the development of the New Accord for
many years and, in April 2003, issued for public comment the third
Consultative Document on the New Accord. The comment period ended on
July 31, 2003, and ACB provided comments on the New Accord to the BCBS
and each of your agencies. Once the BCBS finalizes the New Accord, each
country would need to adopt appropriate legislation or regulations to
implement the New Accord to govern the country’s banking industry.
The ANPR was issued to begin the process of implementing the New
Accord in the United States. The ANPR proposes to apply the New Accord
only to banks with total commercial bank assets of $250 billion or more
or total on-balance sheet foreign exposure of $10 billion or more
(core banks). Other institutions can opt in to the New Accord if they
can meet all of the eligibility standards. Banks approaching these
threshold levels would be expected to start a dialogue with their
supervisors about preparations for implementation. Banks that meet the
threshold requirement because of an acquisition or merger would become
subject to the New Accord. Minimum leverage ratio and prompt corrective
action regulations would continue to apply to core and opt-in banks.
As a result of the planned implementation in the United States, we
would for the first time have a bifurcated regulatory capital framework.
As reflected in the Quantitative Impact Study 3- Overview of Global
Results issued by the BCBS, the New Accord could result in
significant capital reductions for institutions that focus on mortgage
and other retail lending. While that is the core business of ACB’s
members, the cost and complexity of opting in to the New Accord does not
make this a viable option for most community banks.
The U.S. bank regulators have issued two additional documents related
to the New Accord: draft supervisory guidance for the internal
ratings-based systems for corporate credit and draft supervisory
guidance for operational risk advanced measurement approaches for
regulatory capital.3 The regulators plan on providing draft
guidance for the internal ratings-based systems for retail, commercial
real estate, securitizations, and other portfolios at a later date.
Overview of the New Accord
The Accord would have three mutually supporting pillars. Pillar 1
would cover the minimum regulatory capital charge for credit, market and
operational risk; Pillar 2 would cover supervisory review of capital
adequacy; and Pillar 3 would require public disclosure of risk profile
and regulatory capital information.
Pillar 1: Minimum Capital Requirements.
Pillar 1 would establish minimum capital requirements for credit,
market and operational risk.
Credit Risk. Banks would have to meet an extensive set of
eligibility standards for use of the advanced internal-ratings based (IRB)
system for assessing credit risk. The draft supervisory guidance for the
IRB systems for corporate credit provides details on the eligibility
standards for corporate credit.
An institution’s internal assessment of key risk drivers for a
particular exposure or pool of exposures would serve as the primary
inputs in the calculation of minimum capital requirements. Formulas, or
risk weight functions, specified by supervisors would use the
institution’s estimated inputs to derive a specific dollar amount
capital requirement for each exposure or pool of exposures. Exposures
would be assigned into one of three portfolios: wholesale (corporate,
interbank, and sovereign), retail, and equities. There also is specific
treatment for securitization exposures and purchased receivables.
Under the wholesale category, there would be four sub-categories of
specialized lending: project finance, object finance, commodities
finance, and commercial real estate (further subdivided into low asset
correlation or high volatility). The key inputs for each wholesale
exposure would be probability of default (PD), loss given default (the
proportion of the exposure that will be lost if a default occurs) (LGD),
exposure at default (the estimated amount owed to the institution at the
time of default) (EAD), and maturity (the remaining economic maturity of
the exposure). Institutions would be able to take into account credit
risk mitigation techniques, such as collateral and guarantees, by
adjusting their estimates for PD or LGD.
Retail exposures would be divided into residential mortgages,
qualifying revolving exposures, and other retail exposures (which would
include certain exposures to small businesses). The inputs of PD, LGD
and EAD would be assigned to predetermined pools of exposures, rather
than to each individual exposure. There would be no explicit input for
maturity.
