

REINTERMEDIATION IN FINTECH: EVIDENCE FROM ONLINE LENDING*

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August 6, 2018

Abstract

The peer-to-peer loan market was designed to allow borrowers and lenders to interact online without banks as middlemen. Yet we document that P2P lending platforms over time have evolved from trading venues into new credit intermediaries. Lenders now overwhelmingly outsource all decision-making to the platforms' software and adopt passive investment strategies. The dominant role of lending platforms with little skin in the game makes the market vulnerable to moral hazard, checked by the threat of institutional investors' withdrawal. Our findings suggest that the absence of private information spurs reintermediation as the platform's expertise in loan evaluation crowds out that of investors.

Keywords: FinTech; Peer-to-peer lending; Consumer finance; Disintermediation; Reintermediation

JEL Classification Numbers: G11, G12, D53, D81, D82

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Introduction

Online platforms such as Uber, Airbnb, and eBay bring together buyers and sellers of goods and services over the Internet, reducing search costs in a multitude of very different markets. The rise of financial technology (FinTech) is often predicted to result in similar developments in the financial sector, allowing providers and users of finance to interact directly without the involvement of banks and other financial intermediaries.¹ Based upon these ideas, peer-to-peer (P2P) lending markets were created to allow consumers to request small loans online and creditors to evaluate and directly fund loan applications of their choosing. P2P lending platforms were originally organized as online auctions, like an eBay for consumer loans. However, in contrast to eBay, these platforms over time have evolved to take central stage in loan screening, evaluation, and pricing. Far from simply providing a meeting place for borrowers and lenders, they have replaced traditional loan officers in all but name. Why did this happen, and what does this market tell us about the nature and role of financial intermediaries?

This paper studies the reintermediation of P2P lending.² We show that when decision making is based on ‘hard’ data with no private information, the growth in FinTech companies’ technological expertise in loan evaluation crowds out that of investors, who respond by becoming passive and voluntarily outsourcing almost all decisions to a few such firms. The end result may be a highly centralized market, with the platforms’ software replacing traditional intermediaries as a key decision maker.

We study the P2P lending market using loan data from Prosper, one of the biggest P2P platforms in the U.S. We find that in early years, when loan rates were determined via auctions and the platform performed no loan evaluation or pricing, loan funding rates were low and loan cancellations rare. In late 2010, Prosper replaced the auction model with one in which the platform’s software evaluates the loan’s risk, assigns an interest rate, and screens loans for possible fraud or excessive risk. We show that following these changes, funding rates increased dramatically and investors became overwhelmingly

¹E.g., “Role of banks recedes in wake of crisis,” *Financial Times*, June 22, 2014.

²We define reintermediation as the re-emergence of the middleman in technology-enabled markets in the form of online platform’s software designed to perform the functions of traditional intermediaries. These functions include pooling funds, sharing risks, transferring resources, producing information and providing incentives (see Philippon (2015)). By contrast, we consider markets where such platforms only provide infrastructure that enables transfer of resources between other parties, but do not actively undertake other functions of traditional intermediaries to be disintermediated markets (e.g., trading venues, such as Electronic Communication Networks).

passive, outsourcing almost all decisions to the lending platform’s software.

Today, the P2P lending market in the U.S. is by and large neither *peer-to-peer*, nor a lending *market* in which creditors decide who to lend to. First, we show that in recent years over 90% of loans have been provided by institutions rather than retail ‘peers’, typically algorithmically without human involvement. Over 80% of institutional loans are extended through the ‘passive’ mechanism, whereby investors pre-specify loan portfolio parameters and Prosper then automatically funds whole loans on their behalf. And while theoretically open to active investors’ screening, most of the remaining loans in practice are funded within seconds by robots.

Second, the lending platform not only carries out essentially all of the traditional banks’ functions related to consumer loan evaluation, pricing, and servicing, but also performs almost all of the loan screening. We find that P2P investors agree to fund over 98% of loan applications on offer, even though the platform’s software subsequently screens out and cancels 30% of them as too risky or possibly fraudulent. We show that the screened-out loans would, if extended, result in substantially higher losses for investors than other loans with similar risk scores. Nonetheless, investors do not attempt to identify and avoid such loans, effectively outsourcing loan screening, along with all other decisions, to the platform’s algorithms.

Thus, P2P lending platforms have evolved from a mere meeting place for borrowers and lenders to something resembling a delegated asset manager, which for a fee invests creditors’ money in consumer loans of its choosing at the price it deems appropriate. What are the key features of online lending that encourage reintermediation, in contrast with other multi-sided platforms that simply facilitate direct transactions between other parties? P2P loans are evaluated based on a few ‘hard’ variables, and investors have no private or ‘soft’ information about individual borrowers.³ This information structure means that investors’ market expertise is irrelevant, and makes the task of loan picking ripe for outsourcing. Under these conditions, the lending platform has incentives to provide investors with high-quality loan analysis, which can boost loan origination volume by attracting unskilled investors who would otherwise be unable to judge the quality of loans on offer. By contrast, the tendency towards intermediation may be limited

³Petersen (2004) defines hard information as ‘quantitative, easy to store and transmit in impersonal ways, and its content is independent of the collection process.’ In contrast, soft information is ‘information that is difficult to completely summarize in a numeric score.’ In the early years, P2P platforms made some ‘soft’ information about borrowers, such as their photos or textual descriptions, available to investors (see Ravina (2013), Duarte, Siegel, and Young (2012), and Larrimore et al. (2011)). Such information was removed from Prosper in late 2013 and is no longer used.

in those markets in which private information and industry expertise, as well as differences in opinion and preferences, play a more prominent role.

Consistent with this view, we find the quality of Prosper’s loan analysis to be high and improving over time. The absence of soft information and the arm’s length double-blind nature of P2P lending makes online lending susceptible to adverse selection by borrowers, and we show that default rates on P2P loans are higher than on other credits to consumers with similar FICO scores. Nonetheless, P2P lenders’ returns in most periods have been higher than those on junk bonds, even though investors predominantly use passive strategies and perform none of the traditional lenders’ functions related to loan evaluation, pricing, monitoring, and servicing. Investors’ returns reflect the performance of the lending platform as the loan officer. We show that not only is Prosper’s in-house credit score much more informative than FICO in predicting borrower default, but also that its accuracy has been increasing over time. We argue that the presence of institutional investors who are able to identify mispriced loans motivates the platform to improve its algorithms in order to increase funding rates and maximize loan volume. In turn, investors have responded by adopting a more passive approach that largely forgoes active loan picking, presumably because the quality of loan evaluation performed by the platform has become high enough to render additional screening by investors unnecessary.

The original disintermediation and the subsequent reintermediation of the P2P lending market can be rationalized within the model recently suggested by Vallee and Zeng (2018), in which the lending platform solicits and pre-screens loan applications to ensure a certain level of quality before offering them to investors. In the model, sophisticated investors can choose to become informed and perform additional screening at a cost, whereas unsophisticated investors buy all loans on offer as long as the average loan quality is high enough for them to break even. The model predicts that if the platform is not sufficiently skilled at loan evaluation, sophisticated investors screen loans and pick only high-quality ones for investment, while unsophisticated investors do not participate in the market. Consistent with the model’s predictions, we show that in the industry’s early years investors evaluated the loans (through the auction mechanism), with low funding rates and high returns. Vallee and Zeng (2018) also predict that as the platform’s ability to identify bad loans improves, the equilibrium switches to one in which the platform does all the screening and sophisticated investors choose to remain uninformed, investing in all

loans offered to them along with unsophisticated investors. The current state of the market, with passive investors and high funding rates, can be thought of as this second equilibrium in Vallee and Zeng (2018).

Our evidence is instructive in the context of the vast theoretical literature that rationalizes the existence of financial intermediaries (see Gorton and Winton (2003) for a comprehensive review). Intermediaries are thought to be more efficient at mitigating information-related frictions than decentralized markets as they are better monitors (Diamond (1984), Williamson (1986)), reduce information production costs (Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984)), and enforce loan contracts (Boot, Thakor, and Udell (1991)). The P2P lending market provides a relatively clean laboratory for testing a subset of these theories. In contrast to banks, P2P platforms do not take deposits, perform liquidity transformation, diversify across borrowers, or monitor loans after origination. Instead, our findings point towards scale economies and technological improvements in loan evaluation as a key benefit of intermediation (Boyd and Prescott (1986) and Millon and Thakor (1985)). We argue that intermediation may be particularly desirable when investors have no private or ‘soft’ information.

A central question related to the role of banks as delegated loan evaluators and monitors (Diamond (1984)) is, who monitors the bank? The intermediary’s moral hazard problem may be particularly acute in P2P lending. Indeed, in contrast to banks, P2P platforms have historically had little or no stake in the loans they helped originate. Given investors’ reliance on the platform for loan evaluation, a platform may be tempted to relax its lending standards in order to inflate loan origination volume and thus its fees. To investigate this issue, we present a case study of the market’s near-collapse in early 2016 and the subsequent recovery. We document that between 2012 and 2015 returns on newly originated P2P loans decreased by half, and this was not fully anticipated in platforms’ return estimates. Meanwhile, loan originations were growing exponentially through 2015, and defaults did not peak until later. When securities backed by Prosper loans were put on watch for downgrade in early 2016, loan originations fell by as much as 83% in 4 months, driven by a steep decline in institutional funding. Following these developments, the platform re-evaluated its credit models, increased interest rates, and tightened lending standards. Since then, default rates have decreased, returns have gone up, and loan volume has largely recovered. This episode suggests that the moral hazard problem may be checked by reputational concerns and the threat of investor withdrawal if their trust in the quality of loan underwriting by the platform is

eroded. Nonetheless, the long-term viability of the current market model remains an open question.

