February 13, 2012

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
250 E Street, SW.
Mail Stop 2-3
RE: Docket ID OCC-2011-14
Washington, DC 20219

and

Jennifer J. Johnson, Secretary
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
20th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
Docket No. R-1432 and RIN 7100 AD 82
Washington, DC 20551

and

Robert E. Feldman
Executive Secretary
Attention: Comments - RIN 3064-AD85
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
550 17th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20429

and

Elizabeth M. Murphy
Secretary
Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street, N.E.
RE: S7-41-11
Washington, DC 20549-1090

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:

On behalf of the members of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit ("LIHTC") Working Group, we respectfully submit our comments in response to the Notice of Proposed Rule Making’s ("NPRM") request for public input on the proposed rule that would implement Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act enacted on July 21, 2010 (the "Act"). The members of the LIHTC Working Group are participants in the LIHTC industry who work together to help resolve technical LIHTC Program issues and provide recommendations to make the LIHTC Program even more efficient in delivering benefits to help build affordable housing. Our group includes nonprofit and for profit developers, syndicators, investors,
accountants and lawyers. Section 619 prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading and from maintaining certain relationships with hedge funds and private equity funds (the “Volcker Rule”). As described in more detail below, we recommend that the final rule specifically permit banking entities to continue making LIHTC investments and not be limited by the Volcker Rule. We also recommend that banks be permitted to sponsor LIHTC investments as well as be allowed to engage in “covered transactions” with LIHTC investments they make and/or sponsor. We believe these recommendations are consistent with the intent of the Volcker Rule. We have organized our comments below in order of the questions included in the NPRM.

**Question 276.** Is the proposed rule’s approach to implementing the SBIC, public welfare and qualified rehabilitation investment exemption for acquiring or retaining an ownership interest in a covered fund effective? If not, what alternative approach would be more effective?

We believe that the proposed rule’s approach to implementing the SBIC, public welfare and qualified rehabilitation investment exemption for acquiring or retaining an ownership interest in a covered fund is effective, but believe it should specifically state that investments that qualify for LIHTCs are permitted investments as explained in further detail in our response to Question 277.

**Question 277.** Should the approach include other elements? If so, what elements and why? Should any of the proposed elements be revised or eliminated? If so, why and how?

The Volcker Rule generally prohibits banking entities from investing in or sponsoring private equity funds; however, Congress included exceptions for certain permitted activities. One such carve-out or permitted activity is for “investments designed primarily to promote the public welfare.” Congress also recognized the benefits of continuing to allow banks to invest in historic tax credit (“HTC”) funds and created a specific exemption for HTC investments. The LIHTC community, as well as other similar tax credit communities, including the New Market Tax Credit (“NMTC”) and the Renewable Energy Tax Credit (“RETC”) communities, applauds the inclusion of such language since we believe it recognizes and is consistent with Congress’ legislative intent in enacting tax credits that provide incentives for banking entities to make investments in affordable rental housing (Section 42), underserved economic areas (Section 45D), and renewable energy resources (Sections 45 and 48), all of which promote the public welfare. We recommend that LIHTC investments should be permitted by the Volcker Rule under the public welfare exception because public welfare investments include investments that

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1 Section 13(a)(1): “PROHIBITION- Unless otherwise provided in this section, a banking entity shall not...(B) acquire or retain any equity, partnership, or other ownership interest in or sponsor a hedge fund or a private equity fund.”

2 Bank Holding Company Act, Section 13(d).

3 Bank Holding Company Act, Section (d)(1)(E).

4 Ibid.

5 For a more in-depth look at the technical aspects of IRC §42, see Chapter 3, Low-Income Housing Tax Credit Handbook, 2011, Novogradac & Company LLP or [www.novoco.com](http://www.novoco.com).
serve low to moderate income families and communities, and LIHTC investments are statutorily mandated to serve these families. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has issued publications which clearly express the view that investments in the LIHTC program qualify as investments that promote the public welfare. We believe the final regulations should specifically identify LIHTC investments as “investments designed primarily to promote the public welfare.”