Institutions would use a market-based internal model for determining
capital requirements for equity exposures in the banking book. The
internal model would assess capital based on an estimate of loss under
extreme market conditions. Institutions that are subject to market risk
capital rules would continue to apply those rules to assess capital
against equity positions held in the trading book.
The proposal contains detailed rules for determining capital for
retained interests held by institutions that securitize assets as well
as for non-originating institutions that invest in a securitization
exposure.
Purchased receivables would be subject to a two-part capital charge:
one for the credit risk arising from the underlying receivable and the
second for dilution risk (the possibility that contractual amounts may
be reduced through future cash payments or other credits to the
obligor).
Operational Risk. Institutions would have to hold capital for
exposure to risk of loss arising from inadequate or failed internal
processes, people, and systems, or external events. Each banking
organization would be able to use its own methodology for assessing
operational risk exposure provided the methodology is comprehensive and
results in a charge that reflects the institution’s operational risk
experience. The supervisory guidance on operational risk advanced
measurement approaches (AMA) establishes the standards that must be met
to establish a sound operational risk framework.
Pillar 2: Supervisory Review.
Under Pillar 2, supervisors will assess whether an institution holds
sufficient capital in light of its risk profile. Given the current level
of supervisory review of capital adequacy in the United States, the
agencies are not proposing to introduce specific requirements or
guidelines to implement Pillar 2.
Pillar 3: Disclosure Requirements.
Extensive information about an institution’s risk profile, IRB system
for credit risk, and determination of capital requirements, as outlined
in the Consultative Document issued by the BCBS in April, would have to
be disclosed on a quarterly basis. The ANPR suggests that significant
events would have to be disclosed on a current basis. It also suggests
that internal control reports and officer certifications about the
effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting and
disclosure controls and procedures would have to cover the required
capital disclosures.
Supervisory Guidance on IRB Systems for Corporate Credit.
This guidance provides a description of the essential components and
characteristics of an acceptable IRB framework for corporate credit. The
guidance contains standards that are principle-based whenever possible
to give institutions flexibility when implementing the framework.
Institutions must have credit risk management practices that are
consistent with the substance and spirit of the standards.
Qualifying institutions will be expected to have an IRB system
consisting of four interdependent components:
• A system that assigns ratings and validates their accuracy,
• A quantification process that translates risk ratings into IRB
parameters,
• A data maintenance system that supports the IRB system, and
• Oversight and control mechanisms that ensure the system is
functioning as intended and producing accurate ratings.
Each chapter of the guidance provides standards and a detailed
discussion for each of these components. The agencies will evaluate
compliance with the standards for each of the four components and will
also evaluate how well the various components complement and reinforce
one another.
Supervisory Guidance on Operational Risk Advanced Measurement
Approaches for Regulatory Capital.
This guidance establishes the supervisory standards that institutions
must meet and maintain to calculate the operational risk capital charge
under the AMA. Institutions will be expected to use the standards to
develop a framework that measures and quantifies operational risk for
regulatory capital purposes. Operational risk governance processes must
be established on a firm-wide basis to identify, measure, monitor, and
control operational risk in a manner comparable with the treatment of
credit, interest rate, and market risks.
Institutions will need a systematic process for collecting
operational risk loss data, assessing the risks within the institution,
and adopting an analytical framework that translates the data and risk
assessments into an operational risk exposure. Because institutions will
calculate minimum regulatory capital on the basis of internal processes,
the requirements for data capture, risk assessment, and the analytical
framework are detailed and specific. Chapters focus on corporate
governance issues, operational risk management elements (operational
risk policies and procedures, identification and measurement, monitoring
and reporting, and internal control environment), elements of an AMA
framework (internal operational risk loss event data, external data,
business environment and internal control factor assessments, and
scenario analysis), risk quantification (analytical framework and
accounting for dependence), risk mitigation, data maintenance, and
testing and verification.
As part of the ongoing supervisory process, the agencies will
evaluate compliance with the standards as well as how well the various
components complement and reinforce one another.
ACB’s Concerns
Competitive Impact.