This paper contributes to the emerging literature on FinTech and, specifically, P2P lending. Morse (2015) provides a review of the early literature, whereas recent contributions include Balyuk (2018), Butler et al. (2016), Hertzberg et al. (2016), Liskovich and Shaton (2017), Wei and Lin (2016), and Zhang and Liu (2012). Our results complement Jagtiani and Lemieux (2017), who show that the platforms' credit scores are more informative than FICO, as well as Iyer et al. (2016), who document that investors could infer borrower creditworthiness better than FICO during the disintermediation period. Among theoretical contributions, our findings are closely aligned with the predictions of the model by Vallee and Zeng (2018), outlined above. In the empirical section of their paper, Vallee and Zeng (2018) test their model's predictions regarding investors' behavior and loan quality; by contrast, our focus is on the platform's role and the evolution of the market. Our paper is the first to explore reintermediation in FinTech in a setting characterized by the dominance of 'hard' information, sophisticated loan investors, and automated decision making by both investors and the lending platform.

Our findings are broadly supportive of Petersen (2004), who argues that collection and processing of hard information may be more efficient than soft data because it can be delegated. They are also consistent with the theoretical prediction of Stein (2002) that multi-layered organizations are more efficient when information is 'hard,' inexpensive, and verifiable. As in Stein's model, investment decisions in P2P markets can be separated from information acquisition and screening. By providing high-quality loan evaluation, the platform can encourage even uninformed lenders to invest in P2P loans with confidence. Finally, we also contribute to the literature on technological innovation (e.g., Genrig (1998), Hauswald and Marquez (2003)). Banerjee (2005) predicts that investing in screening technology may discourage adoption of superior screening technology by other lenders. Our paper shows that improvements in loan screening brought about by FinTech may crowd out screening by investors, giving rise to reintermediation.

1. The peer-to-peer lending market

The peer-to-peer (P2P) lending market is an online marketplace where individuals and institutions invest in consumer loans. P2P lending platforms appeared in the U.S. in 2006, and have become one of the most successful recent financial technology (FinTech) innovations in consumer finance. P2P loans are

fixed-term, fixed-interest, fully-amortizing unsecured loans. The typical maturities are 3 and 5 years. The size of the loan ranges from \$1,000 to \$35,000, with interest rates between 5% and 35%. Around 80% of P2P loans are reportedly taken for credit card repayment or debt consolidation.

The two largest P2P lending platforms in the U.S. are Prosper Marketplace and Lending Club, which together accounted for 98% of the U.S. market in 2014 (Economist (2014)) and are still dominant players in the market despite some new entrants. As of Q1 2018, they have originated \$39.4 billion in loans to 2.77 million borrowers. While this amounts to a small fraction of the \$1.03 trillion in revolving consumer debt and \$2.85 trillion in secured and unsecured non-revolving consumer debt outstanding at the time (FED (2018)), P2P lending amounts to one third of the unsecured personal loan volume. Loan originations by P2P lending platforms have been growing exponentially since 2013, reaching at least \$2.2 billion in loans in the Q1 2018. PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that by 2025 the size of the market will be at least \$150 billion annually (PwC (2015)).

1.1. Prosper Marketplace

Our analysis is based on data from Prosper Marketplace, which was the pioneer in the U.S. P2P lending market, and is now the second largest P2P lending platform in the U.S. after Lending Club.⁴ Prosper uses algorithm-based systems automating all steps of the lending process, including application handling, data gathering and verification, underwriting, credit scoring, loan funding, investing and servicing.

1.1.1. Borrowing and lending through Prosper

To be eligible for a Prosper loan, prospective borrowers must have a FICO score of at least 640 and satisfy several other criteria. When they request a loan online, they report their income, employment status, and a number other relevant characteristics, and authorize Prosper to request a credit report from a consumer credit bureau. The lending platform then uses a proprietary credit-scoring model to evaluate the Estimated Loss Rate (ELR) on the loan, defined as the annualized expected loss of loan principal due to borrower's default. The ELR summarizes Prosper's assessment of the loan's default risk

⁴While we also have the data for Lending Club and report some key statistics for this platform, the Lending Club data is not sufficiently detailed for us to study investors' composition, funding rates, or cancellation decisions, and hence our focus is on Prosper. A description of Lending Club can be found in Paravisini, Rappoport, and Ravina (2016).

and fully determines the interest rate on the loan. Prosper estimates the ELR are based on a consumer credit bureau’s score (such as FICO or SCOREX) and the platform’s own analysis of historical losses on P2P loans.⁵ The ELR is mapped into one of seven Prosper ratings, which range from AA (the safest) to HR (high risk). This mapping, loan interest rates, and the model Prosper uses to estimate the ELR are adjusted periodically.

It is important to emphasize that in recent years the borrower information that Prosper uses and passes on to investors has been limited to quantitative variables reported by the credit bureau and a few self-reported borrower’s characteristics, such as income and employment status. ‘Soft’ information of various kinds was allowed in P2P platforms in their early years, but was removed in 2013 ostensibly to prevent borrowers’ discrimination, and is no longer used. Moreover, the platform’s decision making is fully automated, and human intervention in the loan evaluation process is explicitly prohibited.⁶

If the borrower accepts the interest rate assigned by the platform, the loan application is listed online through one of the three investment pools (see below), and investors can choose whether to fund the loan or not. After the loan attracts funding or sufficient time has passed, Prosper initiates a pre-funding review, which can result in loan cancellation by the platform if the Prosper’s screening algorithms determine the loan to be too risky or possibly fraudulent. Thus, the platform performs automatic loans screening and cancels loan applications when there is a suspicion that the interest rate assigned by the pricing algorithm based on the observed variables may not adequately reflect true investment risk. If the loan is not canceled by Prosper or withdrawn by the borrower, it is originated for the funded amount.

In addition to retail ‘peers’, investors in P2P loans include institutions, which typically prefer to fund small loans in full. In response to their demand, in April 2013 Prosper introduced a ‘Whole Loan’ (insti-

⁵Prosper employs the following three-step procedure to evaluate the ELR. First, using its historical data on P2P loan defaults in conjunction with the borrower’s self-reported information and credit bureau data, the platform estimates the probability of the loan becoming 60+ days past due within 12 months of the application date. This probability determines the loan’s Prosper Score, ranging from 1 to 11. Second, the platform computes historical loss rates for each combination of the Prosper score and the FICO score (more precisely, one of 12 discrete FICO score bins, FICO 599-619, 619-639, . . . 829-850). Third, Prosper adjusts these ‘base’ loss rates based on a few variables it deems highly predictive of borrower risk, which at different times included the maturity of the loan, the debt-to-income ratio, and whether the borrower has previously had a Prosper loan. The Estimated Loss Rate equals the base loss rate plus any adjustments.

⁶“Prosper’s credit underwriting department carefully chooses permissible fair lending inputs from credit bureau variables and does not rely on any other source other than our own customer credit experience and application information. Also, manual intervention of Prosper’s automated underwriting rules engine is not permitted. For this reason, there is little scope for individuals to add human bias to credit decisions unlike with bank underwriting files.” (Yoshida (2016))

tutional) investment pool to allow accredited institutional investors to purchase loans in their entirety. Retail investors participate in the P2P lending market through the ‘Fractional’ (retail) pool, which allows a number of investors to crowdfund the loans. Fractional pool investors can choose how much to contribute to each loan, starting with as little as \$25 per loan. Prosper randomly allocates each loan application to one of the three pools. Applications expire unfunded if over a two week’s period they fail to attract funding for at least 70% of the requested amount.

Instead of selecting individual loans, many lenders invest passively by instructing Prosper to fund loans with certain characteristics on their behalf. To facilitate this process for institutional investors, in November 2013 Prosper added a passive investment possibility to the whole loan pool. The ‘Whole Passive’ investment pool allows institutions to instruct the platform to invest their money automatically in loans that satisfy certain criteria. By contrast, investors in the ‘Whole Active’ pool can review individual loans and choose which ones to fund. Retail investors in the fractional pool have access to Quick Invest and Auto Quick Invest tools and the Premier order execution service, designed to help them automate their investment decisions.

Prosper makes money by charging borrowers an origination fee, which ranges from 1% to 5%. In addition, investors pay a servicing fee of 1% per annum on all principal payments. Prosper’s estimated return for investors is calculated as the borrower rate, minus the servicing fee, minus the ELR, adjusting for any expected recovery of principal and lost interest, late collection fees, etc.

1.2. The evolution of lending procedures

The timeline of various developments affecting Prosper’s operations is presented in Figure 1. Prosper began operations on November 1, 2005 as an online platform where consumers could borrow from their friends and family. On February 21, 2006, the company announced its public launch as a P2P lending marketplace. The funding model that Prosper originally used is often referred to as Prosper 1.0 (pre-“quiet period” model). The platform played a passive role in loan facilitation by providing infrastructure (similar to trading venues, such as Electronic Communication Networks) and loan ratings (similar to rating agencies). Its ratings, however, were solely based on a consumer credit bureau’s scores. The platform did little borrower screening other than imposing eligibility requirements, collecting credit bureau

data and self-reported borrower information, and facilitating loan repayment. The platform did not price P2P loans. The interest rate was the maximum rate that a borrower was willing to pay up to a state-mandated ceiling (in case of automated funding) or the maximum rate that lenders were willing to accept on “winning bids” (in case of auction bidding). Lenders could either bid on each loan or invest via a “standing order” (a passive investment strategy).

