


# FDIC Banking Review

Winter 1995

Vol. 8, No. 1

- Converted New England Savings Banks
- Cutbacks in Construction Lending
- Recent Developments



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## Understanding the Experience of Converted New England Savings Banks

*by Jennifer L. Eccles and John P. O'Keefe*

*page 1*

The authors summarize the environment surrounding New England savings banks in the 1980s, motivations for mutual-to-stock conversion, and the strategies employed by savings banks after conversion. The financial performance of converted savings banks is compared with that of non-converted mutual savings banks in the region, and asset growth rates necessary to produce a sufficient return to investors are estimated. The authors conclude that growth rates required by the New England converted savings banks were high. Because rapid growth can be risky, such fundamental changes in a bank's operating strategy require careful planning and execution in order to be successful.

## Recent Cutbacks in Construction Lending at BIF-Insured Depository Institutions

*by James L. Freund and Maureen C. Crowley*

*page 19*

One of the most discussed aspects of the "credit crunch" of the 1990-1992 period was the sharp decline in construction lending at BIF-insured depository institutions. This article examines construction lending during that period. The authors show that the banks that cut back most aggressively had a heavy commitment to such lending in the late 1980s and/or were experiencing general earnings or capital problems. In contrast, various tests designed to capture the influence of real-estate market developments that might affect the demand for construction loans did not help to explain lending patterns.

## Recent Developments Affecting Depository Institutions

*by Benjamin B. Christopher*

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This regular feature of the *FDIC Banking Review* contains information on regulatory agency actions, state legislation and regulation, and articles and studies pertinent to banking and deposit insurance issues.

# Understanding the Experience of Converted New England Savings Banks

by Jennifer L. Eccles and John P. O'Keefe\*

**B**anking industry performance and failure rates since the mid-1980s have followed a pattern that is tied closely to regional economic conditions. The pattern begins with increases in bank loan concentrations in areas related to a region's growth, followed by deterioration in asset quality, earnings, and capital when regional recessions appear. Moreover, rapid growth in bank assets often accompanies the shifts in portfolio composition.

These events were repeated by financial institutions in New England.<sup>1</sup> When the regional economy expanded, many financial institutions grew rapidly, through increased lending (particularly in commercial real estate) and/or acquisitions. The subsequent collapse in real-estate prices, combined with a regional recession during the late 1980s and early 1990s, led to the demise of numerous New England banks.

Between January 1, 1990 and March 31, 1994, 88 FDIC-insured banks failed in New England, including a large number of converted savings banks. Of these 88 failures, 47 were commercial banks and 41 were savings banks. The 47 commercial banks represented 17 percent of the 276 commercial banks operating in New England at year-end 1989. The 41 savings banks<sup>2</sup> accounted for ten percent of the 396 savings banks at

year-end 1989; 17 of the 41 were converted savings banks. The 17 converted savings banks that failed represented 22 percent of the total number of savings banks that converted to stock form between 1984 and 1990 and the remaining 24 savings banks that failed represented 7.5 percent of all other savings banks.

While many studies of the causes of bank failures have looked at the relationships among asset growth, portfolio composition and bank-failure rates, few studies have examined the influence of a related event in New England in the 1980s: the large influx of capital resulting from the conversion of many mutual savings banks to stock form.<sup>3</sup> There was a dramatic increase in the number of conversions in New England in the mid- to late 1980s, with a majority (48) of the conversions of state-chartered savings banks to stock form occurring in 1986.

The total capital raised by converted savings banks in Massachusetts alone in 1986 was approximately \$1.1 billion — enough capital to support a 17.5 percent increase in the state's banking assets, assuming a 4.8 percent capitalization rate on the additional assets (the capitalization rate of the largest bank in Massachusetts at that time).<sup>4</sup> The total capital increase associated with all New England savings banks' conversions between 1984 and 1990 was approximately \$2.4 billion.

The capital raised by converting savings banks should have served as a cushion when the economy fell into

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<sup>1</sup> New England is defined as Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont.

<sup>2</sup> The 41 savings banks include five cooperative banks and two federal savings banks.

<sup>3</sup> Another indicator of the influx of new capital into a region is bank chartering activity. In New England, the number of new commercial and savings banks chartered annually increased from one in 1980 to a peak of 26 in 1987, and averaged 19 annually from 1985 through 1991. This rate exceeded the average annual rate of seven new charters issued between 1970 through 1984. Of the 171 New England banks chartered since 1980, 29 (17 percent) failed. In all other regions, 419 of 4,534 (nine percent) of *de novo* banks failed since 1980.

<sup>4</sup> Stated differently, the largest bank in Massachusetts could have nearly doubled in size with the \$1.1 billion capital injection. At year-end 1986, the largest bank in Massachusetts was the First National Bank of Boston, with assets of \$25.1 billion and equity capital of \$1.2 billion (4.8 percent capitalization).

recession. Yet, as noted above, those savings banks that converted between 1984 and 1990 had a higher failure rate than other savings banks and commercial banks. This paper examines why this discrepancy occurred.

The introduction of common equity required management at converted savings banks to be accountable to a new constituency — the shareholder. As part of that duty, management had a fiduciary responsibility to enhance shareholder value and generate an adequate return to investors. Capital raised during conversion led to high capitalization rates that reduced returns on equity. To increase returns on equity, management at newly converted savings banks had several options. The primary strategy employed was to leverage the bank by growing assets. This could be accomplished by growth in the loan or investment portfolio, or by acquisition of another institution. Other possible strategies included engaging in stock repurchase programs, increasing the dividend payout rate, or improving earnings by increasing efficiencies and, therefore, lowering noninterest expense.

Despite the use of these strategies, many converted savings banks were unable to earn competitive returns on equity. By the late 1980s, certain shareholder groups began to express their concerns about the low returns on equity. While management grappled with shareholder issues, the regional economy moved into a recession. The equity “cushion” secured by converted savings banks eroded as losses mounted, and ultimately proved to be insufficient to prevent the failure of many institutions.

This paper first reviews the experience of New England savings banks that converted in the 1980s. Topics to be discussed include the environment surrounding New England savings banks at that time, motivations for mutual-to-stock conversion, and the sequence of events following the rush of conversions. As part of this review, the strategies employed by converted

savings banks are examined. The financial performance of converted savings banks is compared with that of non-converted mutual savings banks in the region.

Next, this paper examines shareholders' expectations of expected earnings growth rates (net income to common shareholders) for converted savings banks. These earnings expectations subsequently are related to banks' financial condition and the regional economy to make inferences about shareholders' expectations regarding banks' strategic plans.

The paper concludes that high asset growth rates were required by the New England converted savings banks in order to generate adequate returns on equity for stockholders. However, as has been demonstrated by previous examples of bank failures, rapid growth can be risky. The experience of converted New England savings banks suggests that a fundamental change in a bank's strategy requires careful planning and execution in order to be successful. These lessons are particularly relevant now, given the large number of mutual savings institutions that have been converting to stock form recently.

## *Background: New England Savings Banks*

### *What Are Savings Banks?*

There are two characteristics of savings banks that deserve consideration before engaging in a review of the environment surrounding New England savings banks in the 1980s. First, the historical origins and functions of savings banks were quite different from those of commercial banks and savings associations. For these reasons, savings banks were issued a unique charter type by bank regulators.

Savings banks originated in Europe as philanthropic institutions, as an attempt to offer the working class a mechanism for saving and investing funds.<sup>5</sup> The first savings bank in the

United States was chartered in 1816. While the number of savings banks has grown over the years, the charter has not been permitted in all states.<sup>6</sup> State-chartered savings banks operated in 19 states as of December 31, 1993.<sup>7</sup>

Historically, state-chartered savings banks have been given broader lending and investment powers than savings and loan associations. Nevertheless, in recent years, savings banks have tended to have a balance sheet that more closely resembled a savings and loan association than a commercial bank. Savings banks have tended to concentrate their assets in long-term assets such as mortgages, rather than shorter-term loans such as commercial and industrial loans, yet their liability structure has tended to be weighted toward shorter-term funds such as deposits.<sup>8</sup>

The second point is that in New England, and in most other regions, savings banks have been predominantly mutual form.<sup>9</sup> Mutual form implies that there are no stockholders of the institution. The primary implications of this form of organization are two-fold. First, it is not possible to approach the capital markets for additional equity because the mutual has not issued any equity stock; hence, all equity-financed asset growth must be

<sup>5</sup> For a detailed history of savings banking in the United States, see Ornstein (1985) or Golembe and Holland (1986).

<sup>6</sup> Savings banks were all state-chartered until 1978, at which time mutual savings banks were permitted to convert to federal charters by The Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978.

<sup>7</sup> Source: Division of Research and Statistics, FDIC.

<sup>8</sup> Legislative changes involving expanded investment powers for banks and thrifts over the past 15 years have tended to blur the differences among savings banks, savings and loan associations, and commercial banks.

<sup>9</sup> The proportion of mutual-form savings banks in New England rose from 70 percent to 75 percent between year-ends 1988 and 1993. Nationally, the proportion of mutual-form savings banks rose from 66 percent to 72 percent over this same interval. This rise was due, in part, to higher failure rates among stock-form savings banks.

funded by retained earnings. Second, the control exerted over management is more limited with mutual ownership.<sup>10</sup>

### *The Changing Environment*

The financial-services industry has been transformed significantly over the past 20 years. Two important factors that affected the savings bank industry were the economy and banking-related legislation and regulation. In particular, the rising interest-rate environment of the 1980s precipitated many changes in the industry. When interest rates rose significantly in the early 1980s, the subsequent asset/liability mismatch caused net interest margins to shrink dramatically. As a result, numerous thrift institutions sustained heavy losses and severe depletion of capital.<sup>11</sup> At the same time, deposit interest-rate ceilings imposed by Regulation Q created a disintermediation out of the banking system and into alternative but higher-yielding investments.

In response to these problems, legislation in the early 1980s was enacted to remove interest-rate ceilings<sup>12</sup> and to expand the powers of thrift institutions.<sup>13</sup> These laws were intended to help depository institutions evolve with the changing economy and compete with other financial institutions. New England states were on the leading edge of reform initiatives, allowing institutions to offer negotiable orders of withdrawal (NOW) accounts in 1972, and granting state-chartered savings banks a fair amount of latitude with respect to powers by the early 1980s:

Of the six New England states, Massachusetts has done the most to expand the powers of its state-chartered thrifts. As of July 1, 1983, state-chartered mutual savings banks and cooperative banks in Massachusetts will have the same powers as commercial banks. In Vermont, savings banks may offer all services offered by commercial banks except trust services. Maine and New Hampshire have granted state-chartered thrifts parity with federal thrifts in most product

lines, and have established more liberal lending limits for commercial, industrial and commercial real estate loans. Connecticut legislated approximate equality between federal and state thrifts, while Rhode Island has expanded thrift powers only in the area of consumer loans. The banking situation in Rhode Island is unique, however, since all state-chartered thrifts own commercial bank subsidiaries.<sup>14</sup>

### *The Flurry of Conversions*

New England states also authorized the conversion of mutual savings banks to stock form. New Hampshire allowed savings banks to convert beginning in 1969, with Maine following in 1975, Vermont in 1981, Connecticut and Rhode Island in 1983, and Massachusetts in 1985.<sup>15</sup>

The majority of conversions occurred in 1986, immediately following the 1985 authorization of conversions in Massachusetts. Table 1 shows the year of conversion, number of converted savings banks per year, total assets of converted savings banks as of the quarter-end after conversion, and median capital ratios as of the quarter-ends immediately before and after conversion. As seen in Table 1, these conversions increased book capitalization rates dramatically.

### *The Economic Boom*

While authorized powers were expanded and mutuals were permitted to convert, the regional economy was heating up. In the 1980s, New England sustained a decade of strong economic growth. This growth increased the demand for bank lending, and created a rich environment for sustained

**Table 1**  
**New England Savings Banks**  
(\$ Millions)

Year	Number of Conversions	Assets	Capital Ratio Before	Capital Ratio After
1985	5	\$1,507	5.55%	12.70%
1986	48	\$16,222	6.60%	16.77%
1987	14	\$3,140	6.19%	14.04%
1988	5	\$1,332	7.73%	11.56%

growth at depository institutions. This growth-oriented environment is seen in the following graphs. Figure 1 shows the growth in nonagricultural employment for the New England region plotted against the national growth rate for 1981 through 1993. For every year between 1983 and 1987, except 1985, the rate of employment growth in New England exceeded the national average. This trend is also evident in Figure 2 — growth in Gross State Product *versus* GDP growth. Office vacancy rates in Boston and Hartford were low in the early 1980s, as shown in Figure 3.<sup>16</sup> Builders responded accordingly, as seen in the growth in office stock shown in Figure 4.

### *Interstate Banking and Acquisitions*

While the booming economy provided incentives for growth in loan portfolios, another legislative development allowed banks to expand

<sup>10</sup> For a discussion of agency conflicts at mutual and stock institutions, see Cordell, MacDonald, and Wohar (1993), or Dunham (1985).

<sup>11</sup> In the 1970s, savings and loan associations were permitted to convert to stock form as a means of recapitalization. *See* Williams, Fleck, and Comizio (1987).

<sup>12</sup> The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980.

<sup>13</sup> The Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982.

<sup>14</sup> FDIC (1983).

<sup>15</sup> Source: Conference of State Bank Supervisors.

<sup>16</sup> Data are available for Boston and Hartford, two large New England metropolitan areas.


across state lines. In 1975, Maine became the first state to adopt nationwide interstate banking. The provision, effective in 1978, required the states in which acquiring banks were located to have a reciprocal interstate banking agreement. The reciprocity provision was dropped by Maine in 1983, and all of the state's largest commercial banks were acquired by emerging regional banks such as Bank of New England, KeyBanks, Fleet, and Norstar. Massachusetts and Rhode Island allowed regional interstate banking in 1983, with Connecticut following suit in 1984, and New Hampshire and Vermont in 1987. By 1990, all New England states had adopted nationwide interstate banking.

Given these new acquisition powers and the strong economy, New England depository institutions embarked on a wave of acquisitions. Recently-converted savings banks became excellent targets for those seeking to expand into new markets. Table 2 shows the number of transactions announced between 1986 and 1990 involving the acquisition of savings banks, as well as the median transaction ratios. Savings banks that were acquired during this frenzy rewarded existing shareholders amply, as institutions were sold at attractive premiums to current market prices and well above initial offering prices.<sup>17</sup> Of the 44 transactions announced between 1986 and 1990, 13 involved an interstate acquisition.<sup>18</sup> Acquisition multiples tended to decrease after the stock market crashed in October 1987. Multiples and the number of acquisitions declined as

<sup>17</sup> The transaction price announced per share was typically at a premium of 40 to 60 percent above the currently traded price. Of the 21 deals announced for which data are available, the premium of the acquisition price to initial offering price ranged from a low of two percent to 193 percent, with a median value of 90 percent. (Sources: Lyons, Zomback & Ostrowski and The Center for Research in Security Prices, University of Chicago.)


<sup>18</sup> There were 49 commercial bank transactions announced between 1986 and 1990, 19 of which involved interstate acquisitions.

**Figure 1**  
Growth in Nonagricultural Employment  
New England vs. National



Source: Commerce Department

**Figure 2**  
Real Growth Rate in Gross State Product  
(Constant 1987 Dollars)




Source: Commerce Department

**Table 2**  
Announced Acquisitions of New England  
Stock Savings Banks (Median Values)

Year	Price/Earnings	Price/Book Value	Premium Paid for Deposits <sup>a</sup>	Number of Deals Announced
1986	14.7x	163%	5.03%	6
1987 Q1-Q3	19.2x	129%	4.82%	8
1987 Q4	13.9x	120%	4.61%	5
1988	18.8x	123%	4.46%	12
1989	23.0x	105%	2.04%	8
1990	28.7x	90%	-1.78%	5


<sup>a</sup> Transaction price as a percentage of total deposits of acquired institution.  
Source: Lyons, Zomback & Ostrowski.

Figure 3  
Office Vacancy Rate



Source: CB Commercial Torto Wheaton Research

Figure 4  
Growth in Office Stock



Source: CB Commercial Torto Wheaton Research

institutions began to suffer from asset quality problems in the late 1980s.

### Motivations for Conversion

What were the motivations for conversion? First, many savings banks welcomed an additional source of capital. Once converted, an institution would have access to the equity markets — an option not available to mutual institutions. For some institutions, the asset/liability mismatch environment of the late 1970s depleted capital levels, and a public stock offering represented a faster means of obtaining capital than earnings reten-

tion. Many banks that chose to convert had lower pre-conversion capitalization rates than peers who did not convert.<sup>19</sup>

Capital injections and improved access to capital markets would be necessary also for banks with strategic growth plans. The booming New England economy fostered a widespread perception among bank management teams that there were tremendous growth opportunities, and asset growth was necessary in order to remain competitive. An institution dependent solely on internal capital generation such as a mutual

savings bank would not have as much flexibility to expand its balance sheet or make acquisitions as an institution with access to external capital markets (a stock savings bank). Limitations on the amount of debt allowed to be counted as capital for regulatory purposes, along with the difficulty of tapping the debt markets as a mutual, made this alternative capital generation option less useful.

Financial rewards for stockholders were another motivator, and depositors and management could become stockholders.<sup>20</sup> An institution that converted would have the potential to pay dividends, to experience appreciation in its stock price, and to sell out to an acquirer at a change-of-control price representing a premium to the current share price. A mutual savings bank did not have the ability to offer these financial rewards to depositors and management. Rather, for mutuals, including mergers of mutuals, rewards to depositors would have to come through interest and non-interest cost savings, if any. In mergers of mutuals, management could only be rewarded through salaries and benefits.<sup>21</sup>

Conversion offered a new set of financial incentives for employees, in terms of additional forms of remuneration. For management, there were stock options; Employee Stock Own-

<sup>19</sup> For a sample of 54 savings banks that converted to stock form, the median capital-to-assets ratio averaged 6.78 percent over the four quarters prior to conversion. A comparison group of 54 peer banks, however, had average capitalization of 8.05 percent over the same period (see Figure 5).

<sup>20</sup> In some mutual-to-stock conversions, certain insider abuses involving self-dealing or excessive management remuneration have been prevalent. The FDIC has been concerned about such abuses, and on June 13, 1994, published a Proposed Rule on Mutual-to-Stock Conversions and a Notice and Request for Comment on how the conversion process should be changed. This is not the focus of this paper. See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 12 CFR Part 333, Mutual-to-Stock Conversions of State Nonmember Savings Banks, *Federal Register*, Vol 59, No. 112, June 13, 1994.

<sup>21</sup> A mutual savings bank was not acquired in the traditional sense because there were no shares outstanding to be acquired.

ership Plans (ESOPs) were available for all employees. These incentives were considered beneficial in attracting and retaining the best employees, especially in a tight labor market such as that experienced by New England in the 1980s.<sup>22</sup> Senior management would have additional responsibilities and challenges with respect to managing a publicly held entity.

Finally, the markets were receptive. The stock market was generally strong, and the underwriters were successful in placing the new issues with investors.<sup>23</sup>

There were several disadvantages to conversion. A primary disadvantage was the necessary fundamental realignment of management responsibilities. After conversion, senior management, in its capacity as fiduciary, would have to report to and work in the interests of the shareholders. As a result, senior management faced increased monitoring by being under the scrutiny of shareholders and analysts. The strategies employed by a mutual savings bank could no longer apply. While increased monitoring could have beneficial results — improved efficiencies at the savings banks — as discussed later, noninterest expense ratios did not improve in the case of converted New England savings banks.

Stockholder scrutiny resulted in a “loss” of management control and an overall change in corporate culture. The possibility existed for an outside group, unhappy with the performance of existing management, to force a change of control and an ouster of existing management *via* a proxy fight. Additionally, there were increased reporting requirements associated with being a stock institution, including filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Moreover, conversions added substantial equity capital, thereby decreasing returns on equity (ROE). The ROE dilution encouraged bank managements to adopt strategies to bolster shareholder returns. It was not clear at the time of conversion that low shareholder returns and the

implementation of strategies to improve returns would be a significant problem for managements.

### *Post-Conversion Strategies*

The conversion process that savings banks were required to follow by bank regulators could force bank management to add more capital than might be needed. In short, converting savings banks were required to issue common stock in amounts based upon the appraised net worth of the bank. For details on the conversion process see Dunham (1985). The increase in capital ratios after conversion resulted in a proportional decrease in returns on equity. Management at converted savings banks engaged in several strategies to improve returns on equity. The primary strategy employed was asset growth, including growth in the loan and investment portfolios. This strategy will be analyzed in the next section.

Alternative strategies employed included stock repurchase programs, increasing the dividend-payout rate, and/or improving earnings by increasing efficiencies and therefore lowering noninterest expense. The evidence suggests that these strategies were not utilized extensively by converted savings banks.

Prior to conversion, mutual savings banks lacked stockholders to whom to pay dividends. Therefore, after conversion, dividend policies had to be established. State regulatory restrictions on dividend payouts typically prohibit an institution from impairing its capital surplus account and/or limit a savings bank to pay dividends from current earnings only. These restrictions effectively limited the use of dividend payouts as a serious leveraging tool.

A review of the 54 converted savings banks' dividend policy shows that dividend rates did increase during the post-conversion period. The converted banks' median quarterly dividend rate (stock dividends as a percent of net income) increased from 14.4 percent four quarters after

conversion to 31 percent eight quarters after conversion. Dividend rates peaked at 32.8 percent ten quarters after conversion.<sup>24</sup>

Analysis of the converted savings banks' noninterest operating expense indicates no improvement in operating efficiency occurred in the post-conversion period. Total noninterest expense includes salaries and employee compensation, expense on premises and fixed assets, and all other noninterest expense. The median total noninterest operating expense of the converted savings banks had an average annualized value of 2.14 percent of assets for the four quarters prior to conversion. Post-conversion noninterest expense ratios were comparable, averaging 2.16 percent, 2.09 percent, and 2.15 percent for the first, second, and third years after conversion. Moreover, tests of the statistical significance of differences in converted and peer banks' operating expense ratios indicated they were not significantly different.<sup>25</sup>

Finally, stock repurchases were another means available to converted savings banks to reduce their capital ratios and offset ROE dilution. Stock repurchases are subject to approval at the state and federal levels because the strategy involves a direct reduction in capital. Analysis of the trend in net sales, conversions, and retirements of capital stock revealed that only 8.5 percent of converted savings

<sup>22</sup> The average unemployment rate for the six New England states in the finance, insurance and real-estate industries declined from 2.82 percent in 1984 to 0.93 percent in 1988, then rose to 5.68 percent in 1991. This unemployment rate remained relatively high in recent years, at 4.35 and 3.70 percent in 1992 and 1993. (Source: *Geographic Profile of Employment and Unemployment*, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.)

<sup>23</sup> See, for example, Zweig (1986).

<sup>24</sup> The dividend rates cited here are based upon quarterly net income and dividend expenditures.

<sup>25</sup> Specifically, no statistically significant difference in the mean operating expense ratios for converted and peer banks was found for most of the post-conversion period at the 95 percent confidence level.



banks engaged in net stock repurchases or retirements. The majority of converted savings banks (67.9 percent) had no net stock sales or retirements in the three-year period subsequent to conversion, while 23.6 percent of converted banks had net stock sales. It is important to note, however, that the average quarterly net stock sales in the post-conversion period were relatively small (about 0.06 percent of assets) compared to the average net stock repurchases and retirements (about 0.20 percent of assets).<sup>26</sup>

### Post-Conversion Financial Trends

#### Sample

In order to investigate the motives and strategies behind mutual-to-stock conversions, the post-conversion financial performance of a sample of converted New England savings banks was studied. Approximately 77 New England savings banks converted from mutual to stock form between 1984 and 1992.<sup>27</sup> Of these 77 banks, a group of 54 banks had sufficient financial information for the analysis. Specifically, the financial condition of the banks was obtained over a period four quarters prior to conversion and 12 quarters subsequent to conversion, thereby allowing the sample to include the majority of conversions that occurred during the peak year of conversions, 1986.<sup>28</sup>

In order to learn whether the performance of the sample of converted banks differed materially from that of other banks in the region, a peer group of nonconverted (mutual form) savings banks was selected for analysis. The peer group consisted of other New England banks of similar size and timing of financial data as the group of converted banks.<sup>29</sup> Because financial trends were presented in terms of an abstract time measure, *i.e.*, the number of quarters from conversion, a given quarter actually consists of data for converted banks from several different calendar periods. Therefore, each converted bank's peer was se-


lected to be another New England bank of similar size with contemporaneous financial data.

#### Financial Performance

As shown in Figure 5 and Table 1, conversions typically increased the book equity capitalization of banks substantially. For the 54 converted New England savings banks, the median capital-to-assets ratio increased from 6.69 percent one quarter prior to conversion to 15.91 percent upon conversion.

Figure 6 shows that converted savings banks' returns on assets (ROAs) improved from being less than those of peers prior to conversion to rates comparable to those of peers after conversion. The improvement in ROA was primarily due to increased net interest margins. Converted savings banks' interest expense declined after conversion due to the increased capitalization (lower proportion of assets funded by interest-bearing liabilities). In addition, interest income increased after conversion, primarily because of

Figure 5  
Median Capital-to-Assets Ratios  
The 54 Converted New England Savings Banks



There are beneficial aspects to increased capitalization. All other factors held constant, an increase in capitalization improves the stability of earnings and reduces the risk of insolvency over the business cycle.<sup>30</sup>

increases in loans (see Appendix A for details on profitability trends). Despite this improvement in ROAs, converted banks' ROEs (Figure 7) generally remained less than those of peer banks for two years subsequent

<sup>26</sup> The average stock sales, conversions and retirements used were actual quarterly net additions.


<sup>27</sup> It is difficult to obtain a precise count of the number of conversions because complete records of conversions were not maintained by federal bank regulators.

<sup>28</sup> These 54 converted savings banks were relatively small in asset size: 33 had assets under \$300 million and only two had assets over \$1 billion at the time of conversion. In addition, most of the 54 banks were in Massachusetts (24) and Connecticut (17). Finally, nine of the 54 banks failed as of year-end 1993.

<sup>29</sup> Because the converted banks changed size substantially during the analysis period, peers of comparable asset size were paired with converted banks over time. To allow for these and other changes, a converted bank may have its peer replaced two or more times during the analysis period. This resulted in the selection of a group of 59 mutual-form peer banks, 54 of which are paired with the converted banks at a given point in time.

<sup>30</sup> A tenet of corporate finance (not proven here) is that as the proportion of equity finance a firm uses increases, the stability of earnings per share of equity is improved, all other things being equal.

**Figure 6**  
**Median Return on Assets (Annualized)**  
**The 54 Converted New England Savings Banks**



to conversions. High post-conversion capitalization rates were a primary cause of converted savings banks' poor returns on equity capital.

It is unlikely that the managements of converted banks sought additional capital solely for the purpose of risk-reduction. Indeed, Figure 8 shows that managements acted quickly to try to offset the dilution of returns on equity by decreasing capitalization rates through leveraged asset growth. Figure 8 presents trends in the median quarterly asset growth rates of converted banks and the peer group. Among converted banks, asset growth rates rose dramatically upon conversion, rising to a median quarterly rate of 13.8 percent. This reflects the fact that the additional capital was used to support asset growth rather than to reduce liabilities. To see this, one can partition asset growth into the portions funded by increases in debt (deposit and non-deposit liabilities) and equity capital. In the quarter prior to conversion, the quarterly asset growth for the combined assets of the 54 converted banks was 13.38 percent. The converted banks' proportional liability and equity capital growth rates during this same interval were 1.28 and 12.1 percent, respectively.

