



October 17, 2012

Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System
20th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20551

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
250 E Street, SW
Mail Stop 2-3
Washington, DC 20219

Robert E. Feldman
Executive Secretary
Attention: Comments/Legal ESS
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
550 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20429

Re: Basel III Capital Proposals

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comment on the Basel III proposals¹ that were recently issued for public comment by the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

I am the CEO and director of a small community bank in Lockhart, Texas and I am adamantly opposed to the inclusion of my small bank in the proposed Basel III capital rules. The inclusion of my bank in the rule will cause irreparable damage to the bank's ability to survive and meet the needs of the small community we serve. It is an ill-advised proposed rule and should be amended to exclude small banks such as ours. I appreciate the opportunity to provide detailed information below to support my position.

Applicability of Basel III to Community Banks

Community banks should be allowed to continue using the current Basel I framework for computing their capital requirements. Basel III was designed to apply to the largest, internationally active, banks and not community banks. Community banks did not engage in the highly leveraged activities that severely depleted capital levels of the largest banks and created panic in the financial markets.

¹ The proposals are titled: *Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital, Implementation of Basel III, Minimum Regulatory Capital Ratios, Capital Adequacy, and Transition Provisions; Regulatory Capital Rules: Standardized Approach for Risk-weighted Assets; Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements; and Regulatory Capital Rules: Advanced Approaches Risk-based Capital Rules; Market Risk Capital Rule.*

Community banks operate on a relationship-based business model that is specifically designed to serve customers in their respective communities on a long-term basis. This model contributes to the success of community banks all over the United States through practical, common sense approaches to managing risk. The largest banks operate purely on transaction volume and pay little attention to the customer relationship. This difference in banking models demonstrates the need to place tougher capital standards exclusively on the largest banks to better manage the ability to absorb losses.

Incorporating AOCI as Part of Regulatory Capital

Inclusion of accumulated other comprehensive income (AOCI) in capital for community banks will result in increased volatility in regulatory capital balances and could rapidly deplete capital levels under certain economic conditions. AOCI for most community banks represents unrealized gains and losses on investment securities held available-for-sale. Because these securities are held at fair value, any gains or losses due to changes in interest rates are captured in the valuation. Recently, both short-term and long-term interest rates have fallen to historic lows generating unprecedented unrealized gains for most investment securities. Additionally, demand for many implicitly and explicitly government guaranteed securities has risen due to a flight to safety and government intervention in the capital markets. This increased demand has caused credit spreads to tighten further increasing bond valuations.

Interest rates have fallen to levels that are unsustainable long-term once an economic recovery accelerates. As interest rates rise, fair values will fall causing the balance of AOCI to decline and become negative. This decline will have a direct, immediate impact on common equity, tier 1, and total capital as the unrealized losses will reduce capital balances. At my bank, for instance, if interest rates increased by 300 basis points, my bank's bond portfolio would show a paper loss of \$1,236,000. This would mean that my bank's tier one ratio would drop by 1.3%.

Large financial institutions have the ability to mitigate the risks of capital volatility by entering into qualifying hedge accounting relationships for financial accounting purposes with the use of interest rate derivatives like interest rate swap, option, and futures contracts. Community banks do not have the knowledge or expertise to engage in these transactions and manage their associated risks, costs, and barriers to entry. Community banks should continue to exclude AOCI from capital measures as they are currently required to do today.

Capital Conservation Buffers

Implementation of the capital conservation buffers for community banks will be difficult to achieve under the proposal and therefore should not be implemented. Many community banks will need to build additional capital balances to meet the minimum capital requirements with the buffers in place. Community banks do not have ready access to capital that the larger banks have through the capital markets. The only way for community banks to increase capital is through the accumulation of retained earnings over time. Due to the current ultra low interest rate environment, community bank profitability has diminished further hampering their ability to grow capital. If the regulators are unwilling to exempt community banks from the capital conservation buffers, additional time should be allotted (at least five years beyond 2019) in order for those banks that need the additional capital to retain and accumulate earnings accordingly.

New Risk Weights

The proposed risk weight framework under Basel III is too complicated and will be an onerous regulatory burden that will penalize community banks and jeopardize the housing recovery. Increasing the risk weights for residential balloon loans, interest-only loans, and second liens will penalize community banks who offer these loan products to their customers and deprive customers of many financing options for residential property. Additionally, higher risk weights for balloon loans will further penalize


community banks for mitigating interest rate risk in their asset-liability management. Community banks will be forced to originate only 15 or 30 year mortgages with durations that will make their balance sheets more sensitive to changes in long-term interest rates. Many community banks will either exit the residential loan market entirely or only originate those loans that can be sold to a GSE. Second liens will either become more expensive for borrowers or disappear altogether as banks will choose not to allocate additional capital to these balance sheet exposures. Community banks should be allowed to stay with the current Basel I risk weight framework for residential loans. Furthermore, community banks will be forced to make significant software upgrades and incur other operational costs to track mortgage loan-to-value ratios in order to determine the proper risk weight categories for mortgages

Subchapter S Community Banks

Imposing distribution prohibitions on community banks with a Subchapter S corporate structure conflicts with the requirement that shareholders pay income taxes on earned income. Those banks with a Subchapter S capital structure would need to be exempt from the capital conservation buffers to ensure that their shareholders do not violate the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code. We recommend that the capital conservation buffers be suspended during those periods where the bank generates taxable income for the shareholder.

In conclusion, I strongly urge that you change this proposed rule to more fairly regulate a small community bank such as First-Lockhart National Bank. If implemented as drafted, this rule will have huge negative affects on our bank including the unnecessary need to raise additional capital and the unintended consequence of irrationally limiting certain types of credit previously extended to our customers.

Sincerely,



J. Roland Velvin
President & CEO