Regulatory scrutiny of the P2P loan market caused Prosper to enter a “quiet period” on October 15, 2008 and cease operations until July 13, 2009. Upon reopening, Prosper transformed P2P loans into securities (‘borrower-dependent notes’) and made changes to its lending process. The platform’s new funding model is often referred to as Prosper 2.0 (post-“quiet period” model). Prosper’s platform continued to operate as an essentially disintermediated loan market with the platform doing little borrower screening, other than fraud detection and income verification. The platform was verifying income and employment for a quarter of P2P loans, cancelling around 15% of them because of verification failure. The interest rate was determined in an auction process. Prosper set the minimum rate on a loan based on its rating, whereas borrowers determined the maximum rate. Investors could place manual bids on P2P loans or use Prosper’s “portfolio plan system” (a passive strategy). Because of the platform’s passive role in loan evaluation and screening, we call the 2005-2010 period the *disintermediation* period.⁷

On December 20, 2010, Prosper made a major change to its platform by switching from the auction funding model to a fixed rate model. The platform started pricing loans and took a more active role in loan screening by stepping up its verification, loan cancellation, and collection efforts. On July 20, 2012, the platform also introduced more granular ELR-based pricing while continuing to report coarser Prosper ratings alongside ELRs. The change to posted prices marks the change to the so-called Prosper 3.0 model and gradual transition to a reintermediated P2P loan market. We call the 2011-2012 period the *transition* period.

Prosper made a number of substantial changes to its credit model throughout 2013: The platform introduced a new credit model (end of 2012 – early 2013), launched separate investment pools for institutional investors (April 2013), and started using the FICO credit score in its pricing model instead

⁷Prosper’s data set contains limited data for 2005-2006, so we focus on 2007-2008 in most tests when examining the platform’s role during this period.

of SCOREX (September 2013). Prosper’s loan evaluation and pricing has become more dynamic, with frequent adjustments to its ELR algorithms and the mapping between ELRs and interest rates. Prosper has also been updating its credit model periodically.⁸ At the same time, Prosper has reduced the amount of information provided to investors. In September 2013, the platform removed loan descriptions from applications and eliminated the ability of investors to ask questions to borrowers. In January 2015, Prosper reduced the frequency of updating its historical defaults data from daily to quarterly. Thus, soft information that used to be available in the P2P loan market during the disintermediation period, such as borrower pictures or narratives, was phased out and is no longer available. We refer to the period after 2013 as the *reintermediation* period because of the platform’s active role as an intermediary in the P2P loan market. As we argue below, one can compare the current Prosper to an investment fund where automated software acts as a fund manager making essentially all decisions as to loan evaluation, screening, and loan allocation.

2. The data

2.1. Sample construction

Two loan data sets are available for download from Prosper’s web site, one detailing loan applications (“listings”) and one describing the subsequent performance of originated loans. To construct our sample, we first remove any duplicates from each data set, retaining only the last entry for each loan. We also remove all loan applications that do not meet Prosper’s eligibility criteria, loans without a Prosper rating or with a Prosper score over 11 (the highest possible), as well as one-year maturity loans, which Prosper stopped originating in April 2013. We also exclude loan applications from Iowa, Maine, North Dakota, and Puerto Rico, because borrowers residing in these states were prohibited from using Prosper for a substantial portion of our sample period and their loan applications could not result in loan origination.

The resulting data set includes 1,242,278 loan applications submitted between February 2007 and February 2018, resulting in 871,414 originated loans. Loan applications fail to result in loan origination

⁸The platform’s latest credit model is based on TransUnion data. Prosper switched from using Equifax data to exclusively using TransUnion data in April 2017. Of note, LendingClub has also been making some major changes to its pricing and screening algorithms and the platform no longer uses FICO in its loan evaluation model, relying on machine learning.

if they are withdrawn by the borrower, expire unfunded, or are canceled by the platform as part of the screening process. In practice, the most important of these factors by far is loan cancellations by Prosper, which account for 86.6% of failed applications.

In order to relate loan returns after origination to borrower characteristics, it is necessary to merge loan performance and listing details files, which are not linked in Prosper. To this end, we match loans in the two data sets on variables common to both, i.e., loan origination date and time, loan amount, interest rate, Prosper rating, and loan maturity. If there is a unique match based on these variables, the entry is classified as matched. If there are several listings that can be matched to a particular loan or vice versa, we classify all these observations as unmatched. This approach allows us to match 95% of originated loans before 2010, but this proportion decreases in later years as the number of listings increases, so that only 49% of loans originated in 2016 and later are matched uniquely.

Our matched sample consists of 423,065 originated loans, for which we have data on subsequent loan performance through November 2017. We use this sample in tests that combine variables from both files (e.g., regressions of loan default rates on borrower characteristics), but report statistics from the full performance and listings data sets whenever possible. Most of our tests focus on the period after February 2013, the month when Prosper added a large number of borrower characteristics employed in our tests, including the FICO score, and around the time when the institutional loan pool was introduced. Although the length of this period is less than half of Prosper’s history, it covers over 94% of all loans.

We supplement our analysis with data on loans originated by Lending Club (LC) between May 2007 and March 2018. After excluding loans that are not eligible for investment by the general public, the LC sample includes 3,390,733 loans. Of these, there is enough information for us to compute default rates for 1,646,238 loans, and realized returns for 1,558,437 loans. To match Prosper’s loan data, we focus on LC’s loan performance through November 2017 in all loan default and returns tests.

2.2. Summary statistics

Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for all loan applications as well as for loans that were originated on Prosper. The summary statistics for Lending Club loans are provided for reference. The median loan size on Prosper is \$12,000. Loans in our sample are amortized over either 36 or 60 months, with

the former comprising 71% of all loans. The median interest rate on originated loans is 14.3% and the median estimated loss rate of principal due to default (ELR) is 6.24%. The median borrower’s FICO score is 689.5 and median (self-reported) annual income is \$60,700. For comparison, the median FICO score in the general population during this period was 700 and the per capita income in the U.S. in 2016 was \$43,183, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Comparing the distributions of FICO scores, we notice that while means and medians are similar for the general population and P2P borrowers, the dispersion is much higher for the former. This is to be expected, given that risky borrowers with FICO scores below 640 generally cannot apply for a P2P loan, whereas those with very high scores are less likely to need a loan, or if they do, they may find it easier to secure cheap credit from banks.

The median applicant is employed with their current employer for 6.17 years, does not have a mortgage, and has the debt-to-income ratio of 0.17. Around 15% of Prosper borrowers come back for another loan from the platform. There are few differences between the characteristics of loan applications and those of originated loans in the matched sample apparent from Table 1. One notable exception is that applicants who have at least one prior Prosper loan are more likely to be successful. The platform’s algorithms are much less likely to cancel a loan application if the borrower already has an outstanding Prosper loan, presumably because the borrower was screened previously.

Panel C of Table 1 shows realized annual returns and default rates on Prosper loans. Across all loans, the default rate is 6.23% per annum. With the average interest rate of 15.8% less 1% servicing fee that Prosper subtracts from payments to lenders, net returns average 6.32% across the sample, and the median is 10.5%. These returns are substantial for our sample period when interest rates were low by historical standards, particularly given that, as we show below, in order to earn them investors needed to do little else other than buy indiscriminately all loans offered to them by the platform. It should be noted, however, that our sample period does not include any periods of major stress in the consumer loan market. In addition, the general trend since 2011 has been toward lower returns, although there may have been a partial reversal in the later part of the sample. The evolution of returns over time is discussed in detail in Sections 5 and 6.

3. Main stylized facts

We begin our analysis by documenting several stylized facts about the P2P loan market focusing on the period after 2013, which we call the reintermediation period. We show that investors regard the lending platform as an intermediary rather than as a passive match-maker, and outsource most credit adjudication tasks, such as loan evaluation and screening, to the platform’s software.

3.1. P2P investor pools and investment automation

Prosper’s platform was originally designed as a platform for peers to lend to peers. Despite some presence of institutional investors in the platform’s early years, P2P loan investments were largely dominated by retail lenders. Prosper introduced the institutional investment pool in April 2013, and split it into the active and passive subpools in November 2013. Table 2 reports a large increase in the annual P2P loan volume during the reintermediation period.

Figure 2 shows the relative size of the two institutional pools and the retail investor pool over time. In recent years, the institutional loan funding has been the largest by far. Overall, since November 2013, 75.2% of all originated loans were funded through the passive institutional pool and 16.3% through the active institutional pool. By contrast, retail investors funded only 9.4% of loans throughout this period.⁹ Thus, only a small fraction of lending extended through P2P markets is still retail-to-retail, or “peer-to-peer”.

Institutional lending is not only dominant, but also largely passive: Over 82.2% of all institutional loans are funded through the Whole Passive pool, whereby the lending platform is instructed to fund the loans on investors’ behalf automatically as long as they satisfy some pre-specified criteria. Moreover, the true degree of investment automation is likely to be even higher, especially in the active institutional (‘Whole Active’) pool. Although investors in this pool choose which loans to fund, human contribution to this process may be largely limited to setting up loan-picking robots, with little involvement in the evaluation of specific loans afterwards. Indeed, we find that the median loan in 2016 was funded within

⁹While the proportion of retail funding went up briefly to 30.3% in July 2016, this increase appears to have been temporary, driven by the drop in institutional funding following the Moody’s announcement of a potential downgrade of securitizations backed by Prosper loans. We describe this episode in greater detail below. By the end of 2016, the trend appears to have been reversed, with only 6.9% of loans funded through the retail investor pool throughout 2017.

just 3.75 seconds after being listed on the platform. These funding times are implausibly short for human decision making, and suggest automated investment through the platform’s application programming interface (API). We find that the funding times in the active institutional pool were steadily decreasing in years 2013–2015, with the medians of 12, 10, and 8 seconds, respectively.¹⁰ These statistics are consistent with fast algorithmic decision-making in the active institutional pool.