The results of the BCBS’s latest quantitative impact study, although
based on incomplete information, indicate that institutions that can use
the IRB approach to determining capital and that have primarily a retail
portfolio may see their minimum capital requirements reduced
significantly.4 Retail lending, particularly residential
mortgage lending, is the fundamental business of ACB’s community bank
members. As a result, we are concerned that smaller institutions that do
not possess the resources necessary to develop an IRB system for
assessing capital, or do not have business models that would make the
costs associated with such a system reasonable in relation to expected
benefits, will be left at a competitive disadvantage. Many community
banks will end up holding capital under the current capital requirements
that is higher than that of more risky institutions.
The large majority of financial institutions in the United States
will be at a competitive disadvantage to the extent that they cannot
deploy capital as efficiently as larger, more sophisticated
institutions. Capital is a fundamental financial metric that all
companies actively measure and manage in order to improve earnings and
competitive position. There are few, if any, transactions in which a
bank does not consider the impact on capital. Smaller institutions could
become takeover targets for institutions that can establish an IRB
approach to capital, and the smaller banks that survive as stand-alone
entities will find it more costly to compete for quality assets, leaving
them with riskier assets, lower credit ratings and higher costs of
funding. Or, they may be forced to operate with less capital in order to
provide more competitive pricing.
Competitive implications also can result from the different ways in
which the New Accord is implemented in different countries. Although the
level of detail in the third Consultative Paper has been reduced from
prior versions, more decisions about implementation have been left to
bank supervisors. Bank supervision varies significantly from one country
to another in approach, intrusiveness, and quality. The manner in which
the New Accord is implemented and enforced against institutions in one
country, and the manner in which cross-border issues are addressed, can
provide a competitive advantage or disadvantage to organizations in
another country that might face more lenient or stricter application of
the New Accord’s provisions. This is of particular concern to ACB’s
members who compete against the U.S. mortgage subsidiaries of foreign
banks.
The competitive effects are exacerbated by the “all or nothing”
approach to U.S. implementation of the New Accord. Institutions opting
in to the New Accord not only must implement the complex and expensive
IRB approach as opposed to simpler alternatives, but also must do so
across all asset classes in order to realize even the most obvious
benefits of the New Accord. Also, if an institution cannot meet the
significant burden of adopting both the IRB approach to calculating
credit risk and the AMA to measuring operational risk, there is no
ability at all to align capital more closely with balance sheet risk
and, therefore, compete more effectively with core banks. This approach
not only effectively precludes all but the largest institutions from the
more risk-sensitive treatment, but also introduces a bifurcated approach
to regulatory capital that has the potential to significantly impact the
competitiveness of smaller institutions. Institutions that have the
resources to develop an IRB system and collect the necessary data could
benefit from lower capital requirements even though their loan
portfolios may be no less risky than that of an institution that must
remain on Basel I. This is not an equitable result. The mortgage loan
area is a particularly good example of this point. Historical default
data reflected in the white paper attached as Appendix B to this comment
letter show that mortgage loans are less risky than the Basel I capital
requirement would imply. Institutions subject to the New Accord could
see their capital requirements for mortgage loans decrease
significantly. Institutions that remain on Basel I will be subject to
higher capital requirements for the same types of mortgage loans with
similar levels of risk.
The agencies have requested information from commenters about the
specific competitive effects of the New Accord. It is difficult for any
one institution or trade association to have the information necessary
to provide detailed comments about the effects due to lack of
information about the portfolios of core banks and lack of understanding
of how this complex proposal applies to any specific institution. ACB
believes it is up to the agencies, who have the necessary information,
expertise and resources, to review, analyze and understand the
competitive implications of the proposal prior to implementation of the
New Accord in the United States.