We request that the rule makers issue specific guidance that these tax credit programs, as well as state and local programs that were created for a similar purpose as these federal tax credit programs, qualify as permissible activities by a banking entity as they meet the requirements of promoting public welfare in Section 619(d)(1)(E) and paragraph 11 of Section 5136 of the Revised Statutes. We believe this would be consistent with the treatment that the HTC has already received by being specifically identified in Section 619(d)(1)(E) of the Act.

Section _.13(a)(1) of the proposed rule permits a banking entity to acquire or retain an ownership interest in, or act as sponsor to a covered fund “that is designed primarily to promote the public welfare, of the type permitted under paragraph (11) of section 5136 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (12 U.S.C. § 24), including the welfare of low- and moderate-income communities or families…” or “that is a qualified rehabilitation expenditure with respect to a qualified rehabilitation building or certified historic structure, as such terms are defined in section 47 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or a similar state historic tax credit program.”

As stated above, we agree with the Agencies and believe the proposed rule permits a banking entity to sponsor tax credit investments because they either serve the communities or families of low- and moderate-income or qualify under Section 47 of the Internal Revenue Code. However, Section _.13 of the proposed rule does not specify whether or not this permitted activity overrides the prohibitions included in Section _.16 of the proposed rule. The guidance is unclear on whether or not a banking entity can sponsor a tax credit investment with which it has a certain relationship. The proposed rule generally prohibits a banking entity from engaging in any transaction with a tax credit fund if the transaction “would be a covered transaction as defined in Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 371e), as if such covered banking entity and the affiliate thereof were a member bank and the covered fund were an affiliate thereof.”

The Federal Reserve Act states:

“the term 'covered transaction' means with respect to an affiliate of a member bank--
(1) a loan or extension of credit to the affiliate;
(2) a purchase of or an investment in securities issued by the affiliate;

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6 Under the Bank Holding Company Act, Section 13(d)(1)(E), Section 5136 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (12 U.S.C. 24) defines a permitted activity as making investments “directly or indirectly, each of which promotes the public welfare by benefiting primarily low- and moderate-income communities or families (such as by providing housing, services, or jobs).”
7 The LIHTC program is governed by Section 42 of the Internal Revenue Code and is designed to attract capital to build affordable housing for low-income families.
8 The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency issued publications which refer to investments in the LIHTC program as public welfare investments. See the following publication:
9 Proposed rule, Section _.13(a)(1)(ii) & (iii).
10 Proposed rule, Section _.16(a)(1).
(3) a purchase of assets, including assets subject to an agreement to repurchase, from the affiliate, except such purchase of real and personal property as may be specifically exempted by the Board by order or regulation;

(4) the acceptance of securities issued by the affiliate as collateral security for a loan or extension of credit to any person or company; or

(5) the issuance of a guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit, including an endorsement or standby letter of credit, on behalf of an affiliate.\(^{11}\)

We believe that Congress recognized the need for banking entities as tax credit investors by permitting tax credit investments in Section 13(d)(1)(E) of the Volcker Rule.\(^{12}\) Similarly, the Agencies recognized the need for banking entities as sponsors of tax credit funds by permitting banking entities to continue sponsoring tax credit investments in Section 13(a)(1) of the proposed rule.\(^{13}\) The Agencies exercised their authority granted in Section 13(d)(1)(J) of the Volcker Rule to permit this activity because it “generally would facilitate investment in small businesses and support the public welfare, would promote and protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial stability of the United States.”\(^{14}\) We also believe that a banking entity should be permitted to engage in covered transactions\(^{15}\) with investments that are permitted under Section 13(a) of the proposed rule for many of the same reasons as those used to support why banking entities may sponsor tax credit investments.