In contrast with the institutional pools, the median funding time in the retail investment pool increased from 1.14 hours to 44.2 hours in 2013–2016 and then decreased to 7.4 hours in 2018, suggesting mostly manual loan picking. However, there is large heterogeneity in funding times for this pool. Some 3.5% of these loans are funded within a minute and about 5% are funded within five minutes of appearing on the platform, suggesting automated decision-making. Investors’ attention spikes at 9AM and 5PM, when Prosper makes new listings available; investors logging in around these times are also more likely to fund older, outstanding listings.

To summarize, institutional investors fund 90% of Prosper loans, predominantly by instructing Prosper to purchase in full on their behalf all loans that satisfy certain criteria investments are institutional and involve little ongoing human input. Robots play a dominant role, with Prosper’s software evaluating loans and funding 75% of them via the passive institutional pool, and active institutional investors using algorithmic decision making with limited human involvement.

3.2. Funding rates and loan screening

Loan screening is as a key aspect of the lending decision. Information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders can result in credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)), whereby some borrowers may be unable to secure a loan at any interest rate because of lenders’ concerns about their hidden riskiness.¹¹ The adverse selection problem may be particularly acute in P2P markets because of the absence of soft information and the arm’s length relationship between borrowers and lenders, who do not even know

¹⁰The median funding time increased to 55 seconds in 2017. This was probably caused by Prosper’s switch to a new data format, with TransUnion replacing Experian as the source of credit report data. The median funding times dropped to 26 seconds in 2018.

¹¹Bester (1985) defines credit rationing as credit denied to borrowers who would otherwise accept higher interest rates or provide collateral; this definition is consistent with how the term is used by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). By contrast, Jaffee and Russell (1976) define credit rationing as supplying a smaller loan amount than demanded by the borrowers after quoting an interest rate.

each other’s identities.

In contrast to traditional bank lending, where banks perform all loan evaluation and screening, the P2P loan market’s design in principle allows both the lending platform and investors to engage in borrower screening. On the one hand, the P2P lending platform prices loans and screens out (cancels) some possibly fraudulent or risky loan applications.¹² On the other hand, investors can perform their own credit evaluation using the information provided by the platform to determine whether the loan price set by the platform is commensurate with the loan’s level of credit risk, and deny funding to borrowers who they deem too risky.

In our data set, screening out by investors results in denial of funding, and screening out by Prosper results in a loan cancellation. Along with the loan pool composition, Figure 2 shows the proportion of loan applications that failed to attract funding from investors. This proportion is quite small. As many as 98.5% of all listed applications have been funded since 2013 and as many as 95.4% of loan applications have been funded since 2007 (see Table 2). Table 3 reports historical funding and cancellation rates by Prosper rating. Prosper ratings vary from AA (safest), with the average interest rate of 6.9% and the average binned FICO score of 750.8, to HR (riskiest), for which the interest rate is 29.6% and the FICO score average is 661.8 (see Panel A).¹³ The fraction of funded applications varies somewhat across credit quality and investor pools, reflecting investors’ preferences and loan picking skills. Nonetheless, the funding rates are universally high. By and large, investors fund almost all loans offered to them by the lending platform, apparently with little if any effort to evaluate individual loan applications before deciding to lend.

The low rejection rates suggest that investors rely on the lending platform for effective loan evaluation and screening. Prosper’s algorithms flag a fraction of loan applications as potentially suspicious, and attempt to automatically verify certain critical information, such as borrower’s income and employment status. Prosper’s screening algorithm may cancel a loan if it determines that the likelihood of default

¹²Although Prosper provides a wealth of borrower data to investors, borrower identities are not shared with investors. Therefore, the P2P platform can do more in-depth borrower screening than investors can, including identity checks and income verification.

¹³The table also shows that there is high correlation between the FICO score and the SCOREX score. The FICO score is a widely-recognized measure of default risk in consumer lending. However, because FICO is only available starting from 2013 in the data, some of our tests are based on SCOREX.

by the borrower may be materially greater than the one implied by the initially assigned Prosper rating. In the data, 25.9% of loan applications have been canceled by the lending platform since 2007, with somewhat higher historical cancellation rates for high-rated loans (Table 3). Cancellation rates have been even higher for the reintermediation period, standing at around 26.9% through the period (Table 2).¹⁴ These high cancellation rates are in sharp contrast with less than 2% of applications rejected by investors.

In order to test whether investors try to avoid suspicious loans, one can compare funding rates (outcome of investors' screening) on loans that are subsequently screened out (cancelled) by Prosper with those that are not. Unless investors' and the platform's screening efforts are perfect substitutes, one would expect to find fewer cancellations for funded versus unfunded loan applications. Contrary to the above hypothesis, we find that on average 26.3% of funded loans are subsequently canceled by Prosper, compared with only 16.6% of loans that failed to attract funding. This difference is particularly pronounced for riskier, lower-rated loans. Thus, historically the probability of being screened out by Prosper has been more than 1.5 times as high for funded as for unfunded loans. Thus, investors appear unconcerned about potential fraud, apparently trusting the platform's screening algorithms and doing little screening of their own.

3.3. Evolution of loan screening: platform vs. investors

Table 2 reports loan funding and cancellation rates for each of the three phases in the platform's development, disintermediation, transition, and reintermediation. It shows that funding and cancellation rates have generally both increased over time. The proportion of loan applications that receive investor funding has increased from 24.9% during the disintermediation period to 73.2% during the transition period and 98.5% during the reintermediation period. Loan cancellations by the platform increased from a mere 5.0% in 2009–2010 to 21.9% in 2011–2012 and 26.9% since 2013. The quality of the borrower pool as proxied by the SCOREX score hasn't changed dramatically over time, although it is somewhat lower during the reintermediation period. This decrease in borrower quality possibly reflects the platform's efforts to boost loan supply in view of the increased demand from institutional investors over this period.

Figure 3 shows the evolution of the proportion of loan applications rejected by investors (unfunded)

¹⁴ Prosper reportedly verified income and/or employment information self-reported by borrowers for 58% of the originated loans on a unit basis and approximately 72% of originated loans on a dollar basis between July 13, 2009 and March 31, 2016. Subsequent to such verification, Prosper canceled 11% of loan applications solely on the grounds of inaccurate or insufficient information (Prosper Prospectus dated May 24, 2016).

and by the platform (canceled). There is a sharp decline in the proportion of unfunded loans and a jump in loan cancellations in 2011, when the lending platform switched from the disintermediated auction market to the pre-set rate environment. The overall trend has been towards an increasing role of the platform in loan screening, which we interpret as evidence of redetermination. Moreover, loan screening by the lending platform has replaced that by investors, suggesting that the two are substitutes. Investors over time have gradually outsourcing most of the decision-making on loan pricing and screening to the lending platform, and have recently been willing to snap almost all loans offered to them by Prosper.

Table 2 also summarizes annual realized returns and their determinants for the three periods in the platform’s evolution. Despite being as high as 14.1% during 2009–2010, realized loan returns decreased during the transition period and reached 6.0% in the reintermediation period. The decrease in returns after 2013 appears to be due to both lower interest rates for all Prosper ratings and increasing default rates. While we discuss these trends in more detail in Section 5, it should be noted that the observed pattern is consistent with the predictions of Vallee and Zeng (2018). In their model, as the platform takes a more central role in screening, it has incentives to reduce the quality of the loan pool to maximize loan origination volume. This results in lower returns compared to earlier periods, when sophisticated investors were active in loan evaluation and funded only high-quality loans.

Overall, the evidence so far suggests that in addition to evaluating the risk of default and assigning loan interest rates, Prosper’s algorithms also essentially decide which loans should be originated and which denied credit. The fact that investors agree to fund most of the loans that are subsequently flagged as suspicious by Prosper suggests that they rely on the platform’s automated algorithms to screen out fraudulent applications. The market is essentially one in which the platform’s algorithms make almost all important decisions relevant to lending. And on the investors’ side, three quarters of the loans receive funding through the passive institutional pool, and most of the remaining ones are invested in by robots, apparently with more attention given to identifying underpriced loans¹⁵ than to detecting fraudulent applications likely to result in large losses. Central to this market structure is the expectation of a high quality credit analysis by the lending platform’s software as the de facto loan officer, which we study

¹⁵Balyuk and Davydenko (2017) show that investors are more likely to fund loans for which Prosper overestimates the probability of default, offering opportunities for high risk-adjusted returns.

next.

4. Loan evaluation and the platform’s role

4.1. Adverse selection in P2P markets

Asymmetric information about borrower risk may result in a market failure (credit rationing), whereby consumers may be denied credit because of lenders’ concerns that only the riskiest borrowers would apply for loans (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). The absence of soft information means that P2P loan applications must be evaluated based on a limited number of variables reported by either the borrower (possibly untruthfully) or a consumer credit bureau. In addition, the arm’s length nature of P2P lending, where neither the borrowers, nor the lenders know each other’s identity, may lower the psychological and reputational costs of defaulting on a loan. These factors are likely to result in adverse selection, as consumers of lower quality than suggested by their bureau credit scores may attempt to borrow through the P2P market and later default in high numbers.

To test this hypothesis, one can compare consumer default rates on P2P loans with those for other credits, controlling for the borrower’s FICO score as an observed traditional “hard” measure of credit quality. Since roughly 80% of Prosper loans are taken to refinance credit card debt, P2P loan default rates can be compared with those on credit card balances that consumers carry as debt. Using P2P loan data from Lending Club, Jagtiani and Lemieux (2017) find that for a given FICO score, the probability of debt becoming delinquent within 12 month of origination is noticeably higher for Lending Club loans than for credit card debt. We reproduce their statistics on credit card defaults in Panel A of Table 4, along with our own estimates of the 12-month delinquency rates on Prosper and Lending Club loans originated during the same period.¹⁶

Consistent with the adverse selection being present in P2P markets, the table shows that P2P borrowers are riskier than credit card borrowers with similar FICO scores. Moreover, borrowers on Prosper are riskier than on Lending Club, which reportedly caters to the higher end of the P2P market.

