October 7, 2003
Public Information Room
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
250 E Street, SW, Mailstop 1-5
Washington, DC 20219
ATTN: Docket No. 03-18
Jennifer J. Johnson
Secretary
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
20th Street and Constitution
Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20551
ATTN: Docket No. OP-115
Steven F. Hanft
Legal Division, Room MB-3064
Federal Deposit of Insurance Corporation
550 17th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20429
Information Collection Comments
Chief Counsel's Office
Office of Thrift Supervision
1700 G Street, NW
Washington, DC 20552
ATTN: Docket No. 03-35
Re: Joint Notice of Proposed Guidelines
Dear Sirs or Madams:
These comments are submitted on behalf of Guidance Software, Inc. in response
to the Joint Notice of proposed guidance, entitled Interagency Guidance on
Response Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer
Notice ("the proposed guidance"), issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency ("OCC"), the Federal Deposit of Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ("Federal Reserve"), and the
Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") (collectively, the "Agencies"). The
proposed guidance interprets section 501 (b) of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and
the Interagency Guidelines Establishing Standards for Safeguarding Customer
Information and describes the Agencies' expectations regarding the response
programs that a financial institution should develop and apply to address
unauthorized access to or use of customer information that could result in
substantial harm or inconvenience to a customer.
Guidance Software strongly supports the proposed guidance. Internal and
external threats to the security of customer information often lead to the
misuse of such information. Financial institutions must be required to develop a
response program to protect against risks associated with these threats. The
proposed guidelines include important measures to protect customer information
systems maintained by financial institutions and its service providers. A
response program ensures that each financial institution can quickly respond to
incidents involving the unauthorized access or use of customer information. The
proposed guidelines properly set forth the methods used to access, collect,
store, use, transmit, and protect customer information. They include crucial
requirements that regulatory and law enforcement agencies are notified when
financial institutions become aware of an incident involving unauthorized access
to or use of customer information. Furthermore, the proposed guidance clearly
establish the corrective measures that must be taken to protect customers whose
accounts were accessed without authorization, including notifying affected
customers in a timely manner.
The proposed guidance, however, should also require financial institutions to
establish effective means for collecting, preserving, and authenticating
computer evidence in a form admissible in court. A regulated institution, as
part of its response process, should have an effective computer forensics
capability in order to investigate and mitigate computer security incidents. The
leading international financial standards-setting institution, the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision1 (the "Basel Committee"), has, like the
Agencies' proposed guidance, realized that "[e]ffective incident response
mechanisms are ... critical to minimise operational, legal and reputational
risks arising from internal and external attacks."2 The Basel Committee has
acknowledged the importance of computer forensics in its risk management
standards for electronic banking, and in collecting evidence required for legal
action. In its paper entitled "Risk Management for Electronic Banking", the
Basel Committee set forth fourteen risk management principles, which urge banks
to establish effective incident response capabilities. Principle 14 recommends
that in implementing effective response to unforeseen incidents, banks should
develop a "process for collecting and preserving forensic evidence to facilitate
appropriate post-mortem reviews of any e-banking incidents, as well as to assist
in the prosecution of attackers."3
The International Organization for Standardization ("ISO") also supports the
use of computer forensics in responding to computer security incidents. In
December 2000, ISO formally adopted a "code of practice for information
security" ("ISO 17799"). ISO 17799 has emerged as one of the most widely
recognized information security standards in the world.4 Under ISO 17799, a
financial institution that at has suffered a security incident must properly
collect evidence for a variety or purposes, including internal problem analysis
and for use as evidence in relation to a potential breach of contract, breach of
regulatory requirements or in the event of civil or criminal proceedings.5 ISO
17799 explicitly notes that a financial institution "should ensure that their
information systems comply" with the requirements applicable to the production
of admissible evidence.6 Indeed, "[t]o achieve quality and completeness of the
evidence, a strong evidence trail is needed."7 Thus, ISO 17799 calls on
financial institutions to use computer forensics to preserve the admissibility
of evidence: "For information on computer media: copies of any removable media,
information on hard disks or in memory should be taken to ensure availability.
The log of all actions during the copying process should be kept. .." 8 If a
financial institution does not have the tools necessary to collect evidence in
manner that preserves its admissibility, it risks compromising its legal (and
hence its financial) position:
When an incident is first detected, it may not be obvious that it will result
in possible court action. Therefore, the danger exists that necessary evidence
is destroyed accidentally before the seriousness of the incident is realized.9
A financial institution can minimize this danger by employing the best
computer forensics tools available in its response to a security incident.
As discussed above, a broad computer forensics capability, as well as proper
procedures and practices, is crucial for the referral and reporting of computer
security incidents to law enforcement and federal regulatory agencies. When
critical computer evidence is not properly preserved and handled by a regulated
institution, it becomes difficult for law enforcement to successfully prosecute
the matter, or for regulatory authorities to analyze the situation effectively.
Computer forensics assists in preserving records and other evidence, and prevent
the tampering of evidence that may be required in a criminal or civil legal
action.
In sum, Guidance Software, Inc. supports the proposed interagency guidelines,
but strongly recommends that the guidelines incorporate the need for
institutions to collect properly preserved evidence. Computer forensics has
proven useful in preserving records and preventing the tampering of evidence to
ensure its admissibility in court. The Basel Committee and ISO 17799 have
recommended the use of computer forensics in collecting evidence to support a
legal action, whether civil or criminal.
Guidance Software, Inc. appreciates this opportunity to submit comments on
the Joint Notice and hopes that its comments will be taken into consideration by
the Agencies developing the final guidelines. If you have any questions
regarding the matters discussed in this letter, please do not hesitate to
contact us.
Sincerely,
Guidance Software, Inc. By:
Victor Limongelli, General Counsel
Sharon Tom, J.D.
1 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established in 1974 by the
governors of the G10 central banks (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States).
Members also included non-central bank supervisory authorities and are mainly, but not
exclusively, from G10 countries. It provides a forum for regular cooperation on
banking supervisory matters. Over recent years, it has developed increasingly
to a standard-setting body on all aspects of banking supervision.
2 "Risk Management for Electronic Banking," at 3, available
at: http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs98.pdf
3 Id. at 21.
4 Symantec Advantage, Winter 2002, Issue 13.
5 ISO 17799, § 6.3.1.
6 Id., § 12.1.7.2.
7 Id § 12.1.7.3.
8 Id.
9 Id.
|