**Table 3**  
**The 54 Converted New England Savings Banks:**  
**Quarterly Changes in Asset Composition**  
**(As a Percent of Total Assets in Prior Quarter)**

Asset Portfolio Item	Quarter from Conversion				
	0	1	2	3	4
Cash Balances Due	0.53%	-0.05%	-0.43%	0.22%	0.15%
<b>Securities</b>	<b>3.45</b>	<b>1.17</b>	<b>0.42</b>	<b>0.27</b>	<b>0.80</b>
Federal Funds Sold	3.74	-3.74	-0.48	-0.47	-0.26
<b>Net Loans and Leases</b>	<b>5.53</b>	<b>5.52</b>	<b>4.83</b>	<b>4.64</b>	<b>3.64</b>
Trade Account Assets	0.00	0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.02
Premises	0.05	0.04	0.07	0.01	0.08
Real-Estate Owned	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.03	-0.05
All Other Assets	0.06	0.17	0.15	0.25	0.17
<b>Total Asset Growth</b>	<b>13.38%</b>	<b>3.11%</b>	<b>4.61%</b>	<b>4.94%</b>	<b>4.55%</b>

In the conversion quarter approximately 54 percent of the asset growth occurred in liquid assets (cash balances and securities) and 41 percent in loans (Table 3). Subsequent asset growth among converted banks remained high for the two-year period following conversion. Nearly all of the converted banks' asset growth in quarters 1 through 12 was achieved through additional lending, although several savings banks nearly doubled in size by acquiring other savings banks. Loan growth fell during quarters 7 through 12 as the regional economy slid into recession.<sup>31</sup> The vast majority of converted banks' loan growth

<sup>31</sup> As shown in Table 1, a large portion of the conversions occurred in 1986. Indeed, 67 percent of the 54 conversions followed here occurred in 1986. Consequently, the average loan growth rates three years after conversions generally reflect activity in 1989.


was in traditional real-estate lending for residential dwellings. However, converted banks also increased lending in nontraditional areas as well. In particular, converted banks increased concentrations in construction and land development loans to a greater extent than peer banks (Figure 10).

Figures 8 through 10 indicate that converted savings banks had different post-conversion growth and portfolio strategies than mutual-form peer banks. Appendix A presents data on the statistical significance of these differences. Those tests showed that the converted savings banks' capitalization rates changed over time, moving from rates significantly lower than those of peer banks prior to conversion to post-conversion rates significantly higher than those of peer banks (see Appendix A, Table 4).


Converted savings banks' post-conversion loan growth also exceeded that of peer banks for a brief period after conversion. However, asset and loan growth rates of converted banks returned to levels similar to those of peers by about 18 months after conversion. Finally, converted savings banks increased concentrations in construction and land development loans significantly above those of peer banks in the post-conversion period. These results suggest that converted savings banks had more-aggressive post-conversion growth and portfolio strategies than mutual-form peer banks. It should be pointed out that very similar results were obtained for different samples of mutual-form peer banks. Therefore, it is felt that these results are fairly robust with respect to the choice of peer banks.

Converted savings banks funded asset growth primarily with liabilities in order to decrease capitalization rates and leverage earnings, but they were unable to match asset growth rates with deposit growth. Competition for deposits is seen in Figure 11, which shows the spread between the average rate for 6-month and 1-year certificates of deposit in the Boston market and the Bank Rate Monitor national average rate. The Boston market rate exceeded the national average rate for most of the late 1980s.


**Figure 8**  
**Median Asset Growth Rates (Quarterly)**  
**The 54 Converted New England Savings Banks**




**Figure 9**  
**Median Growth in Total Loans (Quarterly)**  
**The 54 Converted New England Savings Banks**



**Figure 10**  
**Median Construction and Land Development Loans**  
**The 54 Converted New England Savings Banks**



**Figure 11**  
**Annual Effective Yield Spread**  
**Boston vs. National**




Source: Bank Rate Monitor

As a result, converted savings banks altered their liability composition in the post-conversion period. Converted savings banks increased their reliance on nondeposit liabilities, primarily through the reported item “other borrowed money.”<sup>32</sup> For the sample of 54 converted savings banks, the median ratio of other borrowed money to total liabilities rose from 2.45 percent to 11.06 percent in the three-year period subsequent to conversion.<sup>33</sup> In contrast, for the mutual-form peer banks the median ratio of other borrowed money to liabilities remained fairly steady, varying between zero percent and 0.2 percent for the same period.

In the three-year period after conversion, the converted savings banks had an average quarterly asset growth rate of just over three percent, with 66 percent of that average growth financed by deposits and 35 percent funded with nondeposit liabilities.<sup>34</sup>

Figure 12 shows that converted savings banks also increased their reliance upon high-cost liabilities and did so to a greater extent than their peers. High-cost liabilities are defined as brokered deposits plus time deposits of \$100,000 or more. For the sample of 54 converted savings banks, the median ratio of high-cost liabilities to total liabilities rose from 3.17 percent to 8.18 percent over the three-year period subsequent

**Figure 12**  
**Median High-Cost Liabilities**  
**The 54 Converted New England Savings Banks**



to conversion. For the comparison group of mutual-form peer banks, the high-cost liabilities ratio rose from 2.95 percent to 5.97 percent over the same period. Statistical tests of the significance of differences in liability composition between converted banks and the comparison group of mutual-form peers (not presented here) indicate that the differences in the two groups' reliance upon other borrowed money and high-cost funds were statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level over most of the pre- and post-conversion periods.

The reliance upon nontraditional sources of funding, such as high-cost deposits, by converted savings banks to fund asset growth has important implications. These changes in liability composition indicate that the converted savings banks were unable to expand their core deposit franchise quickly enough to support loan growth.<sup>35</sup>

<sup>32</sup> The funding category “other borrowed money” is used in the Reports of Condition and Income that banks are required to file with federal bank regulators.

<sup>33</sup> Banks only report the total value of “other borrowed money” and not its components. Other borrowed money includes items such as Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) advances, borrowings on a bank's own promissory notes, and borrowings from Federal Reserve Banks. Additional data supplied by the Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston were available on advances for 25 of the 54 converted savings banks between 1986 and 1993. For these 25 banks, advances as a percent of total liabilities increased from 5.45 percent to 12.28 percent between year-ends 1986 and 1988. For these same 25 banks, advances usage generally fell after December 1988, and was 7.49 percent of liabilities at year-end 1993. However, because advances data were not available for all 54 banks in our sample, it is not clear whether advances usage was the cause for the increase in other borrowed money.

<sup>34</sup> Stated differently, the average quarterly asset growth rate for the converted savings banks was 3.03 percent between quarters 1 and 12. Over this same period, average deposit growth was 1.99 percent of assets and nondeposit liability growth was 1.05 percent of assets. While some equity financing was used, the average value was negligible during this period.

<sup>35</sup> Core deposits commonly refer to a bank's stable deposit base. These deposits come from depositors who seek traditional banking services and are not as sensitive to deposit interest rates as those depositors who are not as concerned with banking services. Core deposits generally are defined as demand and other transaction accounts plus savings deposits of \$100,000 or less. Core deposits are considered low-cost and have low volatility.

### Required Growth Rates

So far we have seen that converted savings banks' ROEs after conversion were substantially below those of their peer mutual savings banks. Investors may tolerate lower ROEs in exchange for the risk-reducing effect of a higher level of capitalization, and converted savings banks generally had much higher capital ratios than their peers. However, the post-conversion growth of these institutions suggests that management attempted to increase ROEs and reduce capital ratios. This section uses a simple approach to determine the rate of leveraged asset growth that would have been required to achieve the same ROEs as existed prior to conversion, had asset growth been the sole strategy adopted. To do this, the target ROE is related to the banks' underlying profit rate on assets (ROA) and existing capitalization rate. By definition, the ROE equals the product of the ROA and the inverse of the capital-to-assets ratio (equity multiplier). That is,

$$ROE = \left( \frac{Net\ Income}{Assets} \right) * \left( \frac{Assets}{Capital} \right)$$

In the pre-conversion period (during quarters -4 to -1), the average ROE among both peer and converted banks was approximately 15 percent.<sup>36</sup> The overall profit rate on assets, ROA, averaged one percent for the converted savings banks in the year prior to conversion. Assuming converted banks expected this average ROA to persist, the banks would have needed to reduce equity capitalization from an average rate of 16 percent (at conversion) to 6.7 percent in order to achieve an ROE of 15 percent.<sup>37</sup> This reduction in capitalization could be achieved with various rates of asset growth over a long or short period. For example, target capitalization and ROE could be met with a compound annual leveraged asset growth rate of 15.5 percent for six years, or 19 percent for five years. The median annual asset growth rates shown in Figure 6 averaged 12 percent over the two-year period subsequent to conversions. As mentioned previously, lower capitalization rates decrease the stability of earnings per share of common stock. Therefore, banks' knowingly accept more risk when leveraging earnings.

It appears that many converted banks were following a strategy of leveraged asset growth over a period in excess of six years as a way to leverage earnings. The 12 percent median growth rate was high relative to the 7.71 percent average asset growth rate among all FDIC-insured savings banks between 1986 and 1988.

### Epilogue

Managements at converted New England savings banks focused on leveraged asset growth to improve the rate of return on equity, which was a key measure of performance for the banks' new constituency, the shareholder. However, managements soon were required to confront a new issue: small groups of vocal, hostile shareholders. The booming market for converted thrifts had attracted a new set of investors. While most savings banks had converted *via* community offerings that placed the majority of stock in the hands of local depositors (and management), non-local or outside investors began to increase their stock holdings of converted savings banks. These investors sought to take advantage of the strong acquisitions market. Often, these groups accumulated sufficient stock in a given institution to solicit a board seat or otherwise influence management in an effort to elicit the sale of the institution. Sale often was viewed as the best way to maximize shareholder value, particularly given the difficulty in raising returns on equity to levels acceptable to shareholders.

In certain cases, management's attention was diverted from running the institution to staving off proxy fights and hostile takeover attempts, and implementing "poison pills" such as shareholder rights plans.<sup>38</sup> Moreover, profitability declined among both converted and peer banks over the sample period, reflecting the widespread problems resulting from the softening of New England real-estate markets, as well as a regional recession in the later quarters, and increased competition for deposits to fund the high rates of asset growth. Had the regional economy continued to expand, greater asset growth might have been possible. Moreover, if net interest margins and overall profitability had remained high,

less asset growth would have been necessary to increase or at least maintain ROEs.

### Conclusion

The experience of the converted New England savings banks has useful lessons for bankers and bank regulators. High capitalization rates alone do not provide protection against failure. In fact, this study finds that the high capitalization rates achieved upon conversion to stock form led managements to engage in rapid asset growth. When this occurs, additional risk is borne through rapid loan growth and credit quality may suffer. This was the case for the group of 54 converted New England savings banks; their net loan and lease charge-offs increased from a median annual rate of 0.007 percent of assets one quarter prior to conversion to 0.110 percent of assets 12 quarters after conversion.<sup>39</sup> Finally, if strategic growth plans are not well-thought-out, the bank increasingly may become reliant upon volatile, high-cost liabilities.

Conversion to stock form results in a fundamental change in the nature of an institution. Bank managements need to have well-defined strategic plans, particularly when planning to expand operations. If growth plans are ill-timed or not supportable given market opportunities, severe difficulties may be encountered. This study has shown that the sample of New England converted savings banks faced these problems and suffered as a result.

<sup>36</sup> ROEs of publicly traded commercial banks during the mid-1980s tended to be in the range of 13 to 15 percent. See Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc., *Peer Bank Averages*.

<sup>37</sup> Some improvement in ROA after conversion may occur with the reduction in total interest expense associated with increased capitalization.

<sup>38</sup> There were five proxy fights involving New England savings banks between 1988 and 1990. Source: D.F. King & Co., Inc.

<sup>39</sup> Statistical tests of the difference between converted and mutual-form peer savings banks' net loan and lease charge-off rates showed that the converted banks' rates were significantly higher than those of the peer banks eight quarters after conversion (at the 95 percent confidence level). Moreover, converted banks' net loan and lease charge-off rates remained significantly higher than those of peer banks during the entire third year after conversion.

## APPENDIX A

### Statistical Significance Tests

This appendix looks at the statistical significance of the differences between converted savings banks' and peer banks' financial performance. Specifically, peer banks' financial ratios were subtracted from those of converted savings banks on a quarterly basis. The mean differences in the two groups' financial ratios were obtained. Next, the Student's "t" statistics were computed to test the hypothesis that the mean differences in the financial ratios were not significantly different from zero. Tables 4, 5, and 6 present both the mean differences in financial ratios and the associated Student's t statistics. The same mutual-form peer bank group used in the figures is used in Tables 4, 5, and 6. A Student's t statistic of 1.96 or greater means that the mean differences in the financial ratios are statistically different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level. Mean differences in financial ratios greater than zero result when the converted banks' mean ratios are greater than those of peer banks, and *vice versa* when mean differences are negative.

Table 4 shows that the converted savings banks' capitalization rates increased from pre-conversion rates significantly lower than those of peer banks to post-conversion rates significantly higher than those of peer banks. Converted savings banks' post-conversion asset and loan growth rates were significantly higher than those of peer banks for a brief period after conversion. Converted savings banks' concentrations of construction and land development loans were significantly greater than those of peer banks in the post-conversion period. As stated before, these results generally held for different peer groups.

Tables 5 and 6 present information on converted and peer banks' earnings. Table 5 shows that converted savings banks' ROAs were significantly less than those of peers prior to conversion but, in general, were not

significantly different than peers' ROAs after conversion. Converted banks' ROEs generally remained significantly less than those of peers for two years subsequent to conversions.

tization, *i.e.*, a reduction in the proportion of assets financed with deposits and debt capital. This reduction in total debt was enough to offset converted banks' increased reliance upon

Table 4  
Comparison of the 54 Converted and Peer Banks'  
Balance-Sheet Activity  
Mean Ratio Differences (t Statistics), Quarterly Growth Rates

Number of Quarters from Conversion	Capital/Assets	Asset Growth	Loan Growth	Construction Loans/Assets
-4	-1.54 (-4.44)	0.60 (1.38)	-0.08 (-0.12)	1.06 (2.11)
-3	-1.41 (-4.48)	1.63 (0.79)	1.02 (0.61)	0.60 (1.06)
-2	-1.47 (-4.45)	-0.23 (-0.49)	0.94 (1.25)	0.94 (1.73)
-1	-1.81 (-5.46)	1.50 (1.77)	-0.38 (-0.44)	1.21 (2.09)
0	<b>7.47</b> <b>(10.43)</b>	<b>9.82</b> <b>(8.13)</b>	<b>2.88</b> <b>(3.35)</b>	<b>0.78</b> <b>(1.30)</b>
1	6.95 (10.18)	0.84 (1.24)	5.50 (6.92)	1.50 (2.41)
2	6.40 (9.50)	2.27 (2.84)	3.16 (2.78)	1.67 (2.63)
3	5.72 (8.52)	2.42 (2.98)	2.59 (3.33)	1.58 (2.59)
4	5.75 (9.96)	0.67 (0.69)	0.89 (0.99)	1.08 (1.55)
5	4.87 (8.88)	1.70 (2.67)	1.96 (2.87)	2.30 (2.89)
6	4.18 (7.25)	3.08 (2.30)	2.38 (1.73)	2.70 (4.06)
7	3.98 (6.80)	0.39 (0.59)	-0.56 (-0.80)	3.05 (3.95)
8	3.49 (5.80)	1.80 (1.28)	1.38 (0.79)	2.77 (3.49)
9	3.25 (5.47)	1.28 (0.91)	2.56 (0.88)	1.95 (2.36)
10	3.03 (5.27)	0.51 (0.47)	0.93 (0.85)	2.12 (2.86)
11	2.19 (3.77)	-2.00 (-3.80)	-1.09 (-1.56)	2.44 (3.50)
12	1.80 (3.29)	-0.59 (-0.98)	-1.59 (-2.66)	1.47 (1.88)

Table 6 shows that converted banks were able to earn very favorable net interest margins (NIMs) after conversion to stock form. This was due to declines in interest expense, as well as increases in interest income. Interest expense declined primarily because of the increase in equity capi-

high-cost funding (see Figure 12) in the post-conversion period. The increase in interest income was attributable to the large increases in loans after conversion. Prior to year-end 1987, banks were able to treat all fees and points associated with loans as part of current interest and fee

**Table 5**  
**Comparison of the Converted and Peer Banks' Profitability**  
**Mean Ratio Differences (t Statistics), Annualized Profit Rates**

Number of Quarters from Conversion	Return on Assets	Return on Equity
-4	-0.29 (-2.38)	-0.02 (-0.01)
-3	-0.02 (-0.13)	3.55 (1.86)
-2	-0.32 (-2.09)	-1.94 (-0.92)
-1	-0.42 (-2.45)	-4.06 (-1.43)
<b>0</b>	<b>-0.03</b> <b>(-0.33)</b>	<b>-6.18</b> <b>(-6.21)</b>
1	0.13 (1.51)	-5.05 (-5.44)
2	0.005 (0.03)	-5.26 (-4.54)
3	-0.09 (-0.52)	-5.41 (-3.97)
4	-0.08 (-0.44)	-5.95 (-2.68)
5	0.07 (0.59)	-2.47 (-2.21)
6	-0.11 (-0.44)	-3.01 (-1.68)
7	-0.28 (-1.43)	-6.41 (-2.48)
8	-0.29 (-1.34)	-4.82 (-2.43)
9	-0.55 (-1.49)	-9.10 (-1.84)
10	-0.46 (-2.36)	-7.84 (-2.95)
11	-2.06 (-1.84)	-1426.06* (-1.01)
12	-0.70 (-2.28)	-8.78 (-1.69)

\* This large value resulted from one converted bank's ROE.

**Table 6**  
**Comparison of the Converted and Peer Banks' Income and Expenses**  
**Mean Annualized Differences in Rates as a Percent of Assets (t Statistics)**

Number of Quarters from Conversion	Net Interest Margins	Loss Provisions	Net Noninterest Income
-4	0.02 (0.11)	0.12 (1.77)	0.06 (0.55)
-3	-0.12 (-0.84)	0.05 (1.39)	0.11 (0.81)
-2	-0.04 (-0.33)	0.05 (2.59)	0.07 (0.65)
-1	0.05 (0.34)	0.05 (1.86)	0.17 (1.99)
<b>0</b>	<b>0.09</b> <b>(0.51)</b>	<b>0.02</b> <b>(0.75)</b>	<b>-0.04</b> <b>(-0.25)</b>
1	0.55 (4.95)	0.03 (1.20)	0.21 (2.11)
2	0.33 (2.52)	0.04 (1.73)	0.06 (0.59)
3	0.22 (1.40)	0.21 (1.38)	0.01 (0.10)
4	0.34 (2.32)	0.30 (1.60)	-0.003 (-0.03)
5	0.29 (2.87)	0.07 (0.89)	0.01 (0.14)
6	0.24 (2.45)	0.10 (0.94)	-0.01 (-0.06)
7	0.33 (3.71)	0.36 (2.33)	0.17 (1.81)
8	0.22 (1.97)	0.44 (2.11)	0.11 (1.10)
9	0.34 (2.71)	0.80 (2.31)	0.25 (1.51)
10	0.09 (1.04)	0.47 (3.25)	0.21 (1.50)
11	-0.005 (-0.04)	1.83 (1.87)	0.35 (1.60)
12	0.08 (0.79)	0.60 (2.11)	0.22 (1.52)

income (interest income).<sup>40</sup> Because the majority of conversions in the sample occurred in 1986, the large increases in real-estate loans subsequent to conversions generated high fee income for mortgage lenders.

<sup>40</sup>The treatment of fee income on loans changed with Financial Accounting Standards Board Statement 91 (FASB-91), Accounting for Nonrefundable Fees and Costs Associated with Originating or Acquiring Loans and Indirect Costs of Leases. FASB-91 required banks to amortize most of the fee income associated with mortgage lending.

## APPENDIX B

### Required Returns to Common Stockholders

#### Expected Earnings Growth Estimates

The previous sections looked at the strategies used by the converted savings banks to improve profitability (ROEs). We were able to determine, *ex post*, that strategic plans focused upon leveraged asset growth. It also would be interesting to know what shareholders' *ex ante* expectations were regarding strategic plans and the effect of those plans upon bank earnings. This section used market data on converted banks' common stock prices along with their financial data (income statements and balance sheets) to address these questions. First, share prices and financial statements were used to obtain estimates of expected earnings growth rates, *i.e.*, expected growth rates in net income to common stockholders. Second, these expected earnings growth rates were related to banks' profitability and asset levels in order to make inferences about expected asset growth rates. The methodology used to obtain expected earnings growth rates is that presented by Ben-Horim and Callen (1989). The results of that analysis are presented next, followed by a description of the Ben-Horim and Callen methodology.

<sup>41</sup> Daily stock returns over a three-year period subsequent to conversions were available for 24 of the institutions in the original group of 54 converted savings banks. Daily returns were compounded to obtain actual quarterly returns. The median quarterly returns were then compounded to obtain annualized values.

<sup>42</sup> It should be noted that a portion of the poor post-conversion return performance may be due to the general stock market "crash" of October 1987. Although the October 1987 market crash would explain poor returns for year-end 1987, poor performance in other periods should be determined primarily by bank performance.

### Expected Earnings Growth Rates

Shareholders' expectations of future earnings are generally reflected in common share prices and returns. As shown in Figure 13, converted banks' common stock returns fell soon after conversion. Figure 13 presents the trend in the median return on common shares of a sample of 24 converted New England savings banks. The 24 savings banks were selected from the 54 banks used in the financial trend analysis.<sup>41</sup> Initially, the performance of converted savings banks appeared

attractive. However, returns dropped quickly after conversion and remained poor for most of the post-conversion period shown in Figure 13.<sup>42</sup>

The poor earnings expectations were reflected in estimates of expected earnings growth rates. Figure 14 shows the trends in expected earnings growth rates for a small group of converted savings banks. This group is a subset of the 24 converted banks whose share returns are shown in Figure 13. Earnings data were not available for all 24 banks in every quarter, but were available for seven of the

Figure 13  
Median Common Stock Returns (Annualized)  
Converted New England Savings Banks





Figure 14  
Median Expected Earnings Growth Rates (Annualized)  
Converted New England Savings Banks





original 24 banks. As Figure 14 shows, the expected earnings growth rates for this group declined over the post-conversion period.

### *Expected Asset Growth Rates*

In order to relate the expected earnings growth rates to expectations about converted banks' asset growth strategies, one can look at the relationships between overall profitability, asset growth, and resulting earnings growth. While there is no formal model for relating earnings expectations to banks' strategic plans, inferences were made based upon bank performance. The expected total earnings as of the end of the period can be expressed as the product of the expected return on end-of-period assets (ROA), and the end-of-period asset level.<sup>43</sup>

$$E_1 = (ROA_1) * (Assets_1)$$

If the overall profit rate on bank assets (ROA) is expected to remain constant over time, then the expected earnings growth rate will be the same as that for total assets. If, however, the ROA is expected to decline, then the expected earnings growth rate will be less than that for assets.<sup>44</sup> This latter situation can explain the declining expected earnings growth rates observed in Figure 14.

The declining expected earnings growth rates shown in Figure 14 are in agreement with the relatively high asset growth rates in Figure 6. To see this more clearly, consider the following example. Suppose a bank's ROA declines from 0.8 percent to 0.7 percent. Suppose also that the bank's

<sup>43</sup> The return on assets can be defined as the ratio of net income to either average assets for the period or end-of-period assets. Average assets are the preferred denominator, because an average asset value is more reflective of the asset level which existed over the period to generate earnings. Period-end assets are used in this paper in order to simplify the discussion. Moreover, because quarterly data are used, the difference between period-end and average asset levels should not be large.

<sup>44</sup> For infinitesimally small changes in ROA and assets, the percentage change in earnings will equal the sum of the percentage changes in ROA and assets.

assets increase from \$100 million to \$120 million over the period. This would result in an asset growth rate of 20 percent, yet the earnings growth rate is only five percent. If, however, assets had increased to only \$110 million (ten percent), the earnings growth rate would be -3.8 percent. Therefore, the trends in expected earnings growth rates shown in Figure 14 are consistent with the hypothesis that shareholders anticipated moderate leveraged asset growth to offset a portion of the adverse impact that weakening ROAs had upon earnings growth rates.

Overall profitability among both converted and peer savings banks did decline in the late 1980s and early 1990s (see Figure 6). We do not have estimates of expected ROAs, nor expected asset growth. However, it seems reasonable to expect that shareholders of the converted savings banks were aware of the need for leveraged asset growth to bolster profit rates on equity capital (ROEs). In addition, shareholders also should have been aware of the adverse impact of the regional recession, as well as the weakening real-estate market upon savings banks' overall profitability. Therefore, if ROAs were expected to decline, the expected growth rates in earnings for a given quarter would be less than the expected growth rates in total assets.

### *Estimating Expected Earnings Growth*

Standard economic theory states that market value of any financial claim is equal to the present discounted value of the stream of earnings the claim is expected to generate. The discount rate used to value expected earnings can alternatively be thought of as investors' required rate of return or the firm's funding cost. Because actual earnings may differ from expectations, the required rate of return is also an expected rate of return. Given an expected earnings stream, investors in debt or equity instruments adjust market prices so that the instrument will yield the required

rate of return. The cost of common equity capital is, therefore, the discount rate that investors use to value expected dividends. Equation 1 gives the standard expression for the present value of a firm's stock. To simplify the presentation a firm index is not used in equation 1, leaving implicit the knowledge that all terms vary across firms.

In this equation,  $V_0$  is the current market share price of a firm's common stock,  $d_t$  is the expected value, at time  $t$ , of dividends to be received at time  $t$ , and  $k_t$  is the expected rate of return on the firm's stock over period  $t-1$  to  $t$ .

$$1) V_0 = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{d_t}{(1+k_t)^t}$$

Equation 1 permits a firm's required returns to vary over time. While this may be theoretically appealing, the analysis is greatly simplified if one assumes a constant discount rate over time. This constant rate would be an average of the time-dependent rates. Even with this simplification, it is not possible to obtain estimates of the required rate of return from equation 1 without knowledge of the expected dividend stream. If one assumes, for simplicity, that dividends (earnings) grow at a constant expected rate,  $g$ , equation 1 is further simplified as equations 2 and 3.

$$2) V_0 = \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} \frac{d_0(1+g)^t}{(1+k)^t}$$

or

$$3) V_0 = \frac{d_1}{(k-g)}$$

From equation 3, one obtains the common expression (equation 4) for the required return on common equity capital as the sum of the expected dividend yield plus expected growth rate in earnings.

$$4) k = \frac{d_1}{V_0} + g$$

Estimation of equation 4 is made difficult by the need to project not only next period's earnings and divi-

dends, but also the future growth rate in earnings. Ben-Horim and Callen (1989) show that it is possible to avoid the need to estimate  $g$  by introducing stock market data on firm value into equation 4. Specifically, Ben-Horim and Callen introduce Tobin's  $q$ , the ratio of the market value of a firm to the replacement cost of its assets (equation 5).

$$5) \quad q = \frac{V_0 + D_0}{RC}$$

In equation 5, the market value of the firm is defined as the sum of the present value of common stock plus the present value of all other claims on the firm's earnings and assets (preferred stock and debt, denoted  $D_0$ ). The replacement cost of assets is denoted as  $RC$ . If factor markets are competitive, replacement costs will equal the present value of the expected earnings generated by assets. In order to simplify the analysis further, Ben-Horim and Callen assume that any invested capital will earn a constant expected rate of return,  $r$ . Under these assumptions, factor markets value firm assets in the same way one would a perpetuity. Thus, the re-

placement cost of assets is equal to the ratio of expected total earnings in the next period,  $E_1$ , to  $r$ . Under these assumptions Tobin's  $q$  for the levered firm can be rewritten as:

$$6) \quad q = \frac{V_0 + D_0}{\frac{E_1}{r} + D_0}$$

Ben-Horim and Callen next introduce the firm's dividend and internal investment decisions into the analysis by assuming that the firm reinvests a constant proportion of earnings,  $b$ , each period. It is easy to show that with this reinvestment policy, the expected growth rate in earnings,  $g$ , equals the product of the retention rate times the expected rate of return on invested capital, *i.e.*,  $br$ . Under these assumptions, the required rate of return on equity capital can be expressed as a function of the firm's expected earnings, reinvestment rate, and the rate of return on invested capital.

$$7) \quad k = \frac{(1-b) E_1}{V_0} + br$$

Rewriting  $r$  in terms of Tobin's  $q$ , equation 7 becomes:

$$8) \quad k = \frac{(1-b)E_1}{V_0} + (b) \frac{E_1 q}{V_0 + D_0(1-q)}$$

or

$$9) \quad k = \left[ 1-b + \frac{bqV_0}{V_0 + D_0(1-q)} \right] \frac{E_1}{V_0}$$

Ben-Horim and Callen state that estimation of required returns using equation 9 is made easier by the fact that one can avoid estimation of growth in earnings by using information on current market values, replacement costs, and earnings. This is clearly seen in the expression for the growth rate implied by equation 9.

$$10) \quad g = (E_1) \frac{bq}{V_0 + D_0(1-q)}$$

Because the expected value of earnings in the next period equals this period's earnings times one plus the growth rate, equation 10 simplifies to:

$$11) \quad \frac{g}{(1+g)} = (E_0) \frac{bq}{V_0 + D_0(1-q)}$$

One may, therefore, solve for the growth rate in earnings implied by equation 10 using current market information.