We note that the agencies are taking the position that a regulatory
flexibility analysis is not required under the Regulatory Flexibility
Act.5 We strongly disagree and believe that the cases cited
by the agencies in their analysis are inapplicable to this particular
rulemaking. The agencies directly supervise all banks and savings
associations in the United States and this proposal will surely impact
in a direct fashion all of those institutions either by requiring that
they comply with the New Accord, giving them the option of opting in, or
requiring that they continue to comply with current capital
requirements. Furthermore, the Small Business Administration has said
that even in cases where the impact on small businesses would be
indirect, it is good public policy for the agency to perform the
regulatory flexibility analysis.6
We believe that any review of the competitive effects should consider
alternative approaches to the proposed U.S. implementation of the New
Accord. Different options are discussed later in this comment letter.
They include simplifying the proposal so that the possibility of opting
in is reasonably available to many more institutions and revising the
current capital requirements to make them more risk-sensitive for
institutions that remain under that scheme.
Implementation Issues.
Although the most recent version of the New Accord is less detailed
than previous versions, it remains an extremely complex document and few
industry representatives and supervisory personnel will have a good
grasp of all of the provisions and intricate details. With that being
the case, there is concern about how such a sophisticated and complex
capital accord can be adequately implemented, supervised and enforced.
Since adequate capital is so important to the global financial
community, the inability to properly assess and measure compliance with
capital requirements can lead to significant safety and soundness
issues.
Implementation concerns initially lie at the financial institution
level. Institutions will have to hire and retain the necessary expertise
to implement the New Accord throughout the organization. These experts
will have to explain to the institution’s management in an
understandable way the models used by the institution, how those models
comply with the requirements of the New Accord, and the impact on the
institution from changes in the model. The public markets recently have
been harmed by companies that employed sophisticated and opaque
financial instruments and accounting principles that could not be
understood by a company’s board, management or investors. Recent
corporate governance initiatives have emphasized the importance of
proper board supervision over a company’s operations. It is hard to see
how an average board member will be able to understand and monitor a
financial institution’s compliance with the New Accord. Many board
members may be reluctant to acknowledge their lack of understanding and
may not be in a position to raise relevant and necessary questions. This
will leave the institution’s compliance with the New Accord to the few
people at an institution who completely understand all of its technical
details and the models used by the institution. These people, however,
will probably not fully understand the dynamics of each business unit
and could easily miss important, subtle distinctions or developments
that could have a dramatic impact on real-world risk at the bank.
The other major implementation issue is the cost of compliance.
Experts have estimated that it could cost $100 million or more for
large, internationally active banks to establish the necessary
infrastructure to comply with the advanced IRB approach. Even if some of
this cost would otherwise be incurred to improve risk management
practices, this is still a huge sum and does not include ongoing
maintenance requirements. While the costs at smaller institutions would
be less, they would still be substantial and would eliminate the
possibility for smaller institutions to opt in to the framework. With
that goes the opportunity to provide incentives for smaller financial
institutions to continue to improve their risk management systems.
The other major implementation concern is at the supervisory level.
All agencies will have to expend substantial resources to ensure that
they have the necessary expertise and systems to administer and enforce
the New Accord, even if it will apply to only a handful of their
supervised institutions. To the extent that funds are not available to
do so, or the necessary expertise is not available, capital requirements
will not be administered properly, creating significant safety and
soundness concerns. Even if banking supervisors can administer the
complex rules, the effort to do so adequately could divert resources
from other areas of emerging risks that should receive more attention.
This is specifically a concern with regard to foreign bank supervisors,
many of whom supervise U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks that compete
with ACB members in the United States.
