The Effects of Regulating Penalty Fees for Consumer Financial Products

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August 2, 2012

Abstract

We examine the welfare effects of regulation in a model where firms can shroud add-on costs, such as penalty fees for credit cards. In isolation, imposing price controls or disclosure mandates on such fees can increase or decrease welfare, even when these regulations have no direct costs. There are, however, strong complementarities between price controls and disclosure mandates: conditional on disclosure being mandated, price controls always (weakly) increase welfare, and conditional on prices being sufficiently constrained, disclosure mandates always (weakly) increase welfare.

Keywords: Disclosure, Shrouding, Regulation, Add-on Pricing, Household Finance

JEL Classification: D60, G28

*The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any private publication or statement by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author’s colleagues upon the staff of the Commission. We thank Brian Bucks, Mike Fishman, Dave Haushalter, Peter Iliev, Yuji Masujima, Paul Rothstein, Joel Vanden, and seminar participants at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Federal Reserve Board, the Global Finance Conference, Penn State, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the World Finance Conference for their helpful comments and suggestions. All errors are our own.

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1 Introduction

A common feature of many consumer credit products is the combination of low-cost initial terms with high-cost subsequent terms, which are often obfuscated by lenders. For example, credit cards often feature low introductory teaser rates combined with much higher subsequent rates and fees. The term “stealth pricing” was coined to refer to these pricing practices developed by Providian Financial in the 1990’s. Negative-amortization and interest-only mortgages, which grew in prevalence prior to the crisis, also feature low introductory teaser rates which increase after a pre-set period. Even standard fixed-rate mortgages have often featured substantial prepayment penalties, which were generally obscured from consumers at the end of long mortgage documents.\(^1\) A number of studies find that a large proportion of consumers, in fact, do not understand key lending terms and underestimate future costs.\(^2\)

Such obscured costs can cause certain consumers to unknowingly enter into transactions that are ultimately welfare-reducing. For example, a first-year college student may open a credit card account with zero upfront costs to finance spending. He may then later regret having spent so much money once he learns the associated long-term costs when those costs are eventually imposed. In addition, markets with hidden add-on costs can allow for implicit transfers between consumers who use the product differently. For example, consumers who pay off their credit card balances in full each month often enjoy short-term lending with no fees and even associated rewards and incentives. This use is subsidized by other consumers who pay interest and fees on their credit card balances.

The aggregate fees paid by consumers are substantial. US households paid $15 billion per year in credit card penalty fees according to a White House estimate, and $516 per year her household in bank and credit card fees according to Stango and Zinman (2009).\(^3\) Motivated in part by mounting household debt leading up to the financial crisis of 2008, both price and disclosure regulations have been proposed and instituted to remedy the problem of hidden fees. For example, the Credit Card Act has banned inactivity fees and capped late fees at $25. In the mortgage domain, the Dodd-Frank Act has placed certain explicit limits on the size of prepayment penalties for standard mortgages and banned them outright for non-standard types. The principal regulations governing disclosures for consumer lending are contained in the Truth in Lending Act of 1968 (TILA) and its subsequent amendments. This act calls for “clear” disclosure of a loan’s APR, the loan amount, and all costs. The Dodd-Frank Act enhances these requirements for mortgages by requiring the disclosure of specific costs at origination and on a monthly basis.

We analyze the effects of regulation in markets for goods where add-on costs may be shrouded

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\(^1\)While prepayment penalties are generally seen as exploitative, this view is not unanimous; for example, Mayer, Piskorski, and Tchistyi (2011) show that it can be socially optimal for firms to issue prepayment penalties.

\(^2\)In the mortgage domain, a large number of consumers do not understand key mortgage terms, underestimate their current interest rate as well as future interest rate increases in adjustable-rate mortgages and prepayment penalties. See, e.g., Crickshank (2000), Campbell (2007), Bucks and Pence (2008), and Gerardi, Goette, and Meier (2010), respectively. In addition, Stango and Zinman (2009) find that most of the fees incurred by credit card borrowers are avoidable.

by producers. To be specific, add-on costs are any optional costs that may be paid at some point after the product has been acquired. Examples of such costs include not only penalty fees and rates for credit cards but also redemption fees for mutual funds and a variety of other consumer costs. We develop a model based on that of Gabaix and Laibson (2006), in which there are naïve consumers, who fail to anticipate add-on costs, and sophisticated consumers, who rationally anticipate them. Add-on fees may be shrouded and excessive in equilibrium since both types of consumers’ demands can be insensitive to this cost.

There are two primary motivations for regulation: to improve the welfare of all consumers (regardless of their need for protection), and to protect the least sophisticated consumers who are most in need of protection. In this paper, we analyze the effects of regulation on two welfare functions that capture regulators’ desired goals. The first is total surplus, which measures the average monetized net benefit of consumers from the product. The second is unsophisticated welfare, which measures this net benefit to consumers who do not realize that add-on costs/fees exist unless the costs are disclosed.

It is well-known that disclosure mandates can harm welfare if they are costly to implement, and price controls can harm welfare if they lead to underprovision of the good. We abstract away from these concerns; disclosure has no direct costs, and price caps are always greater than production costs. Following Gabaix and Laibson (2006), however, we assume disclosure is imperfect: if a firm discloses the price of the add-on, some, but not all, unsophisticated consumers will understand the disclosure and take the price into account. We show that disclosure mandates can decrease welfare. Specifically, disclosure increases the number of consumers who understand the costs of the add-on, and consumption of the add-on can decrease as a result. Since consumers’ valuation for the add-on is assumed to exceed its production cost, such avoidance is inefficient, and total surplus can decrease. In addition to harming total surplus, disclosure mandates can actually harm unsophisticated consumers. As mentioned before, disclosure mandates can reduce consumption of the add-on. Since firms earn less from selling the add-on, they must compensate for these lost profits by increasing the price of the base good. In some markets, the harm caused by the increase in the price of the base good can dominate the benefits unsophisticated consumers receive from the disclosure.

Like disclosure mandates, price controls can harm welfare. In particular, when disclosure is not mandated, there can exist two equilibria in some markets. In one equilibrium, firms voluntarily disclose the add-on price, whereas in the other, they shroud it. Total surplus and unsophisticated welfare are higher in the equilibrium with disclosure. When price controls are implemented, it is possible for the market to move from the equilibrium with disclosure to the one with shrouding. When such a transition occurs, total surplus and unsophisticated welfare can decline.

Though both forms of regulation can harm consumers when employed in isolation, we show that when applied jointly, the unintended consequences described above can be averted. Conditional on disclosure being mandated, price controls always (weakly) increase both total surplus and unsophisticated welfare. Conditional on prices being sufficiently constrained, disclosure mandates
always (weakly) increase both total surplus and unsophisticated welfare. To our knowledge, we are the first to document such complementarities between disclosure mandates and price controls.

We finally examine a variation of the model in which consumers have heterogeneous valuations for the product, which can represent a social harm to some in the sense that its cost exceeds some consumers’ monetized utility from consuming the good. For example, it has been argued that several classes of consumer financial products are harmful to consumers such as payday loans, actively managed mutual funds, and retail structured products. Moreover, credit and debit cards are harmful to consumers who would not have obtained them had they properly anticipated the fees they incur. In this variation of the model, both price and disclosure regulations can provide additional benefits to consumers. In most cases, the regulations reduce the amount that firms earn from selling the add-on. Firms respond by increasing the price of the base good so that it is closer to the production cost. As a result, there is less consumption of the good by consumers whose valuation is less than the production cost. Our main takeaways from the baseline model continue to apply in this more general model: both forms of regulation can harm welfare when employed in isolation, but when applied jointly, the negative consequences can be avoided.

Our paper is outlined as follows. We discuss the related literature in Section 2. Section 3 then discusses the general assumptions of the model. Section 4 analyzes the baseline model, in which the product is socially beneficial. In Section 5, we analyze the model in the case that the product represents a social harm to some consumers. We conclude in Section 6.

## 2 Related Literature

Our model of shrouded add-on prices is motivated by Gabaix and Laibson (2006). They show that if a subset of the population is naïve, allocational inefficiencies and shrouded add-on prices can persist in equilibrium, even if markets are competitive and advertising is costless. Ellison (2005) develops a similar model in which firms utilize add-on pricing in order to price discriminate among rational consumers. In his model, high add-on prices are not sustainable if advertising and search are costless. We analyze the effects of pricing and disclosure regulations in a Gabaix and Laibson (2006) type setting.

These models belong to a more general class in which firms can make prices difficult for consumers to understand. Kosfeld and Schüwer (2011) also study regulation within a model based on Gabaix and Laibson (2006). They focus on consumer education and find that education can harm welfare for similar reasons as in our model. They do not, however, conduct a comprehensive analysis of price controls.\(^4\) Heidhues, Köszegi, and Murooka (2011) examine a market in which firms can impose hidden surcharges.\(^5\) In their model, regulators can improve welfare by restricting the amount

\(^4\)For example, they assume that regulators have perfect information and can set prices at their first-best value. Price controls in our model are more realistic in that they may be different than the first-best value. In practice, regulators may have imperfect information about production costs or imperfect ability to enforce this price. In addition, these authors do not consider the effect of price controls and disclosure mandates jointly.

\(^5\)Surcharges differ from add-on prices in that with surcharges, there is only one good but two components to the price: an upfront fee and an additional fee that must be paid by everyone who purchases the good. With add-on
firms can charge through hidden surcharges. They also examine a version of their model in which
the good is socially wasteful as we do. Piccone and Spiegler (2011) develop a model where firms
choose how to frame information to consumers; for example, the unit of measurement (e.g., ounces
or grams) to make it easy or hard for consumers to compare the firm’s products to competitors’
products. They find that firms have incentives to make their goods difficult to compare. Carlin and
Manso (2010) develop a model in which firms can alter the composition of sophisticated consumers
(who are relatively unprofitable to the firm) and unsophisticated consumers (who are relatively
profitable to the firm) by obfuscating prices. They analyze the optimal timing of obfuscation given
that obfuscation is costly and that consumers learn over time.

Our paper is also related to the literature on disclosure. Generally, if consumers are rati-
onal and there are no externalities associated with disclosure, it is difficult to justify govern-
ment-mandated disclosure; firms will voluntarily disclose if the benefits from disclosure outweigh the costs,
and Bayesian consumers will rationally update their beliefs about the firm and its products based
on the firm’s decision of whether or not to disclose. Possible externalities include the revelation
of useful information about consumer trends, technological shocks, and optimal operating practices
(Leuz and Wysocki (2008)). Fishman and Hagerty (2003) model a monopolist selling a product to
heterogenous consumers, some of whom can understand the information content of the disclosure,
others of whom can only observe whether or not the firm discloses information. They show that
disclosure mandates can be beneficial to the consumers who are able to process the information,
neutral for those who are unable to process the information, and harmful for the seller. Grubb (2011)
finds that price disclosure mandates can be socially harmful when some consumers are inattentive
because disclosure can restrict firms’ ability to price discriminate.

3 Model Setup

We adopt the model of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) with some minor changes. Firms sell a product,
offering an up-front observable price of \( p_1 \) for the base good. They also offer an add-on to this
product with a price of \( p_2 \) that is potentially unobserved. Firms’ production functions for the base
good and the add-on are both linear (with no fixed costs). Without loss of generality, we assume the
unit production cost to be 0. Hence, prices are net of production costs, and they represent per-unit
profits.

The price of the add-on is bounded by \( \overline{p} \) so that no firm can charge \( p_2 > \overline{p} \). This maximum
price comes from either explicit or implicit price controls imposed by regulatory bodies, the legal
system, etc. Obviously, price controls can harm welfare when they lead to underprovision of the
good. We abstract away from this concern by assuming \( \overline{p} > 0 \).

There is a fraction, \( \alpha \), of unsophisticated consumers. Specifically, if no firm discloses its price
for the add-on, these consumers assume the add-on price to be zero, the production cost. The

remainder of consumers are sophisticated and rationally anticipate the price of the add-on, whether it is disclosed or not.

• **Period 0:**

Each firm determines its prices for the base-good, $p_1$, and the add-on, $p_2$. Each firm also decides whether to disclose or shroud the add-on price. There are no direct costs to disclosure, although our results hold when there are direct costs to disclosure.

• **Period 1:**

If any firm discloses the price of its add-on, all sophisticates and a fraction $\lambda \in (0, 1]$ of unsophisticated consumers observe add-on prices. The remainder of unsophisticated consumers assume the add-on price is zero. For example, they may not read disclosures or properly process them as a result of cognitive costs or limitations. We refer to any such consumers who improperly anticipate the add-on price as naïve. Unsophisticated consumers who understand the add-on price disclosure behave identically to sophisticates, and we refer to them as such.6

Consumers choose a firm, from which they buy either zero or one units of the base good. Consumers randomly select among all firms that provide them with the highest expected utility.

• **Period 2:**

Consumers who purchase the base good decide whether to acquire zero or one units of the add-on. If firms do not disclose the add-on price, consumers do not observe this price until after their decision. For example, consumers may not learn the magnitude of penalty fees on a credit card until well after a late or delinquent payment. Our analysis can easily accomodate the case where consumers observe the add-on price before their decision as in the model of Gabaix and Laibson (2006).

Each consumer $i$ derives monetized utility $u_i \in [u, \bar{u}]$ from consuming the base good. More formally, the population can be thought of as the rectangular region $[u, \bar{u}] \times [0, 1]$. A consumer $(u_i, t_i) \in [u, \bar{u}] \times [0, 1]$ has valuation $u_i$ for the base good, and valuation $e$ for the add-on. If no firm discloses the price of its add-on, the agent is naïve if and only if $t_i < \alpha$. If at least one firm discloses the price of its add-on, the agent is naïve if and only if $t_i < \alpha(1 - \lambda)$.