¹⁶For comparability with Jagtiani and Lemieux (2017), in Panel A of Table 4 we compute default rates as the fraction of loans that become 60 days past due within 12 months of origination. Elsewhere, we define default rates for a group of loans in the spirit of the hazard-rate analysis as the number of months that end in default divided by the total number of months that the loans are under risk, annualized as $1 - (1 - p)^{12}$ to yield the same cumulative probability of survival.

Thus, the platform’s role in this market can be substantiated by the need to mitigate borrower adverse selection, including detecting cases when the FICO score is not reflective of the true risk of borrowers.

4.2. Prosper score vs. FICO score

Prosper explicitly recognizes that P2P borrowers may not be representative of the general consumers’ population and employs its own proprietary model to predict loan losses. It combines an in-house analysis of P2P loan defaults with a credit bureau’s score (FICO or SCOREX) to compute the Estimated Loss Rate (ELR), which is then directly mapped into borrowers’ interest rates.¹⁷

The default-predicting ability of Prosper’s credit assessment relative to agency scores is illustrated by Panel B of Table 4, which shows default rates for different combinations of Prosper ratings and FICO buckets. Panel C of Table 4 shows the respective statistics for Lending Club subgrades, for comparison. The first thing to note is that Prosper’s assessment differs substantially from what the FICO score suggests for some borrowers, such as borrowers with FICO scores below 680 yet rated AA by Prosper. Moreover, default rates vary widely across Prosper ratings, but little across FICO bins for a given rating. For example, default rates for loans rated A vary between 2.52% and 3.27% across different FICO buckets and the relationship between default probability and FICO buckets for this rating does not appear monotonic. By contrast, default rates for loans within the 660-679 FICO bucket vary between 2.68% and 13.89% across different Prosper ratings, and the relationship looks monotonic in borrower risk as measured by Prosper rating. Moreover, the probability of default for borrowers in the 660-679/AA FICO-rating cell is similar to the default probability for the 780+ FICO consumers rated A by Prosper.

Thus, Prosper ratings largely subsume FICO scores, rendering them relatively uninformative. This may have been expected, given that Prosper’s model incorporates FICO scores. What is reassuring is that at least on average Prosper’s credit risk assessment is not simply incrementally informative but apparently vastly superior. Thus, by processing hard information effectively, the lending platform is able to reduce the uncertainty about borrowers’ quality, which should encourage lenders to participate in this market

¹⁷Based on data from Lending Club, which employs its own credit scoring procedure, Jagtiani and Lemieux (2017) find that the platform’s assessment of borrowers’ risk often differs significantly from what their FICO scores suggest; they also find that the correlation between Lending Club’s scores and FICOs has been decreasing over the years, potentially because the platform has been reducing its reliance on the agency score in favor of its own evaluation of borrower risk. In early 2018, Lending Club reported plans to completely exclude FICO scores from their model.

and mitigate the credit rationing problem. Prosper’s risk evaluation should be particularly valuable for unsophisticated retail investors, for whom evaluating individual loans’ risk would be impractical. As to institutional investors, the fact that 80% of them invest through the whole passive loan pool suggests that they also mostly trust Prosper’s assessment of risk and regard the assigned loan interest rate as adequate.

4.3. Loan pricing and default risk

In this subsection, we examine which loan characteristics are priced by Prosper, and whether the same variables also affect the hazard rate of default. As described above, Prosper uses a proprietary model to estimate the loss rate on the loan (ELR), which is then mapped into the borrower’s interest rate. We focus on ELR, which summarizes Prosper’s assessment of expected default losses. By contrast, loan interest rates are also affected by time-varying interest rates and risk premia, and thus are a noisier measure of default risk. We model default risk using a parametric hazard model, outlined in Appendix B.

Table 5 reports regressions of the ELR and the default hazard on various borrower and loan characteristics. Most determinants of the ELR also strongly affect the hazard rate of default. The effect of most variables conforms to expectations. Both the ELR and default risk are increasing in the debt-to-income ratio and the borrower’s recent credit activity, as measured by the number of transactions and credit inquiries within the last 6 months. They are decreasing in the borrower’s income, the number of credit lines in the borrower’s name, and unused credit available on credit cards. Long-term loans and those extended to self-employed and delinquent borrowers are riskier, which is reflected in Prosper’s model. Of note, Prosper favors repeat borrowers with lower rates as it assigns lower ELRs to such borrowers, which is consistent with lower default rates by such borrowers, perhaps owing to the survivorship bias.

While most borrower characteristics that feed into Prosper’s credit model do predict variations in default risk, Column (3) of Table 5 shows that many variables are significantly related to the default hazard even after controlling for the ELR. Thus, their effect on default may not be fully captured by the Prosper model. Moreover, as Columns (4) and (5) show, some factors (such as non-linear transformations of other variables, such as the debt-to-income ratio) significantly affect the ELR but are not related to the actual default hazard in our tests. Moreover, some variables, such as whether the borrower has a

mortgage, seem to be priced with the wrong sign. Hence, it should be possible to build a more precise model that would improve on that used by Prosper, which would allow investors to identify loans that are can be expected to earn superior return given their true risk. Vallee and Zeng (2018) show that investors subscribed to a service called LendingRobot are able to earn superior returns, presumably because its algorithms correct some of the mispricing introduced by the platform.¹⁸ Nonetheless, the Prosper model provides a high quality credit analysis, far superior to credit bureau’s scores.

4.4. Performance of Prosper’s model over time

Prosper states that its model is updated periodically to reflect changing expectations and to incorporate the growing history of P2P loan performance. In addition to capturing the average level of default risk, a good credit model should be able to distinguish between safe and risky loans in the cross-section. A standard measure of classification accuracy is the area under the ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve, which plots the classifier’s sensitivity (the “true positive” rate, or the proportion of defaults correctly classified as such) against 1–specificity (the “false positive” rate, or the proportion of nondefaulting loans wrongly classified as defaulting). The ROC area varies from a minimum of 0.5 for a random predictor with no power to a maximum of 1 for a predictor that makes no classification errors.

To assess the cross-sectional accuracy of Prosper’s model and its performance over time, we measure the area under the ROC curve using the ELR as the risk measure that summarizes Prosper’s risk assessment. We focus on loans originated in the passive institutional pool, which are likely more representative for the purposes of studying the quality of Prosper’s credit analysis than the average loan in the sample. Indeed, the set of loans originated through the active institutional and retail pools is affected by investors’ attempts to identify attractive investments, which may bias the results.

Across all passive institutional loans, the ROC curve area is 0.651 (Table 6). For comparison, this statistic is only 0.596 for FICO bins, which implies considerably lower accuracy. In fact, the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval around the ELR-based ROC area is almost universally higher than the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval around the ROC area based on FICO bins.

¹⁸In order to calculate loan returns, we also build our own parametric hazard model of defaults based on the full history of loan performance available to date, as outlined in Appendix B, which includes 22 borrower and loan characteristics. The variables included in regressions of Table 5 constitute a subset of the full specification.

Moreover, ELR’s sorting ability has increased over the years. The ROC area based on ELR as the classifier has been steadily increasing, with the lower bound of the confidence interval in 2017 being higher than its upper bound in 2013. Figure 4 shows the ELR-based ROC area for different monthly loan cohorts. As can be seen, the classification accuracy has generally been trending up, suggesting that the quality of Prosper’s model has been improving over the years. The patterns described above are similar for Lending Club (Panel C of Table 6).¹⁹ The predictive ability of its measure of loan risk, subgrade, appears to exceed that of the FICO score, despite that the predictive ability of the FICO score for LC loans is similar to FICO’s predictive ability for Prosper loans.

4.5. Loan screening by Prosper

In the presence of adverse selection coupled with investors’ tendency to fund almost all loans on offer, the ability of the lending platform’s algorithms to identify and cancel applications from borrowers who are riskier than they appear may potentially be crucial in preventing credit rationing and potential market breakdown. Unlike traditional banking, where loan applications are screened before a credit decision is made, Prosper uses a hybrid process: A P2P loan application is listed on the platform and becomes available for investors to fund *before* the application is screened by Prosper’s algorithms, which may involve verifying borrower’s self-reported information. This substantially reduces the time it takes to originate a loan, but may raise concerns of lax screening.

To better understand the screening process in these markets, we first relate the probability of loan cancellation to borrower characteristics. If Prosper effectively screens out borrowers of low hidden quality, one would expect to see more cancellations for borrowers with overstated income or an unreliable FICO score, either because of its coarseness as a measure of riskiness or because of a short credit history that does not adequately reflect the borrower’s risk. Prosper does not verify income and employment for all loans, but rather uses a proprietary algorithm to determine which loan applications to screen. For example, according to Prosper, the algorithm is supposed to flag loans for which the borrower’s self-reported income is ‘highly determinative’ of the Prosper rating.

¹⁹Recently, Vallee and Zeng (2018) have employed a similar methodology to document an upward trend in the accuracy of Lending Club’s and Prosper’s models. Their ROC area analysis is based on the platforms’ ratings; we use the ERL for Prosper and subgrade for Lending Club as a more granular default predictors.