In light of these concerns, more examination needs to be made into
the real-world consequences of adopting an extremely complicated capital
regime, including the resources needed for implementation, the problems
inherent in on-going maintenance, the improbability of effective
regulation and market oversight, and the competitive pressures that
could encourage banks to game the system. In reviewing implementation
issues, ACB would like the agencies to also address the ability of
smaller institutions to use third party vendors, consortiums or other
joint approaches in meeting the conditions for opting in to the New
Accord. After the New Accord is implemented, whether in its present form
or a more simplified version, it is likely that products and services
will be offered to assist institutions in obtaining the necessary data
and establishing the necessary infrastructure to develop an IRB approach
under the New Accord. Institutions may be able to pool data and share
costs through joint project development, group negotiation with IT
vendors, centralized scorecard building, centralized model building,
generic process development and other joint efforts. The agencies should
allow institutions that cannot absorb initial and maintenance costs on
their own to utilize other methods for developing acceptable IRB
systems.
Alternative approaches that do not represent such a radical departure
from the existing regulatory capital framework should also be considered
to deal with the implementation issues. Supervisors can get a
substantial amount of the benefits expected from the New Accord’s
approach with a much lower level of complexity.
Alternative Proposal.
For all of the reasons discussed above, ACB believes that the
agencies should consider alternative approaches to implementing the New
Accord in its present form. While there may be problems with the current
capital requirements, it seems that those problems could be resolved in
a way that is easier and less costly to implement and exposes a greater
number of institutions to more risk-sensitive capital requirements. As
Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman Ferguson has said in testimony
before Congress, “The capital requirements should be a function of risk
taken, and, under Basel II, if two banks had very similar loans, they
both should have a very similar required capital charge.” 7
Vice Chairman Ferguson went on to say, “[B]anks with lower risk
profiles, as a matter of sound public policy, should have lower
capital than banks with higher risk profiles.” 8 (emphasis
added) We agree with Vice Chairman Ferguson and believe the proposal for
implementation of the New Accord in the United States is inconsistent
with his statement. Although some smaller institutions may choose to
have capital levels higher than required by regulation, that is a choice
that is made and should not be used to justify leaving in place higher
capital requirements on these institutions for the same types of lending
engaged in by core and opt-in banks. Allowing more institutions to
benefit from more risk-sensitive capital requirements will increase the
safety and soundness of the banking system by providing incentives to a
greater number of institutions to improve their risk management systems.
Prior to adopting any approach, however, the agencies should agree on
the desired purpose of revised capital requirements. If it is to link
capital more closely to balance sheet risk, then the approach should be
developed with that principle in mind and implemented without regard to
whether the result is an increase or decrease in capital for any
particular institution. If the purpose is to encourage institutions to
improve their risk management systems and give them a reward for doing
so, that opportunity should reasonably be available to all institutions.
If however, the agencies believe that larger, more risky institutions do
not have adequate risk management processes in place in light of their
size and complexity, then that should be handled as a supervisory matter
and addressed separately from the adoption of more risk-sensitive
capital requirements. Using capital requirements as an incentive for
banks to establish IRB systems may not make sense. If an IRB system
showed that operations were more risky and, in fact, more capital was
needed, the institution that expended substantial resources to develop
the system may be tempted to tweak the system to get a different result.
If the IRB system showed that substantially less capital is required,
this may not be acceptable to some agencies, a position already
reflected in the adoption of capital floors in the New Accord during the
first two years of implementation.
One alternative approach to the New Accord would be to revise the
current accord to make it more risk-sensitive for all institutions, and
then add more complexity to capture any additional risk at
internationally active banks. A revised accord could include more
baskets and a breakdown of particular assets into multiple baskets when
taking into consideration collateral values (which can be obtained by
third party appraisal services or published listings), loan-to-value
ratios and credit scores. Credit mitigation measures, such as mortgage
insurance and guarantees, could be incorporated into the framework and
other revisions could be made to further refine current capital
requirements. One example of how assets could be treated under a more
refined Basel I is set forth in Appendix A. This example is provided
merely to open up the dialogue on different approaches as any effort to
refine Basel I for all institutions should be a collaborative effort
between banking supervisors and the banking industry.