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6Our assumptions and terminology can be summarized as follows. Ex ante, consumers are either sophisticated or unsophisticated. Sophisticated consumers are rational Bayesians who understand the game, whereas unsophisticated consumers are not. Ex post (after firms choose their pricing strategy), consumers are either sophisticated or naïve. Ex post sophisticated consumers understand the add-on prices that firms charge, whereas naïve consumers assume the add-on price equals the production cost. Consumers who are ex ante sophisticated are always sophisticated ex post, regardless of whether firms shroud or disclose their add-on prices. Unsophisticated consumers can be sophisticated or naïve ex post. If all firms shroud their add-on prices, all unsophisticated consumers are naïve ex post. If any firm discloses its add-on price, a fraction $\lambda$ of ex ante unsophisticated consumers understand the disclosure and are sophisticated ex post, whereas the remaining $1 - \lambda$ are naïve ex post.
Each consumer derives monetized utility $e$ from consumption of the add-on good.\footnote{An alternative interpretation of $e$ is the opportunity cost of not buying the add-on from the firm. Specifically, this quantity could represent the cost of close substitutes as in Gabaix and Laibson (2006). For example, consumers may avoid the add-on cost of high subsequent interest rates on their credit cards by exerting costly effort to roll their balances over to new cards with lower introductory rates.} Throughout this paper, we assume consumers are homogeneous in their valuations for the add-on for analytic simplicity; assuming heterogeneity in $e$ does not materially alter our results. We also assume that $\bar{u} + e > 0$ and $e > 0$. In other words, all consumers’ valuation for the add-on is greater than its production costs, and there are some consumers whose valuation for the base good and add-on is more than the combined production cost.\footnote{Arguably, some consumer financial products such as actively-managed mutual funds and payday loans impose harms on a preponderance of consumers. In unreported analysis, we find that our results are largely similar when $\bar{u} + e < 0$.}

We assume there are no direct costs to disclosure. Our objective is to study social losses (and gains) that can result from regulations even in the absence of these costs. In addition, they strengthen our argument that disclosure requirements can decrease welfare as we elucidate later in the paper.

There is more than one firm that sets prices in Bertrand competition for consumer demand. Each consumer makes his purchase decision for the base good and add-on to maximize his total projected utility. Specifically, sophisticates purchase the add-on if $e \geq Ep_2$, where $Ep_2$ is the rational expectation for the add-on price offered by a firm. When computing $Ep_2$, sophisticated consumers take all relevant information into account: namely, the maximum amount firms are allowed to charge for the add-on ($\bar{p}$), and whether firms choose to disclose or shroud the price of the add-on. Naïfs always buy the add-on if they have purchased the base good since they project its price to be zero.

3.1 Learning

In our model, the interaction between consumers and firms is a one-time game—firms set their prices and choose whether or not to shroud based only on the effects that period. In practice, firms and consumers are engaged in a repeated game, and naïve consumers can learn about penalty fees by incurring them. A natural question is whether our model applies to repeated interactions between firms and consumers.

Although we motivated our model by assuming that consumers are unaware of penalty fees, our analysis applies to situations where consumers know about the fees but underestimate the likelihood that they will incur the fees. For example, consumers may overestimate their ability to monitor their accounts and avoid fees. As a result, they would underestimate the expected cost of the add-on as in our model. Cognitive biases can suppress learning about these kinds of personal attributes as in Gervais and Odean (2001). In this framework, disclosure mandates might consist of mandating banks to provide consumers with information to de-bias them. For example, when consumers open an account, firms could disclose the average penalty fee paid by consumers and the percentage of consumers who incurred fees the previous year. After each year the consumer has had an account.
with a firm, the firm could provide annual penalty fee statements showing each consumer the total penalty fees he incurred that year. Such disclosures might cause consumers to pay more attention to their behavior and learn the true expected cost of add-ons more quickly over time.

Gabaix and Laibson (2006) provide other reasons why a static model such as ours can be applicable in more realistic scenarios. First, new consumers constantly enter markets, so there will always be myopic consumers who have never learned about penalty fees. Moreover, firms can create new types of penalties and charge fees for them.

3.2 Properties of Equilibria

As in Gabaix and Laibson (2006), we restrict our attention to symmetric pure-strategy equilibria, i.e., ones in which all firms charge the same prices for the base good and the add-on. In all such equilibria, firms earn zero profit. This result follows from the usual argument for competitive markets, except that in this market, firms compete on the price of the base good rather than the add-on. Specifically, if firms earned positive profits in equilibrium, a firm could earn a higher positive profit by lowering the base good price slightly and capturing all demand. Another feature of the symmetric equilibria is that the price of the add-on is either the maximum amount firms are allowed to charge, \( p \), or the amount consumers value the add-on, \( e \). The logic behind this result is straightforward. In any equilibrium, firms earn non-negative profits from naïve consumers and non-positive profits from sophisticated consumers.\(^9\) If \( p^*_2 \notin \{p, e\} \) and a firm raises the price of its add-on, naïve consumers’ demand would be unaffected, while the demand of sophisticated consumers would either fall to zero (if \( p^*_2 < e \)) or be unaffected (if \( p^*_2 \geq e \)). It follows that if \( p^*_2 \notin \{p, e\} \), a firm could earn positive profits by raising the price of the add-on.

These results are stated formally in the following lemma.

**Lemma 1.** In any symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium,

(i) firms earn zero profit, and

(ii) \( p^*_2 \), the equilibrium price of the add-on good, satisfies \( p^*_2 \in \{p, e\} \).

4 Baseline Model

In our baseline model, consumers have homogeneous valuations for the base good such that: \( u_i \equiv \bar{u} = u = u \) for all \( i \). In Section 5, we analyze the effects of regulation when consumers have heterogeneous preferences for the base good.

\(^9\)This follows from the fact that naïve consumers always consume the add-on, whereas sophisticated consumers only consume the add-on if its price is no greater than their valuation for it.
4.1 Equilibria with Mandatory Add-on Price Disclosure

We first consider the equilibrium prices when regulators require firms to disclose add-on prices. In practice, examples of disclosure mandates include statutes such as TILA and the Federal Reserve Board’s rules on monthly credit card disclosures imposed in early 2010. In the next section, we study the equilibrium for both prices and disclosure when this decision is voluntary.

**Proposition 1.** When disclosure is mandatory, there exists a threshold, \( \tilde{p}_{MDU} = \frac{e}{\alpha(1-\lambda)} \), such that:

- **If** \( \bar{p} \geq \tilde{p}_{MDU} \), there exists an equilibrium in which firms charge \( p^*_1 = -\alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p} \) for the base good and \( p^*_2 = \bar{p} \) for the add-on. Only naïfs purchase the add-on. We refer to this equilibrium as MD Unfair.

- **If** \( \bar{p} \leq \tilde{p}_{MDU} \), there exists an equilibrium in which firms charge \( p^*_1 = -\min\{\bar{p}, e\} \) for the base good and \( p^*_2 = \min\{\bar{p}, e\} \) for the add-on. All consumers purchase the add-on. We refer to this equilibrium as MD Fair.

No other symmetric pure-strategy equilibria exist when disclosure is mandatory.

The intuition for this proposition is straightforward. First, the threshold value of \( \tilde{p}_{MDU} = \frac{e}{\alpha(1-\lambda)} \) is increasing in consumers’ reservation value for the add-on, \( e \). Consider the case where \( \bar{p} > e \). From Lemma 1, firms weigh two alternatives for the add-on price. They can (i) charge \( e \), the maximum amount sophisticated consumers are willing to pay to consume the add-on, and sell the add-on to all consumers (both sophisticated and naïve), or they can (ii) charge the maximum allowed price, \( \bar{p} \), and only sell it to the naïve consumers (who fail to understand the price disclosure and comprise \( \alpha(1 - \lambda) \) of the population). The first strategy is optimal when \( e > \alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p} \); otherwise, charging \( \bar{p} \) is optimal.

The MD Unfair equilibrium is “unfair” in the sense that the add-on is overpriced relative to consumers’ reservation value. As a result, naïfs overpay for the add-on and their utility is lower than that of sophisticated consumers who do not buy the overpriced add-on. In the MD Fair equilibrium, sophisticates and naïfs have the same realized utility. Specifically, even if naïfs were sophisticated, they would still consume the add-on. Our analysis shares the feature of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) and others that add-ons are priced above costs while base goods are priced below.\(^{10}\) In our model, firms maximize add-on prices for a fixed level of sophisticate demand since naïf demand is insensitive to add-on costs. In the context of credit cards, this outcome captures the idea that cards are generally offered with low upfront fees and rates (and even rewards and incentives) while featuring high rates and fees that arise later.

\(^{10}\)See Ellison (2005) and the references contained therein.
4.2 Equilibria with Voluntary Add-on Price Disclosure

We now consider the case when the decision to disclose or shroud add-on prices is voluntary. This framework can apply in markets in which disclosure regulations do not exist or are lax in that information can be effectively obscured within pages of legal text. We assume that firms prefer shrouding to disclosure if both result in identical profits (as they would if there were an infinitesimal cost to disclosure).

The following proposition summarizes the equilibria that exist for prices and disclosure. When $\bar{p} > e$, this setting is identical to that of Gabaix and Laibson (2006) under perfect competition.

**Proposition 2.** When disclosure is voluntary, there exist thresholds, $\bar{p}_{MDU} = \frac{e}{\alpha(1-\lambda)}$ and $\bar{p}_{SU} = \frac{e}{\alpha}$, such that:

- If $\bar{p} \geq \bar{p}_{SU}$, there exists an equilibrium in which firms shroud and charge $p^*_b = -\alpha \bar{p}$ for the base good and $p^*_a = \bar{p}$ for the add-on. Only naïfs purchase the add-on. We refer to this equilibrium as Shrouded Unfair.

- If $\bar{p}_{MDU} \geq \bar{p} \geq e$, there exists an equilibrium in which firms disclose and charge $p^*_b = -e$ for the base good and $p^*_a = e$ for the add-on. All consumers purchase the add-on. We refer to this equilibrium as Voluntarily Transparent.

- If $\bar{p} \leq e$, there exists an equilibrium in which firms shroud and charge $p^*_b = -\bar{p}$ for the base good and $p^*_a = \bar{p}$ for the add-on. All consumers purchase the add-on. We refer to this equilibrium as Shrouded Fair.

No other symmetric equilibria exist when disclosure is voluntary.

If firms are allowed to shroud the price of the add-on, there are some equilibria where firms voluntarily disclose the price of the add-on, and there are others where firms shroud the price of the add-on. If firms shroud the price of the add-on, consumers’ decisions to purchase the add-on cannot depend on the add-on price. That is, they are price-insensitive. Hence, if firms shroud, it is a dominant strategy for firms to charge the maximum allowed price, $\bar{p}$. It trivially follows that if firms charge less than $\bar{p}$ for the add-on, they will disclose the add-on price. Sophisticated consumers recognize this, so they rationally infer that the price of the add-on is $\bar{p}$ whenever firms shroud.

Consider the case where price controls are relatively lax in that $\bar{p} > e$. In this case, shrouding equilibria can only exist if firms earn more from selling the add-on to naïfs at $\bar{p}$ than from selling the add-on to all consumers at $e$. Since naïfs comprise $\alpha$ of the population when firms shroud, a shrouding equilibrium can only be sustained if $\alpha \bar{p} \geq e$. We refer to this equilibrium as Shrouded Unfair because firms overcharge for the add-on, which is only purchased by naïfs. Disclosure equilibria can only exist if firms earn more from selling the add-on to all consumers at $e$ than from selling the add-on only to naïfs at $\bar{p}$. Since naïfs comprise $\alpha(1-\lambda)$ of the population when firms disclose, disclosure
equilibria can only be sustained when $\alpha(1 - \lambda)p \leq e$. We refer to this equilibrium as Voluntarily Transparent because firms voluntarily choose to disclose the price of the add-on. It follows that if $p \in \left[ \frac{\alpha^e}{\alpha(1 - \lambda)} \right]$, the market can support either the Shrouded Unfair or Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium.

Finally, consider the case where price controls are stringent in that $p \leq e$. Since firms are prohibited from charging more than consumers’ valuation for the add-on, all consumers will purchase the add-on, regardless of the price. Hence, firms charge $p$ for the add-on, and since they prefer shrouding to disclosure when they yield equal profits (by assumption), firms shroud the add-on price. We refer to this equilibrium as Shrouded Fair because all consumers purchase the add-on, which is not overpriced.

In all these equilibria, base goods are priced below cost while the add-on is priced above cost. As in Gabaix and Laibson (2006), firms can shroud add-on prices in equilibrium even though the market is competitive and there are no costs to disclosure. Such an equilibrium can be sustained because no firm has an incentive to inform naïfs and compete on add-on prices. Specifically, any firm which decreases and discloses its add-on price must increase their base good price to break even. Consumers who learn this information may simply purchase the base good at a cheaper price from a competitor while avoiding its high cost add-ons. This “curse of debiasing” prevents competition from moderating exorbitant add-on costs.

4.3 Welfare

Since all consumers’ valuation for the base good and add-on exceeds the production costs, in the first best outcome, all consumers consume the base good and add-on. Since production costs are normalized to 0, consumers’ net monetized utility in the first best is $u + e$. In the credit card example, this seems to suggest that in the first best outcome, everyone pays his bills late, exceeds his credit limit, etc., which is an extreme and somewhat nonsensical interpretation of our model. A more reasonable interpretation is to acknowledge that the likelihood of engaging in a penalized activity is continuous rather than discrete. Consider the optimal probability at which sophisticated consumers incur penalties: presumably, even consumers who understand penalties would occasionally incur them (due to a temporary need for extra liquidity, a simple mistake because they do not allocate all their time monitoring when their bills are due, etc.). In the first best scenario, the marginal utility that consumers derive from increasing the probability of engaging in penalized activity by $\varepsilon$ equals the marginal costs incurred by banks for processing the increase in the penalty probability by $\varepsilon$. The parameter, $e$, represents the difference between consumers’ monetized utility from engaging in penalized activities at the first best probability (versus never engaging in penalized activities), netted against the cost banks incur from processing penalties at the first best probability.\footnote{Arguably, some real-world penalty fees for credit cards have exceeded their production costs, and if those fees were reduced to their production costs, sophisticated consumers would have altered their behavior and incurred more penalties. If so, consumers have spent more effort monitoring their activity than they would have in the first best scenario, indicating a loss in total surplus relative to first best.}

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We let $\Lambda_{FB}$ denote the per capita consumer surplus in the first best outcome:

$$\Lambda_{FB} = u + e. \tag{1}$$

The first best outcome is achieved in some, but not all, of the equilibria.

