August 31, 2016

MEMORANDUM TO: The Board of Directors
FROM: Diane Ellis
Director
Division of Insurance and Research
SUBJECT: Designated Reserve Ratio for 2017

Summary and Recommendation

The Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act) requires that the FDIC Board of Directors (Board) designate a reserve ratio for the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF or fund) and publish the designated reserve ratio, or DRR, before the beginning of each calendar year. 1 On October 22, 2015, the Board approved for publication a notice setting the DRR at 2 percent for 2016. 2 Staff recommends maintaining the DRR at 2 percent for 2017 and requests that the Board authorize staff to publish the attached notice to that effect in the Federal Register.

The Board must set the DRR in accordance with its analysis of certain statutory factors: risk of losses to the DIF; economic conditions generally affecting insured depository institutions; preventing sharp swings in assessment rates; and any other factors that the Board determines to be appropriate. 3 Staff has identified one “other factor” for the Board’s consideration: viewing the DRR as a minimum goal that will allow the fund to grow sufficiently large in good times to increase the likelihood of the DIF remaining positive during bad times, consistent with the FDIC’s comprehensive, long-term fund management plan.

The manner in which the Board evaluates the statutory factors may depend on its view of the role of the DRR. Governing statutes do not direct the Board on how to use the DRR. Based on current circumstances and historical analysis, staff continues to view the DRR as a long-

2 80 Fed. Reg. 65,756 (Oct. 27, 2015). The DRR is expressed as a percentage of estimated insured deposits. The DRR was first set at 2 percent for 2011 in a final rule approved by the Board on December 14, 2010. See 75 FR 79,286 (Dec. 20, 2010), codified at 12 C.F.R. § 327.4(g). The Board has set the DRR at 2 percent for every year since 2011.

Concur: Charles Yi
General Counsel
range, minimum target for the reserve ratio, consistent with the comprehensive, long-range fund management plan contained in the October 2010 proposed rulemaking to raise the DRR to 2 percent (October 2010 NPR).  

**Background**

**Governing statutes**

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank), which was enacted on July 21, 2010, gave the FDIC much greater discretion to manage the DIF, including where to set the DRR. Among other things, Dodd-Frank: (1) raised the minimum DRR to 1.35 percent (from the former minimum of 1.15 percent) and removed the upper limit on the DRR (which was formerly capped at 1.5 percent) and consequently on the size of the fund;  

(2) eliminated the requirement that the FDIC provide dividends from the fund when the reserve ratio is between 1.35 percent and 1.5 percent;  

and (3) continued the FDIC’s authority to declare dividends when the reserve ratio is at least 1.5 percent, but granted the FDIC sole discretion in determining whether to suspend or limit the declaration or payment of dividends.  

The FDI Act continues to require that the Board consider the appropriate level for the DRR annually and, if the Board is changing the DRR, to engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking before the beginning of the calendar year.

In effect, while the FDI Act requires that the Board consider specific factors and other factors that the Board determines are appropriate, it grants the Board broad discretion to set the DRR, so long as it is set no lower than 1.35 percent. Neither the FDI Act nor the amendments

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4 75 FR 66272 (Oct. 27, 2010).
8 Dodd-Frank also required that the fund reserve ratio reach 1.35 percent by September 30, 2020 (rather than 1.15 percent by the end of 2016, as formerly required) and that the FDIC offset the effect of increasing the reserve ratio from 1.15 percent to 1.35 percent on institutions with less than $10 billion in total consolidated assets. 12 U.S.C. § 1817(m). The FDIC issued a final rule implementing these requirements in March 2016. See 81 Fed. Reg. 16,059 (Mar. 25, 2016).
9 Dodd-Frank also made permanent the increase in the standard maximum deposit insurance amount (SMDIA) from $100,000 to $250,000. See 12 U.S.C. 1821(a)(1)(E). The SMDIA is subject to an inflation adjustment under 12 U.S.C. 1821(a)(1)(F), and beginning April 1, 2010, and every five years thereafter, the FDIC is required to consider certain factors and determine whether an inflation adjustment is appropriate. In 2015, the FDIC considered the factors and determined that the inflation adjustment would not affect the level of the SMDIA in the foreseeable future because it would not take effect until the value of $100,000, inflation adjusted since 2005, exceeds the current SMDIA of $250,000.
under Dodd-Frank establish a statutory role for the DRR as a trigger, whether for assessment rate determinations, recapitalization of the fund, or dividends.

**Comprehensive, long-range management plan for the DIF**

The October 2010 NPR proposed raising the DRR to 2 percent. After consideration of comments received, a final rule adopted by the Board in December 2010 set the DRR at 2 percent.