Another option is to give more U.S. financial institutions the proper
incentives to continue to improve risk management practices. This could
be done by allowing U.S. banks and savings associations to adopt the
standardized approach in the New Accord. Of course, some of the problems
with the standardized approach, including the operational risk charge,
would have to be resolved. Also, the conditions for opting in to an IRB
approach could be made less burdensome and the IRB approach could be
simplified to make it a more viable prospect for smaller institutions.
Moving operational risk to Pillar II, as suggested later in this letter,
also would help. Even many of our smaller members would like the
opportunity to improve their risk management practices to such a degree
that they can use their own internal assessment of risk to determine
adequate capital levels.
Pillar I – Minimum Capital Requirements.
Residential Mortgage Loans. The New Accord will contain a
minimum LGD value of ten percent for residential mortgage exposures. The
agencies believe that LGDs during periods of high default rates are
unlikely to fall below this level if measured appropriately. LGD for
mortgage loans will differ based on lien status, prime versus subprime
loans, delinquency status, borrower credit score, loan-to-value ratios
at inception and at time of default, and the existence of private
mortgage insurance. Many factors create LGD values much lower than ten
percent for specific residential mortgage loan portfolios. Over the
course of a mortgage loan, principal amortization has historically
exceeded any depreciation in value, resulting in lower loan-to-values
ratios as time goes on. Since loan-to-value ratios usually are set
initially at 80 percent, only a significant decrease in value would
generate any losses at the time of default. In cases where the
loan-to-value is higher, usually private mortgage insurance is available
to reduce any increased risk. Accordingly, ACB does not believe that the
proposed ten percent LGD floor is warranted.
Asset correlation factors provide a measure of the extent to which
changes in the economic value of separate exposures are presumed to move
together as a result of economic events such as changes in interest
rates, housing prices or recession. The asset correlation factor is
central to calculating capital requirements and risk-weighted assets
under the New Accord. The asset correlation factor for all residential
mortgages, including home equity loans and lines of credit, has been
fixed at 15 percent, regardless of the PD measure. This approach
reflects the agencies’ view that the performance of residential
mortgages is influenced by broader trends in the housing market for
borrowers of all credit qualities. The assumed asset correlation also
reflects the higher average maturity associated with residential
mortgages and is higher than would likely be the case if a specific
maturity adjustment were also included in the framework. This 15 percent
is above industry practice and is higher than what is applied to credit
cards and other retail loans. Also, since the maturity for home equity
loans and lines of credit is usually shorter than that for first lien
mortgages, the asset correlation factor of 15 percent appears to be
particularly high for those loans and lines of credit. In fact, the
capital requirement for a high loan-to-value second mortgage could be
greater than it is for an unsecured credit card loan to the same
borrower. We suggest that the 15 percent asset correlation factor be
reduced to 10 percent for residential first lien mortgages and that a
separate risk weight curve be established for home equity loans and
lines. As an alternative, home equity loans and lines could be moved to
the “other retail” category.
ADC Exposures. ADC loans for single-family housing are
included in the high volatility commercial real estate category, even
though historical default rates on those loans are well-below commercial
real estate averages and are more similar to the default rates
associated with other residential mortgage loans. A June 2003 white
paper issued by the Federal Reserve Board analyzed the loss
characteristics of commercial real estate loan portfolios of U.S.
financial institutions and noted that some key features of single-family
construction loans could be positive factors resulting in lower capital
requirements.9 We recommend that ADC loans for one-to-four
family residential construction be included in the low asset correlation
category.
Expected Loss. The New Accord should not require that capital
be held against expected losses. This approach is contrary to industry
practice. Expected losses for assets are covered in the pricing of loan
products and loan provisioning. The BCBS recently proposed a revision to
the New Accord that changes the treatment of expected losses.10
Under the new proposal, which is subject to public comment, the IRB
capital requirement would be based solely on unexpected losses. However,
banks would have to compare the IRB measurement of expected losses with
the total amount of loan provisioning, both general and specific. If
expected losses exceeded the total provision, a shortfall would result
and need to be deducted from capital, with 50 percent deducted from tier
one capital and 50 percent deducted from tier two capital. If total
provisions exceeded expected losses, the excess could be added to Tier
two capital up to a maximum of 20 percent of tier two capital.