Recalling our assumption that $u + e > 0$, it follows from Propositions 1 and 2 that all consumers will purchase the base good in every equilibrium. Sophisticated consumers always behave rationally. They only consume the add-on if its price is no greater than their valuation ($e \geq p^2_2$). It trivially follows that their realized net utility is $u - p^*_1 + \max\{e - p^*_2, 0\}$. Naïve consumers, on the other hand, consume the add-on regardless of its price. Their realized net utility is therefore $u + e - p^*_1 - p^*_2$. We let $U_s$ and $U_n$ denote the monetized net utility derived by sophisticated and naïve consumers, respectively:

$$U_s = u - p^*_1 + \max\{e - p^*_2, 0\} \tag{2}$$

$$U_n = u + e - p^*_1 - p^*_2 \tag{3}$$

We introduce functions to capture consumer welfare in the market. Total surplus ($\Lambda_s$) is the per capita net monetized utility among the entire population of consumers. It is a weighted average of $U_s$ and $U_n$, where the weights are determined by the proportion of consumers who are sophisticated in equilibrium. Unsophisticated welfare ($\Lambda_u$) is the per capita consumer surplus among the population of ex ante unsophisticated consumers, i.e., those who act naïvely if add-on costs are shrouded.\(^\text{12}\) It is a weighted average of $U_s$ and $U_n$, where the weights are determined by the proportion of these consumers who become sophisticated in equilibrium. For both functions, we subtract the per capita consumer surplus in the first best outcome ($\Lambda_{FB}$). It trivially follows that $\Lambda_s$ is never positive. Moreover, since sophisticated consumers always behave optimally, their realized net monetized utility is always as large as unsophisticated consumers’ Hence, $\Lambda_s \geq \Lambda_u$, and $\Lambda_u$ is also non-positive in every equilibrium.

To mathematically express these functions, we introduce additional notation. Let $\alpha^*$ denote the proportion of consumers who are naïve in equilibrium, and let $\lambda^*$ denote the proportion of unsophisticated consumers who learn about add-on prices in equilibrium. If no firm discloses its add-on price, then none of the unsophisticated consumers learn about add-on prices ($\lambda^* = 0$), and there will be $\alpha$ naïve consumers in the market ($\alpha^* = \alpha$). If any firm discloses its add-on price, then the proportion of unsophisticated consumers who learn about the add-on price is $\lambda$ (i.e., $\lambda^* = \lambda$), so there will be $\alpha(1 - \lambda)$ consumers who remain naïve ($\alpha^* = \alpha(1 - \lambda)$).

\(^{12}\) $\Lambda_u$ can be viewed two different ways. First, it represents an expected utility assuming that unsophisticated consumers are homogeneous, i.e., if firms disclose, each unsophisticated consumer has probability of $\lambda$ of understanding the disclosure and probability of $1 - \lambda$ of not understanding it. Second, suppose that in practice there are three types of consumers: (i) fully rational consumers, (ii) semi-rational consumers who naïvely assume $p^*_2 = 0$ if prices are shrouded, but can understand disclosure when it is presented to them, and (iii) irrational consumers who naïvely assume $p^*_2 = 0$ whether prices are disclosed or not. Unsophisticated welfare is the average utility of semi-rational and irrational consumers, weighted by the relative proportion of each in the population.
\[
\alpha^* = \begin{cases} 
\alpha & \text{if no firm discloses its add-on price} \\
\alpha(1 - \lambda) & \text{if any firm discloses its add-on price}
\end{cases} 
\]
\[
\lambda^* = \begin{cases} 
0 & \text{if no firm discloses its add-on price} \\
\lambda & \text{if any firm discloses its add-on price}
\end{cases} 
\]

\( \Lambda_s \) and \( \Lambda_u \) can then be expressed,
\[
\Lambda_s = \alpha^* U_n + (1 - \alpha^*) U_s - \Lambda_{FB} 
\]
\[
\Lambda_u = \lambda^* U_n + (1 - \lambda^*) U_s - \Lambda_{FB} 
\]

Firms earn zero profits in every equilibrium (Lemma 1). Thus, firms are unaffected by any inefficiencies in the market: all inefficiencies in the market accrue to consumers. With regard to total surplus, there is only one possible source of inefficiency in this market: if the equilibrium price of the add-on, \( p^*_2 \), exceeds consumers’ valuation for it, \( e \), then sophisticated consumers will refrain from consuming it. This is socially inefficient because consumers’ valuation for the add-on, \( e \), exceeds its production cost, 0. It follows that \( \Lambda_s \) equals 0 if \( p^*_2 \leq e \), and \( \Lambda_s \) equals \(-(1 - \alpha^*)e \) if \( p^*_2 > e \). Recalling Propositions 1 and 2, and using obvious abbreviations (e.g., “MDF” to refer to the MD Fair equilibrium), \( \Lambda_s \) in the five equilibria are given by
\[
\Lambda_{s,\text{MDF}}^* = \Lambda_{s,\text{VT}}^* = \Lambda_{s,\text{SF}}^* = 0 
\]
\[
\Lambda_{s,\text{SU}}^* = -(1 - \alpha)e
\]
\[
\Lambda_{s,\text{MDU}}^* = -[1 - \alpha(1 - \lambda)]e
\]

In the MD Fair, Voluntarily Transparent, and Shrouded Fair equilibria, \( p^*_2 \leq e \), and all consumers, sophisticated and naïve, consume the base good and add-on. (See Propositions 1 and 2.) Moreover, \( p^*_1 + p^*_2 = 0 \), so it trivially follows that each consumer’s net monetized utility (whether he is sophisticated or not) is \( u + e \), the first best outcome. Hence,
\[
\Lambda_{u,\text{MDF}}^* = \Lambda_{u,\text{VT}}^* = \Lambda_{u,\text{SF}}^* = 0. 
\]

In the MD Unfair and Shrouded Unfair equilibria, \( p^*_1 < u \) and \( p^*_2 > e \). Unsophisticated consumers (like sophisticated ones) consume the base good, so their net monetized utility from the base good is \( u - p^*_1 \). However, unlike sophisticated consumers, unsophisticated consumers will consume the add-on if they remain naïve in equilibrium, which occurs with probability \( 1 - \lambda^* \) (see (5)). Hence, unsophisticated consumers’ per capita losses from the add-on are given by \(((1 - \lambda^*)(p^*_2 - e))\). It follows that \( \Lambda_u \) in the MD Unfair and Shrouded Unfair equilibria is given by
\[
\Lambda_u^* = u - p^*_1 - (1 - \lambda^*)(p^*_2 - e) - \Lambda_{FB}. 
\]
Plugging in the prices from Propositions 1 and 2, and recalling the definition of $\lambda^*$ (from (5)), unsophisticated welfare in the unfair equilibria can be expressed,

\[
\begin{align*}
\Lambda^*_u,SU &= -(1 - \alpha)\overline{p} \\
\Lambda^*_u,MDU &= -\lambda e - (1 - \lambda)(1 - \alpha)\overline{p}
\end{align*}
\]

(13) \hspace{1cm} (14)

Another way to justify (13) and (14) is to separately compare unsophisticated consumers’ consumption utility and their payment disutility relative to the first best. In the first best outcome, each consumer gets consumption utility $u + e$ and payment disutility 0 (the production cost). In the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, all unsophisticated consumers are naïve in equilibrium, so they consume the add-on even though its price exceeds their valuation. Their consumption utility is therefore $u + e$, which is the same as in the first best. However, unlike the first best, the total price of the base good and add-on is not 0; in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, $p_1^* + p_2^* = (1 - \alpha)\overline{p}$. Hence, relative to the first best outcome, unsophisticated consumers’ monetized utility is $(1 - \alpha)\overline{p}$ lower in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium. This term reflects naïve consumers’ overpayment for the add-on.

In the MD Unfair equilibrium, each unsophisticated consumers has probability $\lambda$ of becoming sophisticated, in which case he avoids the overpriced add-on. Since consumers derive monetized utility $e$ from consuming the add-on, their expected consumption utility is $\lambda e$ lower in the MD Unfair equilibrium than in the first best (where they all consume the base good and the add-on). Regarding their expected payments to firms, all unsophisticated consumers consume the base good, which costs $p_1^*$, and those that are naïve in equilibrium (proportion $1 - \lambda$ of unsophisticated consumers) pay $p_2^*$ for the add-on. Hence, each unsophisticated consumer’s expected cash flow to firms is $p_1^* + (1 - \lambda)p_2^*$ higher in the MD Unfair equilibrium, which corresponds to the $-(1 - \lambda)(1 - \alpha)\overline{p}$ term in (14). Again, this term reflects naïve consumers’ overpayment for the add-on.

### 4.4 Effects of Regulation

The functions defined in Section 4.3 capture the welfare of two populations that are particularly relevant for regulators. $\Lambda_s$ measures the per capita net monetized benefit of all consumers, regardless of their need for protection, and $\Lambda_u$ measures the per capita net monetized benefit of unsophisticated consumers, who arguably need protection.

We consider the effects of two common types of regulations that are employed in practice: disclosure mandates and price controls. Examples of disclosure mandates include TILA and the “Schumer Box,” while examples of price controls include the Fed’s 2010 Amendment to Regulation Z of TILA, which caps most credit card penalties at $25.

To analyze the effects of these regulations on consumer welfare, it is useful to graphically depict $\Lambda_s$ and $\Lambda_u$ as a function of the maximum add-on price, $\overline{p}$, for each of the five equilibria. Figures 1 and 2 simply summarize equations (8)-(11) and (13)-(14).
4.4.1 Disclosure Mandates

Here, we consider disclosure regulation in isolation, assuming that the maximum feasible add-on price, $\bar{p}$, is exogenous. For example, price controls may not be within the scope of a given regulatory agency or exogenously imposed by a separate governmental body. The following proposition summarizes the effect of mandating disclosure on consumer welfare.

**Proposition 3.** If the market is in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, mandating disclosure:

- increases (decreases) total surplus if it results in the MD Fair (MD Unfair) equilibrium.
- decreases unsophisticated welfare if it results in the MD Unfair equilibrium and $\bar{p} < \frac{e}{1-\alpha}$; otherwise, mandating disclosure increases unsophisticated welfare.

*If the market is in the Voluntarily Transparent or Shrouded Fair equilibria, mandating disclosure has no effect on either welfare function.*

We first discuss the effect of mandating disclosure on total surplus, which can deduced from Figure 1. Consider the region where $\bar{p} > \bar{p}_{MDU}$. Mandating disclosure shifts the equilibrium from Shrouded Unfair to MD Unfair. In both equilibria, firms price the add-on unfairly (i.e., $p^*_2 = \bar{p} > e$). Mandating disclosure decreases surplus because it increases the number of sophisticates who inefficiently avoid the add-on.

In the $\bar{p}_{SU} \leq \bar{p} < \bar{p}_{MDU}$ region, mandating disclosure increases total surplus by shifting the equilibrium from Shrouded Unfair to MD Fair. In this case, disclosure regulation will eliminate inefficient avoidance of the add-on by decreasing its price. Such regulations have no effect on total surplus if the market is in the Voluntarily Transparent or Shrouded Fair equilibrium. When disclosure mandates are imposed in either of these equilibria, the market moves to the MD Fair equilibrium, and the first best outcome is achieved in all three of these equilibria.

The effects on unsophisticated welfare can be deduced from Figure 2. In the region where $\bar{p} \leq \bar{p}_{MDU}$, mandating disclosure has the same effects on unsophisticated welfare as it does on total surplus. First, it strictly increases unsophisticated welfare if the equilibrium shifts from Shrouded Unfair to MD Fair. In the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, unsophisticated consumers overpay for the add-on whereas they do not in the MD Fair equilibrium. Second, mandating disclosure has no effect on unsophisticated welfare when imposed in the Voluntarily Transparent or Shrouded Fair equilibrium, the market simply moves to the MD Fair equilibrium, which is also first best.

Finally, consider the effects on unsophisticated welfare when disclosure mandates move the market from the Shrouded Unfair to the MD Unfair equilibrium ($\bar{p} > \bar{p}_{MDU}$). In this case, disclosure regulation decreases the pool of naïfs who overpay for the add-on. As a result, firms earn less
from selling the add-on. Firms respond by increasing the price of the base good from \( p_i^* = -\alpha \bar{p} \) to \( p_i^* = -\alpha (1 - \lambda)\bar{p} \), an increase of \( \alpha \lambda \bar{p} \). Unsophisticated welfare increases only if the harm from the increase in the base good price, \( \alpha \lambda \bar{p} \), is less than the expected benefits they receive from understanding the disclosure and avoiding the add-on. Since unsophisticated consumers save \( \bar{p} - e \) when they understand disclosure (which occurs with probability \( \lambda \)), these expected benefits are equal to \( \lambda (\bar{p} - e) \). Hence, unsophisticated welfare improves when the market moves from the Shrouded Unfair to the MD Unfair if \( \bar{p} > \frac{e}{1 - \alpha} \).

This proposition highlights a rather striking result: disclosure requirements can strictly decrease welfare even when the associated costs are zero. When price controls are lax in that \( \bar{p} \geq \bar{p}_{MDU} = \frac{\bar{e}}{\alpha (1 - \lambda)} \), disclosure mandates can decrease total surplus and unsophisticated welfare. Disclosure mandates cannot cause harm if price controls are sufficiently strict in that \( \bar{p} < \bar{p}_{MDU} = \frac{\bar{e}}{\alpha (1 - \lambda)} \). Therefore, price controls and disclosure mandates can function as complements in that sufficient price controls eliminate harms associated with disclosure mandates.

In addition, disclosure regulations are harmful only if the effectiveness of disclosures is weak as measured by the parameter, \( \lambda \). Weak disclosure methods such as the obscuring of information in lengthy disclosure documents can, in fact, impose harms on consumers. Our analysis, therefore, provides additional arguments for strengthening and simplifying cost disclosures at the point of sale.

Finally, Proposition 3 suggests that disclosure mandates generally have better effects on unsophisticated welfare than on total surplus—the parameter region where disclosure mandates improve total surplus is a strict subset of the region where unsophisticated welfare is improved. Hence, there is greater rationale for disclosure regulation based on protecting unsophisticated consumers than based on maximizing total surplus.

### 4.4.2 Price Controls

We now examine the case when the maximum add-on price is endogenous. We refer to regulators decreasing the maximum add-on price (\( \bar{p} \)) as imposing additional price controls.