Specifically with regard to tax credit investments, we believe it is equally important to permit banking entities to continue guaranteeing tax credit investments as it is to permit them to sponsor these investments. We believe that a banking entity should be permitted to guarantee a tax credit investment because it not only facilitates investment in small businesses and supports the public welfare, but also many of the risks of being a guarantor are mitigated. For example, there are guarantees from the general partner ensuring the delivery of the LIHTC and in some cases the yield on investment. In addition, LIHTC investments have enjoyed a relatively low risk of foreclosure. Based upon a survey of LIHTC properties, only .35% of the properties had been foreclosed upon between 1991 and 2003, which is less than .1% on an annualized basis.\(^{16}\) This foreclosure rate is far lower than other types of real estate investment.\(^{17}\) Lastly, there is a built in

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\(^{11}\) Federal Reserve Act, Section 23A(b)(7)

\(^{12}\) Bank Holding Company Act, Section 13(d) — PERMITTED ACTIVITIES-(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding the restrictions under subsection (a), to the extent permitted by any other provision of Federal or State law, and subject to the limitations under paragraph (2) and any restrictions or limitations that the appropriate Federal banking agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, may determine, the following activities (in this section referred to as ‘permitted activities’) are permitted: (E) Investments in one or more small business investment companies, as defined in section 102 of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (15 U.S.C. 662), investments designed primarily to promote the public welfare, of the type permitted under paragraph (11) of section 5136 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (12 U.S.C. 24), or investments that are qualified rehabilitation expenditures with respect to a qualified rehabilitated building or certified historic structure, as such terms are defined in section 47 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or a similar State historic tax credit program.

\(^{13}\) Footnote 292 of the preamble to the proposed rule.

\(^{14}\) Ibid.

\(^{15}\) According to the Federal Reserve Act, Section 23A(b)(7), “covered transactions” include the following: extension of credit (loans); purchase or investment in securities; purchase of assets; acceptance of securities as collateral security; issuance of a guarantee, acceptance, or letter of credit.

\(^{16}\) Ernst & Young LLP “Understanding the Dynamics IV – Housing Tax Credit Investment Performance”, 2007.

\(^{17}\) For an analysis of the track record of the LIHTC and other reasons for its success, see “Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, Assessment of Program Performance & Comparison to Other Federal Affordable Rental Housing Subsidies,” 2011, Novogradianc & Company LLP, [www.novocom.com/lihtcperformancespecialreport.php](http://www.novocom.com/lihtcperformancespecialreport.php).
cushion. Guarantees of tax credit investments often times pose less risk to a banking entity, as a guarantor, than making direct investments, as an investor, because guaranteed transactions have a built-in margin, or cushion, between the anticipated and guaranteed performance of the assets. The anticipated performance or “expected yield” is equal to management’s expectations when the investment is originally made. The guaranteed performance is typically lower than what management expects and represents a “minimum yield”. As such, the guarantor only absorbs a loss when the asset performs under the minimum yield and the general partner’s guarantee fails. If the asset performs worse than expected but better than what is guaranteed, the guarantor incurs no loss. Contrarily, for direct investors, typically, they bear the risk of an underperforming asset as it pertains to tax losses.

**Question 278.** Should the proposed rule permit a banking entity to sponsor an SBIC and other identified public interest investments? Why or why not? Does the Agencies’ determination under section 13(d)(1)(J) of the BHC Act regarding sponsoring of an SBIC, public welfare or qualified rehabilitation investment effectively promote and protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial stability of the United States? If not, why not?

The proposed rule should permit a banking entity to sponsor an SBIC and other identified public welfare investments. Since the Volcker Rule carves out, and thereby allows, banking entities to make public welfare investments, including LIHTC investments, as well as HTC investments, we agree with your conclusion that this carve out also allows banking entities to sponsor these investments. In short, if a banking entity is permitted to make a LIHTC, NMTC and/or HTC investment in which it assumes market risks, we agree it should also be permitted to sell it and similarly participate as a sponsor because this activity does not contradict a key objective of the Act which is to promote and protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial stability of the United States. The Volcker Rule permits a banking entity to invest in these tax credit investments. Here, the permitted risk of investing is greater than the risk of sponsoring tax credit investments.

**Question 279.** What would the effect of the proposed rule be on a banking entity’s ability to sponsor and syndicate funds supported by public welfare investments or low income housing tax credits which are utilized to assist banks and other insured depository institutions with meeting their Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) obligations?