While the proposal marks an improvement over the previous approach,
the treatment of shortages does not deal with the fact that expected
losses on retail products are often covered in the pricing and the
changes to the measurement of capital to reflect differences between
expected losses and provisions appear to be arbitrary. In addition, the
proposal will be problematic in the United States until the accounting
issue related to loan loss reserves is resolved. We note that the
industry and the banking regulators have opposed the proposal on loan
loss reserves recently issued by the American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants. That proposal would reduce the amount of allowable
reserves.11
Operational Risk. ACB opposes a separate operational risk
charge under Pillar I. Although the AMA has been refined to provide
financial institutions more flexibility in determining the charge, it is
inappropriate to impose a regulatory capital charge against a risk that
cannot be measured or even defined in a manner acceptable to everyone.
Also, it is uniformly agreed that there currently is not sufficient
empirical data to measure past operational losses and the establishment
of systems to capture and analyze such data is still in the formative
stages. The requirement that core and opt-in banks meet the requirements
of both the IRB and AMA approach at the same time creates significant
obstacles for smaller institutions that would like to benefit from more
risk-sensitive capital requirements. We also disagree with the
limitations on the use of risk mitigating devices, including risk
transfer through insurance.
ACB thinks that the better approach is to include operational risk in
Pillar II and give supervisors the ability to determine the appropriate
level of capital for each institution. Supervisory pressure can still
act as a strong incentive for banks to continue to develop approaches to
operational risk management and to ensure that banks are holding
sufficient capital buffers for this risk.
Leverage Ratio. We agree with the agencies that U.S. banking
institutions should continue to be subject to a leverage ratio
requirement, whether that requirement stays the same or is reduced for
institutions that are well or adequately capitalized under prompt
correction action regulations. Because internal ratings-based systems
are not always precise and there are no satisfactory methods in place to
adequately measure operational risk, sole reliance should not be placed
on the results of economic capital calculations for purposes of
computing minimum regulatory capital requirements. A leverage ratio
requirement will help ensure that there is a base level of capital
available in the event of a crisis.
Pillar III - Disclosure Requirements.
ACB appreciates that the disclosures requirements have been scaled
back in the New Accord, particularly those relating to the IRB approach
and securitization. We believe that further refinements should be made
to the required disclosures to ensure that the requirements provide
information useful and understandable to members of the public who will
not know the technical details of the New Accord. Disclosure of large
quantities of information is not the same thing as transparency. As
Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan has pointed out,
“Transparency challenges market participants not only to provide
information, but also to place that information in a context that makes
it meaningful.” 12 We would suggest that a less prescriptive,
more principles-based approach be used to establish disclosure
requirements.
The agencies should work closely with securities and accounting
professionals and groups to make sure required disclosures are
consistent with accounting principles and securities rules and
regulations and do not unduly burden public companies. For example, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently passed a regulation
governing the use of non-GAAP financial measures.13 It would
place a significant burden on SEC reporting companies if any of the
required capital-related disclosures were considered non-GAAP numbers
under this regulation. Also, there should be some mechanism in place for
revising the disclosure requirements to accommodate future advances in
and changes to accounting principles and securities rules and
regulations.
The ANPR also indicates that banking organizations would be required
to publish material information about significant events as soon as
practicable rather than on a quarterly basis.14 As you know,
the SEC requires public companies to disclose certain information on a
current basis and has specific rules detailing the types of information
that must be disclosed and the timing of the disclosure. With such a
complex regulatory capital framework, it would not always be clear what
is meant by “significant event,” and the agencies give no indication of
how this information should be disclosed or the timing of the
disclosure.15 We think the agencies should leave it to the
SEC to determine what information needs to be disclosed on a current
basis. The SEC currently is in the process of revising its regulations
in this area.16
If the agencies decide to go ahead and mandate current disclosure for
the first time, the proposed rule that follows this ANPR should contain
more information about the agencies’ expectations in this area. Also, if
there is to be a current disclosure requirement, that same requirement
should apply to all institutions subject to the New Accord, whether they
are in the United States or based in other countries. Otherwise,
institutions not subject to the current disclosure requirement could
have a competitive advantage and their information would not be as
transparent to market participants.
