



**JEFF DAVIS BANK  
&  
TRUST COMPANY**

JENNINGS, LOUISIANA 70546

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October 23, 2009

Robert E. Feldman  
Executive Secretary  
Attention: Comments  
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation  
550 17<sup>th</sup> Street, NW.  
Washington, DC 20429

Email: [comments@fdic.gov](mailto:comments@fdic.gov)

RE: Proposed Guidance on Correspondent Concentration Risks

This letter is in response to the request for comment on the Proposed Interagency Guidance on Correspondent Concentration Risks.

Jeff Davis Bank & Trust Company is a community bank comprised of \$488,069,000 in assets and is located in Jennings, Louisiana. Given our size, we rely on the support and services that we receive from the correspondent banking relationships we maintain with bankers banks and commercial banks that provide correspondent services. These correspondent providers are critical to our survival and fruition as they allow us to compete very effectively with larger regional and money center institutions that are in our market.

While we could support the establishment of additional regulatory guidance on managing correspondent concentration risks, we are concerned that several points made in the proposal could be harmful to community banks depending on the interpretation by regulatory field examiners. These include but are not limited to the following:

**Loan participations purchased from correspondents considered as a credit exposure**

As a matter of business, many community banks buy loan participations through bankers' banks and other correspondent banks to enhance and/or diversify their respective loan portfolios. The proposed guidance implies that the amount of loan participations purchased from correspondents be included when calculating gross credit exposures to those institutions. Given that loan participations are approved and executed between financial institutions on an arms length basis and that the credit exposure is to the borrower involved and not the correspondent bank, we recommend that this reference be removed or clarified.

### **Funding exposures of 5% of an institutions total liabilities**

The proposed guidance mentions liability concentrations and funding exposures of 5% of an institution's total liabilities having posed elevated risk to recipient institutions. We recommend that the funding concentration limitation reference be excluded from the proposed guidance due to inconsistency and lack of disclosure. The funding concentration limitation lacks sufficient discussion in the guidance. For example, the guidance does not distinguish large depositors from the long-term secured advances from the Federal Home Loan Bank system. Each of these sources has its own strengths and weaknesses that cannot be addressed with a one-size-fits-all limitation. Funding concentration should be addressed in a guidance that is more appropriate to funding rather than correspondent concentration limits. This could be included in any final guidance on funding and liquidity management.

### **Concentration limitations as a percentage of capital**

We recognize that credit exposures of 25% or more of capital to any one correspondent are generally considered as a concentration by the Agencies. However, many community banks that closely monitor the financial condition of their correspondent relationships have Board approved concentration limits that are in excess of this percentage. As Regulation F is currently written, there is no limitation on exposure to any one correspondent if that institution is at least adequately capitalized. Given that many correspondent banks in the country remain sound, well capitalized, and profitable institutions, we recommend that additional language be included in the final guidance to clarify that the 25% of capital exposure reference is a guideline and that ultimately the respective management and boards of directors of each financial institution must decide their appropriate risk exposure tolerances to their correspondent banks.

Additionally, we request that that the Federal Reserve's restriction to one Excess Balance Account Agent per financial institution be eliminated. The allowance for multiple correspondent banks to act as agent would further encourage diversification in correspondent bank relationships and improve risk management practices for reducing concentrations at any one correspondent. All financial institutions should have the option to designate each of their correspondent banks to serve as agent for separate Excess Balance Accounts at the Federal Reserve. This would also enable correspondent banks to better assist their respondent banks with managing concentration or diversification concerns that directly impact both that correspondent and their respondent.

Finally, we feel that the proposed guidance is vague. We currently review Banks for Fed Funds sales on a quarterly basis. We also determine the maximum balances and the Banks to which we are willing to sell. Will continuance of this review still be satisfactory? Also, will you distinguish between Principal and Agency Fed Funds?

We believe the guidance should be more specific with additional time for response. The number of correspondent banks continues to decrease. We feel that additional time is necessary to consider possible unintended consequences that may result from taking action too soon.

We appreciate the opportunity to respond to the Proposed Interagency Guidance for Correspondent Concentration Risk and thank you for your consideration of our comments.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Dan L. Donald, Jr.", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Dan L. Donald, Jr.  
President and Chief Executive Officer