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# Recent Cutbacks in Construction Lending at BIF-Insured Depository Institutions

by James L. Freund and Maureen C. Crowley\*

The topic of the “credit crunch” received considerable attention during the early 1990s. As a result, several initiatives aimed at eliminating regulatory disincentives to lending were put in place. For example, documentation requirements recently were reduced to the legal minimum for loans to small and medium-sized businesses. Also, examiners and bankers were encouraged to emphasize the character and general reputation of borrowers when considering such credits.<sup>1</sup> In the academic arena, several studies have examined the recent portfolio adjustments of insured financial institutions to identify possible financial and/or regulatory constraints to the flow of credit. For instance, Hancock and Wilcox (1992) studied permanent single-family and commercial loans. Peek and Rosengren (1993) examined “bank dependent loans,” and Bizer (1993) analyzed commercial and industrial loans, as well as “100 percent risk-weight” loans.

This article reports on the role of BIF-insured commercial and savings banks in the provision of construction and development credit to the real-estate industry. Insured depositories traditionally have been a key source for construction and development credit, especially for small builders and developers. Established cus-

tom relationships with local financial institutions have been important in ensuring a timely flow of such credit. Thus, any disruption in construction credit from banks is likely to be difficult to replace in the short run.

This article documents the sharp decline in aggregate construction lending on the books of BIF-insured institutions during the 1990-1992 period. Lending patterns varied widely across regions and between categories of banks. A regression analysis is presented that quantified the relative importance of the different factors that determined whether an institution’s construction loan portfolio was shrinking. An institution’s profitability, capital position, and recent experience with construction lending were the strongest factors in determining whether, and by how much, lending was cut back. In contrast, various tests to capture the influence of real-estate market developments that might affect demand factors did not yield statistically significant results.

## *The Recent Decline in Construction and Development Lending*

As shown in Figure 1, construction loans on the books of BIF-insured commercial and savings banks in-

creased rapidly from just under \$40 billion at year-end 1980 to nearly \$150 billion at year-end 1989. Because construction cost increases were relatively modest during the period, this increase represented a substantial rise in real activity funded. During the next three years, however, such credits fell by 45 percent, to just over \$80 billion at the end of 1992. While construction costs moderated in the early 1990s, most of the decline represented a decrease in projects funded.<sup>2</sup>

### *Individual Bank Data*


The study utilized data from individual bank Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports) to examine the rapid decline in construction lending from the second quarter of 1990

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<sup>1</sup> See *Inter-Agency Policy Statement on Credit Availability*, FDIC, PR 20-93. Joint release 3/10/93.

<sup>2</sup> The non-residential fixed-investment implicit price deflator (1987=100) rose 14 percent between 1982-1991; the implicit price deflator for residential investment grew 31 percent during the same period. Non-residential investment prices actually declined one percent from 1991-1992, and residential investment prices rose only 1.4 percent in that period. Data are from the Bureau of Economic Statistics, U.S. Department of Commerce.


**Figure 1**  
**Construction Loans Held by BIF-Insured Institutions**  
**(End-of-Period Balance: 1980-1992:Q4)**



through the third quarter of 1992. The study included banks in continuous operation that had construction loans on their books at either the beginning or the end of the designated

period. Because the study focused on the amount of credit supplied by the banking system as a whole, institutions that were involved in mergers during the period were included in

**Figure 2**  
**Median Change in Construction Loans Held by**  
**BIF-Insured Institutions in Continuous Operation**  
**(1990:Q1-1992:Q3)**



the sample. A merger-adjustment procedure was used in which construction loans for currently-operating, BIF-insured institutions that acquired another bank or a thrift were compared to the sum of such loans at their constituent institutions at the beginning of the period. Both unassisted mergers and acquisitions of failed banks and thrifts during the period were included.

The Call Report data have two limitations. First, direct data on net credit extensions are not available. Thus, construction lending activity must be estimated by subtracting the stock of loans at the end of a period from that at the beginning, and adding back any charge-offs taken during the period.<sup>3</sup> A second drawback is that the data do not separate commercial and residential construction lending.

Given those caveats, Figure 2 shows while aggregate bank lending declined, not every bank cut back on construction lending. Indeed, both ends of the distribution were highly populated, with high proportions of banks experiencing both sharp increases and decreases during the period. Overall, 46 percent of BIF-insured commercial and savings banks experienced a decline in construction credit; the remaining 54 percent had a higher volume of such loans in 1992:Q3 than in 1990:Q1.

**Banks with Reduced Construction Loans.** The more than 4,400 institutions that had reduced adjusted construction credits outstanding at the end of the period were typically larger banks with relatively heavy initial concentrations of such lending. These banks (and the institutions

<sup>3</sup> Charge-offs are accounting adjustments to a period-end balance sheet that reduce a bank's loan balances in recognition that the loan is likely to default. If this adjustment is not added back in, calculated net credit extensions would be understated. Adjustments were not made for other factors affecting changes in the stock of loans on the books over any period — net loan sales and writedowns of loan balances at foreclosure — because data do not exist at the necessary level of detail.

they acquired) accounted for 85 percent of total construction lending in early 1990. By the end of the period under study construction loans on their books, after adjustment for charge-offs, had dropped by \$64 billion. Twenty-one large banks accounted for a large portion of the total reduction. Each of these institutions experienced a reduction of \$500 million or more during the period; the decline in construction lending at these institutions totaled \$24 billion.

The subsequent failure of institutions that played key roles in construction loan markets in 1990 had a

significant influence on declines in overall lending. Commercial banks and savings banks that were operating in 1992 absorbed 418 failed thrifts and banks during the period under study. The median change in construction credit for the combined institutions was -48 percent. These institutions accounted for 40 percent (\$25 billion) of the overall decline in construction lending.

**Banks with Increased Construction Lending.** Over half of the BIF-insured institutions that were making construction loans in the third quarter of 1992 had more loan volume on their

books (after adjustment for charge-offs) than in early 1990. More than 3,000 banks at least doubled their lending during that period — 1,000 of these institutions had construction loans on their books in 1992 that were not in the market three years earlier.


Banks with a higher volume of construction loans on their books accounted for \$8.6 billion in increased construction lending. This increase was dwarfed, however, by the \$64 billion decline in construction lending among institutions that cut back.

**Characteristics of Gainers and Losers**


Both popular discussions and academic work have focused on several key factors in discussing lending changes at banks during the so-called “credit crunch” period. Figures 3 through 5, which illustrate some of these factors, show that lending behavior was anything but uniform.

Figure 3 shows regional differences.<sup>4</sup> Commercial and savings banks in the Northeast experienced a sharp decline in construction loans on their books. The median change in adjusted construction loans in the Northeast was -35 percent, and two-thirds of the institutions experienced declines. In the Southwest the median change was -3 percent. At least half of the banks in all other regions increased construction lending. In fact, in the Central and Midwest regions the median change exceeded 40 percent. It should be noted, however,

**Figure 3**  
**Change in Construction Loans at BIF-Insured Institutions by Region (1990:Q1-1992:Q3)**



**Proportion of Institutions with Reduced Construction Lending**



<sup>4</sup>The regional definitions are as follows:

*Northeast* - Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Vermont.

*Southeast* - Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia.

*Central* - Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin.

*Midwest* - Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota.

*Southwest* - Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Texas.

*West* - Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, Pacific Islands, Utah, Washington, Wyoming.

that a significant proportion of the institutions in all regions also recorded declines (lower panel, Figure 3).

Figure 4 illustrates the often-observed notion that capital shortages act generally as a deterrent to lending — and particularly to riskier credits such as construction loans. The median change among the 300 institutions in the sample that had less than 4 percent equity capital in 1990:Q1 was -39 percent. About 2,500 banks with initial capital-to-asset ratios between 4 percent and 7 percent had a median change in construction loans held of -9 percent. Many well-capital-


ized institutions increased construction loan portfolios sharply. Among the 6,400 banks with initial capital ratios between 7 percent and 15 percent, the median change was a positive 23 percent. Half of the banks with capital in excess of 15 percent more than doubled their lending.

Banks with heavy concentrations of real-estate lending in early 1990 — and those with high proportions of delinquent real-estate loans — subsequently were likely to cut back on construction lending. For the 4,000 banks that started the period with more than 30 percent of their portfolio

in real-estate assets, the median change was -3 percent. In contrast, the 181 banks that had less than 5 percent of their assets in real-estate lending as of 1990:Q1 aggressively pursued construction loans, with half of these institutions more than tripling their holdings by 1992:Q3 (Figure 5).

The collapse of many commercial real-estate markets and mounting economic difficulties saddled many banks with problem real-estate loans in early 1990. As shown in Figure 6, the median change in construction lending for banks reporting no problem real-estate loans (90 days or more past due or in nonaccrual status) was an increase of 38 percent.<sup>5</sup> In contrast, institutions in the sample (representing just over 30 percent of total assets) with more than 5 percent of their real-estate loans in difficulty reduced their construction lending sharply during the period. At the extreme, those banks reporting 15 percent or more of their real-estate loan portfolio as troubled had a median change of -39 percent. Even among the best-capitalized institutions at least 40 percent of the institutions cut back during the 1990-1992 period.

**Figure 4**  
**Change in Construction Loans at BIF-Insured Institutions**  
**by Equity Capital**  
**(1990:Q1-1992:Q3)**




### *A Model of Bank Construction Lending*


A model was constructed to identify, and determine the relative importance of, the various influences on construction lending at BIF-insured institutions in the early 1990s. The model was based on the premise that banks allocate a desired share of their portfolio to construction loans, given their level of assets. Because it is not possible to adjust an institution's portfolio instantaneously, only part of the desired adjustment of construction loans on the books is likely to be made during any given period.

<sup>5</sup> Nonperforming loans are classified as 90 days or more past due if they are well-secured and in process of collection. Otherwise, their status must be designated as nonaccrual.

**Figure 5**  
**Change in Construction Loans at**  
**BIF-Insured Institutions,**  
**by Initial Real-Estate Lending Concentration**  
**(1990:Q1-1992:Q3)**



**Figure 6**  
**Change in Construction Loans at**  
**BIF-Insured Institutions,**  
**by Initial Troubled Real-Estate Loans Held**



Thus, the construction loans (CL) on the books at the end of any given period, after adjustment for charge-offs, are likely to be the last period's stock of such loans plus or minus a fraction,  $\beta$ , of the difference between today's desired level ( $CL^*$ ) and last period's actual level:

$$(1) CL_t = CL_{t-1} + \beta (CL_t^* - CL_{t-1})$$

The desired stock of construction loans in period  $t$  is posited to be a target proportion of total assets. The target proportion is addressed in this study, while the level of assets is taken as given. Thus,

$$(2) CL_t^* = (CL_t / ASSETS_t) * (ASSETS_t)$$

Given the focus of this study on explaining changes in lending, equation (4) was derived by substituting equation (2) into equation (1) and rearranging terms in equation (3). After scaling the results, equation (5) explains the change in construction loans during a period relative to assets at the end of the period. It is posited that in any period the

relative change in construction lending is: 1) positively related to that period's desired portfolio concentration in construction lending and 2) negatively related to last period's construction loans relative to today's level of total assets.

$$(3) CL_t = CL_{t-1} + \beta (CL_t / ASSETS_t)^* (ASSETS_t) - \beta CL_{t-1}$$

$$(4) CL_t - CL_{t-1} = \beta (CL_t / ASSETS_t)^* (ASSETS_t) - \beta CL_{t-1}$$

$$(5) \frac{(CL_t - CL_{t-1})}{ASSETS_t} = \beta (CL_t / ASSETS_t)^* - \beta (CL_{t-1} / ASSETS_t)$$

A fully specified model of the target proportion of assets allocated to construction loans would incorporate the returns and risks to construction lending relative to all other assets. This paper estimates a reduced-form approach to identifying the major influences on the desired role of construction lending in bank portfolios.



Several characteristics of a bank and its portfolio are likely to have affected a bank's desired construction loan portfolio during the early 1990s. First, a bank's capital position is a key determinant of its ability and willingness to book relatively risky assets such as construction loans.<sup>6</sup> On the one hand, the better the initial capital position of the bank, the more likely that it would be willing and able to take on relatively risky investments such as construction lending. On the other hand, poorly capitalized banks may decide they should take chances to "gamble" their way back to health — the well-known "moral hazard" argument. Studies conducted at the FDIC suggest that the effect of capital positions on lending also can be tempered by the profitability of the bank.<sup>7</sup> For instance, highly capitalized banks that are temporarily experiencing earnings problems may lend less-aggressively than profitable, highly capitalized institutions.

Second, many have argued that the adverse developments in real-estate markets in the late 1980s led to a negative perception regarding real-estate investments in the early 1990s. Thus, institutions with high concentrations of construction loans in the early 1990s reportedly were under pressure — from existing stockholders, potential sources of new capital, and/or regulators — to reduce their concentrations of such loans regardless of other economic factors. In addition, institutions that had a high proportion of nonperforming real-estate loans would be less inclined, *ceteris paribus*, to make new construction loans.

In order to understand the "credit crunch," it is important to separate restricted supply of credit from lower demand. Lack of data is a serious obstacle to identifying shifts in demand for construction loans. Nonetheless, this paper attempts to identify local economic conditions that should affect banks' construction loan portfolios. Because construction loans for residential and commercial projects are combined in the bank

data, developments likely to affect loan demand in both sectors of real-estate markets were included.

These factors were incorporated into equation (5), yielding the following relationship:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (6) \quad & \frac{(CL_t - CL_{t-1})}{ASSETS_t} + \alpha_0 \\
 & + \alpha_1 (CAPITAL/ASSETS)_{t-1} \\
 & + \alpha_2 (AVERAGE RETURN ON ASSETS)_{t, t-1} \\
 & - \alpha_3 (CL/ASSETS)_{t-1} \\
 & - \alpha_4 (NONPERFORMING REAL-ESTATE LOANS)_{t-1} \\
 & + \alpha_5 (CONTEMPORANEOUS REAL-ESTATE \\
 & \quad DEMAND INDICATORS)_{t, t-1} \\
 & - \beta (CL_{t-1}/ASSETS_t) \\
 & + \mu
 \end{aligned}$$

### Empirical Tests

The estimation of the equation was complicated by two factors regarding the final term,  $(CL_{t-1}/ASSETS_t)$ , which was introduced into the model when the first difference/partial adjustment framework was adopted. First, the equation also includes a term to capture the independent negative influence of high concentrations of construction lending in the initial period. Because the two terms are likely to be highly collinear, the initial concentration variable was omitted. It is likely that the remaining term will capture some of the influence of the omitted variable. Second, the fact that the final term is imbedded, arithmetically, in the dependent variable suggests that contemporaneous correlation may be a problem, thereby further complicating the interpretation of the results.

Moreover, the equation that was estimated added several independent variables to the basic model to account for non-economic factors. First, a dummy variable was added to identify institutions that acquired a failed bank or thrift during the period. Because the data were adjusted for mergers, this variable should identify any negative effect on the combined entity's portfolio resulting from the un-

willingness of the acquirer to assume the failed institution's construction loans. Acquirers often choose not to take all of the assets of a failed institution. Second, a set of dummy variables was included to distinguish among charter types of the BIF-insured institutions. If, as some have claimed, supervisory pressure acted to discourage real-estate lending, any differences among federal regulatory agencies with regard to such actions would be identified by these variables. Because a dummy variable for FDIC-supervised savings banks was omitted, the included dummy variables measure regulator-specific differences relative to savings banks.

Because it is virtually impossible to isolate the relevant market areas a bank serves for construction lending, two basic tests were conducted. First, the model was tested for all banks that were active during the period 1990:Q1 to 1992:Q3, without regard

<sup>6</sup> Hancock and Wilcox, in particular, discuss the role of capital position thoroughly.

<sup>7</sup> For a discussion of the interaction between profitability, capital position, and loan growth, see O'Keefe (1993).

to specific real-estate market influences that might differentially affect demand for construction loans. Second, a subset was selected consisting of institutions that were located in the 50 major metropolitan areas for which detailed data on both residential and commercial real-estate markets were available.

**All Banks.** The results explaining the change in construction lending between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q3 for the 9,563 BIF-insured depository institutions that were active construction lenders are reported in Table 1. The dependent variable was the change in construction loans on an institution's books, after adding back charge-offs, divided by total assets in 1992:Q3.<sup>8</sup>

As for the independent variables, profitability was measured by the average return on assets during the entire period. Troubled real-estate lending at a bank was captured by the proportion of real-estate loans in 1990:Q1 that was either 90 days or more past due or in nonaccrual status. The lag term initially was measured as the ratio of construction loans on the books in 1990:Q1 to total assets in 1992:Q3.

The capital position of a bank was entered as the equity capital-to-total

assets ratio as of 1990:Q1. Subsequent tests used an estimate of each institution's surplus or deficit capital position relative to its leverage capital requirement.<sup>9</sup> The estimated required level was based on the bank's overall CAMEL rating and general guidelines followed by examiners at federal bank regulatory agencies on the corresponding capital needed. While both measures yielded significant results, the latter variable was somewhat stronger. Thus, only the results for the capital surplus variable are reported here.<sup>10</sup>

The basic results are reported in line (1) of Table 1. Standard errors are reported below each coefficient. As hypothesized, both profitability and capital positions had significant, positive effects on construction lending. Banks with problem real-estate assets were less likely to increase holdings of such loans.

The acquisition of a failed bank or thrift during the period was associated with subsequent cutbacks in construction lending, after adjusting for the effects of the merger. Also noteworthy was the relative effect of different regulators. Statistical tests suggest the coefficient for national banks was significantly lower than for

both state member and nonmember banks, but the coefficients for the two regulators of state banks were not significantly different from each other.

Large reductions in subsequent construction lending were statistically correlated with high initial holdings of construction loans. The .57 coefficient represented a reasonable partial adjustment factor. However, this variable, as suggested above, also captured the independent, negative effect of high initial holdings of construction loans in a period of severe difficulty for such assets. The rather high adjusted R<sup>2</sup> was greatly influenced by the inclusion of this very significant variable and by its probable role in contemporaneous correlation in the estimated equation.

<sup>8</sup> Direct data on such charge-offs are available for construction loans, starting in 1991. The adjustment factor for the three quarters of 1990 under study was estimated by applying the ratio of construction loan charge-offs to total real-estate charge-offs in 1991 to total real-estate charge-offs during 1990.

<sup>9</sup> As calculated by John O'Keefe of the FDIC's staff.

<sup>10</sup> For a more detailed discussion of measures of a bank's capital position relative to its "desired level" or target level, see Hancock and Wilcox (1992).

Table 1  
Changes in Construction Lending: Full Sample Results

	Constant	Capital			Lag/Concentration				Charter Type <sup>d</sup>			Region <sup>d</sup>		Adj. R <sup>2</sup>
		Surplus Deficit <sup>a</sup>	Avg. ROA <sup>b</sup>	Troubled Real-Estate Loans <sup>a</sup> (%)	Const. Loans <sup>a</sup> /Assets <sup>c</sup>	Greater Than .10 <sup>d</sup>	Less Than .01 <sup>d</sup>	Acquired Failed Inst. <sup>d</sup>	Nat. Bank	State, Fed Member	State, Non-Member	South-West	West	
(1)	0.006 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	+0.02 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	+0.08 <sup>c</sup> (0.01)	-0.07 <sup>c</sup> (0.006)	-0.57 <sup>c</sup> (0.006)	—	—	-0.004 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	+0.004 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	+0.008 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	+0.006 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	—	—	.56
(2)	-0.011 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	+0.03 <sup>c</sup> (0.003)	+0.28 <sup>c</sup> (0.01)	-0.09 <sup>c</sup> (0.01)	—	-0.068 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	+0.004 <sup>f</sup> (0.001)	-0.008 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	+0.004 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	+0.008 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	+0.005 <sup>c</sup>	—	—	.28
(3)	-0.011 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	+0.03 <sup>c</sup> (0.003)	+0.28 <sup>c</sup> (0.01)	-0.10 <sup>c</sup> (0.01)	—	-0.071 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	+0.005 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	-0.008 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	+0.001 (0.002)	+0.005 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	+0.003 <sup>f</sup> (0.001)	+0.004 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	+0.013 <sup>c</sup>	.29
(4)	-0.006 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	+0.03 <sup>c</sup> (0.01)	+0.28 <sup>c</sup> (0.01)	-0.10 <sup>c</sup> (0.01)	—	0.068 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	+0.004 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	-0.008 <sup>c</sup> (0.0020)	+0.0004 (0.002)	+0.004 <sup>f</sup> (0.002)	+0.002 (0.001)	—	—	.28

<sup>a</sup> 90:Q1

<sup>b</sup> 90:Q2-92:Q3

<sup>c</sup> 92:Q3

<sup>d</sup> Dummy variables specification

<sup>e</sup> Significant at 99 percent confidence level

<sup>f</sup> Significant at 90 percent confidence level

Observations = 9,563

Table 2  
Changes in Construction Lending: Additional Hypotheses

	Constant	Capital Surplus Deficit <sup>a</sup>	Avg. ROA <sup>b</sup>	Troubled Real-Estate Loans <sup>a</sup> (%)	Lag/Concentration			Charter Type <sup>c</sup>			Region <sup>c</sup>		Camel Rating <sup>c</sup>		Adj. R <sup>2</sup>
					Greater Than .10 <sup>c</sup>	Less Than .01 <sup>c</sup>	Acquired Failed Inst. <sup>c</sup>	Nat. Bank	State, Fed Member	State, Non-Member	South-West	West	Avg. Camel Rating	Incr. Camel Rating <sup>f</sup>	
(1)	-0.024 <sup>d</sup> (0.005)	+0.03 (0.05)	+0.40 <sup>d</sup> (0.06)	-0.09 <sup>d</sup> (0.03)	-0.050 <sup>d</sup> (0.005)	+0.010 <sup>c</sup> (0.005)	-0.006 <sup>c</sup> (0.004)	-0.002 (0.005)	+0.008 (0.006)	+0.014 <sup>d</sup> (0.006)	+0.021 (0.007)	+0.009 <sup>c</sup> (0.005)	—	—	.48
(2)	-0.008 <sup>d</sup> (0.002)	+0.03 <sup>d</sup> (0.003)	+0.24 <sup>d</sup> (0.01)	-0.10 <sup>d</sup> (0.01)	-0.073 <sup>d</sup> (0.002)	+0.004 <sup>d</sup> (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	+0.001 (0.002)	+0.006 <sup>d</sup> (0.002)	+0.003 <sup>c</sup> (0.002)	+0.003 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	+0.013 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	—	—	.25
(3)	-0.024 <sup>d</sup> (0.003)	+0.05 <sup>d</sup> (0.01)	+0.35 <sup>d</sup> (0.02)	-0.11 <sup>d</sup> (0.01)	-0.067 <sup>d</sup> (0.002)	+0.005 <sup>d</sup> (0.001)	— (0.002)	-0.003 (0.002)	+0.005 <sup>d</sup> (0.002)	+0.002 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	+0.001 <sup>c</sup> (0.001)	+0.011 <sup>d</sup> (0.001)	+0.005 <sup>d</sup> (0.001)	+0.004 <sup>d</sup> (0.001)	.27

<sup>a</sup> 90:Q1

<sup>b</sup> 90:Q2-92:Q3

<sup>c</sup> Dummy variables specification

<sup>d</sup> Significant at 99 percent confidence level

<sup>e</sup> Significant at 90 percent confidence level

<sup>f</sup> 1990-1992

Observations: Equation (1): Assets >\$1 Billion ... 401

Equation (2): Assets <\$500 Million ... 8,892

Equation (3): No mergers ... 8,346

To mitigate this problem, the initial construction loan variable was replaced by two dummy variables to capture the high and low ends of the distribution of the variable. The high-concentration dummy identified all institutions with initial construction loans to current assets of ten percent or more (463 institutions with total assets of \$300 billion). The low-concentration dummy marked banks with less than one percent of total assets in construction loans (5,221 institutions with total assets of \$800 billion). The results of this alternative specification are reported in Table 1, row 2. As expected, high initial levels of construction loans were associated with subsequent reductions, while the opposite was true for banks with low concentrations. The change in specification increased the importance of the economic factors captured in the other coefficients; the sign on the constant term reversed. The explanatory power of the model declined significantly, with the adjusted R<sup>2</sup> falling to .28.

A set of regional dummy variables also was included to capture broad differences in economic conditions influencing construction lending. In the tests discussed below, specific local market conditions were examined in

areas in which suitable data existed. When dummy variables were included in the equation, only the coefficients for the Southwest and the West were statistically significant. The positive signs no doubt reflected the emerging recovery in many Southwestern states during the early 1990s from their difficulties in the mid-1980s, and the heavy building in key California markets in the early 1990s that led to current problems in commercial real-estate markets. An alternative specification in which dummy variables were included for only these two regions is reported in Table 1, row 4. In neither specification did the addition of the regional dummy variables appreciably improve the explanatory power of the equation.

**Other Hypotheses.** Several “credit crunch” studies have focused on a limited number of large banks. The considerable number of smaller banks that increased their construction lending suggests that this approach would be incomplete when studying construction lending. A variable capturing the size of the institution was tested to see if scale were a factor, but it was found to be insignificant (not shown). Table 2 reports the results of alternative tests in which the basic model was applied separately to large banks with initial assets over \$1 billion (row 1),

and small banks with initial assets of less than \$500 million (row 2).

The most notable differences for large banks are the lack of significance of initial capital position and the increased importance of profitability. The results also suggest that differentials among charter types are more important among large banks. When only larger institutions were considered, lending at national banks was not significantly different than at the omitted savings banks. In fact, in this test only state nonmember banks had significantly more construction lending. The negative effects of high initial construction loan holdings were smaller for large banks, but the positive effect on subsequent construction lending for banks with low initial lending also was stronger.<sup>11</sup> The results

<sup>11</sup> An inspection of those banks with the highest increases in construction lending suggested that a number of large banks that were aggressive construction lenders were predominantly foreign-owned. To the extent that such institutions respond to corporate needs of customers in their home country, they would not be affected by the same forces as domestic institutions. However, when a dummy variable was entered to distinguish the 136 banks in the sample that had at least 25 percent foreign ownership, it was statistically significant but negative.

for small banks were similar to the overall sample results.