ACB is also concerned about the disparate treatment that might occur
in the public markets between public companies that are core banks and
public companies that remain subject to the current capital
requirements. A number of smaller publicly traded institutions operate
under the same rigorous market demands as their global counterparts.
These institutions may well face negative market reaction to a perceived
lack of transparency, despite the fact that they are well run, well
managed and serve their shareholders’ interests well. Also, investors
and analysts may look unfavorably at the institutions that fail to
establish the risk management systems required for core banks,
regardless of whether the institution is any more risky or needs such
sophisticated and costly systems. In fact, most of our members have
relatively simple business plans compared to the internationally active
banks. These institutions may end up with higher costs for capital or
may very well have to incur the significant costs of opting in even
though it may not be reasonable to do so.
Conclusion
Although ACB agrees with the approach of the New Accord in trying to
more closely link minimum capital requirements with an institution’s
risk profile, we remain very concerned about the competitive impact and
the cost and complexity of the New Accord. In light of these concerns,
we believe that the agencies should consider alternative approaches that
would simplify the proposal and allow a greater number of financial
institutions to adopt more risk-sensitive capital requirements.
ACB stands ready to work with the regulators in developing a
simplified proposal and additional options for more risk sensitive
capital requirements for all U.S. financial institutions. If you would
like to discuss our suggestions for an alternative approach or if you
have any questions about our comments, please contact the undersigned at
(202) 857-5088 or via e-mail at rdavis@acbankers.org, Charlotte Bahin at
(202) 857-3121 or via e-mail at cbahin@acbankers.org, or Diane Koonjy at
(202) 857-3144 or via e-mail at dkoonjy@acbankers.org.
Sincerely,
Robert R. Davis
Executive Vice President and
Managing Director, Government Relations
*Attachments
_______________________________
ACB represents the nation's community banks. ACB members, whose
aggregate assets total more than $1 trillion, pursue progressive,
entrepreneurial and service-oriented strategies in providing financial
services to benefit their customers and communities.
68 Fed. Reg. 45900
(August 4, 2003).
68 Fed. Reg. 45949.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Quantitative Impact Study 3 -
Overview of Global Results (May 5, 2003).
68 Fed. Reg. 45946-45947.
SBA Office of Advocacy, A Guide for Government Agencies - How to
Comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act, at 20 (May 2003).
A Review of the New Basel Capital Accord: Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, June 18, 2003
(statement of Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, at 12).
Id. at 18.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Loss
Characteristics of CRE Loan Portfolios, at 42 (June 2003).
See Basel II: Significant Progress on Major Issues,
issued by the BCBS on October 11, 2003 and available at www.bis.org/press/p031011.htm.
See Proposed Statement of Position: Allowance for Credit
Losses, issued by the AICPA on June 19, 2003, and available at
www.aicpa.org/download/acctstd/2003_06_19_%20ED_SOP.pdf.
Remarks by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan on Corporate
Governance at the 2003 Conference on Bank Structure and Competition at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May 8, 2003.
Conditions for Use of Non-GAAP Financial Measures, 68 Fed. Reg.
4820 (Jan. 30, 2003).
68 Fed. Reg. 45944.
17 CFR 249.308 (Form 8-K).
Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing
Date, 67 Fed. Reg. 42913 (June 25, 2002).
*Attachments can be viewed in the FDIC Public Information Center, 801
17th Street, NW, Washington, DC, during business days from 8:00 a.m. to
5:00 p.m.
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