**Proposition 4.** If the market is in the Shrouded Fair or the MD Fair equilibrium, imposing additional price controls has no effect on total surplus or unsophisticated welfare.

If the market is in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium, imposing additional price controls decreases both total surplus and unsophisticated welfare if it results in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium; otherwise, it has no effect on either welfare function.

If the market is in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, imposing additional price controls:

- increases total surplus if it results in the Voluntarily Transparent or Shrouded Fair equilibria; otherwise, it has no effect on total surplus.
- increases unsophisticated welfare.
If the market is in the MD Unfair equilibrium, imposing additional price controls:

- increases total surplus if it results in the MD Fair equilibrium; otherwise, it has no effect on total surplus.
- increases unsophisticated welfare.

Suppose first that the market is in the Shrouded Fair equilibrium (where disclosure is voluntary and $\bar{p} \leq \epsilon$). In this case, welfare is first-best since firms price the add-on fairly. From Figures 1 and 2, it is clear that decreasing the maximum add-on price cannot shift the equilibrium and has no effect on welfare. The same reasoning applies if price controls are imposed in the MD Fair equilibrium (when $\bar{p} \leq \tilde{p}_{MDU}$ and disclosure is mandatory).

Now consider the intermediate region of $\tilde{p}_{SU} \leq \bar{p} \leq \tilde{p}_{MDU}$ where both the Voluntarily Transparent and Shrouded Unfair equilibria can be sustained when disclosure is voluntary. In this region, a decrease in $\bar{p}$ can potentially shift the equilibrium from Voluntarily Transparent to Shrouded Unfair. In this case, price controls decrease welfare. Price controls have no effect, however, if the market remains in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium.

Finally, suppose price controls are imposed in one of the unfair equilibria (MD Unfair or Shrouded Unfair). It is clear from Figure 1 that total surplus is unaffected unless the market moves to a different equilibrium, in which case surplus improves.13 From Figure 2, it is clear that price controls always improve unsophisticated welfare when they are imposed in an unfair equilibrium.14 Either the market moves to a fair equilibrium, which is first best, or it stays in the unfair equilibrium, in which case price controls reduce the amount naïve consumers overpay for the add-on.

In the previous section, we showed that disclosure mandates can harm welfare, but only if add-on prices are not sufficiently constrained. Here, we document another complementarity between price and disclosure regulations. Namely, when disclosure is voluntary, price controls can reduce welfare; however, when disclosure is mandated, price controls always (weakly) improve welfare. Price controls only harm welfare when they push the market from a fair equilibrium to an unfair equilibrium. With voluntary disclosure, this is possible because the Voluntary Transparent equilibrium and the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium can both exist whenever $\bar{p}$ is in the interval $\left[\frac{C}{\alpha}, \frac{C}{\alpha(1+\lambda)}\right]$ (Proposition 2).

With mandatory disclosure, on the other hand, there is a threshold, $\tilde{p}_{MDU}$, for the maximum add-on price such that fair equilibria only exist if $\bar{p} \leq \tilde{p}_{MDU}$, and unfair equilibria only exist if $\bar{p} \geq \tilde{p}_{MDU}$ (Proposition 1). Hence, reducing $\bar{p}$ can never shift the market from a fair equilibrium to an unfair one. These complementarities are noteworthy since price controls and disclosure mandates are often viewed as substitutes, in that greater disclosure obviates the need for price controls. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to document complementarities between disclosure mandates and price controls.

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13Note that price controls cannot move the market from MD Unfair to Shrouded Unfair or vice versa; only a change in disclosure mandates can cause a movement between these equilibria.

14Again, recall that price controls cannot move the market from MD Unfair to Shrouded Unfair or vice versa; only a change in disclosure mandates can cause a movement between these equilibria.
5 Heterogeneous Valuations Model

The markets we analyze are perfectly competitive in the sense that firms earn zero profits in equilibrium. In competitive markets, prices usually equal production costs. However, in Section 3 we showed that in the presence of naïve consumers and shrouded add-on prices, prices for the goods do not equal production costs in any equilibrium. These pricing distortions only affect economic efficiency in two of the equilibria in Section 4: the MD Unfair and Shrouded Unfair equilibria. In these equilibria, all consumers’ valuations for the add-on exceed the production cost of the add-on, but sophisticated consumers refrain from consuming the add-on because its price ($\bar{p}$) exceeds their valuation ($e$). In the other three equilibria, on the other hand, all consumers consume the base good and the add-on. Even though prices for the base good are below production costs, there is no inefficient consumption of the base good because all consumers’ valuations for the base good exceed the production cost.

In practice, it is reasonable to believe that consumers have heterogeneous valuations not only in markets for consumption goods, where there is heterogeneity in which consumers purchase different types of goods, but also in credit markets. For example, consumers differ in their preferences for borrowing on credit cards versus using cash instruments.\(^\text{15}\) In the previous section, we examined the polar case where all consumers had the same valuation for the good. We now examine the opposite case where consumers’ valuations vary over a wide interval. In addition, we assume that the good is socially harmful to some consumers in the sense that their valuation is below production costs. This model is appropriate when some consumers regret use of a good once they learn its long-term costs. It has also been argued that certain credit and investment products such as actively managed mutual funds are harmful to consumers because cheaper alternatives are often available.\(^\text{16}\) In our heterogeneous model, some consumers participate in the market by purchasing the base good, while others abstain from the market entirely because equilibrium prices exceed their valuations.\(^\text{17}\)

The effects of regulation are more nuanced in this setting. Regulation can be more desirable when valuations are heterogeneous. As in the homogeneous case, equilibrium prices for the base good are always less than the production cost. Unlike the homogeneous case, this mispricing induces some consumers to consume the good even though their valuations are less than the production costs. Specifically, some naïve consumers fail to account for the expense of the add-on, which is priced above cost, when deciding to purchase the base good. Also, in the unfair equilibria, some sophisticated consumers consume the base good (and avoid the add-on) even though the base good’s production cost exceeds their valuation for it. Regulation can reduce this socially harmful consumption. Price controls and disclosure regulation (in tandem or in isolation) can raise total surplus by inducing...

\(^{15}\)Sprenger and Stavins (2012), for example, study heterogeneity in the use of payment instruments including credit and debit cards.

\(^{16}\)There are numerous add-on fees associated with investment vehicles such as mutual funds including early redemption fees. The arguments against actively managed mutual funds extend back to the seminal paper of Jensen (1968).

\(^{17}\)Our paper is not the first to examine socially harmful products in this setting. For example, Heidhues, Köszegi, and Murooka (2011) study product innovation in a similar model where goods with shrouded costs can be socially harmful.
firms to raise the price of the base good to a level closer to the production cost, which causes fewer consumers to participate in the market.

We assume consumers’ valuations for the base good are uniformly distributed over the interval $[u, \bar{u}]$:

$$u \sim U(u, \bar{u}).$$

To avoid normalization, we assume that the measure of consumers in the economy is equal to $\bar{u} - u$. To simplify our analysis, we also assume that valuations are sufficiently dispersed so that in each equilibrium, some sophisticated consumers purchase the base good and others do not: $u + e \leq -\bar{p}$. We continue to assume that the add-on represents a net benefit to consumers, i.e., $e \geq 0$. For example, credit card use may induce overspending and impose associated harms on consumers; however, the option to pay bills late or exceed one’s credit limit may still be valuable to a consumer net of the cost to the producer.

Finally, we address consumers’ participation constraints. In the baseline model, all consumers purchase the base good in every equilibrium, so the participation constraint is irrelevant. In this section, some consumers will avoid the base good in every equilibrium. Sophisticated consumers always behave rationally. Conditional on consuming the base good, they consume the add-on if its price is no greater than their valuation ($e \geq p_i^*\lambda$). It trivially follows that a sophisticated consumer with base good valuation $u_i$ purchases the base good if $u_i - p_i^* + \max\{e - p_i^*, 0\} \geq 0$. Naïve consumers, on the other hand, believe they receive the benefits of the add-on without having to pay more than production costs. In the case of credit card penalty fees, such consumers may not diligently monitor themselves, believing that their fine will be negligible if they miss a payment or exceed their limit. Therefore, a naïve consumer with base good valuation $u_i$ purchases the base good if $u_i + e \geq p_i^*$. \footnote{As mentioned previously, an equivalent assumption would be that naïve consumers underestimate their likelihood of paying the add-on fee for a fixed amount of effort to avoid it. Therefore, they would project their net cost from the add-on to be less than the true expected value (as in our model).}

### 5.1 Equilibria

Since Lemma 1 applies whether valuations are homogeneous or heterogeneous, the equilibria are similar in the baseline and heterogeneous models. The add-on price is either $e$ or $\bar{p}$, and the base good price is set so that firms earn zero profits. As in the homogeneous model, there are five possible equilibria: three when disclosure is voluntary (Shrouded Unfair, Shrouded Fair, and Voluntarily Transparent) and two when it is mandatory (MD Fair and MD Unfair). In the three equilibria in which the add-on price is “fair” (Voluntarily Transparent, Shrouded Fair, and MD Fair), prices for the goods are the same as they are in the homogeneous model.

In the “unfair” equilibria (Shrouded Unfair and MD Unfair), the add-on price is still the maximum value, $\bar{p}$, though the base good prices are no longer $-\alpha\bar{p}$ and $-\alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p}$. In these equilibria, the equilibrium base good price depends on the proportion of each firm’s customers (i.e., consumers who purchase the base good) that are naïve in equilibrium. In the baseline model, this
proportion is always either $\alpha$ (in the shrouding equilibria) or $\alpha(1 - \lambda)$ (in the disclosure equilibria). Since sophisticated consumers and naïfs have different participation constraints, this is no longer true.

Consider the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium. To compute the proportion of each firm’s customers who are naïfs in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, first note that a sophisticate participates in the market if and only if $u_i \in [p^*_1, \pi]$ (i.e., if $u_i - p^*_1 + \max\{e - p^*_2, 0\} \geq 0$), whereas a naïf participates if and only if $u_i \in [p^*_1 - e, \pi]$ (i.e., if $u_i + e \geq p^*_1$).\footnote{Recall that in the Shrouded Unfair equilibria, $\pi > e$.} Hence, the measure of naïfs participating in the market is $\alpha(\pi - p^*_1 + e)$, while the measure of sophisticates participating in the market is $(1 - \alpha)(\pi - p^*_1)$. Therefore, the measure of all customers in the market is the sum of the two or $\pi - p^*_1 + \alpha e$. It follows that in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, the proportion of each firm’s customers that are naïfs, $\alpha_{su}$, satisfies:

$$\alpha_{su} = \frac{\alpha(\pi - p^*_{1, SU} + e)}{\pi - p^*_{1, SU} + \alpha e}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (15)

where $p^*_{1, SU}$ is the base good price in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium. Only naïfs purchase the add-on in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, so firms earn $\alpha_{su} p$ for the add-on per customer. Therefore, the zero profit condition (Lemma 1) again implies that the price of the base good satisfies:

$$p^*_{1, SU} = -\alpha_{su} \bar{p}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (16)

Combining (15) and (16) and solving for $p^*_{1, SU}$ and $\alpha_{su}$, it can be shown that the proportion of each firm’s customers that are naïfs in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium is given by the following equation:

$$\alpha_{su} = \frac{-\pi + \alpha(\bar{p} - e) + \sqrt{\pi - \alpha(\bar{p} - e)^2 + 4\alpha\bar{p}(\pi + e)}}{2\bar{p}}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (17)

The analysis for the MD Unfair equilibrium is analogous. Since firms are compelled to disclose, the proportion of naïfs in the population of $\alpha$ is simply replaced by $\alpha(1 - \lambda)$ in the equation above. It follows that the proportion of each firm’s customers that are naïfs in the MD Unfair equilibrium is given by the equation:

$$\alpha_{mdu} = \frac{-\pi + \alpha(1 - \lambda)(\bar{p} - e) + \sqrt{\pi - \alpha(1 - \lambda)(\bar{p} - e)^2 + 4\alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p}(\pi + e)}}{2\bar{p}}.$$ \hspace{1cm} (18)

**Proposition 5.** When disclosure is mandatory, there exists a threshold, $\bar{p}^\dagger_{MDU} = \frac{e}{\alpha_{mdu}}$, such that:

- If $\bar{p} \geq \bar{p}^\dagger_{MDU}$, there exists an equilibrium in which firms charge $p^*_1 = p^*_{1, MDU} = -\alpha_{mdu} \bar{p}$ for the base good and $p^*_2 = \bar{p}$ for the add-on. We call this equilibrium MD Unfair.
When disclosure is voluntary, there exists a threshold, \( p_{SU}^{d} = \frac{\epsilon}{\alpha m} \), such that \( e < p_{SU}^{d} < p_{MDU}^{d} \) and:

- If \( p \geq p_{SU}^{d} \), there exists an equilibrium in which firms shroud and charge \( p_{1}^{*} = p_{1,SU}^{*} = -\alpha_{su}p \) for the base good and \( p_{2}^{*} = p \) for the add-on. We call this equilibrium Shrouded Unfair.

- If \( e \leq p \leq p_{MDU}^{d} \), there exists an equilibrium in which firms disclose and charge \( p_{1}^{*} = -e \) for the base good and \( p_{2}^{*} = e \) for the add-on, and firms disclose the price of the add-on. We call this equilibrium Voluntarily Transparent.

- If \( p \leq e \), there exists an equilibrium in which firms shroud and charge \( p_{1}^{*} = -p \) for the base good and \( p_{2}^{*} = p \) for the add-on. We call this equilibrium Shrouded Fair.

No other symmetric equilibria exist.