It is possible that the influence of regulators on banks' construction lending would be exerted directly in the form of pressure not to make these types of loans. Bizer (1993) believes, alternatively, that the primary channel through which such regulatory pressure is exerted is by downgrading the supervisory classification of the institution that results from an unfavorable bank examination — the summary composite CAMEL rating for banks. To test for this effect, both the initial CAMEL rating of the bank and a dummy variable that took the value of 1 if the institution was downgraded during the period between 1990:Q1 and 1992:Q3 were included in the model.<sup>12</sup> In general, it might be expected that banks with either a high initial CAMEL rating or those "downgraded" (poorly-performing institutions) might be reticent about taking on new construction credits in a risky real-estate environment. On the other hand, a positive coefficient would suggest that a "moral hazard" problem caused poorly-managed institutions to engage in riskier lending and/or that better-managed banks chose not to make such loans given the troubled real-estate environment.

The results are shown in Table 2, row 3. Both low initial ratings and "downgradings" in ratings were associated with higher construction lending. These results do not support the Bizer hypothesis concerning the dampening effect of examinations on lending. Of course, in the case of ratings changes, the increase in lending could have caused the poorer review.

Alternatively, it has been argued that regulatory enforcement actions that inhibited construction lending were triggered by extremely poor capital positions.<sup>13</sup> To test this hypothesis, institutions with capital deficits or capital that exceeded their estimated leverage requirement by one percent or less in early 1990 were identified. When tested in conjunction with the model as specified, a

dummy variable denoting those banks did not have a significant effect on construction lending.

**Geographic Demand Factors.** To fully assess the significance of deteriorating financial conditions or regulatory actions that might have affected the availability of credit, account must be taken of real-estate market conditions that affected the demand for such loans. Unfortunately, it is impossible to define the geographic market areas for a given period for a given type of bank loan — primarily because information does not exist on the extent and location of out-of-area lending.

Some earlier studies attempted to address this problem by grouping states into broad regions. In this study the opposite approach was attempted. Instead of attempting to match demand indicators to banks, the model was applied to banks located in the 50 major real-estate markets for which the best commercial real-estate data existed. Data from Torto/Wheaton Research collected by CB Commercial were utilized for office-building and industrial-building activity, and from F.W. Dodge for retail markets. About 2,200 BIF-insured institutions located in the 50 major markets in 1992:Q3 were studied.

Differential demand for commercial construction loans was measured by the weighted average percentage growth in occupied floor space across three categories of commercial real estate — office, industrial, and retail — in each market during the 1990-1992 period. A similar weighted average of vacancy rates in 1990 also was used to gauge differential market conditions.<sup>14</sup> The percentage change in newly issued permits for residential construction was used to measure geographic differences in demand for housing construction credit.<sup>15</sup>

The test results are presented in Table 3. Results are reported in row 1 for the basic model applied to the smaller sample; the results were quite similar to the full sample of all banks nationwide. When initial construction lending was included, all vari-

ables were still significant. However, the coefficient on the initial capital position of the bank was larger. The dummy variables for charter type no longer were substantially different from each other. Results are presented in row 2 for the basic model using dummy variables for initial construction loan holdings to avoid contemporaneous correlation problems. The importance of initial capital position was enhanced in this specification, but the charter-type dummy variables were insignificant. All other variables were barely changed from the basic results nationwide.

The results of adding the market-specific real-estate variables are shown in Table 3, row 3. New construction lending at banks rose more rapidly in markets in which newly issued permits for residential construction were the strongest. This result held when it was tested in conjunction with the measures of commercial activity or when tested alone. Surprisingly, high commercial vacancy rates and lack of growth in occupied commercial floor space across markets were not associated with cutbacks in construction lending. Tests isolating markets with the highest and lowest vacancy rates and the highest and lowest growth in demand — when tested separately or in conjunction with one

<sup>12</sup> CAMEL ratings are at least partially determined by some of the financial measures used in the equation. However, the rating presumably also reflects other aspects of a bank's performance and, thus, may well have an independent effect.

<sup>13</sup> Peek and Rosengren (1993) argue that regulatory enforcement actions spurred by low capital were key to cutbacks in lending.

<sup>14</sup> Both variables were weighted by the relative importance of the categories of commercial real estate in new construction in the market in question during the period under observation.

<sup>15</sup> No comprehensive measure of market disequilibrium in housing markets is available. Newly issued permits were used as a measure of differential demand for construction loans. While permits are usually issued well in advance of the actual bank construction lending, for a period as long as that under observation, this measure runs the risk of simultaneity between the independent and dependent variables.

Table 3  
**Changes in Construction Lending: The Influence of Local Real-Estate Market Conditions**

	Constant	Capital Surplus Deficit <sup>a</sup>	Avg. ROA <sup>b</sup>	Troubled Real-Estate Loans <sup>a</sup> (%)	Lag/Concentration			Local Demand			Charter Type <sup>d</sup>				Adj. R <sup>2</sup>
					Const. Loans <sup>a</sup> / Assets <sup>c</sup>	Greater Than .10 <sup>d</sup>	Less Than .01 <sup>d</sup>	Occup. Comm. Space (% Chg.)	Comm. Vac. Rate	Res. Permits (% Chg.)	Acquired Failed Inst.	Nat. Bank	State, Fed Member	State, Non-Member	
(1)	0.009 <sup>e</sup> (0.004)	+0.05 <sup>e</sup> (0.01)	+0.21 <sup>e</sup> (0.03)	-0.13 <sup>e</sup> (0.02)	-0.62 <sup>e</sup> (0.01)	—	—	—	—	—	-0.005 <sup>f</sup> (0.003)	+0.012 <sup>e</sup> (0.004)	+0.012 <sup>e</sup> (0.004)	+0.012 <sup>e</sup> (0.004)	.68
(2)	-0.009 <sup>f</sup> (0.005)	+0.07 <sup>e</sup> (0.01)	+0.54 <sup>e</sup> (0.04)	-0.23 <sup>e</sup> (0.02)	—	-0.07 <sup>e</sup> (0.004)	+0.007 <sup>e</sup> (0.003)	—	—	—	-0.008 <sup>f</sup> (0.005)	+0.005 (0.005)	+0.007 (0.006)	+0.003 (0.005)	.34
(3)	-0.031 <sup>e</sup> (0.008)	+0.07 <sup>e</sup> (0.001)	+0.54 <sup>e</sup> (0.04)	-0.25 <sup>e</sup> (0.02)	—	-0.06 <sup>e</sup> (0.04)	+0.007 <sup>e</sup> (0.003)	-0.003 <sup>f</sup> (0.002)	+0.002 <sup>e</sup> (0.001)	+0.005 <sup>e</sup> (0.003)	-0.009 <sup>†</sup> (0.005)	+0.006 (0.006)	+0.008 (0.006)	+0.005 (0.006)	.34

<sup>a</sup> 90:Q1

<sup>b</sup> 90:Q2-92:Q3

<sup>c</sup> 92:Q3

<sup>d</sup> Dummy variables specification

<sup>e</sup> Significant at 99 percent confidence level

<sup>f</sup> Significant at 90 percent confidence level

Observations = 2,192

another — were similarly unsuccessful.<sup>16</sup>

Table 4 presents some sample statistics illustrating the reason underlying the lack of success of the commercial real-estate variables. It divides the sample into the highest and lowest quartiles with respect to construction loan growth. Banks with declines in construction lending were located typically in areas where residential building was declining. The banks with the highest growth in construction lending were located in metropolitan areas where residential permits rose 13 percent, on average, during the 1990-1992 period. In the case of commercial indicators, however, little difference was apparent

between market trends and bank construction lending.

The lack of success of the commercial market variables may reflect specification problems. One explanation is that demand for commercial construction credit did not increase in those markets with growing local demand for commercial space and relatively low vacancy rates. These areas may have had no new construction because developers continued to be discouraged by excess supply conditions elsewhere in the country. How-

ever, this explanation is not borne out by data available on new commercial permits. These data show that commercial construction in many areas, especially the Southwestern states, rose during the study period.

Another explanation is that banks were funding primarily residential construction activity, leaving commercial construction lending to others. Given the problems that thrifts and insurance companies were experiencing at that time, this explanation also seems unlikely. Moreover, data collected by

Table 4  
**Real-Estate Market Characteristics and Changes in Construction Lending**

Variable	High Construction Loan Growth	Low Construction Loan Growth	All Other
Observations	535	497	1,159
Mean Change in Construction Loans <sup>a</sup> / Assets <sup>b</sup>	+3.6%	-7.9%	-0.4%
Mean Percent Change Occupied Commercial Floor Space	+0.9%	0.8%	+0.7%
Composite Commercial Vacancy Rate	11.2%	10.8%	10.7%
Mean Percent Change in Newly Issued Residential Building Permits	13.1%	~1.6%	11.5%

<sup>a</sup> 90:Q1-92:Q3

<sup>b</sup> 92:Q3

<sup>16</sup> Different markets are likely to have different amounts of vacancy space even in market equilibrium, due to differences in land costs, varying transportation costs within the region, and whether the local real-estate market is growing or shrinking. In an attempt to account for such differences, excess supply in commercial real-estate markets during the period under observation was measured as the difference between the average vacancy rate during the 1980-1990 period and the rate during the first quarter of 1990. Even in this re-specified form the variable continued to be statistically significant with the wrong sign. In addition, lagged vacancy rates were tested in recognition that loans on the books respond to cutbacks in new construction lending only after existing commitments were funded. This specification did not improve the results either.

HUD on new-construction loan commitments by commercial banks suggest that over 40 percent of total construction lending during the period under study was for non-residential projects.<sup>17</sup>

Finally, the underlying problem may have been that out-of-area lending at many banks may have weakened the link between local commercial activity and lending. Non-local lending is more likely with respect to large commercial projects than with many residential projects, which are typically smaller in scale. One test of this hypothesis is to separate large banks from small ones. Presumably, larger banks have a broader geographic reach. However, a variety of tests limiting the sample to banks in three asset-size categories — less than \$1 billion, \$500 million, and \$100 million — failed to yield significantly different results.

### *Conclusion*

While the term “credit crunch” typically refers to a general restriction of lending, construction loan funding activity during the 1990-1992 period varied widely among BIF-insured commercial and savings banks. Although construction lending declined sharply at many large institutions, a large number of smaller institutions rapidly increased their lending during the period. The key variables influencing construction lending activity

included capital position, past degree of concentration in — and success with — construction lending, and profitability during the period.

As has been the case in other studies, attempts to isolate the effects of reduced loan demand on the decline in construction credit proved difficult. Differences in the health of local housing markets were significant in explaining lending patterns among depository institutions, but the same linkage did not hold for commercial real-estate market conditions. Because commercial projects are often large and the funding market more national in scope, “out-of-area” lending is probably more important than for residential construction credit. Unfortunately, no data exist on the geographic pattern of banks’ construction lending. Without that information, it is impossible to match lending data with commercial real-estate market indicators in a meaningful way.

No attempt was made to address directly the issue of whether regulators “caused” the credit crunch. Everything else being equal, the various tests showed some differences among institutions supervised by different regulators, suggesting that policy enforcement may have had a small effect on lending practices. However, the evidence did not suggest that adverse changes in supervisory ratings negatively affected construction lending. Moreover, variables testing for an

additional negative effect of bank location in New England and for very weak capital positions, that would trigger supervisory actions, added little explanatory power. These results were not consistent with the hypothesis that unusual regulatory pressure on weakened institutions in New England during the period may have affected lending in that region in an important and unique way.

The results suggest that bank regulators seeking to apply policies that were aimed to alleviate the “credit crunch” were faced with a trade-off. Many institutions were increasing their lending in the 1990-1992 period. Large banks that had dominated the construction loan market in the late-1980s and were already holding considerable volumes of problem credits cut back the most. Attempts to maintain the flow of credit to real-estate developers had to, by sheer force of numbers, include these institutions. However, safety-and-soundness considerations suggested that tighter underwriting standards and less concentration in construction lending were prudent steps to maintain — or restore — the health of the institutions and the deposit insurance funds.

<sup>17</sup> See *Survey of Mortgage Lending Activity*, Table 13, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Financial Management, various issues.

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# Recent Developments Affecting Depository Institutions

by Benjamin B. Christopher\*

## *Regulatory Agency Actions*

### *Inter-Agency Actions*

The federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies are engaging in joint or coordinated efforts in a number of regulatory areas that are mentioned specifically in this issue of the *Review*, among which are retail sales of non-deposit investment products, savings bank mutual-to-stock conversions, depository institution management interlocks, Community Reinvestment Act enforcement, prevention of discrimination in lending, and accounting practices. For full information on the inter-agency actions included in this issue, reference is necessary to the pages devoted to each of the agencies and the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.

### *Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation*

#### *Deposit Insurance Assessments*

The FDIC will seek comments on issues related to the way deposit insurance premiums are calculated and collected. Currently, each insured institution determines its assessment premium amount semiannually and submits payment to the FDIC. Under the proposal, the FDIC would determine the assessment premium on a quarterly basis and send four quarterly invoices (two of which would become the semi-annual Certified Statements) to the in-

sured institution. The invoices for each quarterly period would be based on the quarterly Report of Condition provided by each financial institution for the immediately preceding quarter.

Each payment would be made *via* the Automated Clearing House (ACH) network in the form of a direct debit initiated by the FDIC. The first quarterly payment would be made approximately 32 days before the current semiannual payment date; the second quarterly payment would be made about 60 days after the current semiannual payment date.

The FDIC believes that the proposed amendments would result in a more efficient collection process, and would reduce regulatory burden on insured institutions. The amendments also would clarify the obligation of acquiring institutions to pay assessments on deposits assumed from institutions terminating their insured status; and would delete from the assessments regulation the existing references to experience factors, which are not available for use after 1994. *FIL-45-94, FDIC, 6/16/94; FR, 6/10, p. 29965.*

#### *Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment Products*

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), FDIC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) and the Office of Thrift Su-

pervision (OTS) issued a joint statement on retail sales of mutual fund and other nondeposit investment products by federally insured financial institutions. The statement supersedes the guidance previously issued by each of the four agencies, and results in the agencies operating under the same inter-agency statement for the provision of mutual fund and other investment services. The statement applies to insured depository institutions selling at retail, either directly or indirectly, a mutual fund or other nondeposit investment product. Banks and thrifts recommending or selling such products should ensure that customers are fully informed that the products: (1) are not FDIC-insured, (2) are not deposits or other obligations of the institution and are not guaranteed by the institution, and (3) involve investment risks, including possible loss of principal. These disclosures should be conspicuous and presented in a clear and concise manner.

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Reference sources: *American Banker* (AB); *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ); *BNA's Banking Report* (BBR); and *Federal Register* (FR).



The agencies said that tellers should not qualify customers, make specific recommendations about nondeposit investments, or accept orders. Among a number of other things that banks and thrifts should do to minimize the possibility of customer confusion are: when a customer opens an investment account, obtain a signed statement acknowledging that the disclosures have been received and understood; separate physically the investment sales areas from the deposit-taking areas; and ensure that investment sales personnel are properly qualified and trained. *FIL-9-94, FDIC, 2/17/94; "Inter-Agency Statement on Retail Sales of Nondeposit Investment Products," FRB, FDIC, OCC, OTS, 2/15/94.*

### ***Savings Bank Mutual-to-Stock Conversions***

The FDIC adopted an interim rule, effective February 15, 1994, that will enable the agency to formally review and, if necessary, prevent unfair or unsafe conversions of FDIC-supervised savings banks from mutual to stock form of ownership.

Among the FDIC's concerns are that, in some cases, insiders may set the stock offering price well below the true value of the institution, or they may obtain more than a fair share of the stock subscription. Excessive compensation packages also are of concern. Under the interim rule, an FDIC-supervised state-chartered savings bank must provide the appropriate FDIC regional office with advance notice of its plans to convert from mutual to stock form as well as copies of all application and disclosure materials. The FDIC has 60 days from the receipt of a complete notice to review the conversion plan before it can be consummated, although the agency can extend the review period for another 60 days. A proposed conversion could not be consummated if the FDIC objects within the allotted time. If the FDIC notifies the savings bank that it has no objection to the transaction or if the FDIC does not respond within the allotted time, the conversion may be completed. This interim rule departs from the FDIC's past practice of sug-

gesting to other federal or state regulators that modifications be made in a conversion plan. *PR-7-94, FDIC, 2/8/94; PR-3-94, 1/28; FR, 2/15/94, p. 7194; 2/1/94, p. 4712.*

FDIC-insured mutual state-chartered savings banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System would be required under a proposed rule to comply with new substantive provisions when proposing to convert to the stock form of ownership. The proposed requirements are similar to the OTS' regulations which were revised recently. Currently and during the pendency of this proposed rulemaking, the FDIC will continue to use the case-by-case procedure under the interim rule (see above) in reviewing notices of proposed conversions of state savings banks. The proposed rule would require (among other things): the submission of a full appraisal report, including a complete and detailed description of the elements that make up an appraisal report and justification for the methodology employed; a depositor vote on all mutual-to-stock conversions of state savings banks; that stock options (if any) be granted at no lower than the market price at which the stock is trading at the time of grant; that the subscription offering provide a reference to eligible depositors and others in the bank's "local community"; the submission of a business plan, including in part, a detailed discussion of how management intends to deploy the capital raised through the sale of stock in the conversion; and a prohibition on stock repurchases within one year following the conversion. *FR, 6/13/94, p. 30316; FIL-39-94, FDIC, 6/13.*

### ***Financial Derivatives***

FDIC-supervised commercial and savings banks were notified that the agency has updated and consolidated its guidance to examiners and regional offices regarding the analysis and treatment of financial derivatives, such as interest-rate swaps, futures and options contracts. The guidance is applicable principally to financial institutions that are "end-users" of derivatives. It focuses on the fundamental risks of financial derivatives and off-balance-sheet

activities, with the expectation that it will assist examiners in determining institutions' potential exposure and in assessing their risk management practices. *FIL-34-94, FDIC, 5/18/94.*

### ***BIF Reaches \$15.2 Billion***

The Bank Insurance Fund (BIF) totaled \$15.2 billion (unaudited) on March 31, 1994, continuing its strong growth from \$13.1 billion at year-end 1993, from a negative \$101 million at the end of 1992, and a negative \$6.8 billion in 1991. The BIF's recovery to date primarily has reflected improved underwriting income resulting from greatly reduced numbers of bank failures (no failures occurred in the first quarter) a drop in the estimated cost of banks expected to fail in future periods, and the Corporation's cost-control efforts. In 1993, gross revenue to the BIF totaled \$6.4 billion (unaudited), including approximately \$5.8 billion from assessments, \$0.2 billion from interest on U.S. Treasury obligations, and \$0.4 billion from other sources. Provision for loan losses was a negative \$7.7 billion, and other expenses were \$0.9 billion, resulting in net income of \$13.2 billion to the BIF.

The ratio of the BIF to insured deposits stood at 0.80 percent at March 31, 1994, up from 0.70 percent at year-end 1993. The FDIC said in its quarterly statement that the BIF may reach the recapitalization goal of 1.25 percent as early as 1996.

The Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) had net income of \$262 million in the first quarter of 1994, and on March 31 the SAIF totaled \$1.4 billion (unaudited), or 0.20 percent of insured deposits. Revenue to the SAIF in 1993 was \$923 million, of which \$898 million was assessments earned. Expenses and losses for the year amounted to \$46 million. The net income of \$877 million increased the balance of the SAIF to just under \$1.2 billion at year-end. *Financial Reports, FDIC.*

### ***Bank Failures Continue to Decline***

Eight FDIC-insured banks, with assets totaling \$844.7 million, have

failed in 1994 through July 15, continuing the declining trend in bank failures. The banks were located in California (4), Connecticut (2), Massachusetts and Missouri. In 1993, there were 42 failures of insured institutions, twenty of which were located in California and ten in Texas.

The number of commercial banks on the FDIC's "Problem List" fell for the ninth consecutive quarter, to 383 as of March 31, 1994, and their assets declined for the eighth straight quarter, to \$53 billion. A year earlier, there were 671 "problem" banks, with assets amounting to \$377 billion. "Problem" savings institutions totaled 118 as of March 31, 1994, representing 5.3 percent of savings institutions in operation, and their assets were \$89 billion, or 8.9 percent of savings institutions' assets. *FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile, FDIC, Recent Issues; and FDIC Office of Corporate Communications.*

### **Management Official Interlocks**

The FDIC proposed to amend its regulations that implement the Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act as part of a joint initiative by the federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies. The Act generally prohibits certain management official interlocks between unaffiliated depository institutions, depository holding companies, and their affiliates. The proposal would create limited exemptions to the prohibition on management official interlocks between certain depository organizations located in the same community or "relevant metropolitan statistical area" (RMSA). Such interlocks would be permitted between institutions that together control only a small percentage of the total deposits in the community or RMSA. *FR, 4/20/94, p. 18764; 6/9, p. 29740.*

### **Activities of State-Chartered Banks and Subsidiaries**

The FDIC approved final rules implementing statutory restrictions on the activities of insured state banks and their majority-owned subsidiaries. The new rules were to go into effect when published in the *Federal Register*.

With certain exceptions, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) prohibits state banks and their majority-owned subsidiaries from conducting activities "as principal" that are not permitted for national banks. The bank may, however, engage in an otherwise prohibited activity if it meets its minimum capital requirements and the FDIC determines that the activity does not present a significant risk to the deposit insurance funds. Under the final rules:

(a) The term "as principal" is defined to exclude agency activities. Thus, a state bank can, without prior FDIC consent, operate insurance agencies, securities brokerage firms, real-estate agencies, travel agencies, financial planning services and certain other agencies if authorized by state law.

(b) Activities are listed that do not present a significant risk to the insurance funds and therefore are permissible. Among the activities are those defined by the FRB as "closely related to banking."

(c) Application procedures are described for an institution seeking FDIC consent to continue or begin an otherwise prohibited activity.

In a related action, state banks that are members of the SAIF are put under the same restrictions on corporate activities that apply to BIF-insured banks. *PR-133-93, FDIC, 11/30/93; FR, 12/8/93, pp. 64460, 64462.*

### **Activities and Investments of State Savings Associations**

The FDIC is amending its regulations concerning applications and notices by savings associations. The amendments conform the definitions of "significant risk" and "equity security" to other definitions of those terms in the FDIC's regulations, and allow insured state savings associations to conduct activities and make investments without the FDIC's prior approval provided that the activities and/or investments were found to be permissible for federal savings associations under an order or

a written interpretation issued by the OTS. This change also places insured state savings associations on a par with the treatment accorded insured state banks under the FDIC's regulations. The final amendment is effective December 8, 1993. *FR, 12/8/93, p. 64455.*

### **Receivership Rules: Least-Cost Resolution**

The FDIC adopted a regulation required by FDICIA on the least-cost resolution of failed and failing depository institutions insured by the FDIC. The final rule adds a new Section to the FDIC's regulations stating the prohibition in Section 13(c) of the FDI Act on taking any action under that section that would have the effect of increasing losses to any insurance fund by protecting uninsured depositors or nondepositor creditors of a failed or failing depository institution. In addition, the final rule references the systemic-risk exception to the prohibition. The final rule also includes the provision of 13(c) which makes clear that the FDIC is not prohibited from engaging in purchase-and-assumption transactions under which uninsured deposits may be acquired so long as the loss to the insurance fund on those uninsured deposits is less than if the institution had been liquidated and the insured deposits were paid. The regulation is effective January 21, 1994. *FR, 12/22/93, p. 67662.*

### **CrossLand Sale Satisfied Least-Cost Mandate**

A report by the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concludes that the FDIC's resolution of the CrossLand Federal Savings Bank of Brooklyn, New York, in August 1993, was in compliance with the least-cost calculation and documentation requirements of Section 13(c) of the FDI Act, as amended by FDICIA, and criteria contained in an earlier report of GAO in July 1992.

CrossLand experienced substantial losses from 1989 through 1991, resulting from the weak New York

real-estate market and the bank's concentration in real-estate development lending. CrossLand's efforts to replenish its capital as required by its primary regulator, the OTS, were unsuccessful. The bank, which had \$8.7 billion in assets as of December 1991, was declared insolvent by the OTS on January 24, 1992.

The FDIC is required by statute to resolve a failed bank in a manner least costly to the BIF. Immediately upon CrossLand being declared insolvent, the FDIC placed the bank in conservatorship, and injected \$1.2 billion in cash to restore capital to the required level and to strengthen the bank by reducing its high-cost debt. The FDIC also hired a chief executive officer to manage CrossLand in conservatorship and approved a business plan that was designed to return the bank to operating profitability by downsizing and stabilizing it. After considering various alternatives for resolving the conservatorship, in August 1993 the FDIC sold the conservatorship — by then the assets were down to \$5.2 billion — through a public offering.

The report said the process the FDIC used for the 1993 decision was well-documented and adequately supported with cost estimates for each alternative, and that there was much improvement over the 1992 process in establishing a conservatorship. In addition, the GAO found no evidence of significant problems with the management and control of CrossLand during its operation under FDIC conservatorship. *FDIC Sale of CrossLand Conservatorship Satisfied Least-Cost Test, U.S. General Accounting Office, April 1994.*

The FDIC estimated the losses to the BIF from the CrossLand resolution, as of December 31, 1993, to be \$784.8 million. *PR-20-94, FDIC, 3/30/94.*

#### ***Assistance for Areas Affected by Earthquake***

The FDIC announced a series of steps to assist the rebuilding in the area damaged by the earthquake in Southern California. Guidelines that

the FDIC will send to the banks it supervises suggest that extending repayment terms, restructuring existing loans or easing terms for new loans, if done in a manner consistent with sound banking practices, can both contribute to the health of the community and serve the long-term interests of the lending institution. Other regulatory relief actions include a temporary waiver of certain real-estate appraisal regulations for the affected areas, and temporary relief from certain capital requirements if an already adequately capitalized bank finds its asset levels increasing due solely to deposits of insurance proceeds or government assistance funds. *PR-4-94, FDIC, 1/25/94; FDIC Statement, 1/25/94.*

See also "Real Estate Appraisal Exceptions in Major Disaster Areas," *FR, 2/11/94, p. 6531*; OCC, FRB, FDIC, OTS, and NCUA, reporting actions pursuant to Section 2 of the Depository Institutions Disaster Relief Act of 1992 (DIDRA), which authorizes the federal financial institution regulatory agencies to make exceptions to statutory and regulatory requirements relating to appraisals for certain transactions.

#### ***Treasury Study of Depository Institutions Disaster Relief***

The Department of the Treasury, in consultation with the federal bank regulatory agencies, is conducting, and requesting comments on, a study of the effectiveness of the federal banking agencies' response to recent disasters. Pursuant to Section 5 of DIDRA, the study group intends to complete the study by February 12, 1995, and will submit to Congress a final report including recommendations for administrative or legislative action. *FR, 6/29/94, p. 33574.*

#### ***Alternative Dispute Resolution***

The FDIC adopted a Statement of Policy to further its commitment to the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) for resolving appropriate disputes in a more timely, less-costly manner than litigation or administrative

adjudication. The Statement reiterates the agency's support of the cost-effective use of ADR, including negotiation, mediation, early neutral evaluation, neutral expert fact-finding, mini-trials and other hybrid forms of ADR in appropriate instances; it does not favor the use of binding arbitration other than as set forth in the Administration Dispute Resolution Act of 1990. An ADR Task Force has been created to design, implement and coordinate ADR efforts across the Corporation, and to develop strategies for educating employees and disputants about ADR options. *FR, 3/30/94, p. 14860.*

#### ***Establishment and Relocation of Remote Service Facilities***

The FDIC proposed revising its application and publication requirements for the establishment and relocation of remote service facilities (RSF), in order to lessen the regulatory burden on state nonmember banks and state-licensed branches of foreign banks. Currently, banks desiring to establish an initial RSF must comply with the requirements in these respects that are applicable to the establishment of a "brick and mortar" branch office, while successive RSFs may be established or relocated without a formal application. There is no differentiation based upon the condition of the applying institution.