The October 2010 NPR also set out a comprehensive, long-range management plan for the DIF that was designed: (1) to reduce pro-cyclicality in the risk-based assessment system by allowing moderate, steady assessment rates throughout economic and credit cycles; and (2) to maintain a positive fund balance even during a banking crisis by setting an appropriate target fund size and a strategy for assessment rates and dividends.\(^\text{11}\)

During an economic and banking downturn, insured institutions can least afford to pay high deposit insurance assessment rates. Moreover, high assessment rates during a downturn reduce the amount that banks can lend when the economy most needs new lending. For these reasons, it is important to reduce pro-cyclicality in the assessment system and allow moderate, steady assessment rates throughout economic and credit cycles.\(^\text{12}\)

It is also important that the fund not decline to a level that could risk undermining public confidence in federal deposit insurance. Although the FDIC has significant authority to borrow from the Treasury to cover losses, the FDIC has viewed the Treasury line of credit as appropriate for covering unforeseen losses, not as a source of financing projected losses.

A 2 percent DRR is an integral part of the FDIC’s comprehensive, long-range management plan for the DIF. A fund that is sufficiently large is a necessary precondition to maintaining a positive fund balance during a banking crisis and allowing for long-term, steady assessment rates.

In developing the long-range management plan, staff analyzed historical fund losses and income data from 1950 to 2010 to determine how high the reserve ratio would have to have been before the onset of the two banking crises that occurred during this period to maintain a positive fund balance and stable assessment rates. The analysis, which was detailed in the October 2010 NPR, concluded that moderate, long-term average industry assessment rates, combined with an appropriate dividend or assessment rate reduction policy, would have been sufficient to prevent

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\(^{11}\) 75 FR at 66272. Pursuant to the comprehensive plan, the FDIC also adopted a new Restoration Plan to ensure that the DIF reserve ratio reaches 1.35 percent by September 30, 2020, as required by Dodd-Frank. 75 FR at 66293.

\(^{12}\) At a September 24, 2010 roundtable organized by the FDIC, bank executives and industry trade group representatives uniformly favored steady, predictable assessments and found high assessment rates during crises objectionable. The proceedings of the roundtable can be viewed in their entirety at: http://www.vodium.com/MediapodLibrary/index.asp?library=pn100472_fdic_RoundTable.
the fund from becoming negative during the crises. Staff also found that the fund reserve ratio would have had to exceed 2 percent before the onset of the crises to achieve these results.\footnote{The analysis set out in the October 2010 NPR sought to determine what assessment rates would have been needed to maintain a positive fund balance during the last two crises. This analysis used an assessment base derived from domestic deposits to calculate assessment income. Dodd-Frank, however, required the FDIC to change the assessment base to average consolidated total assets minus average tangible equity. In the December 2010 final rule establishing a 2 percent DRR, staff undertook additional analysis to determine how the results of the original analysis would change had the new assessment base been in place from 1950 to 2010. Both the analyses in the October 2010 NPR and the December 2010 final rule show that the fund reserve ratio would have needed to be approximately 2 percent or more before the onset of the crises to maintain both a positive fund balance and stable assessment rates. The updated analysis in the December 2010 final rule, like the analysis in the October 2010 NPR, assumed, in lieu of dividends, that the long-term industry average nominal assessment rate would be reduced by 25 percent when the reserve ratio reached 2 percent, and by 50 percent when the reserve ratio reached 2.5 percent. Eliminating dividends and reducing rates successfully limits rate volatility whichever assessment base is used. See 75 FR at 79288.}

Staff views the 2 percent DRR as the minimum level needed to withstand a future crisis of the magnitude of past crises. Because analysis shows that a reserve ratio higher than 2 percent increases the chance that the fund will remain positive during such a crisis, the 2 percent DRR should not be treated as a cap on the size of the fund.

\textbf{Analysis of Statutory Factors}

As discussed above, the FDI Act requires that the Board set and publish the DRR annually in accordance with its analysis of statutory factors.\footnote{Specifically, in setting the DRR for any year, the Board must consider the following factors:}

\begin{enumerate}
\item The risk of losses to the DIF in the current and future years, including historic experience and potential and estimated losses from insured depository institutions.
\item Economic conditions generally affecting insured depository institutions so as to allow the DRR to increase during more favorable economic conditions and to decrease during less favorable economic conditions, notwithstanding the increased risks of loss that may exist during such less favorable conditions, as the Board determines to be appropriate.
\item That sharp swings in assessment rates for insured depository institutions should be prevented.
\item Other factors as the FDIC’s Board may deem appropriate, consistent with the requirements of the Reform Act.
\end{enumerate}

\footnote{12 U.S.C. § 1817(b)(3)(C).}
low point at the end of 2009. Primary factors contributing to the cumulative increase in the fund balance since 2009 include assessment income and a reduction in estimated losses associated with past and anticipated failures. At June 30, 2016, the contingent loss reserve for anticipated failures was $437 million, down from $684 million one year earlier.