### 5.2 Welfare

Recall that production costs for the base good and add-on are normalized to 0. Moreover, consumers’ valuation for the add-on, \( e \), is greater than the production cost, i.e., \( e > 0 \). Hence, a first best outcome is achieved if and only if each consumer, \( i \): (i) consumes the base good and add-on if \( u_{i} + e > 0 \) and (ii) does not consume the base good or add-on if \( u_{i} + e < 0 \). Therefore, the first-best per capita net monetary benefit across consumers is given by the following expression:

\[
\Lambda_{FB} = (\bar{u} - u)^{-1} \int_{-e}^{\bar{u}} (u + e) \ du = \frac{1}{2} (\bar{u} - u)^{-1} (\bar{u} + e)^2
\]  

Welfare can be less than first-best in our model, however, since consumers do not necessarily buy the base good under these conditions. Sophisticates with base good valuation of \( u \) realize net monetized utility \( u - p_{1}^{*} + \max\{e - p_{2}^{*}, 0\} \) if this quantity is positive. In addition, naïfs realize net monetized utility \( u - p_{1}^{*} + e - p_{2}^{*} \) if \( u + e \geq p_{1}^{*} \). Therefore, total surplus is given by:

\[
\Lambda_{s} = (1 - \alpha^{*})(\bar{u} - u)^{-1} \int_{p_{1}^{*}}^{\bar{u}} \max\{e - p_{2}^{*}, 0\} \ du + \alpha^{*}(\bar{u} - u)^{-1} \int_{p_{1}^{*} - e}^{\bar{u}} [u - p_{1}^{*} + e - p_{2}^{*}] \ du - \Lambda_{FB}
\]  

As in Section 4.3, \( \alpha^{*} \) denotes the proportion of naïfs in the population in equilibrium, equal to \( \alpha \) if firms shroud and \( \alpha(1 - \lambda) \) if firms disclose. We again measure welfare net of first-best by deducting \( \Lambda_{FB} \).

Similarly, unsophisticated welfare is given by the following expression, where \( \lambda^{*} \) again denotes the proportion of unsophisticated consumers who become sophisticated (equal to \( \lambda \) if firms disclose
and 0 if they shroud):

\[ \Lambda_u = \lambda^*(\pi - u)^{-1} \int_{p_1^*-\max(e-p_2^*,0)}^{\pi} [u - p_1^* + \max(e - p_2^*, 0)] \, du \\
+ (1 - \lambda^*)(\pi - u)^{-1} \int_{\pi-p_1^*}^{\pi} [u - p_1^* + e - p_2^*] \, du - \Lambda_{FB} \]  

(21)

We analyze these welfare functions by aggregating inefficiencies relative to first-best. In the five equilibria discussed in Section 5.1, there are three possible sources of inefficiencies:

(i) It is socially suboptimal for consumers to buy the product if their total valuation is below production cost, i.e., \( u_i + e < 0 \). Naïfs, however, purchase the product when their base good valuation is such that \( u_i \geq p_1^* - e \). Therefore, there is a social loss of \( |u_i + e| \) from each naïf in the interval \( u_i \in [p_1^* - e, -e) \) consuming the product. This inefficiency exists in all of the equilibria since the base good price is less than cost (i.e., \( p_1^* < 0 \)). Let \( \ell_1 \) denote the per capita losses across naïfs associated with this consumption:

\[ \ell_1 = (\pi - u)^{-1} \int_{p_1^*-e}^{-e} (u + e) \, du = \frac{p_1^2}{2(\pi - u)}. \]  

(22)

(ii) In the MD Unfair and Shrouded Unfair equilibria, sophisticated consumers with base good valuations in the interval \( u_i \in [p_1^*, -e) \) consume the base good. This inefficiency only exists in the “unfair” equilibria; in the “fair” equilibria, sophisticates consume both the base good and add-on only if \( u_i + e \geq p_1^* + p_2^* = 0 \). Let \( \ell_2 \) denote the per capita losses across sophisticates associated with this consumption:

\[ \ell_2 = (\pi - u)^{-1} \int_{p_1^*}^{-e} u \, du = \frac{p_1^2 - e^2}{2(\pi - u)}. \]  

(23)

(iii) Sophisticated consumers in the interval \( u_i \in [-e, \pi] \) forego consumption of the add-on.\(^{20}\) This inefficiency only exists in the unfair equilibria (MD Unfair and Shrouded Unfair) where the add-on is overpriced relative to consumers’ valuation (i.e., \( p_2^* = \pi > e \)). Let \( \ell_3 \) denote the per capita losses across sophisticates associated with this consumption:

\[ \ell_3 = (\pi - u)^{-1} \int_{-e}^{\pi} e \, du = \frac{(\pi + e)e}{\pi - u}. \]  

(24)

5.3 Regulation

5.3.1 Disclosure Mandates

If add-on price disclosure is voluntary, the market will either be in the Shrouded Fair, Voluntarily Transparent, or Shrouded Unfair equilibria.

\(^{20}\)Sophisticated consumers in the interval \( [p_1^* - e) \) also consume the base good and forego consumption of the add-on in the unfair equilibria. However, since they do not consume the base good in the first-best outcome, their non-consumption of the add-on should not be considered when comparing the welfare to the first-best outcome.
We begin by analyzing the effects of disclosure mandates when the market is in a fair equilibrium. If disclosure is mandated and the market is in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium, welfare is unaffected. The mandate simply moves the market to the MD Fair equilibrium as is clear from Proposition 5. In each equilibrium, prices are given by \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-e, e)\), and the proportion of naïfs in the population is \(\alpha(1 - \lambda)\) since firms disclose. Therefore, consumer welfare is the same in both equilibria.

Now consider the Shrouded Fair equilibrium. In this equilibrium, \(p_1^* = -\overline{p}\) and \(p_2^* = \overline{p} \leq e\), so every consumer who purchases the base good also consumes the add-on. In the homogeneous model, this equilibrium is first-best, and welfare is unaffected by disclosure mandates—such mandates simply push the market to the MD Fair equilibrium, which is also first-best. This is not the case when consumer valuations are heterogeneous. In this case, naïfs make mistakes when their base good valuations lie in the interval: \(u_i \in [p_1^* - e, -e) = [-\overline{p} - e, -e)\), as discussed in the previous subsection. Each such consumer participates in the market by consuming the base good and the add-on even though his combined valuation for the base good and add-on, \(u_i + e\), is less than the price paid for these goods, \(p_1^* + p_2^* = 0\). As with the baseline model, when disclosure is mandated, the market moves to the MD Fair equilibrium, where prices are the same: \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (\overline{p}, \overline{p})\). Mandating disclosure, however, decreases the number of naïfs who make mistakes in their participation decision and, therefore, improves total surplus and unsophisticated welfare.

The following proposition summarizes the effects of disclosure mandates when valuations are heterogeneous and the market is in a fair equilibrium with voluntary disclosure.

**Proposition 6.** If the market is in the Shrouded Fair equilibrium, mandating disclosure strictly increases total surplus and unsophisticated welfare.

If the market is in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium, mandating disclosure has no effect on total surplus or unsophisticated welfare.

The Shrouded Unfair equilibrium is the only unfair equilibrium that exists when disclosure is voluntary. If the market is in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium and disclosure is mandated, the market can move to either the MD Fair or MD Unfair equilibrium (Proposition 5). It is easy to see that total surplus increases if it moves to the MD Fair equilibrium. The only inefficiency in the MD Fair equilibrium is that naïfs consume the good when their base good valuations are in the interval \(u_i \in [p_1^* - e, -e)\). The number of naïfs inefficiently consuming the base good is greater in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium since the proportion of such naïfs is greater. Moreover, the base good price is lower in the Shrouded Unfair since firms earn more from the add-on. In addition, the Shrouded Unfair has inefficiencies from low-valuation sophisticates consuming the base good and high-valuation sophisticates avoiding the add-on. Therefore, total surplus is higher in the MD Fair equilibrium than in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium. For these same reasons, unsophisticated welfare also increases when disclosure is mandated in this case. In fact, the gains to unsophisticated consumers exceeds the total surplus gains because sophisticated consumers’ welfare falls (due to the
rise in price of the base good).

If the market moves from the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium to the MD Unfair equilibrium, total surplus can either increase or decrease. Total surplus can decrease for the same reason as with the baseline model. Namely, the number of sophisticated inefficiently avoiding the add-on increases. Unlike the baseline model, mandating disclosure can increase total surplus in this case. Disclosure causes firms to earn less from the add-on, and firms respond by increasing the price of the base good. The increase in the price of the base good pushes it closer to its production cost, resulting in less consumption of the base good by low valuation consumers.

Unsophisticated welfare can either increase or decrease if the market shifts from the Shrouded Unfair to the MD Unfair equilibrium. As with the baseline model, unsophisticated consumers can benefit by understanding the disclosure and avoiding the overpriced add-on, but they can be harmed by the increase in the price of the base good. In the heterogeneous model, there is an additional benefit from mandating disclosure. Namely, the number of consumers inefficiently buying the base good decreases as a result of the base good price rising.

The following proposition summarizes the effects of disclosure mandates on welfare when valuations are heterogeneous and the market is in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium:

**Proposition 7.** If the market is in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, mandating disclosure:

- strictly increases total surplus and unsophisticated welfare if it results in the MD Fair equilibrium.

- strictly decreases total surplus if and only if it results in the MD Unfair equilibrium and:

\[
\alpha \lambda (2\pi e + e^2) > p_{1, SU}^2 - p_{1, MDU}^2
\]  

(25)

- strictly decreases unsophisticated welfare if and only if it results in the MD Unfair equilibrium and the following condition is met

\[
(2 - \alpha)(p_{1, SU}^2 - p_{1, MDU}^2) + 2(1 - \alpha)p_e[p_{1, MDU}^* - p_{1, SU}^*] - 2\lambda(2\pi e + e^2) < 0.
\]  

(26)

Although the comparative statics of the inequalities in (25) and (26) are complex, we can make statements about the asymptotic properties of these expressions. First, consider the effect of disclosure mandates on total surplus when they shift the equilibrium from Shrouded Unfair to MD Unfair. Disclosure mandates are likely to improve total surplus if the add-on is not very valuable relative to production costs, i.e., if \(e\) is small. For small \(e\), the welfare losses associated with sophisticates’ foregone consumption of the add-on is insignificant. This inefficiency is dominated by the other source of inefficiency: consumption by consumers whose valuations are less than the goods’ production costs. Since \(p_{1, SU} < p_{1, MDU}^*\), this inefficiency is more severe in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium than the MD Unfair equilibrium.
Disclosure mandates also tend to improve total surplus if the maximum add-on price ($\overline{p}$) is large.\(^{21}\) As $\overline{p}$ increases, the difference between the price of the base goods in the MD Unfair and Shrouded Unfair equilibria ($p^*_{1,MDU} - p^*_{1,SU}$) increases without bound.\(^{22}\) Hence, the surplus losses caused by consumption of the base good by consumers with low valuations is significantly higher in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium than in the MD Unfair equilibrium. This difference dominates the other effects, and disclosure improves total surplus.

A comparison of disclosure regulation for the heterogeneous versus homogeneous models is provided in Tables 1 and 2. It is clear from our results that there is generally more rationale for disclosure regulation in the heterogeneous than the homogeneous model. Specifically, disclosure mandates now improve welfare in the Shrouded Fair equilibrium whereas they did not previously. In addition, such regulation is pareto-improving in this case as it decreases the number of naïfs inefficiently buying the base good while leaving the welfare of other consumers unchanged. In contrast, regulation in the baseline model is never pareto-improving. In addition, unlike the baseline model, disclosure can also increase total surplus when it shifts the equilibrium from Shrouded Unfair to MD Unfair.

### 5.3.2 Price Controls

In the baseline model, much of price controls’ efficacy comes from its power to move the market from one equilibrium to another. For example, total surplus is entirely determined by which equilibrium the market is in. The only welfare improvements from price controls that are possible within an equilibrium involve unsophisticated welfare in the unfair equilibria: if the market stays in one of the two unfair equilibria (MD Unfair or Shrouded Unfair), price controls improve unsophisticated welfare by reducing wealth transfers from unsophisticated to sophisticated consumers.

In the heterogeneous model, in contrast, there are additional circumstances in which price controls can improve total surplus and unsophisticated welfare even within the same equilibrium. When the maximum price of the add-on ($\overline{p}$) is reduced, the equilibrium price of the base good ($p^*_1$) rises if firms earn less from the add-on. Consequently, total surplus can rise as consumers with low valuations for the base good are priced out of the market.

Consider first the effects of price controls on total surplus when the market is in the Shrouded Fair equilibrium. If price controls are employed in this equilibrium, they cannot push the market to a different equilibrium (Proposition 5). The only source of welfare losses in this case is participation in the market by naïve consumers with low valuations for the products. These losses decrease in the base good price, which decreases in $\overline{p}$. Hence, price controls always improve efficiency in the Shrouded Fair equilibrium. All of these gains accrue to unsophisticated consumers; they harm themselves by consuming goods whose prices exceed their valuations for the goods. Price controls do not affect sophisticated consumers’ welfare in this equilibrium. Neither their participation decision

\(^{21}\)Note that given our assumptions that $\alpha \leq \frac{1}{1-h^2} - e$, it is not possible for $\overline{p}$ to increase unboundedly without $\alpha$ decreasing unboundedly.

\(^{22}\)To see this, notice that as $\overline{p} \to \infty$, $\alpha_{mdu} \to \alpha(1-\lambda)$, $\alpha_{su} \to \alpha$ so $p^*_{1,MDU} \to \alpha(1-\lambda)\overline{p}$ and $p^*_{1,SU} \to \alpha\overline{p}$, so $\frac{p^*_{1,SU}}{p^*_{1,MDU}} \to \frac{1}{1-\alpha}$. Since $p^*_{1,SU}, p^*_{1,MDU} \to -\infty$ as $\overline{p} \to \infty$, the result trivially follows.
nor the total price they pay ($p^*_1 + p^*_2$) is affected by $\bar{p}$. Hence, price controls are Pareto-improving when the market stays in this equilibrium. The same reasoning applies in the MD Fair equilibrium if $\bar{p} < e$. Therefore, price controls improve efficiency in the MD Fair equilibrium if the maximum add-on price, $\bar{p}$, is less than consumers’ valuation for the add-on, $e$. The following proposition summarizes the effects of price controls when valuations are heterogeneous and the market is in a fair equilibrium.

**Proposition 8.** If the market is in the Shrouded Fair equilibrium, imposing additional price controls increases total surplus and unsophisticated welfare.

If the market is in the MD Fair equilibrium, imposing additional price controls increases total surplus and unsophisticated welfare if the maximum add-on price ($\bar{p}$) is set below consumers’ valuation for the add-on ($e$); otherwise, price controls have no effect on total surplus or unsophisticated welfare.