The proposal provides that an institution whose most recent Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) rating is Satisfactory or better may establish and operate or relocate an RSF by filing a letter with the appropriate FDIC regional director containing certain specified information. Unless the institution is notified otherwise by the FDIC within seven days of receipt of the letter, the institution may establish or relocate the RSF. Existing public notice requirements would be dispensed with in this case. Other requirements would apply to an institution not having a CRA rating of Satisfactory or better, including that they comply with existing notice requirements. Unless the institution is noti-

fied otherwise within 15 days after processing of its information letter, the institution could establish or relocate the RSF. Should a protest be filed or other objection taken, the institution could not proceed until the FDIC provides a written notice of approval. *FR, 4/26/94, p. 21676.*

### ***Disclosure Regarding Deposit Insurance Coverage***

The FDIC proposed that plan administrators of certain retirement and other employee benefit accounts be provided timely disclosures about whether their funds qualify for "pass-through" deposit insurance coverage. In general, "pass-through" insurance means that each participant in the account rather than the total account balance, is individually insured up to \$100,000. Under a 1991 law and the FDIC's implementing regulations, depositors in certain retirement and other employee benefit plan accounts are entitled to "pass-through" deposit insurance coverage based, in part, on whether the insured institution satisfies certain capital standards.

Among the types of accounts affected by the proposed rule are 401(k) retirement accounts, Keogh plan accounts, and corporate pension plan and profit-sharing plan accounts. Situations in which an employee benefit plan administrator would receive a notice indicating an institution's "prompt corrective action" (PCA) category, and whether employee benefit plan deposits at the institution would qualify for "pass-through" insurance coverage, include: (1) when an existing or prospective employee benefit plan depositor requests the information; (2) when someone opens an employee benefit plan account; (3) when the institution has been informed that its capital category has been reduced to "adequately capitalized" from "well-capitalized"; and (4) when the institution's capital category has been reduced to a PCA capital category below "adequately capitalized," thus eliminating "pass-through" insurance coverage on additional deposits.

Also, upon request, existing and prospective employee benefit plan de-

positors would receive more-detailed information about the institution's actual capital ratios. With the exception of immediate disclosures to depositors of new accounts, the notices would be provided within two business days. *PR-132-93, FDIC, 11/30/93; FR, 12/8/93, p. 64521.*

### ***Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses***

The FDIC adopted a Statement of Policy on allowance for loan and lease losses (ALLL) as recommended to the four federal regulators of banks and saving associations by the FFIEC. The statement provides comprehensive guidance on the maintenance of an adequate ALLL and an effective loan review system. It is another step by the agencies to promote consistency in supervisory policies among banks and thrifts.

The guidance, which is effective immediately, explains that the ALLL is designed to absorb estimated credit losses associated with the loan and lease portfolio, including binding commitments to lend. To the extent not provided for in a separate liability account, the ALLL should also be sufficient to absorb estimated credit losses associated with off-balance-sheet credit instruments such as standby letters of credit. The statement covers the responsibilities of the board of directors, the institution's management, and the examiners.

*FIL-89-93, FDIC, 12/21/93; "Inter-Agency Policy Statement on the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL)," OCC, FDIC, FRB, OTS, 12/21.*

### ***Proposal to Recognize Holding Gains and Losses in Tier 1 Capital***

The FDIC issued for comment a proposal to conform its capital definitions for Part 325 leverage and risk-based capital purposes with the recently issued FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115. This new accounting standard requires banks to recognize, as a separate component of stockholders' equity, the amount of net unrealized holding gains and losses on securities held as "available for sale."

The FFIEC notified all banks in September that they must adopt the new FASB 115 accounting standard as of January 1, 1994, or the beginning of their first fiscal year thereafter, if later. Early adoption of this standard is also permitted for Call Report purposes to the extent allowable under FASB 115. The proposed changes would require institutions to include the FASB 115 capital component for "available for sale" securities when calculating Tier 1 capital for leverage and risk-based capital purposes. The FDIC invited comments on several specific questions. The proposed capital rule is similar to rules being developed by the OCC, FRB, and OTS. *FIL-1-94, FDIC, 1/4/94; FR, 12/29/93, p. 68781; PR-137-93, FDIC, 12/14/93; FR, 4/18/94, p. 18328.*

### ***Affordable Housing Pilot Program***

The FDIC announced a pilot effort with the Federal National Mortgage Association that will allow mortgage lenders to offer favorable financing to buyers of FDIC Affordable Housing properties. This pilot program, focusing on properties in Massachusetts, furthers the FDIC's goal to make residential properties retained from failed financial institutions available to low- and moderate-income purchasers. The FDIC, Fannie Mae and the Massachusetts Bankers Association have initiated programs to encourage lending institutions to participate in this joint effort. Eligible purchasers can receive a ten percent credit or grant toward the purchase of FDIC properties. The FDIC properties may be purchased under various arrangements in respect to the down payment and the payment of closing costs, with loan-to-value ratios ranging from 85 percent to 95 percent. *PR-6-94, FDIC, 2/8/94.*

### ***Policy on Risk-Based Capital: Multifamily Housing Loans***

Section 618 of the Resolution Trust Corporation Refinancing, Restructuring, and Improvement Act of 1991 (RTCRIA) requires the FRB, FDIC, OCC and OTS to accord a 50 percent risk-weight to multifamily mortgage loans and related mortgage-

backed securities meeting certain specified criteria and gives the agencies discretion to add other prudential safeguards.

The FDIC amended its risk-based capital guidelines, effective January 27, 1994, to assign a 50 percent risk-weight to loans secured by multifamily residential properties that meet certain conditions and to any securities collateralized by such loans. At present, these loans are assigned to the 100 percent risk-weight category. The rule should facilitate prudent lending for multifamily housing purposes. *FR, 1/27/94, p. 3779; 3/18, p. 12806.*

### ***Securities Disclosure***

Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires that the FDIC issue regulations substantially similar to those of the Securities and Exchange Commission or publish its reasons for not doing so. The FDIC proposed to make its securities disclosure requirements for banks with a class of securities registered under Section 12 substantially similar to those of the SEC in regard to: (1) disclosures of executive compensation; (2) disclosure requirements for small banks; and (3) proxies and related communications among shareholders. Comment is sought also on whether the agency should incorporate in its regulations by cross-reference the comparable SEC rules, or continue to maintain the separate but substantially similar body of rules.

*FIL-36-94, FDIC, 5/20/94; FR, 5/2, p. 22555.*

### ***Proposal to Eliminate Planned Growth Reports***

The FDIC proposed to rescind its regulations that require all insured banks, except insured bankers' banks, to give prior notice of planned rapid growth that involves the solicitation and acceptance of fully insured deposits obtained from or through brokers or affiliates, the solicitation of fully insured deposits outside a bank's normal trade area, or secured borrowings, including repurchase agreements. The proposed rescission would lessen the regulatory burden

on banks that are currently required also to comply with the FDIC's brokered deposit regulation and the prompt corrective action rule, both of which were designed in part to address the same risks resulting from rapid growth. *FR, 4/5/94, p. 15869.*

### ***Fines for Violations of Mortgage Disclosure Law***

The FDIC has started to impose fines against lending institutions for late or inaccurate submissions of data used by federal regulators to check for possible mortgage loan discrimination. The agency has fined six lenders, in amounts ranging from \$2,000 to \$4,000, for late submissions of 1992 and 1993 data required by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA). Data are required by March 1 each year from most lenders on their loans for home purchases, home improvement and refinancing, including the race, gender, income and property location of the loans and loan applications. Data for each institution and nationwide aggregate reports are made publicly available by the agencies. HMDA data for 1992 have been publicly available since October 1993, and the 1993 data reports are being processed for public release later this year. The FDIC supervises more than 3,200 of the 9,649 lenders reporting 1993 data. *PR-39-94, FDIC, 6/17/94.*

### ***Court Rules Against FDIC on Suit Against Bank Officials***

The U.S. Supreme Court ruled unanimously that state law and not federal law governed the conduct of lawyers representing a failed California thrift. In a Texas case, the Court declined to review a decision that held that federal law does not take precedence over state statutes of limitation for suing bank directors or officers for wrongdoing. The two decisions may place at risk an estimated \$3 billion in FDIC and RTC claims.

In a recent article authored by FDIC Acting Chairman Andrew C. Hove, Jr., he expressed strong support

for pending federal legislation that would allow federal regulators to sue for wrongdoing committed up to five years before the date of a banking institution's failure. *The Washington Post, 6/14/94; The New York Times, 7/15/94.*

### ***Report on the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF)***

The Savings Association Insurance Fund Industry Advisory Committee, which was established by Congress in 1989, has recommended that the SAIF and the BIF be merged "as soon as possible." The FDIC administers SAIF, which was created by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) to insure savings institutions, replacing the former Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).

The Committee's report states that if \$8 billion in funds authorized for SAIF by the RTC Completion Act of 1993 are actually appropriated when needed, it will at best avoid a short-term crisis if loss funds are needed by SAIF. Funds "authorized and arguably mandated" by FIRREA have never been provided by the Treasury.

Among the report's conclusions are that an assessment rate disparity between the BIF and SAIF of 13 to 20 basis points likely will occur approximately in 1996, rising to 18 to 20 basis points in 1997. This rate disparity will adversely impact the ability of SAIF-insured institutions to raise capital, and will result in a pronounced shrinkage in the SAIF-insured deposits base. A shrinking deposit base, combined with SAIF's fixed obligation to pay approximately \$770 million per year in interest on Financing Corporation (FICO) bonds, will reduce available funds to cover future losses and expenses. FICO was created by the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 to issue bonds to recapitalize the FSLIC. Unless the SAIF is fundamentally restructured, the report said, it cannot survive, and the only solution that realistically can

avoid further costs to the taxpayers is a merger of the two funds. The resulting fund would achieve the statutorily mandated 1.25 percent reserve ratio in 1997, only one year later than currently projected for the BIF. By 1998, the assessment rate for all insured institutions would be reduced to a range of six to nine basis points, on the assumption of a continuation of the FICO interest obligation. *Report of the Savings Association Insurance Fund Industry Advisory Committee, March 1994.*

### ***Real-Estate Recovery Is Broadening***

A substantial improvement in real-estate markets across the nation occurred for the second quarter in a row, according to a survey of real-estate trends conducted by the FDIC in late April. The composite index that measures change in all types of real-estate markets rose to 78, up from 73 in the quarter ending in January and 67 in October 1993.

Values of the index above 50 indicate that more respondents believed conditions were improving than declining, compared to the previous quarter, while values below 50 indicate the opposite. The surveys, which began in April 1991, are based on interviews across the country with more than 450 senior examiners and asset managers at federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies.

Improvement was reported nationwide in both local housing markets and in local commercial real estate. Almost 70 percent of the respondents saw a strengthening of local housing markets in the three months ending in April, while only three percent reported weaker conditions. The improvement in commercial real estate — almost one half of the respondents reported improvement and only two percent saw worsening markets — was particularly encouraging.

Recovery in regional real-estate markets was most widespread in the South, and was strong also in the Midwest, continuing the relatively favorable assessments received from these regions in previous surveys. In Cali-

fornia, stable market conditions were reported by two-thirds of the respondents for commercial real estate in the quarter, though it should be noted that the 23 percent seeing better conditions in the state was more than double the ten percent reporting weaker markets. In January, only one respondent saw improvement. In housing markets, 43 percent of California respondents in April believed markets were better, up from 29 percent in the preceding quarter. In the West outside of California, stronger conditions in commercial real-estate markets were reported by two-thirds of the respondents, and in housing markets by three-fourths of respondents. The broadening recovery extended also to the Northeast, where 74 percent of those interviewed saw improvement in housing markets, up from 54 percent in January, and 42 percent reported better commercial real-estate markets, rising from 33 percent in January.

Another positive development was that for the third consecutive quarter there was distinct progress nationwide in reducing excess inventories of commercial real estate. During the first two years of the survey, not much reduction was reported. While 65 percent of the respondents in April still reported an excess supply in commercial real estate, the figure was down from 72 percent in January and 82 percent in July 1993. California lagged here also with 94 percent reporting excess inventories in April. In residential real estate nationally, excess supply conditions were reported by 29 percent of the respondents, declining from 33 percent in January. Further evidence of improvement in housing markets was that 18 percent of those reporting nationally, and 33 percent in the Midwest, saw "tight" supply conditions. *Survey of Real Estate Trends, FDIC, April 1994.*

### ***Newsletter on Consumer Issues***

The FDIC introduced *FDIC Consumer News*, a quarterly, free newsletter that presents information of interest to bank customers. The first issue features a report to help con-

sumers avoid costly mistakes under the insurance rules, noting the FDIC's concerns about the large number of depositors with funds over the \$100,000 insurance limit, and the increased number of depositors' complaints that bank personnel gave them wrong information about their coverage. The report discusses the new deposit insurance rules that took effect December 19, 1993. Other topics in the first issue include federal efforts to increase lending to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, new disclosures for deposit accounts and mutual funds sold by banks, and a new consumer protection law on unclaimed funds.

Each issue of the newsletter also will include the addresses and phone numbers of the various government agencies where consumers can get information or other help regarding their rights under the banking laws. *PR-131-93, FDIC, 11/22/93.*

### ***Resolution Trust Corporation Operations Update***

The RTC resolved eight institutions in June, bringing the total number of resolutions to 726 since the inception of the agency in 1989. As of June 30, 1994, the RTC had 18 institutions remaining in its conservatorship program, all of which are expected to be resolved by the end of the third quarter of the year.

Assets under RTC management, including both conservatorships and receiverships, amounted to \$48 billion at the end of May. The 25 conservatorships held about \$16 billion in gross assets on May 31, 1994. Cash and securities were 31 percent of these assets; performing 1-4 family mortgages, 22 percent; other performing loans, 17 percent; delinquent loans, seven percent; real estate, three percent; investments in subsidiaries, ten percent; and other assets, ten percent. Assets in receivership remaining from the 718 institutions closed by the RTC amounted to \$32 billion on May 31 (excluding approximately \$11 billion in cash, liquid investments, and accounts receivable accumulated from receivership collections). Because

many of the relatively marketable assets have been sold before an institution enters a receivership, most of the assets retained by the RTC in receivership consisted of lower-quality, less-marketable assets. Thus, real estate and delinquent loans represented 40 percent of receivership assets. Cash, securities, and performing 1-4 family mortgages represented only 18 percent of receivership assets.

From inception through May, the RTC collected \$150 billion from securities, \$101 billion from 1-4 family mortgages, \$52 billion from other mortgages, \$29 billion from non-mortgage loans, \$16 billion from real estate, and \$20 billion from other assets. Book value asset reductions were \$413 billion, and the RTC recovered 89 percent (\$367 billion) on these collections. The RTC has recovered 98 percent from securities, 97 percent from 1-4 family mortgages, 78 percent from other mortgages, 90 percent from non-mortgage loans, 56 percent from real estate, and 69 percent from other assets. The RTC also has collected \$18.1 billion in receivership income.

As of the end of June 1994, RTC resolutions had protected 24.1 million deposit accounts from financial loss. These accounts had an average account balance of \$9,000. The thrifts closed from the RTC's inception through May 31 held \$228 billion in assets at the time of closure. Of this total, \$49 billion, or 21 percent, were sold to acquirers (after taking into account assets returned to the RTC under put-back provisions of resolution transactions). Estimated resolution costs for the 718 closed thrifts totaled \$84.5 billion. This amount represented 32 percent of their total liabilities at the time of resolution. If the insured deposits of all 718 institutions had been paid out to depositors, the estimated resolution costs would have been \$88.4 billion. The \$3.9 billion difference represented the estimated savings, or premiums, over insured-deposit payout costs. These savings were equal to two percent of core deposits, represented by deposits with balances below \$80,000.

Since its inception through May 31, 1994, the RTC has obtained \$118 billion in funding from external sources as follows: \$50 billion in appropriations under FIRREA, \$41 billion in loss funds authorized by 1991 Acts of Congress, and \$27 billion in Federal Financing Bank (FFB) borrowings. The RTC also has obtained \$105 billion in recoveries from receiverships. The RTC Completion Act, enacted into law on December 17, 1993, authorized the Treasury to provide the RTC with up to \$18.3 billion in loss funds. *RTC Review, July 1994.*

#### ***Improved Returns in Nonperforming Loan Auction***

The RTC's fourth National Nonperforming Loan Auction, held in Kansas City, Missouri, in April 1994, provided the highest return the RTC has received in these auctions, an average of 60 cents per dollar of book value, compared to 50 cents in the August 1993 auction. The improvement in recovery is credited to offering smaller-sized, geographically localized loan packages. An official said higher returns were obtained by stratifying loan pools by state, city and zip code. *RTC Investor, June 1994.*

#### ***Defining a Minority Neighborhood***

The RTC adopted, and requested comments on an interim rule that defines "predominantly minority neighborhood" under Section 21 of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act, as amended. The interim rule is effective February 24, 1994. Section 21 requires, among other things, that in considering offers to acquire any insured depository institution, or any branch of an insured depository institution, located in a predominantly minority neighborhood, the RTC will give preference to an offer from any minority individual or minority-owned business, including depository institutions, over any other offer that results in the same cost to the Corporation. Section 21 permits the RTC to lease to a minority acquiror, on a rent-free basis, subject to certain condi-

tions, any branch of a failed institution which is located in a "predominantly minority neighborhood," and authorizes the RTC to provide additional preferences in the form of capital assistance and performing assets. The interim rule generally defines "predominantly minority neighborhood" as any U.S. Postal Zip Code geographical area in which 50 percent or more of the persons residing there are minorities based upon the most recent Census data. *FR, 2/24/94, p. 8842.*

#### ***"Gross Negligence" Ruled Necessary to Convict Directors of Federal Thrifts***

The U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago ruled that the RTC must prove "gross negligence," rather than "simple negligence," to convict 13 former directors and officers of Concordia Federal Savings and Loan Association, which failed in 1990. The Court said that FIRREA established a national gross negligence standard for directors and officers at nationally chartered institutions. The Court did not rule on whether this national standard preempts state laws. This is the first such "negligence" case at the circuit court level to involve a federally chartered institution. Directors of state-chartered institutions have lost two cases in two other circuits. *AB, 11/15/93, p. 2.*

#### ***Court Rules on RTC's Power to Subpoena Information***

In a case involving officials of two failed savings institutions, Trustbank Savings, McLean, VA, and American Pioneer Savings Bank, Orlando, FL, a federal appeals court limited the RTC's power to issue subpoenas for personal financial information to persons that the RTC may reasonably suspect may be liable for the institution's failure. Personal financial information to determine a potential defendant's liability in a savings and loan failure can be subpoenaed, as can information necessary to identify attachable assets, or to establish evidence of illegal asset transfers to avoid restitution payments to the RTC. The agency cannot subpoena personal

financial information from officials of failed thrifts for the purpose of deciding whether to sue them. *WSJ*, 3/23/94, p. B8; *AB*, 3/23, p. 3.

### ***Affordable Housing Accomplishments***

A report on the RTC's Affordable Housing Disposition Program shows that through November 30, 1993, 78,000 dwelling units had been sold for \$1.2 billion. These units consisted of about 23,900 single-family units, and 54,100 multifamily units of which 22,500 were solely for low- and very low-income tenants. Purchasers of the single-family homes had incomes averaging approximately \$21,900, or 61 percent of the national median income, and they paid an average price of about \$27,400. According to a recent survey of buyers at nationwide auctions, 40 percent were minorities, 74 percent were first-time buyers, and 13 percent were veterans.

The RTC realized 74 percent of appraised value for both single-family and multifamily properties, with an overall return of 65 percent of book value. *The Sinker Lining, RTC, Fall/Winter 1993*, p. 10.

### ***Federal Reserve Board***

#### ***Extensions of Credit by Federal Reserve Banks***

The FRB adopted amendments, effective January 30, 1994, to its Regulation A to implement Section 142 of FDICIA regarding limits on Federal Reserve Bank credit. Under Section 142, after December 19, 1993, the FRB may be financially liable to the FDIC for certain losses incurred by the insurance funds administered by the FDIC. The amendment was intended to discourage advances to undercapitalized and critically undercapitalized insured depository institutions, due to a concern that such advances could lead to increased losses to the insurance funds.

Among the principal substantive changes were: placing limitations on Federal Reserve Bank credit to undercapitalized and critically undercapitalized insured depository

institutions; clarifying the term viable, as it applies to an undercapitalized insured depository institution; and providing for assessments on the Federal Reserve Banks for amounts that the FRB may be required to pay the FDIC under Section 142. The final rule provides that a Federal Reserve Bank may make or have outstanding advances to or discounts for a depository institution that it knows to be an undercapitalized insured depository institution only: (1) if, in any 120-day period, the advances or discounts are not outstanding for more than 60 days during which the institution is undercapitalized; (2) during the 60 days after the receipt of a written certification of viability from the Chairman of the FRB or the head of the appropriate federal banking agency; or (3) after consultation with the FRB. A Federal Reserve Bank may make or have outstanding advances to or discounts for an institution that it knows to be a critically undercapitalized insured depository institution only during the five-day period beginning on the date the institution became critically undercapitalized or after consultation with the FRB. *Press Release, FRB, 12/16/93; FR, 12/28, p. 68509.*

#### ***Capital Requirements for Recourse Arrangements***

The FRB, OCC, FDIC and OTS proposed revisions to their risk-based capital standards regarding regulatory capital treatment of recourse arrangements and direct credit substitutes that expose banks, bank holding companies, and thrifts to credit risk. The joint proposal was developed under the auspices of the FFIEC. The proposal would allow banks and bank holding companies to maintain lower amounts of capital against low-level recourse transactions. Higher amounts of risk-based capital would be required against certain direct credit substitutes including, for banking organizations, purchased servicing rights that provide loss protection to the owners of the loans serviced, and purchased subordinated interests that absorb the first dollars of losses from

the underlying assets, and, for both banking organizations and thrifts, certain guarantee-type arrangements (such as standby letters of credit) provided for third-party assets that absorb the first dollars of losses from those assets. The OTS is proposing to change its existing capital regulations only in respect to the capital requirements for the treatment of guarantee-type arrangements that absorb first-dollar losses.

In addition, the agencies are publishing a preliminary proposal to use credit ratings to match the risk-based capital assessment more closely to an institution's relative risk of loss in certain asset securitizations. *Press Release, FRB, 5/25/94; FIL-37-94, FDIC, 5/31; FR, 5/25, p. 27116.*

#### ***Community Reinvestment Act***

The FRB, OCC, FDIC, and OTS proposed revising their regulations concerning the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). The proposed procedures are designed to emphasize performance rather than process, to promote consistency in assessments, to permit effective enforcement against institutions with poor performance, and to reduce unnecessary compliance burden while stimulating improved performance.

The inter-agency proposal would replace 12 subjective factors now being used to assess an institution's CRA performance with three "tests" using objective, performance-based standards in the following areas: (1) lending test: the bank or thrift would be evaluated on loans made to low- and moderate-income areas as well as other areas; (2) service test: the institution's branch locations, their accessibility to low- and moderate-income areas, and the availability of credit and other services would be reviewed; (3) investment test: this analysis would cover investment in community development programs that benefit low- and moderate-income areas. The three tests would apply differently to different types of institutions; for example, relatively large institutions (generally those with assets of \$250 million or more) would be evaluated



on additional information not now reported regarding the geographic distribution of their consumer, small-business and small-farm loan applications, denials and originations. Smaller institutions would be evaluated under a streamlined method that would not include additional data on the geographic distribution of loans.

As an alternative to the three tests, each institution could submit a strategic plan that includes measurable goals for meeting its CRA obligations. The strategic plan would be open to public comment and would be subject to regulatory approval. If the institution failed to meet the goals set forth in its approved plan, its performance would be evaluated under the applicable tests or standards described above. *FR, 12/21/93, p. 67466; 2/3/94, p. 5138; PR-135-93, FDIC, 12/9/93.*

### ***Truth in Savings***

The FRB is publishing for comment a proposed official staff commentary to its Regulation DD. The commentary applies and interprets the requirements of the regulation, which became effective on June 21, 1993. The proposed commentary incorporates much of the guidance provided when the regulation was adopted, and addresses also additional questions.

The purpose of the Truth in Savings Act is to assist consumers in comparing deposit accounts offered by depository institutions. The Act requires institutions to disclose fees, the interest rate, the annual percentage yield, and other account terms whenever a consumer requests the information and before an account is opened. Fees and other information also must be provided on any periodic statement the institution sends to the consumer. Rules are set forth for deposit account advertisements and advance notices to account holders of adverse changes in terms. The Act restricts how institutions must determine the account balance on which interest is calculated. *Press Release, FRB, 1/31/94; FR, 2/7/94, p. 5536.*

The FRB decided not to preempt Wisconsin's truth-in-savings law, be-

cause the state law is not inconsistent with the federal statute. *FR, 5/10/94, p. 24032; AB, 5/12/94, p. 9.*

The FRB proposed new rules, which among other things, would have the effect of producing an annual percentage yield (APY) that reflects the time value of money.

The FRB withdrew other proposed amendments to the regulation that would have required an internal rate of return formula to calculate the APY. The withdrawal was based on considerations of cost and regulatory burden. *Press Release, FRB, 5/4/94; FR, 5/11, p. 24376.*

### ***Truth in Lending: Depository Institutions Disaster Relief***

The FRB granted temporary relief from certain provisions of Regulation Z governing waivers by consumers of the right to rescind certain home-secured loans, so that borrowers in disaster-affected communities in California can gain easier access to loan funds for emergency purposes. Consumers' use of preprinted forms to waive the right of rescission is permitted, if the home securing the extension of credit is located in the disaster area. A consumer must still provide the creditor with a signed, dated waiver statement that a personal financial emergency exists. The FRB's order is effective 2/11/94 and expires on 10/31/94. The FRB acted under provisions of DIDRA, which temporarily authorizes the FRB to make exceptions to the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z for transactions in an area the President has declared to be a major disaster area. *FR, 2/11/94, p. 6532.*

### ***Equal Credit Opportunity: Appraisals***

The FRB revised its Regulation B to implement amendments to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act contained in FDICIA. The law provides credit applicants with a right to receive copies of appraisal reports. The regulation is amended to provide alternative methods of compliance with the law. For creditors that do not automatically provide copies of ap-

praisal reports, the regulation includes limits on when an applicant may request (and a creditor must provide) a copy of an appraisal report, and a requirement that applicants be notified of the right to receive a copy. The final rule applies to applications for credit to be secured by a lien on a residential structure containing 1-4 family units. The effective date is 12/14/93, and compliance is optional until 6/14/94. *FR, 12/16/93, p. 65657; FIL-12-94, FDIC, 2/28/94.*

### ***Loans to Officers and Directors***

The FRB approved a final rule, to be effective February 18, 1994, amending several provisions of its Regulation O. An interim rule is made permanent that increases the aggregate lending limit for small, adequately capitalized banks from 100 percent of a bank's unimpaired capital and surplus to 200 percent. Other amendments are designed to reduce the burden and complexity of the regulation. *Press Release, FRB, 2/18/94; FR, 1/12/93, p. 61803; 2/24/94, p. 8831.*

### ***Public Welfare Investments***

The FRB proposed amending its Regulation H, implementing Section 6 of DIDRA, to permit state member banks to make certain public welfare investments without specific FRB approval, and other public welfare investments with specific approval. The aggregate of the bank's public welfare investments must not exceed the sum of five percent of the bank's capital stock paid in and unimpaired and five percent of its unimpaired surplus. The FRB may waive this limit on a case-by-case basis, and permit such investments up to ten percent of capital stock and surplus as described above. Also, the FRB must limit a bank's investments in any one project.