We examine the determinants of loan cancellations and contrast them against funding decisions by investors in regressions presented in Table 7.²⁰ As expected, the likelihood of loan cancellation is higher for borrowers with lower debt-to-income ratios (Columns (1)–(3)). These borrowers likely have overstated income that reduces the ratio or have little debt suggesting that other traditional lenders may have credit-rationed these borrowers. It is surprising, however, that loan applications from self-employed borrowers are rarely canceled, even though their income cannot be verified. Instead, Prosper appears to price the risk in by assigning higher interest rates to self-employed applicants. Table 7 also shows that the probability of loan cancellation is positively related to the FICO score, although the magnitude of the effect is small on average. However, the fraction of applications from borrowers with a FICO score over 800 that are canceled by the platform is 40%, compared with only 29% for other borrowers, suggesting that the screening algorithm is more likely to be skeptical about applicants with very high scores needing a P2P loan.

In general, the effect of most borrower characteristics on the probability that the application is subsequently canceled by Prosper is consistent with the platform’s screening out those borrowers whose ‘hard’ credit variables may not be reliable predictors of default. This includes borrowers who do not have a mortgage, or have short credit histories and multiple credit inquiries. In contrast, loan applications from borrowers with prior Prosper loans seem to be canceled significantly less often. Having a prior Prosper loan reduces the probability of loan cancellation by 18 percentage points, or 67% relative to the average cancellation rate. This is despite that the financial situation and the risk of the borrower may change significantly between loan applications. Nonetheless, having screened a borrower once, the platform likely has more trust in the information provided by the borrower in subsequent loan applications.

Columns (4)–(6) of Table 7 show that most characteristics that are correlated with a higher probability of loan cancellation are also negatively related to the probability that the loan is funded by investors, even when we control for the loan risk by including ELR fixed effects. This suggests that screening by the platform and screening by investors can at least to a certain degree be considered substitutes. Therefore, improvements in the platform’s ability to screen out risky loans can cause investors to cease

²⁰Since we include listing month fixed effects into our model to control for differences in the borrower pool across time and variations in the screening model employed by the platform, we prefer OLS with fixed effects to logit.

their own screening and become passive to avoid duplication of screening costs. This delegated screening is similar to the role traditional intermediaries play in reducing costs of information production, as in Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984).

4.6. Screening effectiveness

To formally assess whether Prosper’s screening is effective, one would need to investigate if loans that were canceled would have resulted in higher losses had they been extended. Unfortunately, this counterfactual is generally unobservable, so the evidence is only indirect. Carmichael (2017) identifies borrowers who applied for a P2P loan both through Prosper and through Lending Club. He finds that applicants whose Prosper loans were canceled by the platform but who nevertheless received a loan from Lending Club are significantly more likely to default given their rating, implying that canceled loans are riskier than they appear.

Our own evidence regarding loan cancellations is based on Prosper applicants who, having had their loan application canceled, reapply for another loan within a month. For such borrowers, Prosper re-uses their previous credit report, but their self-reported information may be different.²¹ We first compare loan and borrower characteristics for such re-applying borrowers appearing on their old (canceled) and new (resubmitted) loans applications. We find that even though the applicants are the same and no more than a month has passed between the applications, the proportion of applicants who admit to being self-employed increases from 5% to 9%, and the stated monthly income is decreased by \$1,710. Thus, these applicants are likely untruthful on the first application, which is detected by Prosper and leads to the loan cancellation. As a result of the revision in the application data, the loans’ assessed ELR increases by 81.4 basis points on average, which results in a 0.31 points lower Prosper rating, 1.3 percentage points higher interest rate, and 11.5% smaller loan size.

Regression analysis of Table 8 shows that, controlling for the ELR, re-submitted loans that receive funding are significantly more likely to default. We find default rates on these loans to be 3 percentage points higher than those for other borrowers with the same ELR in the same month. Thus, the loans

²¹We focus on borrowers who reapply within 30 days to mitigate concerns that the borrower’s true creditworthiness or their assessment by Prosper are affected by other unobservable factors. In the sample, 76.7% of borrowers who reapply after the application is canceled do so within this period, perhaps to ensure that Prosper uses their prior credit report instead of requesting a new one.

from the previously screened out applicants are too risky even for the newly assigned, higher ELR. Had these loans been issued at the ELR assessed originally on the first application before it was canceled, the resulting default rate would have been 4.3 points higher than on other loans with the same ELR. These findings confirm that loans that are canceled by Prosper are indeed riskier than others with the same assessed risk. However, Prosper appears too lenient when borrowers who were previously screened out reapply for another loan, and does not fully compensate for their higher risk when assigning the new ELR.²²

Vallee and Zeng (2018) predict that when the platform increases its pricing precision (intensive margin of loan screening), it needs to cancel fewer loan applications (extensive margin of screening). However, their model does not allow for the differential pricing of loans of different risk. As such, it cannot explain the existence of credit rationing (loan denial) in situations when riskier borrowers should be able to secure funding simply by paying a higher interest rate. To investigate whether increasing the effectiveness of loan pricing allows the lending platform to reduce the number of canceled loans, we relate loan cancellations to the area under the ROC curve, calculated based on the loan’s ELR as the classifier (Table 9). We find that the increase in the ROC area is associated with fewer cancellations, consistent with Vallee and Zeng (2018). A one standard deviation increase in the ROC area is associated with the loan cancellation rate that is almost 2 percentage point lower, which is a 6.4% decrease relative to the mean. Interestingly, controlling for the fundings status, the passive pool indicator is not a significant predictor of cancellations, which suggests that Prosper does not use lax screening criteria for loans in the passive pool, which investors fund automatically without review.

Overall, the results on loan screening provide evidence that Prosper cancels more applications of borrowers whose self-reported information may lead to the underestimation of default risk. Thus, the platform’s role in screening borrowers extends beyond fraud detection or mechanical income verification, suggesting a pro-active role in loan screening similar to that played by traditional credit intermediaries. Although none of these tests can fully control for the endogeneity of borrowers’ choices, in the absence of

²²Based solely on these statistics, and ignoring further issues arising from the self-selection of risky borrowers, the ELR for repeat applicants after a loan cancellation should be increased by about 3.5% on average instead of the observed 0.8%. However, in interpreting these and other realized performance statistics documented in this paper, one should keep in mind that we obtain them using more data and longer histories than were available at the time when Prosper algorithms were calibrated, so the model parameters chosen at the time may have been adequate conditional on the available data.

a counterfactual our evidence and that reported in Carmichael (2017) suggest that Prosper’s screening algorithms are able to identify and screen out at least some excessively risky or possibly fraudulent applications, mitigating the information frictions that can result in credit rationing and investors’ unwillingness to lend.

5. Loan performance and investment returns

The evidence presented so far is consistent with the platform’s increasing expertise in loan pricing and screening crowding out loan evaluation by investors, who become passive in response. Given the gradual improvement in the platform’s ability to predict default, coupled with its incentives to maximize loan origination volume, loan returns should be expected to trend down, as predicted by Vallee and Zeng’s (2018) model. Yet whether this market structure allows investors to earn returns sufficient to attract even unsophisticated investors to the market is an open question.

This section studies investors’ returns on P2P loans. The absence of secondary-market prices for outstanding loans makes the estimation of realized loan returns a challenging task, which is compounded by the fact that a large fraction of loans in the sample have not matured at the time of the study and are still under risk of default in the future. To overcome these problems, we develop and implement a new procedure for evaluating the performance of non-traded loans, which is described in Appendix A.

5.1. Market trends in loan performance

Figure 5 plots monthly realized returns on Prosper loans net of fees, and compares them with the return on the BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Index during the reintermediation period. The mean (median) monthly return on a portfolio of Prosper loans across calendar months has so far been 9.58% (8.78%). On the one hand, these returns are noticeably higher than those on junk bonds, which averaged 6.37% over the same period. On the other hand, we also find the default rate for Prosper loans in the sample to be high, averaging 6.23% during these years. For comparison, excluding the financial crisis period, default rates on high yield bonds are approximately 2%–2.5% in most sample years, increasing to 3.6% in 2015 and 4.5% in 2016 (Ou *et al.* (2017)). Thus, Prosper loans have earned higher returns but also had higher default risk than junk bonds during our (relatively benign) time period.

Figure 5 shows that returns on Prosper loans decreased from about 13.2% to 8.2% between January 2013 and November 2017. They fell below the high yield bond benchmark for a period of time in the first half of 2016, and were as low as 5.6% in August 2016. This decrease in returns was due to rising default rates, which increased from 5%–6% to above 8% by the end of 2015, without a commensurate increase in loan interest rates.²³ Default rates subsequently declined to 6.1% by the end of the sample, and returns have increased by more than a percentage point.

Overall, although the market will need to go through a full credit cycle before we can assess the long-term investment performance of P2P loans with confidence, so far investors have been able to achieve net returns above those on junk bonds, except for a brief period in 2016. However, consistent with the theoretical predictions of Vallee and Zeng’s (2018), returns have declined considerably since the market became reintermediated. Given that loans originated in later years are over-represented in the data due to the exponential growth of the market, the return on an average loan in the sample (6.23%) is more modest than the market’s cumulative performance to date. Nonetheless, this evidence suggests that lending platforms have been able to pass some of the value they create on to investors.

5.2. Returns to passive and active strategies

A well-established result in the literature is that actively-managed mutual funds underperform passive benchmarks after fees (e.g., Gruber (1996); French (2008)). In contrast to equity markets, P2P loan prices are determined by the lending platform’s software, rather than in negotiations between buyers and sellers in the P2P loan market, implying more potential for mispricing. Therefore, it is possible that active loan selection in P2P markets may outperform passive investment strategies. We test this conjecture by comparing loan performance in the active institutional pool, where investors can evaluate loan applications, with that in the passive pool, where applications are funded automatically as long as they satisfy certain criteria.