Suppose the market is in an unfair equilibrium (Shrouded Unfair or MD Unfair). It can be shown that $p^*_{1,\text{MDU}}$ and $p^*_{1,\text{SU}}$ are decreasing in $\bar{p}$. Therefore, if the market stays within an unfair equilibrium, price controls improve total surplus by increasing the price of the base good, causing low valuation consumers to exit the market. Suppose now that price controls push the market from an unfair equilibrium to a different equilibrium. The only possibilities are that the market moves from the MD Unfair to the MD Fair equilibrium or from the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium to the Shrouded Fair or Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium. In any of these scenarios, it can be verified that the price for the base good ($p^*_1$) rises since the add-on price again decreases. Therefore, the loss from low-valuation naïfs consuming the base good decreases. Moreover, since the market has moved to a fair equilibrium, the market is only subject to one of the three inefficiencies (quantified by (22)-(24)) described on page 22. Hence, inefficiencies decline, and both welfare functions increase.

**Proposition 9.** If the market is in the MD Unfair or Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, imposing additional price controls increases total surplus and unsophisticated welfare.

Finally, suppose price controls are imposed and the market is in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium. The market can either stay in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium or move to the Shrouded Fair or Shrouded Unfair equilibria. Welfare losses in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium are unrelated to the maximum add-on price, $\bar{p}$, since prices are determined by consumers’ value for the add-on, $e$. Hence, if the market stays in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium, both welfare functions are unaffected.

Now consider the situation when the market moves from the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium to the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium. After the transition, firms earn a larger amount from
the add-on since \( a_{\text{sub}} \bar{p} > e \). As a result, the base good price decreases, and more low-valuation consumers inefficiently opt to buy the base good. In addition, sophisticates now avoid the add-on whereas they did not when it was priced at their valuation, \( e \), in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium. Consequently, both welfare functions decrease due to the price controls.

The only other possibility is that price controls move the market from the Voluntarily Transparent to the Shrouded Fair equilibrium. In the baseline model, both of these equilibria are first best, so welfare is unaffected by such a transition. With heterogeneous valuations, however, both equilibria are subject to the inefficiency of low valuation naïfs consuming the base good. The price of the base good is lower in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium where \( p_1^* = -e \) than in the Shrouded Fair equilibrium where \( p_1^* = -p \geq -e \). As a result, there is a wider range of base good valuations for which inefficient consumption by naïfs takes place in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium. On the other hand, there are more naïfs in the population in the Shrouded Fair equilibrium. Whether or not surplus increases as the market moves from the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium to the Shrouded Fair equilibrium depends on which of these effects dominates. It can be shown that price controls strictly increase both welfare measures in this scenario if and only if the maximum add-on price is set such that \( p < e\sqrt{1 - \lambda} \). Specifically, price controls improve welfare if the maximum add-on price is set low relative to consumers’ value for it. In this case, price regulation has a large impact on increasing the base good price and reducing the number of naïfs who inefficiently consume it. In addition, price controls improve welfare when disclosure methods are weak (i.e., \( \lambda \) is low); when \( \lambda \) is small, a shift from the Voluntarily Transparent to the Shrouded Fair equilibrium results in a small increase in the overall number of naïfs. This argument applies for both total surplus and unsophisticated welfare. As discussed in Section 5.2, there are no welfare losses suffered by sophisticates in either equilibrium since they consume both the add-on and the base good efficiently.

**Proposition 10.** Suppose price controls are imposed to a market that is in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium.

If the market stays in the Voluntarily Transparent equilibrium, total surplus and unsophisticated welfare are unaffected.

If the market moves to the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, total surplus and unsophisticated welfare both decrease.

If the market moves to the Shrouded Fair equilibrium, total surplus and unsophisticated welfare increase if the new maximum add-on price is less than \( e\sqrt{1 - \lambda} \). Otherwise, total surplus and unsophisticated welfare decrease.

A comparison of the effects of price controls in the heterogeneous model versus the baseline model is provided in Tables 3 and 4. There are cases in which there is more rationale for price controls in our heterogeneous model than in the baseline model. For example, in the heterogeneous model, price controls can increase welfare within the Shrouded Fair and MD Fair equilibria. Namely,
they increase the base good price and decrease the number of low-valuation naïfs who inefficiently buy the base good. In this case, price controls result in a pareto improvement (whereas they could not in the baseline model). They can also now increase total surplus within the Shrouded Unfair and MD Unfair equilibria. However, there are also cases in which there is less rationale for price controls in the heterogeneous model. Specifically, price controls can decrease welfare when they shift the equilibrium from Voluntarily Transparent to Shrouded Fair since the loss of disclosure can increase the pool of naïfs inefficiently buying the base good. In the baseline model, on the other hand, welfare is first-best in both equilibria.

As in the baseline model, both forms of regulation can lead to reductions in total surplus and unsophisticated welfare. Moreover, there are still complementarities between price controls and disclosure mandates: conditional on disclosure being mandated, price controls always improve welfare, and conditional on prices being sufficiently constrained, disclosure mandates always improve welfare. In other words, each form of regulation can prevent the potential problems caused by the other form of regulation.

6 Conclusion

We have analyzed the welfare effects of price and disclosure regulation in markets where add-on costs can be shrouded from consumers, e.g., penalty fees for credit cards. We derived a number of novel results. First, mandating disclosure can decrease welfare, whether measured by the total surplus that accrues to all consumers or the welfare of unsophisticated consumers. Such disclosure mandates can increase the pool of sophisticated consumers who inefficiently avoid the add-on. This results in higher prices for the base good, harming the naïve consumers who are left behind by the disclosure. Second, price controls can increase or decrease welfare when multiple equilibria can exist. Third, there are complementarities between price and disclosure regulations. Namely, disclosure requirements can never impose harms if prices are sufficiently constrained, and price controls can never impose harms if disclosure is mandated. Finally, both price and disclosure regulations can serve to screen out consumers who are harmed by the product.

Our work suggests a number of paths for future research. First, one could test the model’s empirical implications. According to both versions of the model (baseline and heterogeneous), when the market moves from the Shrouded Unfair to the MD Unfair equilibrium, the base good price increases while the add-on price remains the same. Hence, one could examine whether disclosure regulations (such as TILA and its amendments) increase up-front consumer lending fees while not decreasing subsequent penalty fees. One should expect to observe such an outcome in environments with little or no price controls, i.e., in markets where the unfair equilibria can exist. Second, there are a number of natural extensions of the model. Consumers in our model properly anticipate their utility from use of the base good and add-on. However, models with time-inconsistent preferences are often applicable to consumer credit markets, in which consumers may not properly anticipate their future utility and use of the good. Such models can explain the excessive borrowing and
spending observed in such markets. One could explore how imperfect anticipation of preferences would alter the model, and how educational programs which make consumers more self-aware would affect welfare and the private incentive to disclose information.
A Proofs

Proof. (Lemma 1, (i))

Let \((p_1^*, p_2^*)\) be a symmetric equilibrium. We first prove that firms earn zero profit in any such equilibrium. The per-consumer equilibrium profit when firms offer prices of \(p_1^*\) for the base good and \(p_2^*\) for the add-on is given by the following expression:

\[
\Pi(p_1^*, p_2^*) = \frac{1 - \alpha^* \max\{\overline{\pi} - u^*_S, 0\}}{M} \left( p_1^* + p_2^* \cdot 1\{p_2^* \leq \varepsilon\} \right) + \frac{\alpha^* \max\{\overline{\pi} - u^*_N, 0\}}{M} (p_1^* + p_2^*) \tag{27}
\]

In the expression above, \(M\) represents the number of firms. In addition, \(u^*_S\) represents the minimum base good valuation for which a sophisticate will purchase the base good such that \(u^*_S = \max\{p_1^* + \min\{p_2^* - \varepsilon, 0\}, \underline{u}\}\). Similarly, \(u^*_N\) represents the minimum base good valuation for which a naïf will purchase the base good such that \(u^*_N = \max\{p_1^* - \varepsilon, \underline{u}\}\). For the case when \(\overline{\pi} = \underline{u}\), the equilibrium profit is given by:

\[
\Pi(p_1^*, p_2^*) = \frac{1 - \alpha^*}{M} 1\{\overline{\pi} \geq p_1^* + \min\{p_2^* - \varepsilon, 0\}\} \left( p_1^* + p_2^* \cdot 1\{p_2^* \leq \varepsilon\} \right) + \frac{\alpha^*}{M} 1\{\overline{\pi} \geq p_1^* - \varepsilon\} (p_1^* + p_2^*) \tag{28}
\]

We assume that this equilibrium profit is positive then prove by contradiction that it is profitable for firms to offer \(p_1 = p_1^* - \varepsilon\) for the base good and \(p_2 = p_2^*\) for the add-on if \(\varepsilon > 0\) is sufficiently small. Any such firm will capture all consumer demand previously captured by other firms. Therefore, the off-equilibrium profit from this deviation is given as follows:

\[
\Pi(p_1, p_2) = (1 - \alpha^*) \left( p_1^* + p_2^* \cdot 1\{p_2^* \leq \varepsilon\} \right) - \varepsilon \tag{29}
\]

In the expression above, \(u^*_S\) and \(u^*_N\) now represent the minimum base good valuation for which sophisticates and naïfs will purchase the base good at these off-equilibrium prices, respectively. Namely, \(u^*_S = \max\{p_1^* + \min\{p_2^* - \varepsilon, 0\}, \underline{u}\}\), and \(u^*_N = \max\{p_1^* - \varepsilon, \underline{u}\}\). For the case when \(\overline{\pi} = \underline{u}\), this off-equilibrium profit is given by:

\[
\Pi(p_1, p_2) = (1 - \alpha^*) 1\{\overline{\pi} \geq p_1^* + \min\{p_2^* - \varepsilon, 0\} - \varepsilon\} \left( p_1^* + p_2^* \cdot 1\{p_2^* \leq \varepsilon\} \right) - \varepsilon \tag{30}
\]

Since \(\Pi(p_1, p_2)\) is continuous in \(\varepsilon\), it is clear that \(\Pi(p_1, p_2) > \Pi(p_1^*, p_2^*) > 0\) for \(\varepsilon\) sufficiently small and \(M \geq 2\).

\[\square\]

Proof. (Lemma 1, (ii))

First, suppose \(p_2^* < \min\{\varepsilon, \overline{p}\}\). Consider the per-customer profits of a firm that charges \((p_1^*, \overline{p})\). Since \(p_2^* < \varepsilon\), no sophisticated consumer will choose to frequent the firm that charges \((p_1^*, \overline{p})\). Hence,
the firm’s customers will consist only of naïfs, so \( \pi(p_1^*, \bar{p}) \), the per-customer profits of a firm that charges \( (p_1^*, \bar{p}) \), satisfies

\[
\pi(p_1^*, \bar{p}) = p_1^* + \bar{p} \\
> p_1^* + p_2^* \\
= \pi(p_1^*, p_2^*) \\
= 0,
\]

contradicting the optimality of \( (p_1^*, p_2^*) \). Hence, for any symmetric equilibrium, \( p_2^* \geq \min\{e, \bar{p}\} \).

Now, suppose \( e < p_2^* < \bar{p} \). Then holding the price of the base good constant and increasing the price of the add-on does not affect consumers’ demand (either naïve or sophisticated) for the firm’s products, and it increases the profits the firm earns from the naïve consumers. Hence, \( p_2^* \notin (e, \bar{p}) \).

By the definition of \( \bar{p} \), \( p_2^* \leq \bar{p} \). This, and the results that \( p_2^* \geq \min\{e, \bar{p}\} \) and \( p_2^* \notin (e, \bar{p}) \) imply that \( p_2^* \in \{e, \bar{p}\} \), completing the proof.

\[ \square \]

Proof. (Uniqueness, Proposition 1)

First note that since disclosure is mandatory, there exist measure \( \alpha(1 - \lambda) \) of naïfs and measure \( 1 - \alpha(1 - \lambda) \) of sophisticates.

Case 1: \( \alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p} > e \). Let \( (p_1^*, p_2^*) \) be a symmetric equilibrium.

Suppose \( p_2^* \neq \bar{p} \). By Lemma 1, \( p_2^* = e \), and the zero profit condition implies \( p_1^* = -e \). Consider the per-customer profit of a firm charging \( (p_1, p_2) = (-e, \bar{p}) \):

\[
\pi = \alpha(1 - \lambda)(\bar{p} - e) + [1 - \alpha(1 - \lambda)](-e) \\
= \alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p} - e \\
> 0,
\]

contradicting the optimality of \( (p_1^*, p_2^*) \). Hence, \( p_2^* = \bar{p} \), and Lemma 1 implies \( p_1^* = -\alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p} \), so the equilibrium is unique for this case.

Case 2: \( \alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p} < e \). Let \( (p_1^*, p_2^*) \) be a symmetric equilibrium.

Suppose \( p_2^* > e \). Note that Lemma 1 implies that \( (p_1^*, p_2^*) \) satisfies:

\[
\alpha(1 - \lambda)(p_1^* + p_2^*) + [1 - \alpha(1 - \lambda)]p_1^* = 0,
\]

which implies

\[
p_1^* = -\alpha(1 - \lambda)p_2^*.
\]

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Consider the per-customer profits of a firm that charges \( p_1 = -\alpha(1-\lambda)p_2^* \) and \( p_2 = e \):

\[
\pi = e - \alpha(1-\lambda)p_2^* \\
> \alpha(1-\lambda)p - \alpha(1-\lambda)p_2^* \\
\geq 0,
\]

a contradiction. Hence, \( p_2^* \leq e \), so by Lemma 1, \( p_2^* = \min\{e, p\} \), and Lemma 1 implies \( p_1^* = -\min\{e, p\} \), so the equilibrium is unique for this case.

**Case 3:** \( \alpha(1-\lambda)p = e \). Let \((p_1^*, p_2^*)\) be a symmetric equilibrium. Lemma 1 implies \( p_2^* \in \{e, p\} \). If \( p_2^* = e \), Lemma 1 implies that \( p_1^* = -e \), and if \( p_2^* = p \), Lemma 1 implies that \( p_1^* = -\alpha(1-\lambda)p \).

**Proof.** (Existence, Proposition 1)

**Case 1:** \( \alpha(1-\lambda)p \geq e \). We must show \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-\alpha(1-\lambda)p, p)\) is an equilibrium.