The proposed rule identifies classes of public welfare investments that do not require FRB approval, leaving less-common investments and investments of more than five percent of a bank's capital subject to case-by-case review. Other requirements regarding public welfare investments

without FRB approval include that the bank must be at least adequately capitalized and rated a composite CAMEL "1" or "2," and the bank must not be subject to any written agreement, cease and desist order, capital directive, or prompt corrective action directive. *FR*, 5/26/94, p. 27247.

### ***Bank Investments in Premises***

Effective July 5, 1994, the FRB is amending its Regulation H to allow a state member bank that meets certain conditions to invest in its premises an amount up to 50 percent of its Tier 1 capital without obtaining specific approval. Such an investment in premises generally should not cause significant risk to a bank which is well-capitalized, is rated CAMEL "1" or "2," and is not subject to any written agreement, cease and desist order, or capital directive. This action will significantly reduce the number of applications to invest in bank premises that are filed with the FRB and will thereby reduce regulatory burden. The amendment does not affect state member banks' ability to invest in bank premises, without conditions, up to the amount of their capital stock account. *FR*, 6/3/94, p. 28761.

### ***Approval to Underwrite Equities***

The FRB granted approval for Chase Manhattan Corp., through a wholly owned subsidiary, to underwrite and deal in all types of equity securities, including common stock, on a limited basis worldwide. Commercial banks are prohibited in general by the Glass-Steagall Act from engaging in investment banking activities, however Section 20 of the Act permits limited securities underwriting and dealing by banks. The FRB's rules do not allow a bank holding company's Section 20 subsidiary to derive more than ten percent of its gross revenue from underwriting and dealing in bank-ineligible securities over any two-year period. The Chase subsidiary also is subject to the recordkeeping, reporting, fiduciary standards, and other requirements of the Securities Exchange Act, the Securities and

Exchange Commission, and the National Association of Securities Dealers. *BBR*, 6/13/94, p. 1022.

### ***Alternative Test Proposed for Section 20 Compliance***

The FRB proposed an alternative to the current test used to measure whether a Section 20 subsidiary is in compliance with the "engaged principally" criterion of Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act. Section 20 prohibits a member bank from being affiliated with a company that is "engaged principally" in underwriting and dealing in ineligible securities. The current test is based on the revenue earned from ineligible securities activities relative to the total revenue of the Section 20 subsidiary. Comments are requested on whether asset values or sales volume data, or a combination of both measures, should be used as a new alternative test. *Press Release, FRB*, 7/6/94; *FR*, 7/12, p. 35516.

### ***Anti-Tying Rules Are Eased***

The FRB granted approval for a brokerage subsidiary of First Union Corp., Charlotte, NC, to give price discounts on stock and bond commissions to retail customers who maintain required minimum balances in deposit accounts.

The Glass-Steagall Act requires holding companies to maintain stringent barriers between their securities and commercial banking activities. Anti-tying rules of the Bank Holding Company Act prohibit banks from requiring customers to purchase one service in order to receive another. The FRB used its authority under the BHC Act to grant exceptions if they serve the public interest. The FRB allowed a tie-in in 1990 when it permitted banks to offer price reductions on credit cards issued to their established customers. The agency said it could cancel the approval if anticompetitive practices should develop. *AB*, 12/28/93, p. 1.

The FRB proposed that the exception granted to First Union Corporation (see above) be made available to bank holding companies generally, thus avoiding the need for action on

individual requests. The proposed amendments to Regulation Y would also permit discounts on any traditional bank product if the customer obtains another traditional bank product from an affiliate of the bank. *Press Release, FRB*, 3/11/94; *FR*, 3/16, p. 12202.

### ***Home Mortgage Disclosure***

The FRB is proposing several changes to its Regulation C to provide for earlier availability to the public of disclosure statements required by the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975, and to improve the quality of the data. Amendments to the Act in 1992 provided that starting with the HMDA reports for calendar year 1994, disclosure statements for individual lenders should be available to the public by July 1 of the following year, and that aggregate tables should be available at the central depositories by September 1. Among the proposed changes, lenders would be required to submit their data by February 1 instead of March 1. Another proposal is for reporting in machine-readable format, which should also improve data quality. Institutions also would be required to keep their loan application registers current during the year as data are being collected. *FR*, 6/13/94, p. 30310.

### ***BHC Subsidiary Can Offer Career Counseling Services***

The FRB approved an application from Comerica, Inc. under which Comerica of Detroit, MI would provide career counseling services through a Detroit subsidiary to banks, thrifts, bank and thrift holding companies, and their subsidiaries. The approval covers persons currently employed in, recently displaced from, or seeking employment in these organizations, and to employed persons in financially related positions in other kinds of organizations, and those seeking such positions. *BBR*, 11/15/93, p. 754.

### ***Investments in Community Corporations Approved***

The FRB gave approval for several state member banks to invest in the West Virginia Bankers Association

Community Development Corp., a for-profit corporation which will promote small-business development. Other banks may participate if they are adequately capitalized and not subject to any formal enforcement actions. Investments will be limited to two percent of a bank's capital and surplus. The OCC gave similar permission last December to national banks. It was not until DIDRA that individual banks were explicitly authorized to make investments in community development corporations, although bank holding companies already had this authority. About 75 banking companies are involved in these projects, increasingly through multibank consortia. *AB, 5/6/94, p. 3.*

### ***Charging for Examinations of U.S. Offices of Foreign Banks***

The FRB proposed to amend its regulations relating to the activities of foreign banking organizations in the U.S. to implement provisions of the Foreign Bank Supervision Enhancement Act of 1991 requiring the FRB to charge foreign banks for the cost of examinations of their branches, agencies, and representative offices in the U.S. The amount charged would be the number of examiner hours, times an hourly rate. For branches and agencies, examiner hours would be determined by applying a formula based on the branch's or agency's characteristics. For representative offices, the actual recorded examiner hours would be used. *FR, 12/15/93, p. 65560.*

### ***Revisions to Payments System Risk-Reduction Program***

The FRB adopted changes to its Policy Statement on Payments System Risk, involving the procedures that depository institutions must use if they choose to complete a self-assessment to establish a daylight overdraft net debit cap. First, effective for self-assessments performed on or after January 1, 1995, depository institutions must evaluate their operating controls and contingency procedures in addition to the three existing com-

ponents of the self-assessment (creditworthiness, intraday funds management and control, and customer credit policies and controls). Second, depository institutions will use a "Creditworthiness Matrix" to determine their overall creditworthiness rating, except in certain limited circumstances.

The FRB is eliminating the requirement that branches and agencies of foreign banks provide information on U.S. funding capability and discount window eligible collateral for use in determining their daylight overdraft net debit caps. *FR, 1/20/94, p. 3104.*

### ***Payments System Risk Policy***

The FRB will assess a penalty fee, effective April 14, 1994, on the average daily daylight overdrafts in Federal Reserve accounts incurred by bankers' banks that do not maintain reserves, Edge and agreement corporations, and limited-purpose trust companies. The rate for the daylight overdraft penalty fee is equal to the regular daylight overdraft rate applicable to other institutions plus 100 basis points, quoted on a 24-hour basis, for a 360-day year, and adjusted for the length of the Fedwire operating day. The penalty fee should create an incentive for institutions that do not have regular discount window access to avoid incurring daylight overdrafts in Federal Reserve accounts. *FR, 2/24/94, p. 8977.*

### ***Risk-Based Capital: Netting Arrangements***

The FRB and OCC issued a joint proposal that would amend the agencies' risk-based capital guidelines to recognize the risk-reducing benefits of netting arrangements. A proposed revision to the Basle Accord would allow the recognition of such netting arrangements.

Under the proposal, institutions would be permitted to net, for risk-based capital purposes, the current exposures of interest- and exchange-rate contracts subject to qualifying bilateral netting contracts. Institutions would be allowed to net positive and

negative mark-to-market values of rate contracts in determining the current exposure portion of credit-equivalent amounts of such contracts to be included in risk-weighted assets. *Press Release, FRB, 5/18/94; FR, 5/20, p. 26456.*

### ***Netting Eligibility for Financial Institutions***

The FRB approved a final rule, effective March 7, 1994, concerning the definition of "financial institution" in Section 402 of FDICIA. The Act validates netting contracts among financial institutions. Parties to a netting contract agree that they will pay or receive the net, rather than the gross, payment due under the netting contract. The Act provides certainty that netting contracts will be enforced, even in the event of the insolvency of one of the parties. *Press Release, FRB, 2/1/94; FR, 2/2, p. 4780.*

### ***Protections Under Electronic Payments of Benefits***

The FRB adopted amendments to its Regulation E in order to accord recipients of benefits, such as food stamps and Supplemental Security Income, much the same protections that are available to other users of electronic payment mechanisms. Electronic benefit transfer (EBT) programs involve the issuance of plastic access cards and personal identification numbers to benefit recipients. Benefits can be accessed through automated teller machine (ATMs) and point of sale terminals. The EBT amendments call for general application of the rules on liability for unauthorized transfers, error resolution, and most other provisions. Mandatory compliance was set for March 1, 1997, as requested by a federal EBT task force that represents all the major federal agencies with benefit programs. *Press Release, FRB, 2/24/94.*

### ***Proposal to Expand Fedwire Funds Transfer Format***

The FRB proposed expanding, by late 1996, the Fedwire funds transfer format and the adoption of a more comprehensive set of data elements. An expanded format would improve

efficiency in the payments mechanism by reducing the need for manual intervention when processing and posting transfers. Also, truncation of payment-related information would be minimized when forwarding payment orders through Fedwire that were received *via* other large-value transfer systems, such as the Clearing House Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT). Comments are requested on the benefits and costs to depository institutions, to their customers, and to the overall payments mechanism, from the proposal. *FR*, 12/11/93, p. 63366.

### *Office of the Comptroller of the Currency*

#### *Bank Capital: Risks From Credit Concentration and Nontraditional Activities*

The OCC, FRB, FDIC and OTS proposed a rule, to implement Section 305 of FDICIA, amending their risk-based capital standards by explicitly identifying concentration of credit risk and certain risks arising from non-traditional activities, as well as an institution's ability to manage these risks, as important factors in assessing an institution's overall capital adequacy.

While it is not feasible at this time to quantify the risk related to concentrations of credit for use in a formula-based capital calculation, techniques do exist to identify broad classes of concentrations and to recognize significant exposures. Institutions with significant levels of concentrations of credit risk should hold capital above the regulatory minimums. Risks posed by nontraditional activities will be taken into account by ensuring that, as members of the industry begin to engage in, or significantly expand their participation in, a nontraditional activity, the risks of that activity are promptly analyzed and the activity is given appropriate capital treatment. Section 305 requires the agencies to review their capital standards biennially to determine whether those standards are sufficient to facilitate prompt corrective action under Sec-

tion 38 of FDICIA. Should, however, a nontraditional activity evolve rapidly in the industry, it promptly will be reviewed for proper treatment under risk-based capital. *FR*, 2/22/94, p. 8420; *FIL-15-94, FDIC*, 2/25.

#### *Deferred Tax Assets*

The OCC proposed to amend its capital adequacy rules to limit the amount of certain deferred tax assets that may be included in a national bank's Tier 1 capital for risk-based and leverage capital purposes. The proposal was developed jointly by the OCC, FRB, FDIC, and OTS to respond to the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Statement of Standards No. 109, which was issued in February 1992. The proposed amendment is expected to increase the amount of net deferred tax assets that a national bank may include when computing its regulatory capital. *FR*, 12/23/93, p. 68065.

#### *Guidance on Derivatives*

The OCC issued a guidance covering a wide range of issues that were addressed in a policy statement on derivatives adopted by the agency in the Fall of 1993. Among the provisions, the statement requires banks selling derivatives as agents to ensure that their products are appropriate for buyers. The earlier statement had dealt only with banks as principals. The new statement emphasizes that senior management must approve derivative products that present new risks to banks. It relaxes an earlier requirement that a bank credit officer must approve each derivatives transaction, to state that after a broad policy is established, other officials can approve derivatives transactions.

The statement says that "factors that are considered in determining a bank's overall capital adequacy include the quality of the bank's risk-management systems, and exposure to credit concentrations, as well as liquidity, interest-rate, market, legal and operational risks . . . banks with deficient risk-management practices or significant individual or aggregate risk exposures will be expected to

hold capital above the regulatory minimums." *Bulletin 94-31, OCC*, 5/10/94; *WSJ*, 5/10.

#### *Disclosures in Mutual Fund Sales*

The OCC announced that in response to an interest expressed by a number of national banks in having the agency review disclosure materials they use in sales of mutual fund and annuity products, the agency is offering the opportunity for a one-time review of these disclosure materials. After an initial contact by an OCC examiner, banks will send in brochures, advertising copy or other promotional materials they wish to have reviewed, following the completion of which the bank will be contacted regarding the materials. *Letter to National Banks, OCC*, 5/4/94.

#### *Real-Estate Appraisals*

Effective June 7, 1994, the four federal regulators of banks and thrifts adopted rules, pursuant to Title XI of FIRREA, on real-estate appraisals that are intended to reduce costs and encourage lending without diminishing safe-and-sound banking practices. The revised rules: (a) increase the threshold level to \$250,000, from \$100,000, for loans that require a real-estate appraisal by a certified or licensed appraiser; (b) exempt from the appraisal requirements business loans of \$1 million or less where the sale or rental of real estate is not the primary source of repayment; (c) expand and clarify other exemptions from appraisal requirements, such as those for renewals of existing loans, and loans that qualify for sale or are guaranteed by a U.S. government agency or government-sponsored agency; and (d) reduce and simplify the standards for conducting required appraisals, relying more on industry standards. *FIL-41-94, FDIC*, 6/8/94; *FR*, 6/7, p. 29482.

#### *Inter-Agency Statement on Discrimination in Lending*

Federal agencies that are responsible for enforcing fair lending laws adopted a uniform policy statement on discrimination in lending. The guidance addresses what constitutes

lending discrimination under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA), including specifically such areas as what the agencies consider in determining if lending discrimination exists; what steps lenders might take to prevent discriminatory lending practices; and what lending patterns will be referred to the Department of Justice for investigation. The ECOA prohibits discrimination in credit transactions generally, while the FHA prohibits discrimination in residential real-estate-related transactions.

The statement notes that the courts have recognized three methods of proof of lending discrimination under the ECOA and the FHA: (a) "Overt evidence of discrimination," when a lender blatantly discriminates on a prohibited basis; (b) evidence of "disparate treatment," when a lender treats applicants differently based on one of the prohibited factors (such as race, national origin, sex, *etc.*); and (c) evidence of "disparate impact," when a lender applies a practice uniformly to all applicants but the practice has a discriminatory effect on a prohibited basis and is not justified by business necessity.

Questions and answers, and specific examples, are provided to assist lenders in respect to what constitutes discriminatory lending in the agencies' statement. "*Inter-Agency Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending*," OCC, FRB, FDIC, OTS (*and other agencies*), 3/8/94; FR, 4/15/94, p. 18266; FIL-29-94, FDIC, 4/29.

### **"Retirement CD" Is Permitted**

The OCC issued a "no-objection" letter that permits a Montana bank to offer a "Retirement CD" which combines features of a traditional certificate of deposit with certain payment terms and tax advantages of an annuity contract. Customers may open a Retirement CD account with a minimum initial deposit of \$5,000, and may make subsequent deposits once a year, each of not less than \$1,000. When opening an account the customer chooses a maturity date, with a minimum term of one year. They can elect to receive up to two-thirds of the

account balance in a lump sum at maturity, and any amount which is not so received will be used as the basis for equal monthly lifetime payments to the customer. In respect to the Retirement CD as an annuity for income tax purposes, income taxes reportedly are deferred until the time of withdrawal. The certificate pays a fixed rate of interest up to the first five years, after which the interest rate is adjusted at the bank's sole discretion without reference to any independent index. However, the issuing bank guarantees that the interest rate will never fall below three percent per year. One condition that the OCC specified in its approval was that the bank should hedge its payment obligations; another was that the bank make full and accurate disclosures to its customers.

The FDIC has said the CD is a deposit for deposit insurance purposes, but emphasized that under no circumstances would FDIC insurance extend to the bank's commitment to make lifetime payments, and that this fact should be clearly and conspicuously stated by the bank. AB, 5/13/94, p. 3; Public Letter, FDIC, 5/12.

### **Small-Bank Examination Program to Reduce Paperwork**

Under a program of the OCC now set to apply only to community banks, but which might be extended in part to larger banks, qualifying institutions that meet certain criteria will be subject to examination procedures requiring less documentation than is currently needed. Their paperwork requirements, especially in preparing for an examination, would be reduced. An official said the program generally would cover banks having assets of less than \$100 million, though banks with assets up to \$1 billion also might qualify. A qualifying institution would have a rating of "1" or "2" in the 5-point CAMEL scale, and generally would not be heavily involved in nontraditional products, such as mutual funds, annuities, or complex commercial real-estate loans. However, banks

involved with mutual funds or annuities could qualify if they meet other criteria. AB, 7/8/94, p. 1; Bulletin 94-40, OCC, 6/20.

### **Banks' Acquisitions of Mutual Fund Companies Approved**

The OCC gave approval for Mellon Bank Corp. to acquire Dreyfus Corp., the nation's sixth-largest mutual fund company. Among the conditions imposed on the approval, Dreyfus is required to obtain OCC approval before beginning any new business activities, and Mellon Bank is prohibited in most circumstances from lending to Dreyfus. Other conditions described by observers as "unusually detailed" require Mellon to submit plans to the agency detailing the post-acquisition management reporting structure, and explaining how the holding company will oversee Dreyfus' audit and compliance activities. When the transaction is completed, Mellon's mutual fund assets will increase from \$3.7 billion to \$71 billion, raising it to fifth place among mutual fund management companies. AB, 5/5/94, p. 1.

The OCC approved an application for First Union National Bank, Charlotte, NC, to acquire Lieber & Co., Purchase, NY, which advises and services 15 mutual funds in the Evergreen group with assets of about \$3.2 billion. In an unusual move, the OCC had asked for public comment on both of the above acquisitions. WSJ, 2/24/94, p. A4; 4/18.

The FRB approved the Mellon-Dreyfus acquisition, effective June 22, 1994. In regard to the Truepenney Corp., a Dreyfus non-bank subsidiary which through another subsidiary partially owns a waterfront redevelopment project in New York City, the approval requires that Mellon's involvement in the project be terminated at the end of its first phase, estimated at about seven years, in order to comply with Regulation Y. Technically the project does not meet the community development investment criteria of the regulation, because it does not provide direct

benefits primarily to low- and moderate-income persons. *Press Release, FRB, 6/22/94; BBR, 6/27, p. 1108.*

### ***Lending Limits***

The OCC proposed to revise its rules governing national bank lending limits, this being the first of a series of proposals intended to simplify the agency's regulations and reduce compliance costs. The revisions would clarify the scope and application of the lending limits, and update the rules to address frequently-asked questions and incorporate significant OCC interpretations of the lending limits. In addition, the revisions would simplify calculation of the lending limits by relying primarily on quarterly Call Report information, and revise the definition of capital and surplus upon which lending limits are based to rely on capital components that a bank must already calculate for Call Report purposes. A new exception would be added to the lending limits to allow a bank to advance funds to renew and complete funding a loan commitment under circumstances where the additional advance will protect the position of the bank. *FR, 2/11/94, p. 6593.*

### ***Interstate Branching***

A ruling by the OCC will enable NationsBank Corp. to merge two branching systems in Maryland and the District of Columbia. Federal law generally prohibits operating a single branch system across state lines, however, the approval was granted under a federal statute that allows banks to move their headquarters anywhere within 30 miles from the town or city where the bank was originally chartered. The headquarters of American Security Bank NA would be moved from DC to a suburb, Silver Spring, MD, and American, retaining its branches in DC, would be merged with Baltimore-based Maryland National Bank. Both of the branching organizations were acquired by NationsBank last year.

In a similar case that would result in interstate branching between New Jersey and Pennsylvania, the OCC in January granted approval for First Fi-

delity Bank, NA in Pennsylvania, to move its main office to Salem, New Jersey, and then merge with First Fidelity Bank, NA, New Jersey.

Legislation that would allow interstate branching is pending in Congress and in state legislatures including Georgia, Virginia and Florida. *WSJ, 2/7/94, p. B3C; BBR, 1/17, p. 116; 2/14, p. 306.*

### ***Fair Housing Home Loan Data System***

The OCC issued a final rule, effective June 20, 1994, amending its Fair Housing Home Loan Data System (FHHLDS). The rule enhances the OCC's ability to use data collected under HMDA in fair lending examinations and reduces recordkeeping requirements on national banks that are currently required to maintain duplicative information under both the FHHLDS and HMDA. The final rule replaces the current FHHLDS monthly recordkeeping requirement with the HMDA Loan/Application Registers already maintained by national banks, which will be required to be updated quarterly. All national banks subject to the HMDA, including those banks not subject to the FHHLDS, will be required to maintain information on the HMDA Loan/Application Registers on a quarterly basis. National banks that are not subject to the HMDA requirements will continue to be subject to the original FHHLDS recordkeeping requirement, which will be updated quarterly under this final rule. *FR, 5/20/94, p. 26411.*

### ***National Bank in Delaware May Charge Late Fees to Out-of-State Customers***

The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that national banks are allowed under the National Bank Act to charge late fees based on the law of the state where the bank is located, even if the fees are not permitted in the customer's state (*Copeland v. MBNA America, N.A., 5/26/94*). MBNA, a national bank located in Delaware, issues Visa and MasterCard credit cards to customers nationwide. The Court found that under

the Act as interpreted by the courts, interest includes late fees, and it supported MBNA's argument that it may export the interest rate which is permitted in Delaware, including the late fees the state allows, to customers in other states. *BBR, 6/13/94, p. 1033.*

### ***National Bank Consolidations with Federal Savings Associations***

The OCC is adopting final procedures for national banks to follow in merging or consolidating with federal savings associations. These transactions were authorized in Title V of FDICIA. To the extent appropriate, the procedures parallel the longstanding statutory and regulatory procedures governing mergers and consolidations between national banks and state-chartered financial institutions. Effective: May 2, 1994. *FR, 5/2/94, p. 22497.*

### ***Restrictions on Banks' Insurance Activities Upheld***

A U.S. District Court in Florida upheld a ruling by the State Banking Commissioner that bars Barnett Banks of Marion County, NA from selling insurance through a newly acquired agency. A state statute prohibits bank subsidiaries or affiliates of bank holding companies from insurance agency activities. Barnett argued that Section 92 of the National Bank Act as interpreted by the OCC permits banks to sell insurance in towns with a population up to 5,000. The Court found an express intent to preempt state insurance laws not to be present in Section 92, and thus the matter is determined by the provisions of the McCarran-Ferguson Act which leave insurance regulation and taxation to the states. Barnett has appealed the ruling to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. *BBR, 12/13/93, p. 934.*

### ***Business Contracting Outreach Program***

The OCC proposed a rule for the adoption of a Minority-, Women- and Individuals with Disabilities-Owned Business Contracting Outreach Program. The intention is to ensure that

business concerns owned and controlled by those groups are provided the opportunity to participate in the agency's contracting process. This action, with respect to the minority- and women-owned businesses, is required by FIRREA, and inclusion of individuals with disabilities is consistent with the intent of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as amended. The OCC's activities include (a) targeting appropriate firms for participation in the program; (b) participating in business promotion events comprised of or attended by MWOB and IDOB firms to explain OCC contracting opportunities; (c) ensuring that the OCC contracting staff understands and actively promotes this program; and (d) registering MWOB and IDOB firms in the OCC's database to facilitate their participation in the competitive procurement process for OCC contracts. Ownership and control requirements are specified in the proposal that each prospective MWOB or IDOB must demonstrate that it meets in order to participate in the program. *FR, 11/10/93, p. 59686.*

#### ***Bank Investments in Community Development Corporations***

The OCC amended its regulations concerning national bank investments in community development corporations (CDCs) and community development projects, effective December 31, 1993, to implement Section 6 of DIDRA. Among the amendments, adequately capitalized national banks with assets of \$250 million or less would be exempt from required prior OCC approval for CDC and CD project investments, and can self-certify single investments up to five percent of their unimpaired capital and surplus. For national banks with assets of more than \$250 million, self-certification of individual investments would be permitted up to the lesser of two percent of unimpaired capital and surplus, or \$10 million. Investments that exceed either of those limits would require OCC approval. The ceiling on bank investments in CDCs and CD projects is raised from

five percent of unimpaired capital and surplus to ten percent on a case-by-case basis, subject to a determination by the OCC that there is no significant risk to the deposit insurance fund.

The OCC said its action will reduce regulatory burdens associated with CDC and CD project investments, in a manner that will not endanger banks' safety and soundness, and is intended to promote economic growth and investments in low- and moderate-income areas and underserved rural communities. *FR, 12/27/93, p. 68464; BBR, 1/3/94, p. 8.*

#### ***Publication of CRA Ratings***

A new monthly publication, The CRA Report, will include a listing of Community Reinvestment Act ratings, and for banks rated less than "satisfactory" the full text of their evaluations. CRA ratings of national banks will continue to be released monthly in the OCC's *Weekly Bulletin* and *Interpretations and Actions*. *BBR, 1/10/94, p. 54.*

#### ***Office of Thrift Supervision***

##### ***Conversions From Mutual to Stock Form***

The OTS is amending its regulations governing mutual-to-stock conversions of insured savings associations. Among the changes, the amendments revise and clarify the appraisal standards; prohibit the use of "running" proxies by managements of converting associations; provide stock purchase priority to long-term depositors, and require a stock purchase preference for eligible depositors residing in the association's local community. Also, the amendments prohibit management stock benefit plans in a conversion; prohibit merger conversions except in supervisory situations; lengthen the conversion public comment period; require associations to submit business plans for all conversions; prohibit the repurchase of a converted association's stock within one year of conversion; and make publicly available preliminary conversion proxy materials.