Table 10 documents loan returns and their determinants during the reintermediation period, by Prosper rating and across investment strategies (active vs. passive).²⁴ Panel B reports estimated loss

²³In early 2016, as doubts surfaced about Prosper’s loan quality and improprieties were alleged at Lending Club, the P2P lending market experienced its most serious crisis to date. We describe this episode in detail in the next section.

²⁴When calculating realized returns by rating, we are assuming that any proceeds from loan repayment are reinvested into loans with the same rating that are originated within the same investor pool.

rates (ELRs) for loans originated during this period, which range from 1.45% for AA-rated loans to 16.65% for HR-rated loans. The annualized default rates on originated loans are close to Prosper’s loss estimates, but somewhat smaller for E- and HR-rated loans (Panel C). Default rates increase monotonically from 1.55% for AA-rated loans to 13.87% for HR-rated loans. Panel D reports realized returns on originated loans, which range from 4.18% for AA-rated loans to 12.08% for HR-rated loans.

Table 10 also compares returns on loans originated through active and passive institutional pools. Active institutional investors’ returns average 6.5%, whereas passive institutional investors earn 5.6%. The outperformance of active loan-picking strategies appears to be increasing with the riskiness of P2P loans, and is more pronounced in lower-rated loans, such as loans rated D, E, and HR. However, these univariate comparisons may be affected by the changing composition of the borrower pool. Even if the allocation of loan applications among these pools is random, the changing relative shares of the pools may result in differences in averages if the borrower composition changes.

We address this concern using regression analysis, reported in Table 11. While the negative and significant coefficient for the passive pool dummy in column (1) appears to confirm that passive strategies earn lower returns, other tests show that this difference disappears once we control for the time variation in loan quality by including monthly fixed effects. Although Columns (5)–(7) suggest that loan originated in the passive pool default more often even after controlling for Prosper rating or ELR, we do not find statistically significant differences in net returns across the two pools (Columns (2)–(4)).²⁵

Thus, while potentially there may be scope for improving over Prosper’s credit evaluation, in practice the gains to active loan picking in the reintermediated period appear to be modest. On the one hand, this implies that sophisticated investors who have the ability to perform their own credit analysis may find it uneconomical to do so, and adopt passive strategies instead. On the other hand, to the extent that some sophisticated investors (for example, those using LendingRobot for credit advice) remain active, their presence is unlikely to deter unsophisticated investors from also participating in the market. Thus, by providing high-quality loan analysis the lending platform can attract a wide range of investors.

²⁵Note, however, that the short history of matured loans after 2013 is a greater statistical problem for distinguishing between returns rather than between interest rates or defaults. As defaults are infrequent and especially so for younger loans, the statistical tests of returns may lack power to capture the differences even if these differences exist and will become more pronounced as loans mature.

6. Moral hazard and the 2016 crisis

P2P platforms' main source of revenue is loan origination and servicing fees, which implies that the platforms have incentives to maximize loan origination volume. Yet in contrast to banks, lending platforms typically have little or no skin in the game, bearing little of the credit risk of the loans they help originate. Moreover, because defaults are relatively infrequent and only observed as loans age, the quality of P2P loans is revealed with a substantial lag, which makes it difficult for investors to detect any deterioration in loan underwriting standards in a timely manner. Under these conditions, the platforms' efforts to boost loan volume may allow risky borrowers to obtain loans at attractive interest rates that may not fully compensate investors for the risk of default. This moral hazard problem can potentially result in the market's breakdown if investors lose trust in the quality of the platforms' loan evaluation.²⁶

We illustrate this issue with the episode of near-market collapse in the first half of 2016 and subsequent partial recovery, illustrated in Figure 6. High default rates in 2015 elevated concerns from investors and rating agencies about the quality of P2P loans. On February 11, 2016, Moody's placed Citibank's securitizations of Prosper loans under review for downgrade and revised up loss expectations for Blackrock's securitizations. Upon the announcement, funding rates on Prosper plummeted as institutional investors refused to fund new loans, and loan volume collapsed. Despite Prosper's attempt to bring investors back on board by raising interest rates, loan volume continued to drop until mid-July of 2016, when Moody's finally decided against the downgrade. Over the first half of 2016, loan volume on Prosper fell by 83%, erasing cumulative gains from several years of growth.

In a separate development, a scandal around Lending Club broke out in April 2016. The platform was accused of violating investor instructions by issuing P2P loans that did not meet buyers' criteria, and of poor governance due to undisclosed interest of its CEO in a fund that was buying Lending Club loans, allegedly to boost demand. The loan volume halved as many investors, including banks and other

²⁶A certain degree of lax screening is optimal in the model of Vallee and Zeng (2018) in the passive-investor (reintermediated) equilibrium. Indeed, as long as investors break even, the platform can boost loan origination volume by retaining some low-quality loans in the pool even if it can costlessly screen them out. However, in contrast to this one-period model, in reality investors interact with the platform repeatedly over time. In repeated games the platform may have incentives to increase the proportion of bad loans in the mix *beyond* investors' break-even constraint, if by doing so it can boost volume sufficiently to outweigh future losses from potential investor retaliation.

institutions, put their P2P loan orders on hold or pulled out of the platform.²⁷ Lending Club’s CEO resigned. Both platforms responded to the crisis by re-evaluating their interest rate policies, tightening the lending standards, and eventually switching to a different credit model. Meanwhile, having peaked in mid-2016, default rates started to fall again and loan volume has partially recovered.

Figure 7 plots predicted and realized loan returns by month of origination, as well as the volume of newly originated loans. Two developments are noteworthy and can shed some light on the precursors of and lessons from this near-collapse in the P2P loan market. First, the gradual decline in loan returns documented in Figure 5 was precipitated by the deterioration in the quality of loans made earlier, starting with those originated right after the creation of the whole loan pool in April 2013. Because the median loan age at default is 14 months, it took over a year for the declining loan quality to be reflected in lower returns. All the while, loan volume was growing exponentially even as returns were falling and default losses mounted. Second, while Prosper’s estimate of lenders’ returns either accurately predicted or was somewhat below the actual loan performance up until December 2014, afterwards it remained between 6% and 7% until early 2017. The actual loan quality deteriorated over the subsequent two years, with realized returns falling below 4% for some cohorts. Thus, the platform appears to have underestimated the riskiness of the newly originated loans during this period. This jeopardized the whole market, as under the reintermediated structure investors rely on the platform’s loan analysis to break even. Importantly, we find that the drop in funding during the crisis was fully explained by institutional investors’ withdrawal, whereas loan originations in the retail pool did not decline.

This evidence can be interpreted as consistent with the tendency towards potential erosion of underwriting standards stemming from incentives to accelerate the growth in loan originations. At the same time, the corrective actions taken by the platforms during the crisis and the subsequent market recovery to date suggest that the moral hazard problem may be effectively checked by institutional investors’ threat to withdraw funding if loan performance falls too much. This is reminiscent of the disciplining role of depositors in banks, which make these traditional intermediaries subject to bank runs when the trust in the banking sector is eroded (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). While the history of observed performance

²⁷It is worth noting that Lending Club’s loan volume dropped later than Prosper’s. This mitigates the concern that the decrease in volume originated by the two platforms was caused by some exogenous event affecting the aggregate loan demand, such as an increase in the federal funds rate.

in P2P lending markets is too short to ascertain the viability of the current business model, we believe that this episode illustrates both the potential importance of moral hazard for P2P markets and the platforms' capability of adapting in response to investor withdrawal.

7. Concluding remarks

Currently, the P2P lending market in the U.S. is neither peer-to-peer nor, for the most part, a lending market in the traditional sense. Lending platforms' software performs all essential functions of traditional lending officers, including loan evaluation, pricing, screening, and servicing. Even though institutional investors provide over 90% of financing, most of them choose to remain completely passive. Overall, investors agree to fund over 98.5% of loans offered to them by the platform at the interest rates it deems appropriate. It falls to the platform's software to determine which loan applications should be canceled due to excessive risks. The market looks much like delegated investment management, where the platform chooses the investment portfolio, and investors' decisions are largely limited to whether to participate in the market or not. This structure is a far cry from the market's early years, when the lending platforms' role was to facilitate borrowers' and lenders' direct interactions in a decentralized marketplace.

Why did the market become reintermediated, and what are the lessons for our understanding of the role of the intermediary? We show that loan screening efforts by lenders and the platform are substitutes, which makes it economical to delegate them to a central intermediary to avoid duplication. This outsourcing of decision making is facilitated by the absence of private information about P2P borrowers, which limits the scope for investors' disagreement regarding which loans should be funded. In the situation when the loan data are limited to a number of 'hard', quantitative variables, loan evaluation becomes a straightforward exercise in machine learning. By taking the lead in providing high-quality loan analysis, lending platforms can attract uninformed investors to the market. This also makes a technological 'arms race' unattractive for the sophisticated investors, who respond by becoming passive.

In essence, reintermediation arises as investors' ability to evaluate loans at low cost falls short of the platform's, which has strong incentives to improve in order to boost loan volume. Consistent with the predictions of Vallee and Zeng (2018), we find that investors' returns are lower under the reintermediated model. Nonetheless, the returns compare favorably with those on comparable fixed-income investments

during the same period, suggesting that the platforms have been able to pass some of the value they create on to investors, at least during our benign sample period of low interest rates.