Suppose all firms are charging \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-\alpha(1-\lambda)p, p)\), and consider the profits of a firm that charges \((p_1, p_2)\).

If \( p_1 > p_1^* \), the firm will not attract any na"ive consumers, and it will attract sophisticated consumers if and only if \( p_2 \leq e \) and \( p_2 \leq e - (p_1 - p_1^*) \). For such \((p_1, p_2)\), the firm’s per-customer profits are given by the equation

\[
\pi(p_1, p_2) = p_1 + p_2 \\
\leq e + p_1^* \\
= e - \alpha(1-\lambda)p \\
\leq 0.
\]

Hence, no firm has an incentive to charge \( p_1 > p_1^* \).

If \( p_1 < p_1^* \), the firm will attract every consumer’s demand, but it cannot earn positive profits:

\[
\pi(p_1, p_2) = p_1 + p_21_{p_2 \leq e} + \alpha(1-\lambda)p_21_{p_2 > e} \\
\leq p_1 + \max\{e, \alpha(1-\lambda)p\} \\
< p_1^* + \alpha(1-\lambda)p \\
= \pi(p_1^*, p_2^*).
\]

Hence, no firm has incentive to charge \( p_1 \neq p_1^* \) for the base good. Assume \( p_1 = p_1^* \). Then the firm’s optimal add-on price is clearly either \( e \) or \( p \). Namely, if a firm charges \( p_2 < \min\{e, p\} \), it can earn more from both na"iws and sophisticates if by increasing \( p_2 \) to \( \min\{e, p\} \). If \( e < p_2 < p \), the firm can earn more from na"iws and the same from sophisticates by increasing \( p_2 \) to \( p \). The per-customer
profits earned from \( p_2 = e \) or \( \bar{p} \) are given as follows:

\[
\pi(p_1^*, e) = p_1^* + e \\
\leq p_1^* + \alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p} \\
= \pi(p_1^*, p_2^*).
\]

Hence, \((p_1^*, p_2^*)\) is each firm’s best response, so it is an equilibrium.

**Case 2:** \( \alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p} \leq e \). We must show \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-\min\{e, \bar{p}\}, \min\{e, \bar{p}\})\) is an equilibrium.

Suppose all firms are charging \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-\min\{e, \bar{p}\}, \min\{e, \bar{p}\})\), and consider the profits of a firm that charges \((p_1, p_2)\).

**Case 2.1:** \( e \leq \bar{p} \). In this case, \( p_1^* = -e \) and \( p_2^* = e \). We first show that no firm has an incentive to charge \( p_1 \neq p_1^* \).

If \( p_1 < p_1^* \) and \( p_2 \leq p_2^* \), all the customers purchase the base good and the add-on, so

\[
\pi(p_1, p_2) = p_1 + p_2 \\
< p_1^* + p_2^* \\
= 0.
\]

If \( p_1 < p_1^* \) and \( p_2 > p_2^* \), only naïfs purchase the add-on, so

\[
\pi(p_1, p_2) = p_1 + \alpha(1 - \lambda)p_2 \\
< p_1^* + \alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p} \\
\leq -e + e \\
= 0.
\]

If \( p_1 > p_1^* \), the firm gets customers only if \( p_2 \leq e \) and \( e - p_2 \geq p_1 - p_1^* \), in which case all its customers are sophisticated consumers who purchase both the base good and the add-on, and

\[
\pi(p_1, p_2) = p_1 + p_2 \\
\leq e - e \\
= 0.
\]

Hence, firms have no incentive to charge any price other than \( p_1 = p_1^* = -e \) for the base good.
Given that \( p_1 = -e \), the firm’s per-customer profits are given by the equation:

\[
\pi(-e, p_2) = -e + p_2 1_{\{p_2 \leq e\}} + \alpha(1 - \lambda)p_2 1_{\{p_2 > e\}} \\
\leq -e + \max\{e, \alpha(1 - \lambda)p\} \\
= 0.
\]

Hence, \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-\min\{e, p\}, \min\{e, p\})\) is a best response for each firm.

**Case 2.2:** \( e > p \). If \( e > p \), then \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-p, p)\), and all consumers will purchase the add-on regardless of what prices firms charge for it. The firm will attract customers (naïve or sophisticated) if and only if \( p_1 + p_2 \leq p_1^* + p_2^* \). Hence, for any \((p_1, p_2)\), the firm’s per-customer profit is given by the equation

\[
\pi(p_1, p_2) = (p_1 + p_2) 1_{\{p_1 + p_2 \leq p_1^* + p_2^*\}} \\
\leq p_1^* + p_2^* \\
= \pi(p_1^*, p_2^*).
\]

Hence, \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-p, p)\) is a best response for each firm.

**Proof. (Uniqueness, Proposition 2)**

Consider separately the shrouding equilibria and the non-shrouding equilibria. In particular, the uniqueness claim of Proposition 2 is equivalent to the following claim:

**Possible shrouding equilibria:**

- \( \overline{p} \geq \frac{e}{\alpha} \implies (p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-\alpha\overline{p}, \overline{p}) \)
- \( \overline{p} \in (e, \frac{e}{\alpha}) \implies \text{NO EQUILIBRIUM} \)
- \( \overline{p} \leq e \implies (p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-\overline{p}, \overline{p}) \)

**Possible disclosure (non-shrouding) equilibria:**

- \( \overline{p} \geq \frac{e}{\alpha(1 - \lambda)} \implies \text{NO EQUILIBRIUM} \)
- \( \overline{p} \in \left(e, \frac{e}{\alpha(1 - \lambda)}\right) \implies (p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-e, e) \)
- \( \overline{p} \leq e \implies \text{NO EQUILIBRIUM} \)

**Shrouding Equilibria:**

Note that since firms are shrouding the price of the add-on, there exist measure \( \alpha \) of naïfs and measure \( 1 - \alpha \) of sophisticates.

Suppose there exists a symmetric shrouding equilibrium \((p_1^*, p_2^*)\). Since firms are shrouding, consumers are unable to observe the add-on price, so consumers’ decision over which firm to frequent
and whether to purchase the add-on is independent of the add-on prices that firms actually charge. Hence, it is optimal for firms that shroud the price of the add-on to charge \( p_2 = \bar{p} \); increasing \( p_2 \) increases firms’ profits from naïfs without decreasing the profit earned from sophisticates. Therefore, \( p^*_2 = \bar{p} \).

**Case 1: \( \bar{p} \geq \frac{e}{\alpha} \)**

Only naïfs purchase the add-on, so Lemma 1 implies \( p^*_1 \) satisfies:

\[
\alpha(p^*_1 + \bar{p}) + (1 - \alpha)p^*_1 = 0, \quad \text{i.e.,} \quad p^*_1 = -\alpha \bar{p}.
\]

**Case 2: \( p \in (e, \frac{e}{\alpha}) \)**

Only naïfs purchase the add-on, so \( p^*_1 \) satisfies:

\[
\alpha(p^*_1 + p) + (1 - \alpha)p^*_1 = 0, \quad \text{i.e.,} \quad p^*_1 = -\alpha p.
\]

However, this isn’t an equilibrium. To see this, consider the per-customer profits of a firm charging \((-\alpha \bar{p}, e)\) and unshrouding:

\[
\pi = -\alpha \bar{p} + e > -\alpha \left( \frac{e}{\alpha} \right) + e = 0.
\]

Hence, there’s no shrouding equilibrium if \( \bar{p} \in (e, \frac{e}{\alpha}) \).

**Case 3: \( \bar{p} \leq e \)**

Then all consumers purchase the add-on, so Lemma 1 implies \( p^*_1 = -\bar{p} \).

**Disclosure Equilibria:**

Since firms are disclosing the price of the add-on, there exist measure \( \alpha(1 - \lambda) \) of naïfs and measure \( 1 - \alpha(1 - \lambda) \) of sophisticated consumers.

Let \((p^*_1, p^*_2)\) represent a symmetric equilibrium with disclosure. By Lemma 1, \( p^*_2 \in \{e, \bar{p}\} \).

Suppose \( p^*_2 = \bar{p} \). Since firms prefer shrouding to disclosure if each yields the same profit, no firm charging \( p_2 = \bar{p} \) will choose to disclose the price of its add-on. Hence, \( p^*_2 = e \), all consumers purchase the add-on, and Lemma 1 implies \( p^*_1 = -e \).

**Case 1: \( \bar{p} > \frac{e}{\alpha(1-\lambda)} \)**
Consider the per-customer profits of a firm that charges \((-e, \bar{p})\):

\[
\pi(-e, \bar{p}) = \alpha(1 - \lambda)[-e + \bar{p}] + [1 - \alpha(1 - \lambda)](-e) \\
= \alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p} - e \\
> 0,
\]

contradicting the optimality of \((p_1^*, p_2^*)\), so there is no equilibrium in this case.

**Case 2:** \(\bar{p} = \frac{\alpha}{\alpha(1 - \lambda)}\)

Consider the per-customer profit of a firm that charges \((-e, \bar{p})\) and shrouds:

\[
\pi(-e, \bar{p}) = -e + \alpha(1 - \lambda)\bar{p} \\
= 0.
\]

Since firms prefer shrouding to disclosure when they yield the same profit, \((-e, e)\) with disclosure is not an equilibrium in this case.

**Case 3:** \(p \in \left(e, \frac{\alpha}{\alpha(1 - \lambda)}\right)\)

The analysis before Case 1 proved that \((-e, e)\) is the only possible equilibrium in any of the cases.

**Case 4:** \(\bar{p} = e\). Then Lemma 1 implies \(p_2^* = \bar{p}\), so each firm prefers to shroud, so no disclosure equilibrium can be supported.

**Case 5:** \(p < e\)

Recall that any disclosure equilibrium has the property that \(p_2^* = e\). In this case, that is clearly not possible. Hence, there is no symmetric equilibrium with disclosure if \(p < e\).

\(\square\)

**Proof.** (*Existence, Proposition 2*) To prove the existence claim of Proposition 2, we must show that the following equilibria exist:

**Shrouding equilibria:**

- If \(\bar{p} \geq \frac{\alpha}{\alpha(1 - \lambda)}\), then \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-\alpha\bar{p}, \bar{p})\) is a shrouding equilibrium
- If \(\bar{p} \leq e\), then \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-\bar{p}, \bar{p})\) is a shrouding equilibrium

**Disclosure (non-shrouding) equilibria:**

- If \(\bar{p} \in \left(e, \frac{\alpha}{\alpha(1 - \lambda)}\right)\), then \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-e, e)\) is a disclosure equilibrium

Gabaix and Laibson (2006) prove (see their Proposition 1) that if \(\bar{p} \geq \frac{\alpha}{\alpha(1 - \lambda)}\), then \((p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-\alpha\bar{p}, \bar{p})\) is a shrouding equilibrium.
Consider the case where $\bar{p} \leq e$. We show that $(\bar{p}_1^*, \bar{p}_2^*) = (-\bar{p}, \bar{p})$ is a shrouding equilibrium. Suppose a firm charges $(p_1, p_2)$. Regardless of $p_2$, all consumers that visit the firm will purchase the add-on, since $p_2 \leq \bar{p} \leq e$. The firm will attract customers if and only if $p_1 + p_2 \leq p_1^* + p_2^*$. Hence, for any $(p_1, p_2)$, the firm’s per-customer profit is given by the equation

$$\pi(p_1, p_2) = (p_1 + p_2)1_{\{p_1 + p_2 \leq p_1^* + p_2^*\}} \leq p_1^* + p_2^* = \pi(p_1^*, p_2^*) .$$

Hence, $(p_1^*, p_2^*)$ is a best response, so $(p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-\bar{p}, \bar{p})$ with shrouding is a symmetric equilibrium.

Finally, consider the case where $p \in \left(e, \frac{e}{\alpha(1-\lambda)}\right)$. We show that $(p_1^*, p_2^*) = (-e, e)$ is a disclosure equilibrium. Suppose a firm charges $(p_1, p_2)$.

**Case 1: The firm shrouds**

If the firm shrouds, only naïfs (who compose measure $\alpha(1-\lambda)$ of the population since other firms disclose their add-on prices) will purchase the add-on. The firm attracts consumers if and only if $p_1 \leq p_1^*$. Therefore, the firm’s per-customer profit is given by the equation

$$\pi(p_1, p_2) = (p_1 + \alpha(1-\lambda)p_2)1_{\{p_1 \leq p_1^*\}} \leq p_1^* + \alpha(1-\lambda)p_2 \leq 0 .$$

Hence, the firm cannot earn positive profit by shrouding.

**Case 2: The firm discloses**

If the firm discloses its add-on price, the proof that $(-e, e)$ is a best response is analogous to the proof in Case 2 of the existence proof for Proposition 1. The only difference is that here, if $\bar{p} = \frac{e}{\alpha(1-\lambda)}$, the $(-e, e)$ equilibrium cannot be supported because $(-e, \bar{p})$ with shrouding yields the same profit as $(-e, e)$ with disclosure, and firms prefer shrouding to disclosure when they yield the same profits.

\[ \square \]

**Proof.** (Propositions 3 and 4) These follow directly from Figures 1 and 2. \[ \square \]

**Proof.** (Proposition 5)

Once we establish that

- $p_{1,\text{SU}} = -e$ and $p_{1,\text{MDU}} = -e$ have unique solutions (when viewed as a function of $\bar{p}$), and

\[ \text{Sophisticated consumers rationally infer that the firm charges } p_2 < \bar{p} \text{ if it shrouds.} \]

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• $e < \overline{p}^*_\text{SU} < \overline{p}^*_\text{MDU}$.

the rest of the proof follows the same as it does in the homogeneous case.\footnote{One potential concern is that firms might have incentive to lower the price of its base good to change the mix of sophisticated/unsophisticated consumers that it faces. However, by lowering $p_1$, it’s easily verified that the proportion of unsophisticated consumers that it faces decreases, and since the profits they earn from unsophisticated consumers is always at least as large as the profits firms earn from sophisticates, such a change in the composition never benefits firms.}

To verify the existence and uniqueness of the solution to $p^*_\text{SU}(\overline{p}) = -e$, note that $p^*_\text{SU}$ is continuous and unbounded in $\overline{p}$ and

$$\frac{\partial p^*_\text{SU}}{\partial \overline{p}} = \frac{-\alpha}{2} - \frac{4\alpha(\overline{u} + e) - 2\alpha(\overline{u} - \alpha(\overline{p} - e))}{4\sqrt{(\overline{u} - \alpha(\overline{p} - e))^2 + 4\alpha\overline{p}(\overline{u} + e)}} < 0.$$

(38)

$\overline{p}^*_\text{SU}$ is simply the solution to the equation above. $\overline{p}^*_\text{MDU}$ is the analogous solution when looking at $p^*_\text{MDU}$ (as opposed to $p^*_\text{SU}$).