The interim final rule is effective May 3, 1994, and public comments were requested. *FR, 5/3/94, p. 22725.*

The OTS announced on January 31, 1994, that it was suspending the acceptance of applications involving merger conversions of mutual savings associations under its supervision, the moratorium to remain in effect while OTS reviews its regulations governing these conversions. Merger conversions are transactions in which a mutual savings association is merged into another entity, and the value of the mutual is converted into the stock of the acquirer. Standard conversions, in contrast, are those by which mutual thrifts convert to stock ownership without a merger or acquisition being part of the transaction. *NEWS, OTS, 1/31/94.*

#### ***Charter Conversions Denied on "Convenience and Needs" Criteria***

The OTS denied applications of four savings associations to convert to state-chartered savings banks because they have failed to serve the convenience and needs of their respective communities or to satisfactorily carry out their responsibilities under CRA. These are the first denials by OTS of applications for such conversions. Three New Jersey thrifts — Pulaski Savings Bank, SLA, Springfield; Gibraltar Savings Bank, SLA, Mendham; and United Roosevelt Savings and Loan Association, Carteret — received "needs to improve" ratings on their last two CRA compliance examinations conducted by OTS, including the most recent in 1993. An Ohio institution — The Mayflower Savings & Loan Company, Groesbeck — received the same rating on its last compliance exam, in late 1992. The institutions range in size from the \$60 million-asset Mayflower to the \$160 million-asset (approximate) Pulaski. *NEWS, OTS, 2/18/94.*

#### ***Acquisition of Control of Savings Associations***

The OTS proposed to incorporate into its rules the provisions of Section

211 of FDICIA, which amended the Home Owners' Loan Act to require that the OTS, in reviewing a holding company application to acquire a savings association, consider the competence, experience, and integrity of the officers, directors, and principal shareholders of the proposed acquirors and the savings association to be acquired. Under Section 211, OTS must deny an application if the company fails to provide adequate assurances that the company will make available such information on the operations or activities of the company, or any affiliate, as OTS requires. In addition, the OTS must deny an application by any foreign bank that is not subject to comprehensive supervision or regulation on a consolidated basis by the appropriate authorities in the home country of the foreign bank. *FR, 11/23/93, p. 61850; 6/2/94, p. 28468.*

### ***Capital Standards***

The OTS issued a final regulation making its capital treatment of intangible assets consistent with rules previously adopted by the other federal banking agencies. The new rule also implements a statutory requirement on the valuation of purchased mortgage servicing rights (PMSRs) mandated by FDICIA. Among the changes under the new rule, PMSRs and purchased credit-card relationships (PCCRs) may be included in thrifts' core capital up to 50 percent of core capital. Previously, thrifts could not include PCCRs in their capital. These two types of intangible assets must be valued at the lower of 90 percent of fair market value calculated at least quarterly or 100 percent of remaining unamortized book value. A grandfather provision permits savings associations to continue to include the same amount of PMSRs that they have for the past several years. The new OTS rule disallows any new core deposit intangibles (CDIs) from counting as capital. However, the OTS will grandfather CDIs resulting from prior transactions or those under firm contract when the rule goes into effect on March 4, 1994. *NEWS, OTS, 2/2/94; FR, 2/2, p. 4785.*

The OTS proposed amending its minimum regulatory capital regulations by revising the definition of "common stockholders' equity," in order to incorporate a recent change in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), made by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115. The agency solicited comments particularly on certain questions with reference to SFAS 115, among which are: If unrealized gains and losses are included in regulatory capital, whether these gains and losses should be included in core capital for purposes of the leverage ratio requirement or the risk-based capital requirement; or included in supplementary capital for purposes of the risk-based capital requirement. Section 4 of the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933 requires the OTS to prescribe accounting standards that incorporate GAAP to the same extent as used for regulatory purposes by the federal banking agencies. The proposal is similar to amendments the other federal banking agencies have proposed. *FR, 6/22/94, p. 32143.*

The OTS proposed amending its risk-based capital standards to recognize the risk-reducing benefits of netting arrangements. Savings associations would be permitted to net, for risk-based capital purposes, interest- and exchange-rate contracts subject to legally enforceable bilateral netting contracts that meet certain criteria. The amendments parallel recent amendments proposed by the FRB and OCC. The proposed amendments would allow thrift institutions to net positive and negative mark-to-market values of rate contracts in determining the current exposure portion of the credit-equivalent amount of such contracts to be included in risk-weighted assets. *FR, 6/14/94, p. 30538.*

### ***Annual Independent Audits***

The OTS proposed amending its annual independent audit rules for savings associations to conform to those applicable to other federally insured depository institutions. Under

Section 112 of FDICIA, the FDIC requires annual audits of insured depository institutions with total assets of \$500 million or more. The OTS proposes to eliminate its annual independent audit requirement, and to adopt the requirements in the FDIC's final rule for savings associations. The OTS proposes also to retain the authority to require independent audits of small savings associations if advisable for purposes of safety and soundness. *FR, 3/22/94, p. 13461.*

### ***Authority to Provide Postal Services***

The OTS said in a legal memorandum that federal savings associations may provide the same postal services that are authorized for national banks. These services appear to be limited to: selling stamps and other postal supplies; accepting matter for mailing; selling parcel insurance as agent for the U.S. Postal Service; accepting registered mail; and issuing money orders. A federal savings association offering these services must observe the appropriate rules of the U.S. Postal Service. The books and records of the postal operation must be kept separate from the records of other operations of the savings association and will be subject to inspection both by the OTS and the U.S. Postal Service. *Legal Division Memorandum, OTS, 3/24/94.*

### ***CAMEL Rating System***

The OTS is amending its regulations, effective April 19, 1994, to reflect the conversion from the MACRO to the CAMEL (capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity) rating system. The change will reduce regulatory burden by using the same rating system employed by the other federal banking regulatory agencies, and will improve consistency with regard to risk-related assessments and joint examinations. The OTS expects that virtually no practical effect on savings associations will result from this change. *FR, 4/19/94, p. 18474.*



### ***Release of Unpublished Information***

The OTS proposed to amend its regulations pertaining to release of unpublished agency information that would include, in certain circumstances, records that are exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The proposed regulation does not apply to requests for records that are required to be disclosed under FOIA. The proposal describes in detail the procedures that requesters must follow in seeking the release of unpublished information, and the criteria on which OTS will evaluate requests for this information. *FR, 12/9/93, p. 64695.*

### ***Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council***

#### ***Accounting for Securities Activities***

The FFIEC issued an interim revision to its existing guidance on the accounting and reporting for securities and the holding of mortgage derivatives that addresses the relationship between a policy statement adopted by the federal banking and thrift supervisory agencies, effective February 10, 1992, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board's Statement No. 115, issued in May 1993. Banks must adopt the FASB Statement for their Reports of Condition and Income for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1993. The interim revision to the policy statement: (a) removes the regulatory reporting requirement that "nonhigh-risk mortgage securities" that later become "high-risk" must be redesignated as held-for-sale or trading; (b) instructs examiners to consider any unrecognized net depreciation in held-to-maturity high-risk mortgage securities when they evaluate the adequacy of an institution's capital; (c) reiterates that mortgage derivative products that are high-risk when acquired shall not be reported in regulatory reports as held-to-maturity securities at amortized cost; and (d) explains that, for

banks and thrifts, examiners may seek divestiture of high-risk mortgage securities that do not reduce interest-rate risk when the examiners determine that continued ownership of these securities represents an undue safety-and-soundness risk to the institution. The revision also identifies certain factors that provide evidence of this risk. *FIL-25-94, FDIC, 4/21/94; "Interim Revision to the Supervisory Policy Statement on Securities Activities," FFIEC, 4/15.*

#### ***Accounting for Loan Impairment***

The FFIEC is seeking public comment on certain implementation issues arising from the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement No. 114, which will be effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1994. Under the federal banking and thrift agencies' capital rules, general allowances for loan and lease losses are included in Tier 2 capital, subject to certain limits, but specific allowances are not eligible for inclusion in regulatory capital. Comments are asked to address whether the portion of an institution's allowance established under the Statement should be reported and considered as a specific allowance or a general allowance. Statement No. 114 contains provisions that describe how a creditor should recognize income on impaired loans. However, the FASB recently proposed to replace these provisions with one allowing creditors to use existing methods of income recognition. Among the issues on which the FFIEC is requesting comment are whether the regulatory nonaccrual standards should be retained, and the expected effect of FASB 114 on the level of institutions' allowances for loan losses. *Press Release, FFIEC, 5/13/94; FIL-35-94, 5/23; FR, 5/17, 25656.*

#### ***Electronic Imaging System Risks***

The FFIEC issued a statement to alert the senior management of each FFIEC member agency and all examining personnel to the risks associated with electronic imaging systems in financial institutions. Electronic imaging systems are defined as the technology used to capture, index, store and

retrieve electronic images of paper documents. Many of the traditional audit and security controls for paper-based systems may be reduced or absent in electronic document workflow. New controls must be developed and designed into the automated process to ensure that information in image files cannot be altered, erased or lost. Risk areas that management should address when installing imaging systems, and that examiners should be aware of when examining an institution's controls over imaging systems, are discussed. *Press Release, FFIEC, 12/20/93; FIL-13-94, FDIC, 2/25/94.*

#### ***Risk Management Seminars***

The FFIEC will conduct two Risk Management Planning Seminars in 1994, in response to FIRREA which specifies that the Council "develop and administer training seminars in risk management for its employees and the employees of financial institutions." The seminars for top bank officials and directors will emphasize the development of policies and procedures to control risk. A seminar to be held in Houston, Texas, will be aimed at insured financial institutions of all sizes, while a seminar in New York City will focus on financial institutions that are larger than \$500 million. *Press Release, FFIEC, 12/13/93.*

#### ***Fair Lending Seminars***

The FFIEC will conduct three fair lending seminars in 1994 for chief executive officers of financial institutions. The goal of the seminars is to assist top management of the institutions in better understanding fair lending issues and instituting policies that ensure nondiscriminatory lending practices. Among the topics to be discussed at each seminar are the fair lending priorities of the agency principals and the initiatives underway to carry them out, the role of the Justice Department and the Department of Housing and Urban Development in enforcing the fair lending laws, and ways by which institutions have improved their fair lending. The agencies encourage attendance at these one-day seminars by a member of an

institution's executive management team. *PR-23-94, FFIEC, 4/5/94.*

## **Federal Housing Finance Board**

### ***Advances to Capital-Deficient Members***

The FHFB is amending its regulations, effective February 22, 1994, to incorporate requirements governing secured loans (called advances) made by the Federal Home Loan Banks to capital-deficient members. The final rule prohibits Bank lending to tangibly insolvent members, except at the request of the appropriate federal regulator or insurer, and restricts the Banks from lending to other capital-deficient members whose use of Bank advances has been prohibited by the appropriate federal regulator or insurer. In addition, the final rule provides that a Bank may allow a member to assume advances held by a non-member if the advances had previously been extended by the Bank to another of its members. *FR, 1/20/94, p. 2945.*

## **National Credit Union Administration**

### ***Organization and Operation of Federal Credit Unions***

The NCUA adopted a final interpretive ruling and policy statement (IRPS), effective July 5, 1994, following a proposal issued in July 1993. The proposed IRPS was designed to: (a) update policies on low-income credit unions; (b) streamline the charter application process; (c) address credit unions undergoing corporate and military unit restructuring; (d) clarify NCUA policy on the "operational area" requirement for select group expansions; and (e) make certain other minor or technical changes.

To provide expanded credit union service to low-income persons the IRPS: (a) permits chartering associational low-income federal credit unions, where the association is organized solely for the purpose of providing credit union service to low-income persons; (b) permits a low-income federal credit union, whether

associational or community based, to include in its charter, occupational, associational, and community common bond groups, without regard to location; and (c) permits a federal credit union of any type to include low-income groups in its field of membership, without regard to the group's location, either by forming an association which is organized solely for the purpose of providing such service or by including a community group which could be the basis for chartering a low-income credit union. The Board will institute special reporting requirements and special examination procedures for any credit union including a low-income group in its field of membership to ensure that adequate credit union services are provided to *all* persons in the community.

The NCUA determined also that federal credit unions of all types need additional flexibility when faced with distress situations such as significant corporate or military restructurings. Thus, the final IRPS: (a) permits federal credit unions of all types to apply for designation as a "distressed federal credit union" and to do so regardless of whether they are converting to community charter; (b) permits federal credit unions with such designations to add occupational and associational groups to their fields of membership regardless of location. Controls over the process include a comprehensive review by the NCUA Board prior to initial designation; groups must request service in order to be added to a distressed credit union's field of membership; the regional director must approve all expansion requests; and normal overlap procedures will apply. *FR, 6/3/94, p. 29066.*

### ***Approval Greatly Enlarges CU's Potential Membership***

In what appears to be the largest single potential membership expansion, the NCUA granted approval for Communicators Federal Credit Union, Houston, TX, whose members are mostly local telephone and supermarket workers, to expand its field of

membership to include all retirees and senior citizens living within a 25-mile radius of Houston. The \$97 million-asset credit union would have its potential membership enlarged to over 20 times its current 28,035 members. The three largest expansion approvals last year also primarily involved adding senior citizens groups. *AB, 4/15/94, p. 9.*

### ***Mergers and Insurance Conversions***

The NCUA proposed amendments to clarify that its regulations on mergers, voluntary termination and insurance conversion apply not only to federally insured credit unions converting to non-federally insured credit unions, but those converting to any institution that is not insured by the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF). The amendments will provide NCUA with clear authority to prevent abuses in connection with conversions, involving the agency's authority to require membership votes, to monitor the fairness of those votes, and to ensure that the transaction is handled in the best interests of the members of the NCUSIF. *FR, 6/30/94, p. 33702.*

### ***Mutual Fund Investments***

An NCUA letter to federal credit unions notes that the proliferation of mutual funds, the increasing complexity of mutual fund investments, and often rapid changes in fund portfolios have made it more difficult for credit unions to determine if an individual mutual fund is permissible, and to monitor funds' investments and investment transactions. For these reasons, and to eliminate examiner inconsistency, the NCUA is taking the position that an FCU may invest in a mutual fund only when the prospectus indicates that the fund's authority is *strictly* limited to investments and investment transactions that are legal for FCUs. Thus, a fund authorized to purchase Collateralized Mortgage Obligations (CMOs) and Real-Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs) without restriction is an impermissible investment

for FCUs, even though the FCU has evidence that the fund purchases only securities passing the high-risk securities test. The policy issuance is effective January 1, 1995. *Letter to Credit Unions, No. 150, NCUA, 12/93.*

### ***Nonmember and Public Unit Accounts***

The NCUA amended its regulations, effective June 20, 1994, to change the amount of nonmember and public unit accounts that a credit union may maintain, without a waiver, to 20 percent of total shares or \$1.5 million, whichever is greater. Credit unions accepting nonmember and public unit accounts in excess of 20 percent of total shares are still required to develop a written plan and send it to the Regional Director. *FR, 5/19/94, p. 26101.*

### ***Corporate Credit Unions***

Noting that many corporate credit unions are closely tied to credit union leagues or trade associations through interlocking boards of directors or common management, the NCUA requested comment on whether to require that a corporate credit union's board of directors be independently elected by its members, that the board represent primarily the interests of those members that are credit unions, and that management report only to the corporate credit union's board of directors.

The corporate credit union system consists of 44 corporate credit unions serving the nation's 13,000 natural person credit unions, with the U.S. Central Credit Union in turn serving the corporate credit unions. The corporate credit union system provides liquidity, investment, and payment services to credit unions. As of December 31, 1993, the 44 corporate credit unions held about \$41 billion in assets, half of which was reinvested in shares in U.S. Central. *FR, 4/19/94, p. 18503.*

### ***Credit Unions Examined for Loan Bias***

The NCUA said that data reported under HMDA for 1992 indicated that some credit unions are rejecting mi-

nority mortgage applicants at higher rates than non-minorities, and that those with the highest denial rates in the HMDA data would be given special examinations. The NCUA advised credit unions to review their lending policies and procedures to "ensure that the service and credit needs of all members are provided by their credit unions in a completely fair and nondiscriminatory way." The denial rate, according to the HMDA data, for all mortgage applicants is much lower than at other institutions: in 1992, the overall denial rate at CUs was 9.8 percent, compared to 15.7 percent for all other mortgage lenders. But the denial rate was 19.7 percent for black applicants, 16.6 percent for Hispanics, and 13.6 percent for Native Americans, compared to 7.7 percent for whites. *AB, 1/14/94, p. 8.*

### ***Truth in Savings***

The NCUA extended the date for compliance with its Truth in Savings regulation, to March 31, 1995 for credit unions of an asset size between \$500,000 and \$1 million as of December 31, 1993, that are not automated, and to June 30, 1995 for credit unions of less than \$500,000 that are not automated. The compliance date for all other credit unions remains January 1, 1995.

The Truth in Savings Act (Title II of FDICIA) required the NCUA to issue implementing regulations for credit unions. The agency published a regulation on September 27, 1993. The regulation is effective January 1, 1995, except for some requirements not effective until approved by the Office of Management and Budget. The Act and regulation require credit unions to disclose fees, dividend and interest rates and other terms concerning share and deposit accounts, and limit the methods by which credit unions determine the balance on which dividends are calculated. *FR, 3/22/94, p. 13435.*

### ***Legal Opinion on Interstate Export of Interest Rates***

The NCUA, in an interpretive letter, addressed the authority of feder-

ally insured, state-chartered credit unions to export to other states the late charges allowed under the laws of the state where the credit union is located. It concludes that the credit unions have this authority regardless of any prohibition or limitation by the state where members reside. Late charges, the statement said, are included within the meaning of the term "interest" in Section 523 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA), and this statutory provision preempts all state law limitations in the member's state of residence on the interest which may be charged by a state-chartered, federally insured credit union. *Interpretive Letter, NCUA, 4/11/94.*

### ***Incentive Pay Plans***

The NCUA requested comments on whether to change its rule that prohibits federally insured credit unions from providing incentive pay plans to certain employees related to the credit union's lending activities. Under Section 701 of the agency's rules, federal credit unions are barred from making any loan or extending any line of credit if, either directly or indirectly, any commission, fee, or other compensation is to be received by the credit union's directors, senior management, loan officers, or any immediate family members of such individuals, in connection with underwriting, insuring, servicing, or collecting the loan or line of credit. The regulation does not restrict the payment of non-commission salary to employees. While an official in charge of lending may not receive compensation tied to the performance of the loan department, the agency has taken the position that a chief executive officer's compensation may be tied to the overall performance of the credit union, part of which is based on its loan activities. *FR, 3/15/94, p. 11937.*

### ***State Legislation and Regulation***

#### ***Disclosures to Bank Customers***

*California:* More than 90 percent of banks in the state are obtaining signed

disclosure acknowledgements from customers who purchase mutual funds, according to a survey by the California Bankers Association. The survey covered about ten percent of the membership of the Association. Such matters as mutual funds' lack of federal deposit insurance, and investment risks, are covered in the customer statements. *AB, 1/18/94, p. 8.*

### ***Customers Given Trial Period on Annuities***

*California:* Legislation that became effective on January 1, 1994, provides for a "trial" period of 30 days on the purchase of annuities and life insurance by persons over age 60 during which they can cancel the contracts and have all premiums returned. Previously, the institutions that sell these products had been granting a ten-day "free-look" period. The new legislation poses problems to sellers of variable annuities because of the market fluctuations in the underlying investment securities for the annuities contracts. *AB, 1/24/94, p. 13.*

### ***Selling Annuities Permitted for Banks***

*Colorado:* New legislation allows banks, bank holding companies, and their subsidiaries and affiliates to sell fixed- and variable-rate annuities. The statute requires that the seller receive written acknowledgment from the purchaser that the annuity involves investment risk that is not FDIC-insured. *BBR, 6/6/94, p. 991.*

### ***Restraints on Credit Cards Eased***

*Colorado:* The Governor signed a bill that eliminates prohibitions on credit-card fees and allows returned-check fees of up to \$20, sets a minimum interest charge of up to 50 cents, and lets state-chartered institutions export fees and rates. Existing regulations limit the annual percentage rate (APR) on credit cards to 21 percent with, and 18 percent without, a grace period. The new law reflects federal regulations in requiring that a credit card's APR be conspicuously displayed. *AB, 5/25/94, p. 12.*

*Maine:* The Governor signed legislation containing several provisions aimed toward reversing losses of credit-card jobs to other states. Among the changes, it eliminates the 18 percent ceiling on annual rates and also a \$12 maximum on annual fees, replaces a prohibition on late fees with a maximum fee, and for the 25-day grace period allows immediate calculation of interest for customers with an unpaid balance. Existing restrictions that were unchanged include prohibitions on: fee charged to cardholders who exceed their credit limit, returned-check charges, and charges by companies for attorney's fees during disputes. *BBR, 4/18/94, p. 705; 6/6, p. 991.*

### ***Interstate Banking***

*Florida:* The Governor is expected to sign legislation that allows, on a reciprocal basis, banking organizations in other states to acquire Florida-based banks, and permits Florida banks to make similar out-of-state acquisitions. The legislation would be effective May 1, 1995, and would take the state out of the Southeast regional banking compact. Virginia, and the Georgia legislature, passed similar bills earlier this year, and North Carolina enacted a law in 1993, to be effective July 1, 1996.

Interstate banking and branching legislation now being considered by the Congress would largely supersede the various regional banking networks. *AB, 4/4/94, p. 7; BBR, 4/4, p. 622.*

### ***Housing Agency to Establish Bank***

*Florida:* The State Comptroller approved an application by Dade County's Housing Finance Authority to establish a bank to provide home mortgages to low-income County residents. An official of the Authority noted that of 46 local banks asked recently to participate in a lending program, only one agreed to commit any funds. The Authority's mortgages are small, typically ranging from \$25,000 to \$50,000. The bank will not offer checking accounts, but will provide savings accounts, and expects to

package quantities of low-interest loans into securities that could be sold to pension funds, university endowments and other investors seeking socially conscious investments. *The Miami Herald and Knight-Ridder/Tribune Business News, 12/8/93.*

### ***Mutual Fund Sales Guidelines***

*Illinois:* The Commissioners of Banks and Trust Companies adopted specific guidelines for state-chartered banks' sales of mutual funds. The guidelines, which closely follow guidelines issued by federal regulators, require that institutions disclose that a mutual fund investment is not a deposit, is not insured by the FDIC, and that the investment involves risks. Among other provisions are that personnel involved in soliciting or selling mutual funds should be trained for these activities, that the sales areas for mutual funds should be separate from deposit-taking areas, and that banks should not market mutual funds under names identical to the bank's name. *BBR, 3/28/94, p. 586.*

### ***All Credit Unions in State Are Insured***

*Massachusetts:* All state-chartered credit unions in the state are now covered by federal deposit insurance, the National Credit Union Administration said. Since the private share insurance crisis in Rhode Island, and the conversion process beginning in early 1991, a total of 124 credit unions, with assets of more than \$3.6 billion, have applied for federal coverage, and of these the NCUA approved 106 for insurance. The remaining institutions have merged or closed. *BBR, 4/25/94, p. 750.*

### ***Limit on Cleanup Liability Overturned***

*Michigan:* The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that the Environmental Protection Agency lacked statutory authority to issue its regulation under which a lender is not liable for cleanup costs when it does not participate in the management of the property. The decision came in a suit brought by the State of Michigan and the

Chemical Manufacturers Association to overturn the EPA rule. Shortly before the decision, the Clinton Administration introduced a Superfund reauthorization bill that would provide environmental liability protection to lenders and also authorize the EPA to issue such rules. *AB*, 2/10/94, p. 1.

### ***Court Approves Bank's Purchase of Insurance Agency***

*Michigan:* A decision of the Michigan Supreme Court permits a bank service company to purchase an insurance agency (Ludington Service Corp. v. Michigan, 1/25/94). The Court upheld a ruling by an appeals court that overturned the disapproval of the transaction by state insurance regulators. Legislation now being considered in the state legislature would give financial institutions broad authority to sell various kinds of insurance. *BBR*, 2/7/94, p. 253.

### ***Unannounced Bank Examinations***

*Nebraska:* The Department of Banking will begin conducting a limited number of unannounced examinations of randomly selected state banks. Currently, the Department provides advanced notice of several days to banks scheduled for examination. *Northwestern Financial Review*, 4/23/94, p. 31.

### ***Interest-Rate Deregulation, Consumer Protections Enacted***

*New York:* A new law eliminates the sunset provisions in a 1980 statute that removed interest-rate ceilings, and deregulates fees on credit cards and consumer installment loans. Other key provisions of the legislation that apply to banking institutions include: requiring them to provide basic banking services, including low-cost checking and savings accounts; prohibiting them from engaging in "geographic" discrimination; and requiring them to report their loan activity regarding small businesses and farms. In addition, a toll-free number is established at the New York Banking Department to provide consumers with interest-rate and other information; and two quasi-public companies are created to

make loans to small businesses, especially those in economically depressed areas. *BBR*, 2/7/94, p. 245; *AB*, 2/4, p. 14.

### ***Power to Sell Annuities***

*New York:* The state's highest court, the Court of Appeals, affirmed that state-chartered banks can sell annuities. The court agreed with the Banking Department that annuities are similar to other investment products sold by banks, such as certificates of deposit. In some states, banks are not allowed to sell annuities which are regarded as insurance products. The OCC has authorized national banks to sell annuities, but the power remains unclear because of legal challenges at both the state and federal levels. *WSJ*, 3/31/94, p. A2; *AB*, 3/31, p. 12.

### ***Reverse Mortgage Loans***

*New York:* The Banking Board adopted regulations applicable to reverse mortgage loans. The loans enable persons aged over 60 to access the equity in their homes. Among the provisions, loans are limited to 80 percent of the anticipated value of the real property at maturity. Investment in reverse mortgage loans is limited to ten percent of the lender's capital, undivided profits and surplus. *AB*, 4/11/94, p. 9; *BBR*, 4/11, p. 658.

### ***Stock Payment Disallowed in Mutual Conversion***

*New York:* Officials of Greenpoint Savings Bank and others were required by state regulators, because of failure to obtain a fair appraisal of the thrift, to forego \$40 million in stock benefits from a planned initial public offering in a conversion of Greenpoint from a mutual to stock form of organization.

Last Fall the state issued a proposal to tighten conversion regulations by requiring outside review of executive compensation and two appraisals of the converting institution's net worth. *AB*, 1/26/94, p. 1.

### ***Fiduciary Powers for Foreign Banks***

*New York:* The Banking Department adopted rules, effective May 18,

1994, providing authority for foreign banking corporations to engage in fiduciary activities, and setting up application procedures for the institutions to obtain permission to change their name, and for a license to establish a representative office, branch or agency. *BBR*, 5/30/94, p. 959.

### ***State Bank Powers***

*Oklahoma:* Revisions of the Banking Code give state banks automatic parity with national banks in respect to bank powers. The Banking Board is no longer required to adopt a regulation before a state bank may exercise a power conferred upon national banks. *Oklahoma Banker*, 5/13/94, p. 9.

### ***Protection of Compliance Review Documents***

*Oklahoma:* Amendments to the Banking Code provide a framework within which banks may establish compliance review committees, the findings of which are protected from discovery in civil suits brought against the bank. While the underlying data used by the compliance committee may still be discoverable and admissible, the data compilations and conclusions will be protected and kept confidential. Without this protection, many banks were hesitant to conduct rigorous internal reviews of compliance practices for fear the findings could be used against them. This legislation will not provide confidentiality for compliance review documents which relate to fraud committed by an insider of the institution. *Oklahoma Banker*, 5/13/94, p. 9.

### ***Branching Restrictions***

*Oklahoma:* New legislation has reinstated restrictions on branching by state-chartered savings and loan associations which terminated on July 1, 1993, equalizing the branching powers of state-chartered banks and savings and loans, until July 1, 1996. It closes the "Mississippi loophole" that has enabled national banks in other states to establish *de novo* branches despite statutory restrictions on such branching by state banks. *Oklahoma Banker*, 4/15/94, p. 1.

### ***Thrift Drops Deposit Insurance***

**Oklahoma:** Home Savings and Loan Association, Oklahoma City, a \$15 million-asset state-chartered institution, has dropped its deposit insurance, and plans to pass on to customers its savings on premiums, offering higher interest rates on deposit accounts. Home Savings is the second small thrift in the state to have recently dropped its deposit insurance. Oklahoma is one of the few states that do not require state-chartered depository institutions to have FDIC insurance. *AB*, 5/11/94, p. 3.

### ***Law Barring Home-Equity Loans Overturned***

**Texas:** A panel of the Fifth U.S. Court of Appeals, reversing a lower court, ruled that federal laws and regulations preempt a state law that prohibits most home-equity loans. Under the homestead provisions of the state's constitution, liens on homes are unenforceable, except for loans to cover home purchases, taxes or improvements. *WSJ*, 5/6/94, p. A4.

### ***Banking Department Receives Accreditation***

**Texas:** The Department of Banking became the 29th state banking department to be accredited by the Conference of State Bank Supervisors. The Department supervises 514 state-chartered banks with more than \$43 billion in assets. *Texas Banking*, 5/94, p. 13.