The NPRM currently permits banking entities to continue sponsoring and investing in public welfare investments. We commend the Agencies for recognizing potential issues arising from a bank-sponsored tax credit fund and addressing these issues in the proposed rule. As the proposed rule stands, banking entities may continue to satisfy the investment test for the purpose of their community reinvestment goals through tax credit investments sponsored by other banking entities. Permitting this activity enables smaller banks to take advantage of a larger bank’s ability to efficiently underwrite, select and package the investments into a private equity fund. Larger banks generally have larger community reinvestment goals and have therefore
become more efficient because of economies of scale. Over time, many of the larger banking entities have sold these investments to other banks that do not have the same resources available for the underwriting and selection process. This efficiency has permitted a number of smaller banks to satisfy their community reinvestment goals and to provide meaningful benefits to the communities they serve.

**Question 316.** *What types of transactions or relationships that currently exist between banking entities and a covered fund (or another covered fund in which such covered fund makes a controlling investment) would be prohibited under the proposed rule? What would be the effect of the proposed rule on banking entities’ ability to continue to meet the needs and demands of their clients? Are there other transactions between a banking entity and such covered funds that are not already covered but that should be prohibited or limited under the proposed rule?*

The Volcker Rule states that no banking entity, or affiliate thereof, that serves as a sponsor to a private equity fund may enter into a transaction with a private equity fund, or with any other fund controlled by such private equity fund, “that would be a covered transaction, as defined in Section 23A of the Federal Reserve Act.” The NPRM reiterates this provision is Section 16(a)(1) (the “Super 23A Provisions”). Under the proposed rules, arguably, banking entities will no longer be able to provide guarantees, loans, or letters of credit to the LIHTC investments they sponsor. As a result, LIHTC investments will become less attractive and the availability of capital to develop affordable housing for low- to moderate-income individuals will decrease.

However, we believe that permitting banking entities to continue to engage in “covered transactions” with LIHTC investments will not pose a threat to their safety and soundness. The LIHTC industry has consistently enjoyed a very low foreclosure rate, as mentioned previously, which would deem the investments relatively low in risk. This factor provides a tremendous testament to the investment soundness that participants in the program have relied upon. By continuing to permit banking entities to engage in "covered transactions" and sponsor LIHTC investments, these investments in affordable housing will continue to flourish and satisfy the Congressional intent of promoting public welfare through such investments while not posing a threat to the safety and soundness of these entities.

The prohibition on engaging in covered transactions with covered funds may not have been intended by Congress to apply to the permitted investments allowed by subsection (E) of Section 13(d) of the Volcker Rule. In a subsequent subsection, (G), which is the exemption permitting banking entities to sponsor private equity and hedge funds under certain circumstances, the Volcker Rule specifically provides that the permitted activity in subsection (G) is subject to the Super 23A Provisions of subparagraph (f). There is no such specific limitation set forth to the exemption in subsection (E). Congress may not have intended to sweep public welfare investments and funds comprised of public welfare investments into the definitions of “private equity fund” or “hedge fund” and subject them to the Super 23A Provisions. If subparagraph (f)

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18 Section 13(f)(1) of the BHC
applied to all of the permitted activities, then the reference to subparagraph (f) in subsection (G) would be superfluous.

**Conclusion**

We commend the Agencies for their efforts in implementing Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Act and to request public comments on the process. We believe that the recommendations included in this letter are consistent with the intent of the Volcker Rule based in part on the discussion included in the Financial Stability Oversight Counsel’s (“FSOC”) study. The FSOC realized that Congress may not have intended to capture certain private equity funds that are technically within the scope of the Volcker Rule. We believe that LIHTC investments do not represent a means to circumvent the restrictions on proprietary trading or historically expose banking entities to high risks.

We are excited about the positive impact that the LIHTC Program is having on the nation’s low-income communities and low-income persons and the potential for future success. However, we believe that the program could become less efficient and deliver fewer subsidies to the end users without the clarification we have requested above. We appreciate the opportunity to submit our recommendations and thank you in advance for your time and consideration. Please do not hesitate to contact us if you have any questions regarding our comments or if we can be of further assistance.

**THE LIHTC WORKING GROUP**

Yours very truly,

NOVOGRADAC & COMPANY LLP

by Michael G. Morrison