All that’s left to verify is that $e < \overline{p}^*_\text{SU} < \overline{p}^*_\text{MDU}$. To see this, note that

$$\frac{\partial p^*_\text{SU}}{\partial \alpha} = \frac{-(\overline{p} - e)}{2} - \frac{4\overline{p}(\overline{u} + e) - 2(\overline{u} - \alpha(\overline{p} - e))}{4\sqrt{(\overline{u} - \alpha(\overline{p} - e))^2 + 4\alpha\overline{p}(\overline{u} + e)}}$$

$$= \frac{-(\overline{p} - e)}{2} - \frac{4\overline{p} u + 4\overline{p} e - 2(\overline{u} - \alpha(\overline{p} - e))}{4\sqrt{(\overline{u} - \alpha(\overline{p} - e))^2 + 4\alpha\overline{p}(\overline{u} + e)}}$$

$$< 0.$$

(39)

From (38) and (39), it’s clear that

• $p^*_\text{MDU}(\cdot) > p^*_\text{SU}(\cdot)$

• The $\overline{p}$ that solves $p^*_\text{MDU}(\overline{p}) = -e$ is larger than the $\overline{p}$ that solves $p^*_\text{SU}(\overline{p}) = -e$, i.e.,

$\overline{p}^*_\text{SU} < \overline{p}^*_\text{MDU}$.

That $\overline{p}^*_\text{SU} > e$ is obvious, because the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium can only exist if firms earn as much by selling the add-on at $p$ to naïfs as they do from selling the add-on at $e$ to all of their consumers.

$\Box$
Lemma 2. Total surplus and Unsophisticated welfare in the five equilibria are given by the equations:

\[ \Lambda_{s,MDF}^* = -\frac{\alpha(1 - \lambda) \min\{\overline{p}^2, e^2\}}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]  
\[ \Lambda_{s,SF}^* = -\frac{\alpha \overline{p}^2}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]  
\[ \Lambda_{s,VT}^* = -\frac{\alpha(1 - \lambda)e^2}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]  
\[ \Lambda_{u,MDF}^* = -\frac{(1 - \lambda) \min\{\overline{p}^2, e^2\}}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]  
\[ \Lambda_{u,SF}^* = -\frac{\overline{p}^2}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]  
\[ \Lambda_{u,VT}^* = -\frac{(1 - \lambda)e^2}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]

Proof. Since \( \ell_1 \) (equation (22)) is the only source of inefficiency in the fair equilibria, our welfare functions in these equilibria are given by \( \Lambda_s = -\alpha^* \ell_1 \) and \( \Lambda_u = -(1 - \lambda^*) \ell_1 \). Since prices for the base good are \( p_1^* = -\min\{\overline{p}, e\} \), \( -\overline{p} \), and \( -e \) in the MD Fair, Shrouded Fair, and Voluntarily Transparent equilibria, respectively, total surplus in these equilibria simplifies to:

\[ \Lambda_{s,MDF}^* = -\frac{\alpha(1 - \lambda) \min\{\overline{p}^2, e^2\}}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]  
\[ \Lambda_{s,SF}^* = -\frac{\alpha \overline{p}^2}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]  
\[ \Lambda_{s,VT}^* = -\frac{\alpha(1 - \lambda)e^2}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]  
\[ \Lambda_{u,MDF}^* = -\frac{(1 - \lambda) \min\{\overline{p}^2, e^2\}}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]  
\[ \Lambda_{u,SF}^* = -\frac{\overline{p}^2}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]  
\[ \Lambda_{u,VT}^* = -\frac{(1 - \lambda)e^2}{2(\overline{u} - u)} \]
In addition, unsophisticated welfare is given by:

\[
\Lambda_{u,\text{MDF}}^* = \frac{-(1 - \lambda) \min\{\bar{p}^2, e^2\}}{2(\bar{u} - u)} \\
\Lambda_{u,\text{SF}}^* = -\frac{p^2}{2(\bar{u} - u)} \\
\Lambda_{u,\text{VT}}^* = -\frac{(1 - \lambda)e^2}{2(\bar{u} - u)}
\]

All three of the inefficiencies expressed in (22)-(24) are present in the unfair equilibria (MD Unfair and Shrouded Unfair). Since \(\ell_1\) is due to naïfs while \(\ell_2\) and \(\ell_3\) are due to sophisticates, total surplus in these equilibria is, therefore: \(\Lambda_s = -\alpha^*\ell_1 - (1 - \alpha^*)(\ell_2 + \ell_3)\). This expression can be rewritten for these equilibria as follows:

\[
\Lambda_{s,\text{MDU}}^* = \frac{-p_{1,\text{MDU}}^2 + [1 - \alpha(1 - \lambda)](2\bar{p}e + e^2)}{2(\bar{u} - u)} \\
\Lambda_{s,\text{SU}}^* = -\frac{p_{1,\text{SU}}^2 + (1 - \alpha)(2\bar{p}e + e^2)}{2(\bar{u} - u)}
\]

In any equilibrium, total surplus is the weighted average of sophisticated welfare and unsophisticated welfare,

\[
\Lambda_s^* = \alpha \Lambda_u^* + (1 - \alpha)\Lambda_{\text{soph}}^*.
\]

Sophisticated welfare in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium can be expressed,

\[
\Lambda_{\text{soph}, \text{SU}}^* = (\bar{u} - u)^{-1} \int_{p_{1,\text{SU}}}^{\bar{u}} u - p_{1,\text{SU}}^* \, du - \Lambda_{\text{FB}}
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2}(\bar{u} - u)^{-1} \left[ (\bar{u} - p_{1,\text{SU}}^*)^2 - (\bar{u} + e)^2 \right].
\]

Combining (47), (58), and (59), and solving for \(\Lambda_{u,\text{SU}}^*\),

\[
\Lambda_{u,\text{SU}}^* = \frac{-(2 - \alpha)p_{1,\text{SU}}^2 + 2(1 - \alpha)\bar{p}p_{1,\text{SU}}^*}{2(\bar{u} - u)}
\]

By analogous arguments, unsophisticated welfare in the MD Unfair equilibrium can be expressed,

\[
\Lambda_{u,\text{MDU}}^* = \frac{-(2 - \alpha)p_{1,\text{MDU}}^2 + 2(1 - \alpha)\bar{p}p_{1,\text{MDU}}^* - \alpha\lambda(2\bar{p}e + e^2)}{2\alpha(\bar{u} - u)}
\]

\[\square\]

\textit{Proof. (Proposition 6)} By Proposition 5, in both scenarios, the market moves to the MD Fair

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equilibrium, so the result follows directly from (40)-(45).

Proof. (Proposition 7)

Note that if the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium exists, $\alpha_p^{SU} \geq e$, from which it follows that $p_{SU}^2 \geq e^2$. It follows from (40), (43), (47), and (48) that if the market moves from the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium to the MD Fair equilibrium, total surplus and unsophisticated welfare increase.

The last two claims follow from (46), (47), (48), and (49).

Proof. (Proposition 8) If price controls are implemented in the Shrouded Fair equilibrium, then the market will remain in the Shrouded Fair equilibrium. It follows from (41) and (44) that total surplus and unsophisticated welfare increase.

If price controls are implemented in the MD Fair equilibrium, then the market will remain in the MD Fair equilibrium. It follows from (40) and (43) that total surplus and unsophisticated welfare increase if and only if the new price cap is less than $e$; otherwise, the price controls have no effect on total surplus or unsophisticated welfare.

Proof. (Proposition 9)

If price controls are imposed in the MD Unfair equilibrium, then the market will either stay in the MD Unfair equilibrium or move to the MD Fair equilibrium. If price controls are imposed in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium, then the market will either stay in the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium or move to the Voluntarily Transparent or Shrouded Fair equilibrium. The result then follows from (40)-(47) and (48)-(49).

Proof. (Proposition 10)

This follows from (41), (42), (44), (45), (47), and (48).
References


We plot total surplus, $\Lambda_s$, as a function of the maximum add-on price, $\bar{p}$, for the equilibria described in Propositions 1 and 2.

We plot unsophisticated welfare, $\Lambda_u$, as a function of the maximum add-on price, $\bar{p}$, for the equilibria described in Propositions 1 and 2.
Table 1: Effect of Disclosure Mandates on Total Surplus

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Regulation Equilibrium</th>
<th>Baseline Model</th>
<th>Heterogeneous Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shrouded Unfair</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Increases</strong> if the market moves to the MD Fair equilibrium&lt;br&gt;<strong>Total Surplus Decreases</strong> if the market moves to the MD Unfair equilibrium</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Increases</strong> if the market moves to the MD Fair equilibrium or&lt;br&gt;$\alpha \lambda (2\pi e + e^2) &lt; p_{1, SU}^2 - p_{1, MDU}^2$&lt;br&gt;<strong>Total Surplus Decreases</strong> if the market moves to the MD Unfair equilibrium and&lt;br&gt;$\alpha \lambda (2\pi e + e^2) &gt; p_{1, SU}^2 - p_{1, MDU}^2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarily Transparent</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Unaffected</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Unaffected</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrouded Fair</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Unaffected</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Increases</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We summarize the effects of disclosure mandates on total surplus, $\Lambda_s$. The left column lists the equilibrium the market is in when the disclosure mandates are imposed. The middle column describes the effect of the disclosure mandates on total surplus when consumers have homogeneous valuations for the base good. The right column describes the effect when consumers’ valuations for the base good vary over a wide interval.
Table 2: Effect of Disclosure Mandates on Unsophisticated Welfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Regulation Equilibrium</th>
<th>Baseline Model</th>
<th>Heterogeneous Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shrouded Unfair</td>
<td><strong>Unsophisticated Welfare Increases</strong> if the market moves to the MD Fair equilibrium or $\bar{p} &gt; \frac{1}{1-\alpha}$</td>
<td><strong>Unsophisticated Welfare Increases</strong> if the market moves to the MD Fair equilibrium or $\Gamma &gt; 0$ (see caption below)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Unsophisticated Welfare Decreases</strong> if the market moves to the MD Unfair equilibrium and $\bar{p} &lt; \frac{\epsilon}{1-\alpha}$</td>
<td><strong>Unsophisticated Welfare Decreases</strong> if the market moves to the MD Unfair equilibrium and $\Gamma &lt; 0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrouded Fair</td>
<td><strong>Unsophisticated Welfare Unaffected</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unsophisticated Welfare Unaffected</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarily Transparent</td>
<td><strong>Unsophisticated Welfare Unaffected</strong></td>
<td><strong>Unsophisticated Welfare Unaffected</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We summarize the effects of disclosure mandates on unsophisticated welfare, $\Lambda_u$. The left column lists the equilibrium the market is in when the disclosure mandates are imposed. The middle column describes the effect of the disclosure mandates on unsophisticated welfare when consumers have homogeneous valuations for the base good. The right column describes the effect when consumers’ valuations for the base good vary over a wide interval. 

$\Gamma$ is defined as follows:

$$\Gamma = (2 - \alpha)(p^*_{1, SU} - p^*_{1, MDU}) + 2(1 - \alpha)\bar{p}(p^*_{1, MDU} - p^*_{1, SU}) - 2\lambda(2\bar{p}e + e^2).$$
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Pre-Regulation Equilibrium</th>
<th>Baseline Model</th>
<th>Heterogeneous Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shrouded Unfair</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Increases</strong> if market moves to the Voluntarily Transparent or Shrouded Fair equilibria</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Increases</strong> if the market moves to the Shrouded Fair equilibrium with ( p &lt; e\sqrt{1 - \lambda} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarily Transparent</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Decreases</strong> if the market moves to the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Decreases</strong> if (i) the market moves to the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium or (ii) the market moves to the Shrouded Fair equilibrium with ( p &gt; e\sqrt{1 - \lambda} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrouded Fair</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Unaffected</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Increases</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD Unfair</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Increases</strong> if the market moves to the MD Fair equilibrium</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Increases</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD Fair</td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Unaffected</strong></td>
<td><strong>Total Surplus Increases</strong> if the new maximum add-on price, ( \bar{p} &lt; e )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We summarize the effects of price controls on total surplus, \( \Lambda_s \). The left column lists the equilibrium the market is in when the price controls are imposed. The middle column describes the effect of the price controls on total surplus when consumers have homogeneous valuations for the base good. The right column describes the effect when consumers’ valuations for the base good vary over a wide interval.
### Table 4: Effect of Price Controls on Unsophisticated Welfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre-Regulation Equilibrium</th>
<th>Baseline Model</th>
<th>Heterogeneous Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shrouded Unfair</td>
<td>Unsophisticated Welfare Increases</td>
<td>Unsophisticated Welfare Increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntarily Transparent</td>
<td>Unsophisticated Welfare Decreases if the market moves to the Shrouded Unfair equilibrium</td>
<td>Unsophisticated Welfare Increases if the market moves to the Shrouded Fair equilibrium with $\bar{p} &lt; e\sqrt{1-\lambda}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shrouded Fair</td>
<td>Unsophisticated Welfare Unaffected</td>
<td>Unsophisticated Welfare Increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD Unfair</td>
<td>Unsophisticated Welfare Increases</td>
<td>Unsophisticated Welfare Increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MD Fair</td>
<td>Unsophisticated Welfare Unaffected</td>
<td>Unsophisticated Welfare Increases if the new maximum add-on price, $\bar{p} &lt; e$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We summarize the effects of price controls on unsophisticated welfare, $\Lambda_u$. The left column lists the equilibrium the market is in when the price controls are imposed. The middle column describes the effect of the price controls on unsophisticated welfare when consumers have homogeneous valuations for the base good. The right column describes the effect when consumers’ valuations for the base good vary over a wide interval.