### ***Bank and Thrift Performance***

#### ***Insured Banks Earned \$12.4 Billion in First Quarter***

The FDIC reported that insured commercial banks earned \$11.1 billion in the first quarter of 1994 (preliminary), an amount little changed from the last quarter of 1993, and about \$400 million below the record level set in the third quarter of last year. For the year 1993, the banks earned \$43.4 billion. Net operating income reached a new quarterly record of \$10.7 billion. Lower loan-loss

provisions and overhead expense, as well as increased noninterest income, were the principal factors contributing to the record operating earnings in the quarter. Net interest margins narrowed for the fifth consecutive quarter, as asset yields declined more rapidly than average funding costs. The average net interest margin in the first quarter was 4.26 percent, down from 4.40 percent in the last quarter of 1993, and from 4.67 percent in the last quarter of 1992.

Commercial banks' total assets grew by \$137 billion in the first quarter, to \$3,843.2 billion. This included a \$99-billion increase in the quarter in banks' trading account assets which resulted from changes in accounting for on-balance-sheet amounts associated with certain off-balance-sheet derivatives contracts. The only loan categories having strong growth in the quarter were commercial and industrial loans, which increased by \$10.6 billion, and consumer installment loans, up by \$5.7 billion. Commercial and industrial loans now have had two consecutive quarters of strong growth. Noncurrent loans at commercial banks declined for the twelfth consecutive quarter, to \$40.3 billion, down from \$42.7 billion at year-end 1993, and from the peak level of \$83.3 billion in the first quarter of 1991. Commercial banks' loan-loss provisions and loan charge-offs were the lowest quarterly amounts since the mid-1980s. The ratio of equity capital to total assets was 7.83 percent, down from 8.01 percent at year-end 1993.

Insured private-sector savings institutions earned \$1.3 billion in the first quarter of 1994 (preliminary), representing a decline of \$365 million from the previous quarter. Earnings for the year 1993 were slightly under \$6.9 billion. Over 94 percent of all savings institutions reported positive net income in the first quarter. In the quarter the effects on earnings from lower loan-loss provisions, reduced overhead expense and higher net interest income were offset by large losses related to balance-sheet re-

structurings by a few large institutions. Average profitability was virtually unchanged from the previous quarter at institutions with less than \$5 billion in assets. The average net interest margin was 3.41 percent, almost unchanged from the 3.39 percent in the fourth quarter, but down from 3.51 percent a year ago.

Assets of savings institutions decreased in the quarter by \$4.1 billion, to \$996.7 billion. Total real-estate loans fell by \$12 billion in the first quarter, due largely to a drop in home mortgages. Mortgage-backed securities increased by \$7 billion, and now represent 21 percent of all thrift assets.

Savings institutions' troubled assets fell from 2.10 percent of total industry assets to 1.96 percent during the quarter. A year ago, troubled assets represented 3.02 percent of all industry assets. Net charge-offs of nearly \$800 million contributed to a \$571-million decline in noncurrent loans during the quarter. Noncurrent real-estate loans fell to 2.05 percent of total real-estate loans from 2.09 percent a year ago. Institutions in the Northeast and West regions continue to have the highest noncurrent real-estate loan rates, at 2.75 and 2.47 percent, respectively. For the rest of the U.S., the average noncurrent rate is 0.89 percent. Equity capital grew by \$971 million during the quarter, raising the average core capital "leverage" ratio to 7.55 percent at the end of March, and marking the fourteenth straight quarterly rise in this ratio.

Seventeen savings institutions with \$7 billion in assets either were acquired by commercial banks or switched to commercial bank charters in the first quarter. During the same time, 28 mutual savings institutions with \$18 billion in assets converted to stock organizations. Mutuals now account for 48 percent of all savings institutions and hold 20 percent of the industry's assets. *FDIC Quarterly Banking Profile, Fourth Quarter 1993; First Quarter 1994.*

### ***Fair Lending Rated Highly Burdensome Rule***

The compliance rules rated most often by respondents in a recent survey to be among the most burdensome were the Fair Lending statutes, followed by the Community Reinvestment Act and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act. Fair lending examinations encompass the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and the Fair Housing Act. Compliance examinations are perceived as becoming longer, more detailed, and more reliant on statistical analysis. The *American Banker* surveyed 80 compliance officers, and of the institutions represented, 59 percent had more than \$1 billion in assets, 12 percent were between \$300 million and \$1 billion, and 29 percent were under \$300 million.

Compliance areas in which the responses suggested some progress included more involvement by senior managements in compliance, an improvement in respect to positive attitudes on the part of compliance officers about their jobs, more participation by men in areas of compliance responsibilities where women are still dominant, and expanding compliance sensitivity more widely throughout the bank. *AB*, 6/30/94, p. 16.

### ***Electronic Delivery Systems Replace Branches***

A study sponsored by the Bank Administration Institute concludes that 20 percent of existing bank branches will likely be closed by the end of the decade, as cash machines, home banking, and various electronic delivery systems continue to gain popularity with consumers. Fifty-seven percent of banking transactions already are taking place outside traditional branches, according to the study. Information from more than 35,000 accounts at ten major banks also indicate wide regional variations in the extent of branching. The Midwest, for example, is said to be relatively underserved by bank offices. In general, the older, rural, and small-town resi-

dents tend to favor branches, while the younger, urban bank customers prefer cash machines, telephones and computers for financial transactions.

The rapid increase in branches in supermarkets has resulted in another estimate that 5,000 such branches will be operating in the U.S. by the year 2000. This would be more than double the 2,100 in-store branches currently in operation and seven times the 1989 total of 675. Supermarket branches are seen as having advantages over conventional branches in usually being far less expensive to build and maintain, and also they enable banks to better penetrate retail markets in many cases. *AB*, 11/22/93, p. 1; 1/27/94, p. 18; 2/16, p. 15.

### ***Usage of Direct Deposit Increasing***

The number of employees being paid by direct deposit has tripled in the past five years to 35 percent of all employees in the U.S. at year-end 1993, according to the National Automated Clearing House Association. Over 56 percent of recipients of Social Security benefits receive their payments by direct deposit. *AB*, 3/29/94, p. 14.

### ***Bounced-Check Fees Excessive, Deposit Interest Rates Too Low, CFA Says***

The Consumer Federation of America charged that banks are "gouging" customers on bounced-check fees, receiving \$4.35 billion in fees on bounced checks in 1992, over six times more than the direct cost of \$685 million. The costs consisted of \$581 million in processing expenses and \$104 million in losses on uncollected checks. The \$3.67 billion difference between the fees received and costs for bounced checks represented 11 percent of the industry's earnings of \$32.2 billion in the year. An American Bankers Association spokesman said the amount of fees on bounced checks reflects cost recoupment and also the industry's effort to deter the activity. In addition, quantification of all of the costs related to bounced checks is difficult.

Large banks, those with assets exceeding \$1 billion, had the highest bounced-check fee markup, 971 percent of costs, according to the CFA's study. Banks in the \$300 million to \$1 billion range showed a 469 percent markup, and smaller banks, 315 percent. *AB*, 12/10/93, p. 1.

Banks have not increased their rates paid on money-market accounts and NOW accounts, and have started to raise CD rates only since February, according to a CFA report, although money-market fund rates and Treasury-bill rates have been rising for the past year. The report says that if commercial banks had paid money-market fund rates on their money-market accounts, and paid 6-month Treasury-bill rates on their CDs, consumers would have received an additional \$500 million in interest in April 1994, and \$3 billion more in the twelve months ending in April. *BBR*, 5/9/94, p. 824.

### ***State's Banks Will Cut Fees, Reduce Account Restrictions***

Through the efforts of the Massachusetts Community and Banking Council, formed in 1990 and funded by the state Bankers Association, more than 140 banks have agreed to charge no more than \$3 per month for checking and \$1 a month for savings accounts. Deposit accounts can be opened with only a \$10 deposit, and checking accounts will offer eight free withdrawals a month. The banks also have agreed on identification requirements that are easier for customers. Those who cannot present a credit card or a driver's license will be able to use utility bills, for example, as identification. The account changes take effect immediately. *AB*, 6/29/94, p. 5.

### ***Banks May Require More Information to Help Reduce Bad Loans***

By mid-1994 many bankers may be asking their prospective business borrowers to supply more information, using a 20-page form developed by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. The new form would seek much more extensive and

detailed information than businesses usually have supplied in the past. This would include, for example, the company's five largest customers and suppliers and credit terms and limits for each, the company's plans for ownership succession, and much more information on accounting policies. Businesses would be likely to strongly object to some of the disclosures and small businesses in particular would not be able to meet some of the requirements without the additional expense of hiring an outside accountant. *WSJ, 12/16/93.*

### ***Environmental Trade Group Formed***

The Environmental Bankers Association has been formed by 25 banks with a mission of helping to protect banks from environmental risk and liability. An official said the Association is not a lobbying organization, and will focus on assisting banks internally in managing their environmental policies. Immediate goals include developing model environmental policies, preparing a member roster listing areas of specialization, establishing a member information clearinghouse, proposing bank examination protocol, and creating standards for evaluating consultants. Membership in the trade association is open to all banks. *AB, 3/31/94, p. 9.*

### ***Credit Unions' Assets Now Over \$300 Billion***

Membership in U.S. credit unions reached 67.6 million at the end of May 1994, according to estimates released by the Credit Union National Association, representing a gain of about 5.8 percent since year-end 1992. Membership in credit unions in the U.S. has more than doubled since 1975. Credit unions' assets grew to an estimated \$300.6 billion in May, up by 4.8 percent from year-end 1993, and 11.4 percent from 1992. The 1993 total was about 36 percent of total savings and loan assets and eight percent of commercial bank assets.

The estimated number of credit unions at the end of May was 12,789,

down from 12,960 at year-end 1993. Of the latter total, 6,031 had assets of more than \$5 million, and 574 had over \$100 million in assets. CUNA notes that once a credit union reaches the \$5 million size, their customers require and can support more extensive services such as share drafts, IRAs, larger consumer loans, automated teller access and credit cards. At year-end 1993, for example, the percentages of credit unions having assets of \$5 million to \$10 million, and those over \$100 million (in brackets) offering these services were as follows: share drafts, 66.1 (97.5); IRAs, 68.9 (98.4); ATM cards, 27.7 (97.3); and credit cards, 42.8 (94.9). It may be noted that almost 80 percent of the employees of the \$5-10 million group of credit unions were part-time workers or volunteers. *Credit Union Reports, CUNA.*

### ***Recent Articles and Studies***

#### ***Large Banks' Role in Banking Crisis***

This article, by John H. Boyd and Mark Gertler, concludes that in the banking crisis in the 1980s, banks with the largest assets contributed disproportionately to the losses. This resulted from a combination of circumstances involving deregulation and financial innovations that led to increased competition in the industry and regulatory actions that tended to subsidize risk-taking by large banks more than small banks. Large banks benefitted from a "too big to fail" policy in ways that ranged from favored treatment at the Federal Reserve's discount window to direct subsidies. One of the undesirable results of this policy on the part of the federal bank regulators was to create a nontechnical incentive for banks to become large.

In support of their thesis, the authors examine first the potential sources of loan losses. The losses in the 1980s were caused to a substantial extent by regional factors, for example, in the Southwest the collapse of oil prices, and real-estate prices on the

East and West Coasts. But after allowing for regional conditions, it is shown that the large banks still performed below the industry mean. One measure is the larger banks' relatively low capital-to-asset ratios in the period. Up to a certain asset size, a negative relationship between this ratio and a bank's size might be explained by diversification gains and increased access to purchased money markets as a bank grows larger. However, the ratio is found here to decline markedly with size well beyond the point that might be explained by economies of scale, and in particular a significant decline above the \$10 billion level is noted. Other measures of portfolio risk are presented to indicate that large banks followed higher-risk practices than could be explained by scale economies.

The authors are against any "sweeping withdrawal" of the safety net. They are skeptical about the benefits of mergers of large banks that would create even larger institutions. Newly adopted regulatory capital standards are viewed as having a beneficial effect of forcing banks to internalize the costs of their portfolio decisions. Under FDICIA, not allowing a large bank to fail requires the concurrence of bank regulators and the Secretary of the Treasury. Other provisions of the Act restrict discount window lending as a means of keeping troubled banks in operation, and impose restrictions on interbank lending to undercapitalized banks. *Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Winter 1994, pp. 2-21.*

#### ***Competition in the Credit-Card Industry***

Until about two years ago, credit-card interest rates in the U.S. had remained stable at about 18 percent for a number of years, although during this period there were large fluctuations in the costs of funds to lenders. Wide interest margins in the industry gave rise to Congressional concern about the adequacy of price competition among credit-card issuers. The U.S. General Accounting Office conducted a study of the credit-card



industry between May 1992 and October 1993 focusing on the competitiveness aspects of the industry, and discussing various policy options.

It can be argued that the structure of the credit-card industry provides for adequate competition among card issuers. The industry has about 6,000 issuers, who set their own interest rates and other pricing terms, and there are another 14,000 "participating institutions." VISA and MasterCard permit virtually any federally insured depository institution to join and issue their credit cards. The industry's concentration level, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) estimated to be less than 565 (values of less than 1,000 are considered to be unconcentrated), suggests that the industry should be quite competitive.

Another viewpoint is that the largest card issuers have dominated the credit-card industry and have conformed to each other's interest-rate and pricing decisions. The evidence, the report says, does not appear to suggest that any one card issuer has acted as a dominant price leader. There is some evidence that these issuers have not engaged in tacit coordination wherein firms will not necessarily match a price increase by other firms in the market but will match a price decrease — a situation that generally results in stable pricing. Examples given are reductions in interest rates by some large card issuers in the past that were not matched by rival firms.

The reasons why credit-card interest rates were stable and industry earnings were high during the 1980s can be explained by differences between credit-card and other types of lending. Credit-card lending is riskier than most other lending activities. Average annual charge-off rates for VISA and MasterCard members from 1981 through 1993 consistently exceeded the average charge-off rates for commercial bank lending in the same period; in 1993, the charge-off rate for credit-card lending was more than five times the charge-off rate for all bank lending. Operating costs as a percent-

age of total lending costs are relatively high for credit-card lending, while funding costs are relatively low, thus changes in funding costs will tend to be less influential in shaping credit-card interest rates.

When an industry is experiencing strong growth, as the credit-card industry was in the 1980s, firms in that industry are not forced to compete as much on price to maintain their market shares and have satisfactory earnings. Moreover, the credit-card industry was not under competitive pressures caused by cardholder behavior in the 1980s. Traditionally, shopping by cardholders for lower interest rates has not been a strong characteristic of the industry. Consumers often do not respond to offers of cards with lower interest rates because of the search and switching costs that would be entailed. Cardholders with high credit-card balances and low incomes may find it particularly difficult to switch issuers.

Evidence from the early 1990s indicates that consumers have become increasingly concerned about credit-card debt and interest rates. In the past few years, improved information about interest rates and other credit-card pricing terms has been made available to consumers willing to shop for credit cards. The better information is attributable in large measure to the Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, which, among other provisions, requires card issuers to provide readily-understandable information in all card solicitations about their interest rates, annual fees, and grace periods. The Act also requires the Federal Reserve to collect data on credit-card price and availability from a broad sample of financial institutions offering credit-card services, this information to be made publicly available, and reported to Congress semiannually.

The report concludes that the U.S. credit-card industry should continue to be closely monitored to determine whether the evidences of increased competition will be sustained. The report recommends that the Federal Reserve collect additional informa-

tion, in particular data on the range of interest rates that issuers offer to cardholders. More information is needed for assessing the extent to which cardholders are benefitting from lower card interest rates, how these rates affect industry earnings, and the short- and long-term impacts of competitive developments within the industry. *U. S. Credit-Card Industry, U.S. General Accounting Office, April 1994.*

### ***Preserving Minority Ownership of Financial Institutions***

This U.S. Government Accounting Office report examines actions taken by the Department of the Treasury, FDIC, RTC, and OTS to satisfy the requirements of Section 308 of FIRREA, and Section 403 of RTCRRIA, which were designed to preserve minority ownership of financial institutions and provide assistance for minority-owned institutions and minority investors with acquiring failed institutions.

The FDIC's approach to preserving minority-owned banks is described in terms of maintaining the condition of existing minority-owned banks (MOBs) through the regular supervisory process. Actions include making available training, education, and technical assistance in Call Report preparation, consumer affairs and civil rights, and accounting. In July 1993, the agency reiterated that, as required by statute, when resolving failed MOBs, bids from qualified minority-owned financial institutions (MOFIs) nationwide are to be generally sought before bids from nonminority-owned financial institutions (NMOFIs). While the FDIC generally solicits bids from qualified MOFIs nationwide during its marketing efforts, the actual selection of the winning bidder is determined by the least-cost approach. In some cases state law restrictions on interstate acquisitions of failed or failing MOFIs may be overridden for the benefit of minority acquirers but not for the benefit of nonminority acquirers. The FDIC has established a national list of potential minority bidders for use in identifying and contacting minority investors and MOFIs that are interested

in acquiring failed institutions. The agency has provided assistance in several cases to individual MOBs. In September 1992, agency officials stated they would not ordinarily approve a transaction that allows a troubled institution to acquire a failed institution because of the risk involved. One case was approved because the MOB's financial condition had improved. The agency also has supported several MOBs by using informal enforcement actions to communicate bank problems identified during the examination.

FDIC-supervised MOBs increased from 42 in December 1989 to 52 as of March 31, 1993. From August 1989 to July 2, 1993, 11 MOBs failed, and in their resolution the FDIC preserved the minority ownership of two, sold six to non-minorities, and closed three with payoffs to depositors. MOBs also acquired five failed NMOBs. Total assets of MOBs increased from approximately \$5 billion at the end of 1989 to about \$8 billion in March 1993.

The decline in minority-owned thrifts (MOTs) was not as dramatic as the decline in nonminority-owned thrifts (NMOTs): between December 1989 and March 31, 1993, MOTs were reduced by 27 percent from 56 to 41, while the number of NMOTs fell by 31 percent from 2,541 to 1,761. The decrease in assets held by MOTs was not as dramatic as the decrease in assets of NMOTs. MOTs' assets fell from \$7 billion at the end of 1991 to \$6 billion at the end of 1992, but by the end of the first quarter of 1993 had returned to the level of nearly \$7 billion. Assets of NMOTs in the same period declined from \$870 billion to \$729 billion.

The RTC's approach to preserving the minority ownership of financial institutions includes extending preferences to bidders of the same ethnicity as the previous owners of the failed MOT. The RTC had registered, as of September 14, 1993, 297 minority investors or MOFIs for its list of potential bidders. RTC also offers in-

terim capital assistance, in the form of loans, to successful minority bidders to facilitate the acquisition of institutions. The amount of such assistance is limited to two-thirds of the minimum capital required by the chartering and regulatory agencies, and is subject to repayment within two years. In April 1992, the RTC amended its minority preference resolution guidelines to comply with Section 403 of RTCRRIA which provides for assisting minority investors or institutions with acquiring failed NMOTs. When no acceptable bids are received for failed NMOIs, the agency may accept bids from minority investors or institutions and may provide interim capital assistance.

As of May 18, 1993, the RTC had provided over \$7 million in interim capital assistance to six minority investors or institutions. Since its inception in August 1989 through May 18, 1993, the RTC had resolved 26 of the 29 failed MOTs. Minority ownership was preserved in 12 of the 26 resolutions. Nine of the remaining 14 failed MOTs were acquired by NMOIs because no acceptable proposals were received from minorities. However, the thrifts remained in their previous locations and continue to serve the community. Finally, the RTC closed five MOTs because no qualified minority or nonminority group expressed an interest in acquiring them.

Minority trade associations and executives of MOFIs expressed mixed evaluations of the effectiveness of the regulatory agencies' programs. Some said the FDIC and OTS should provide their examiners with more training on the unique circumstances of the minority-owned banking community and its practices; also, the agencies should not use the same procedures to examine smaller institutions' loan portfolios that are used for larger banks. One suggestion was that an FDIC-managed fund should be established to allocate capital to MOFIs that are attempting to acquire an institution that is about to fail.

Assistance would be in the form of a loan to the acquirer. Another suggestion was that the RTC extend preference to minority groups when considering offers to acquire nonminority-owned institutions or branches located in minority communities. An OTS policy requiring \$2 million in capital for new owners to acquire a failed thrift was said to be too restrictive.

The report said that neither the FDIC nor OTS had evaluated their minority-ownership program's effectiveness, and officials at the agencies say their focus has been on implementation rather than evaluation of their programs. Periodically surveying MOFIs to assess the effectiveness of current approaches is essential given the goals of the legislation and mixed views of the minority institution community regarding the agencies' efforts, the GAO stated.

March 31, 1993		
Supervised Minority-Owned Institutions		
	FDIC	OTS
African-American	22	17
Asian-American	17	13
Hispanic-American	11	11
Native-American	2	—
<b>Total</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>41</b>
Total Assets (\$ billions)	8.32	6.51
Assets of Largest Institution (\$ billions)	1.54	1.79
Assets of Largest Five Institutions (\$ billions)	4.98	3.57

*"Minority-Owned Financial Institutions — Status of Federal Efforts to Preserve Minority Ownership," U.S. Government Accounting Office, November 1993.*

### ***Interstate Banking: Effects of Deregulation***

This report by the U.S. General Accounting Office analyzes the potential impact of further deregulation of interstate banking and branching, focusing on the effects on the structure of the banking industry, the risks to the safety and soundness of the industry, and other implications. Among the specific topics included are the legal and regulatory factors

that will affect the response to a federal nationwide banking and branching law, and antitrust considerations.

Under the McFadden Act of 1927, national banks are allowed to branch anywhere in a state if such branching is allowed under the state law for banks chartered in that state. The Act generally prohibits interstate branching by member banks of the Federal Reserve System. State law governs interstate branching by state-chartered nonmember banks. New York, Oregon, Alaska, and North Carolina permit reciprocal interstate branching, but except for a few minor cases, no interstate branching has been allowed to date. The Douglas Amendment to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 permits bank holding companies to establish and acquire a bank in another state, provided such action is specifically permitted by the state the bank holding company wants to enter. Almost every state now has some statutory provision for such interstate banking, subject to varying restrictions and conditions.

Over time, revisions of state laws have contributed to a substantial increase in interstate banking. By early 1993, all but two states, Montana and Hawaii, permitted some form of interstate banking. Thirty-four states and the District of Columbia permit bank holding companies to enter from any state, either on a reciprocal or nonreciprocal basis. The remaining 14 states (as of 11/93) restricted interstate entry to bank holding companies from their own geographic region. Before states relaxed their interstate banking laws, bank holding companies were free to expand interstate through their nonbank subsidiaries, and banks also could cross state borders by establishing insured nonbank banks, Edge Act Corporations, and loan production offices. The Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 and the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 authorized the interstate acquisition of failed banks and thrifts.

At year-end 1992, a majority of U.S. banking assets were owned by 190 banking companies that operate bank

subsidiaries in more than one state. Approximately two-thirds of these assets were held in the banking companies' headquarters states, and one-third were held out-of-state. The nonbank activities of bank holding companies gave some larger banking companies a physical presence in virtually every state. In 16 states and DC, more than 40 percent of each of the states' bank assets are owned by banking companies headquartered out-of-state. In all except 13 states, more than ten percent of each of the states' bank assets are owned by out-of-state banking organizations.

Increased interstate banking is found to have contributed to a substantial consolidation of the U.S. banking industry and led to an increase in overall industry concentration. From December 1986 to December 1992, the number of independent banking companies in the U.S. declined almost 20 percent, from 10,620 to 8,794, while the percentage of banking assets controlled by the three largest banking companies — a measure of overall industry concentration — increased from 12.8 percent to 14.4 percent. This increase understates the relative importance of the larger banking companies, because they are the main holders of off-balance-sheet accounts excluded from the calculations. However, the study finds no direct relationship between increased interstate banking and changes in the state and local concentration levels of the three largest banking companies. The average concentration levels of the three largest banking companies in local banking markets did not change between 1980 and 1991. Increased interstate banking does not necessarily mean a reduced role for smaller banks. Between 1986 and 1992, banks with assets of less than \$1 billion, measured in 1992 dollars, maintained a national market share of about 20 percent and increased their market share in nine of the 16 states with a relatively large amount of interstate banking.

The study concludes that removing federal interstate banking and branching restrictions would further

encourage the growth of larger, more geographically diversified banking companies. The effects on interstate banking would depend on the extent to which state banking laws are overridden, actions of the state and federal regulators, and business decisions. While increased interstate banking is leading to increased national and regional concentrations of assets, concentration at the state and local levels increases only as a result of mergers and acquisitions among banks that are in the same states or local markets.

Removing interstate banking and branching restrictions could benefit the safety and soundness of the industry, the regulatory process, and many bank customers. However, the removal of such restrictions poses risks as well. The risks can be minimized if interstate expansion is restricted to well-managed and well-capitalized banks, and if the early closure and safety-and-soundness provisions of FDICIA are properly implemented. Risks to the quality and availability of banking services can best be minimized by ensuring that markets remain competitive through vigilant antitrust enforcement, and that laws and regulations governing credit availability are adequately enforced. While interstate banking offers potential benefits to banks and the banking system from reduced costs, expanded market opportunities, and greater diversification of risks, the extent that these benefits are realized depends largely on how well banks are managed. *Interstate Banking — Benefits and Risks of Removing Regulatory Restrictions*, U.S. General Accounting Office, November 1993.

### ***Banking Concentration Stable in Most Western States in 1980s***

This study by Elizabeth Laderman examines the effect that banking consolidation, including such mergers as those between Bank of America and Security Pacific National Bank, and Wells Fargo Bank and Crocker National Bank, had on concentration of banking markets in the West from 1982 through 1992.

Antitrust analysis of bank mergers by the regulatory agencies and Department of Justice focuses mainly on the effects on the structure of local banking markets, using as a measure the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This index is computed as the sum of the squares of the percent market shares of bank deposits of the competitors in the local market. Under DOJ guidelines, a bank merger that increases the HHI in a local market by 200 points and results in an index of at least 1800 would raise competitive concerns. Deposits of savings institutions are included with a weight of 50 percent in calculating the HHI of local banking markets. The guidelines have resulted in merged banks being required to divest banking offices to reduce the effects on market concentration, and even to denials of merger applications.

Within the Twelfth Federal Reserve District, consisting of Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Nevada, Oregon, Utah, and Washington, this study delineates 243 local banking markets. Statewide average HHIs were calculated by multiplying

the HHI in each market by a market-specific weighting factor, which is the deposits in that market divided by the sum of all deposits in all local markets in the state, and adding up all the weighted HHIs for the state. The study finds that, for the most part, bank consolidation has occurred along with stable or decreasing local market concentration, and this holds true in both metropolitan and rural markets. Even California, with two of the largest bank mergers, showed a net decline in weighted average HHIs. In Arizona and Nevada, the HHIs declined by 370 points and 989 points, respectively. The two states with increases in the HHI were Alaska and Hawaii. In Alaska the HHI rose by 183, mostly because of the largest bank's acquisitions as approved by regulators of several of the mid-sized banks in the state that were in weak financial condition. Hawaii had an increase of 709, in part because the largest bank in the state acquired a fairly large savings and loan association.

One factor in the stable or declining HHI in most of the western states

is the increase in the number of banks in some local banking markets, through entry of new banks and branches of existing banks. From 1982 to 1992, 67 local banking markets saw increases in the number of banks. For example, new entry played an important role in the decline in the HHI in both Arizona and Nevada. Another factor is the "dynamics" of competition in local markets, where an "evening out" of market shares suggests that small banks have provided a competitive check on larger banks. Competitors may be able to attract customers from merged institutions because they close branches or otherwise change bank practices, which has happened in some interstate as well as intrastate acquisitions. Following some of the larger mergers in particular, competitors have undertaken aggressive promotional campaigns aimed at attracting the customers of merged or acquired institutions. *Weekly Letter, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 1/28/94.*