


Fintech and Shadow Banking





Tomasz Piskorski
Columbia GSB and NBER

Last Decade: Dramatic Change in Lending Landscape

- Rapid rise of shadow banks (SBs) in the lending market
- Occurred during the period of increasing bank regulatory burden

Shadow bank share in the \$10 trillion US mortgage market




Source: Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru (2018a)

Last Decade: Dramatic Change in Lending Landscape

- Rapid rise of shadow banks (SBs) in the lending market
- Occurred during the period of increasing bank regulatory burden
- Fintech lenders important part of this trend
 - Shadow banks early adopters of financial technology




Shadow bank share in the \$10 trillion US mortgage market



Largest Mortgage Lenders, by Originations in Q1 2018
In \$ billions, purchase mortgages & refis

"Shadow banks" in red



Source: Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru (2018a)

Rise of Shadow Banks: Key Questions


- How much of the growth driven by regulations vs technology
 - Regulation: capital costs, scrutiny/supervision burden, legal costs
 - Technology: lower costs, higher quality products, better models
 - Impact on consumers
 - E.g., access/distribution/pricing of credit/financial services
 - Implications for financial stability and regulation
 - Need to rethink current regulatory framework?
-

Rise of Shadow Banks: Regulatory Burden?

- Extensive regulation of banks after crisis
 - Dodd Frank
 - Basel III
 - Changes in regulators, enforcement..
 - Regulation dampens bank lending
 - Traditional banks face rising capital costs
 - Traditional banks face greater capital constraints
 - Traditional banks face greater regulatory scrutiny
 - Shadow banks fill regulatory gaps?
-

Shadow Bank Expansion in the Residential Mortgage Market


2008



Source: Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru (2018a)

Shadow Bank Expansion in the Residential Mortgage Market

2015



Source: Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru (2018a)


Rise of Shadow Banks: Regulatory Burden?

- Source of Variation (BMPS, 2018a)
 - Banks are exposed to national-level regulatory shocks
 - Counties exposed through 2008 bank lending market share
 - County-level variation in exposure to differentially shocked banks
- Regulatory Changes
 1. Higher Capital Requirements
Bank Capitalization: Banks rebuilding capital → Lend less
 2. Enforcement / Legal Risk
Lawsuits: Banks exposed to more mortgage-related lawsuits → Lend less
 3. Tighter regulatory supervision:
OTS Closure: Banks supervised by OTS → Lend Less
- Outcome
 - Changes in shadow bank market share from 2008

Shadow Bank Expansion and Bank Regulatory Burden

- Assess shadow expansion in response to bank regulatory burden
 - Shocks to Regulatory Burden (BMPS 2017)
 - Banks retreated and shadow banks expanded where regulatory burden \uparrow

ROLE OF REGULATION IN SHADOW BANK EXPANSION




$$\Delta \text{Shadow Bank Lending Share}_c = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \Delta \text{Regulatory Burden}_c + X'_c \Gamma + \epsilon_c$$

Rise of Shadow Banks: Technology?

- Fintech lenders account for significant part of SB expansion
 - 1/3rd in the mortgage market
- Fintech lenders (BMPS, 2018a)
 - Serve more creditworthy borrowers than shadow banks
 - Focus on refinancing
 - Originate and sell loan faster than traditional banks
 - Seem to use different models/data in loan origination process
 - Provide convenience rather than direct cost savings


Fintech Premium: Fintech vs Bank Mortgage Rates



Source: Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru (2018a)

Fintech Premium: Fintech vs Bank Mortgage Rates

- Fintech can offer borrowers convenience rather than costs savings




Source: Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru (2018a)

Rise of Shadow Banks: Regulation vs Technology

- What we know so far:
 - Shadow banks expand in areas with banks subject to more regulatory oversight
 - Fintech lenders command rate premium and appear to process/sell loans faster
 - Quantitative model to assess role of technology and regulation
 - Combine regulatory and technology effects
 - Decomposition: how much in technology and how much is regulation
 - Informed by the data (market shares, prices)
 - Key Findings
 - Estimate that 60-70% of shadow bank growth due to regulation
 - Rest due to financial technology (about 30%)
-

Rise of Shadow Banks: Regulation vs Technology





- 60-70% of shadow bank growth due to increase in bank regulatory burden
- Rest due to financial technology (about 30%)

Source: Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru (2018a)

Rise of Shadow Banks: Implications

- Implications for Financial Stability
 - Fintech/SBs have no deposit funding base, limited balance sheet capacity
 - Dependent on ability to sell loans/warehouse lines/GSEs/crowdfunding



Source: Buchak, Matvos, Piskorski, and Seru (2018a)


Rise of Shadow Banks: Implications

- Implications for Financial Stability
 - Fintech/SBs have no deposit funding base, limited balance sheet capacity
 - Dependent on ability to sell loans/warehouse lines/GSEs/crowdfunding
 - SBs can quickly shutdown in the face of funding problems like in 2007
 - Mortgage market shadow bank share: 2007 \approx 25% vs Now $>$ 50%
 - New lending models have not been tested during downturn
 - In case of the shutdown of fintech/SB lenders who will pick up the slack?
 - Traditional banks (TB) may be unable due to limited experience/market presence
-

Rise of Shadow Banks: Implications

- Implications for Regulatory Framework (BMPS, 2018b)
 - Need to recognize the role of shadow banks and IO of the market
 - SBs response can significantly affect transmission of various policies
 - Quantity, pricing, distribution of credit, bank stability


Lending Changes (\$B) and Capital Ratios



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
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
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
Lending Changes (\$B) and Conforming Limit




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Lending Changes (\$B) and Capital Ratios



Lending Changes (\$B) and Conforming Limit



Rise of Shadow Banks: Implications

- Taxpayer Exposure

- No direct FDIC exposure...but GSE exposure in the mortgage market
 - Increased taxpayer risk due to limited regulation and GSE guarantees?
 - Can make scaling down the role of GSEs even harder

- Consumer Welfare

- SBs dominate market for the least creditworthy (+80% FHA market share)
 - Much less regulatory oversight than traditional banks
- Use of big data/credit scoring algorithms create regulatory challenges

- Traditional Bank Response

- Shadow banks were early adopters of new technologies
 - Less concern about regulatory implications, no legacy investments/systems
 - Traditional banks are catching up
 - Evolving market structure can create further regulatory challenges
-

References

- Buchak, G., G. Matvos, T. Piskorski, A. Seru, 2018a, “Fintech, Regulatory Arbitrage, and the Rise of Shadow Banks”, *Journal of Financial Economics* 130, 453-483.
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- Buchak, G., G. Matvos, T. Piskorski, A. Seru, 2018b, “The Limits of Shadow Banks”, *National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper* 25149.

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