The increase in the DIF balance reflects improvements in banking industry performance and condition. The second quarter of 2016 marked the 25th time in the past 28 quarters in which banking industry earnings posted a year-over-year increase. Three-fifths (60 percent) of all institutions reported year-over-year earnings growth while less than 5 percent were unprofitable – the lowest proportion of unprofitable institutions since the third quarter of 1997. Asset quality, as measured by the volume of noncurrent loans and leases, has improved for 24 of the past 25 consecutive quarters. The total number of institutions on the FDIC’s Problem Institution List fell to 147 as of June 30, 2016, down from 183 at the end of 2015. The number of problem banks, which peaked at 888 in March 2011 and has declined in every quarter since then, is now at its lowest level since the second quarter of 2008. The improvement in the number of problem institutions reflects a continuing trend of supervisory rating upgrades exceeding downgrades. The number of bank failures also continues to decline. Four banks have failed from January through August of this year, compared to six over the same period last year.

Although the banking industry’s financial condition has improved since the most recent crisis, challenges remain. Revenue growth is modest, reflecting narrow margins. The average net interest margin for the industry has declined by 68 basis points since the second quarter of 2010 to 3.08 percent in the second quarter of 2016. The prolonged low interest rate environment has created incentives for institutions to boost yield by increasing the share of longer-term assets on their balance sheets. Average asset yields have risen as a result, but banks have been left more vulnerable to interest rate risk as rates rise.

In staff’s view, high deposit insurance fund losses incurred during the crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s and during the more recent crisis suggest that the Board should set a DRR at a level that would have maintained a positive fund balance during both crises. Adoption of this long-range, minimum goal would improve the DIF’s ability to handle losses during any future periods of severe industry stress and reduce the possibility of increased deposit insurance assessment rates during a banking downturn.

Economic conditions affecting FDIC-insured institutions

The U.S. economy has grown slowly over the seven years since the financial crisis. In 2015, real GDP grew 2.4 percent. The Blue Chip consensus forecast for economic growth is 1.5 percent for 2016, reflecting recent mixed economic indicators. Weak business investment and slow inventory growth suggest that businesses are being cautious in light of poor prospects for growth worldwide. Unemployment has continued to decline in 2016, but the pace of decline has slowed. Inflation has been subdued due to low oil prices and a strong dollar.

Key risks to the U.S. economic outlook include the effect of possible increases in interest rates on economic growth; fiscal challenges at federal, state, and local levels; and a slowing of
growth in several advanced and emerging market economies. Weak productivity growth and an aging population also temper longer-term growth prospects. A slowdown in the U.S. economy could result in more bank failures than projected as well as a decline in the value of failed-bank assets.

Although near-term economic prospects and recent trends in banking industry performance can inform the Board’s decision on the DRR, staff believes that the DRR should be viewed in a longer-term perspective. Twice within the past 30 years, serious economic dislocations have resulted in a significant deterioration in the condition of many insured depository institutions and in a large number of insured depository institution failures at high cost to the DIF. In staff’s view, the DRR should, therefore, be viewed as a minimum goal needed to achieve a reserve ratio that can withstand these periodic economic downturns and their attendant insured depository institution failures. Taking these longer-term economic realities into account, a prudent and consistent policy would set the DRR at a minimum of 2 percent, because that is the lowest level that would have prevented a negative fund balance at any time since 1950 without raising assessment rates during the crises.

*Preventing sharp swings in assessment rates*

Current law directs the Board to consider preventing sharp swings in assessment rates for insured depository institutions. Setting the DRR at 2 percent as a minimum goal would signal that the Board plans for the DIF to grow in good times so that funds are available to handle multiple bank failures in bad times. This plan would help prevent sharp fluctuations in deposit insurance premiums over the course of the business cycle. In particular, it would help reduce the risk of large rate increases during crises, when insured depository institutions can least afford an increase.

*Maintaining the DIF at a level that can withstand substantial losses*

Staff again recommends, as it did in 2010 and every year since then, that the Board consider one additional factor when setting the DRR: viewing the DRR as a minimum goal that will allow the fund to grow sufficiently large in good times to increase the likelihood of the DIF remaining positive during bad times. This aim is consistent with the FDIC’s comprehensive, long-term fund management plan. Having adequate funds available when entering a financial crisis should reduce the likelihood that the fund will become negative or that the FDIC will need to increase assessment rates, levy special assessments on the industry, or borrow from the U.S. Treasury.

*Balancing the statutory factors*

In staff’s view, the best way to balance all of the statutory factors (including the additional factor identified above) is to maintain the DRR at 2 percent. Based on the analysis described above, staff continues to recommend viewing a 2 percent DRR as a long-range, minimum target.
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