While lending platforms today perform many of the functions of traditional banks, they are different in a number of other aspects, which some theoretical research has emphasized as central to their role as intermediaries. In particular, lending platforms do not take deposits or perform liquidity or maturity transformation, which would make them vulnerable to the threat of a bank run. Given that the platforms function as delegated loan adjudicators but rarely hold stakes in the loans they originate, what is there to ensure that high standards in loan evaluation are consistently enforced? The recent market crisis and the platforms' response to it suggest that the threat of investors' withdrawal resulting in a market collapse may provide sufficient discipline. Whether the prevailing structure of the market is sustainable in the long term remains an open question.

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Appendix A.: Return calculations

Estimating returns on P2P loans is challenging, as the absence of a well-functioning secondary market for outstanding loans implies that market prices cannot be used to benchmark loan performance on an ongoing basis. This problem is compounded by the fact that due to the explosive growth of the market, at the time of the study a large proportion of loans has not yet matured. As a result, in order to evaluate loan returns to date it is necessary to estimate the market value of outstanding loans.

Another important issue concerns reinvestment of interim cash flows. Because P2P loans are fully amortizing, their duration is short relative to original maturity, and loan performance metrics are sensitive to assumptions regarding the rate of return on cash flows received in early periods. Our base case assumption is that interim loan payments are reinvested in similar loans belonging to the same cohort.

Thus, when reporting returns on a portfolio of loans with certain characteristics (e.g., with a certain rating), we assume that each loan's cash flows are reinvested in the average loan from the same portfolio originated in the same month as the loan in question. This assumption results in a relatively simple estimation procedure, but it can be unrealistic if there is no market for portfolio loans already outstanding. For this reason, we later also calculate realized returns under the more realistic assumption of reinvestment in new loans that are originated at the time when each cash flow is received.

A.1. Assumptions and notation

We use the letter t to denote calendar time and τ to refer to the age of the loan, i.e., the number of months since loan origination. For a loan originated in calendar month t_0 , the age at time t equals simply $\tau = t - t_0$. We refer to all loans originated in month t_0 as the t_0 -cohort.

When calculating returns for portfolio of loans, we assume that loan proceeds are reinvested at the average return on all portfolio loans from the same cohort with the same maturity. We refer to such a group of loans as a 'batch'. For instance, when computing returns by rating, a reinvestment batch for an A-rated loan with 36 month to maturity issued in January 2014 would comprise other 36-month A-rated loans originated in the same month.

Denote by P and T a loan's principal amount and its initial time to maturity in months. Let N be the size of the batch the loan belongs to, with the batch loans indexed by $i : 1 \leq i \leq N$. We will use the bar over a variable to denote its average value across all loans in the batch. Let R be the expected monthly return on the loan, and \hat{R}_τ the realized return in month τ ; the batch averages for these variables are \bar{R} and $\hat{\bar{R}}_\tau$.

Denote by τ_d the age at which the loan is observed to default, with $\tau_d = T + 1$ if the loan never defaults. We say that a loan survives through month τ if $\tau < \tau_d$, i.e., the loan does not default on at least the first τ payments. The probability of surviving for at least τ months is referred to as the *survival function* and denoted S_τ .

P2P loans are fully amortized, so that in the absence of fees investors would be promised equal monthly payments over the life of the loan. However, the platform's servicing fee can result in payments being different in different months. For instance, Prosper charges a fee that is a proportion of the outstanding principal each month. Because the latter declines over the life of the loan, so does the fee withheld from each monthly payment. As a result, net loan payments to investors increase over time. We denote the required payment on the loan τ months from origination as C_τ . We also assume that if the loan defaults in month τ_d , investors' expected recovery payment discounted to time τ_d is ρ_τ . Evaluated at loan origination, the expected cash flow at age τ is given by:

$$X_\tau = S_\tau C_\tau + (S_{\tau-1} - S_\tau) \rho_\tau. \quad (\text{A1})$$

We assume that this cash flow is will be reinvested and expected to earn \bar{R} per month, thus growing to $X_\tau \bar{R}^{T-\tau}$ by the time the loan matures.

The actual cash flow received by the investor, \hat{X}_τ , will be:

$$\hat{X}_\tau = \begin{cases} C_\tau & \text{if } \tau < \tau_d \text{ and } \tau \leq T \\ \hat{\rho}_\tau & \text{if } \tau = \tau_d \leq T \\ 0 & \text{if } \tau_d < \tau \leq T \text{ or } \tau = 0, \end{cases} \quad (\text{A2})$$

where $\hat{\rho}_\tau$ is the realized recovery payment if the loan defaults at τ . If $\hat{X}_\tau > 0$ and $\tau < T$, this cash flow is reinvested and earns the cumulative return equal to $\bar{R}_{\tau+1} \times \bar{R}_{\tau+2} \times \dots \times \bar{R}_T$ by the time the loan matures.

While the loan is outstanding, investors receive monthly payments and also hold a claim on future loan payments, which becomes worthless when the loan defaults. We refer to this claim as the *loan balance*, and denote its value at age τ as v_τ for $\tau < \tau_d$. As the final piece of notation, the total loan value at age τ is denoted V_τ . It is equal to the value of the loan balance if the loan is alive (i.e., $v_\tau \mathbb{1}_{\tau < \tau_d}$), plus the accumulated value of all cash flows received up to τ .

A.2. Expected returns

The expected value of the loan's cash flows at maturity can be found by growing each expected interim cash flow at rate \bar{R} through maturity:

$$\mathbb{E}_0[V_T] = \sum_{\tau=1}^T X_\tau \bar{R}^{T-\tau}. \quad (\text{A3})$$

The cumulative expected return on the loan is defined as $R^T = \mathbb{E}_0[V_T]/P$. Using Equation (A3) and averaging over all loans in the batch, the average compound rate of growth satisfies:

$$\bar{R}^T = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N R_i^T = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{\tau=1}^T \bar{R}^{T-\tau} \sum_{i=1}^N X_{i\tau}/P_i. \quad (\text{A4})$$

Thus, the average expected batch return can be found by solving the following equation for \bar{R} :

$$1 = \sum_{\tau=1}^T \frac{\frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N X_{i\tau}/P_i}{\bar{R}^\tau}. \quad (\text{A5})$$

The numerator in the above equation gives the expected cash flow in month τ for an investor who invests \$1, splitting it equally across all loans in the batch. Equation (A5) shows that under our reinvestment assumption and definition of the expected return, \bar{R} is the internal rate of return (IRR) on such an investment. Once it is found, the individual loan's expected monthly return can be computed as:

$$R = (\mathbb{E}_0[V_T]/P)^{1/T} = \left(\sum_{\tau=1}^T X_\tau \bar{R}^{T-\tau} \right)^{1/T}. \quad (\text{A6})$$

A.3. Realized returns

In order to evaluate the returns on the loan on a monthly basis while the loan is outstanding, one needs to compute the market value of the loan balance each month, as well as the ongoing returns on the interim cash flows reinvested earlier. In the absence of secondary market prices, given the interest rate on the loan and our model of default risk, the estimates of realized returns will be driven by the observed default experience for the loan and for the batch it belongs to.²⁸

²⁸By fixing risk premia instead of expected returns, our procedure can be easily extended to incorporate the effect of changes in the risk-free rate of interest on loan values. We ignore changes in interest rates in order to fully focus on the effects of credit risk.

Our assumption that interim cash flows are reinvested in the average loan in the batch ensures that in any calendar month the average realized rate of return across all batch loans can be found as the average return on loan balances across all batch loans that were alive in the previous month. To estimate the value of an outstanding loan in the absence of secondary market loan prices, we assume that if the loan is alive at τ , the value of the loan balance, v_τ , can be found by discounting the expected future cash flows at the ex ante rate R , assuming they will be reinvested at the ex ante batch rate \bar{R} .

A.3.1. Loan balance returns

If a loan is alive at $\tau - 1$, the conditional probability of survival through month τ equals $S_\tau/S_{\tau-1}$, and the expected payment then equals $X_\tau/S_{\tau-1}$. The payment is expected to earn \bar{R} monthly until maturity. Therefore, while the loan is alive the expected values of the loan balance can be computed recursively as:

$$v_{\tau-1} = \frac{S_\tau v_\tau + X_\tau (\bar{R}/R)^{T-\tau}}{S_{\tau-1} R}, \quad (\text{A7})$$

starting with $v_T = 0$.

The actual realized return on the loan balance in month τ , denoted \tilde{R}_τ , will depend on whether the loan defaults in that month. If it does not, the loan balance return will be $(v_\tau + C_\tau)/v_{\tau-1}$, and if it defaults, the return will be $\rho_\tau/v_{\tau-1}$. Using the notation for the realized cash flow \hat{X}_τ given by Equation (A2), the return on the loan balance can be written as:

$$\tilde{R}_\tau = \frac{\hat{X}_\tau + v_\tau \mathbb{1}_{\tau < \tau_d}}{v_{\tau-1}}. \quad (\text{A8})$$

The average realized rate of return on loan balances for all batch loans at age τ is denoted $\bar{\tilde{R}}_\tau$ and can be found by averaging the loan balance returns given by Equation (A8) across all batch loans that were alive at $\tau - 1$. Under our assumptions, all previously reinvested interim cash flows earn in month τ the same return $\bar{\tilde{R}}_\tau$.

A.3.2. Total loan returns

The total value of the loan at age τ is the value of the loan balance (zero if $\tau \geq \tau_d$), plus the loan payment received in that month, \hat{X}_τ , plus the reinvested value of payments received in prior months. The prior payments, whose value at $\tau - 1$ can be found as $V_{\tau-1} - v_{\tau-1}$, earn in month τ the average batch return, $\bar{\tilde{R}}_\tau$. Thus, the loan value can be computed recursively as:

$$V_\tau = v_\tau \mathbb{1}_{\tau < \tau_d} + \hat{X}_\tau + (V_{\tau-1} - v_{\tau-1}) \bar{\tilde{R}}_\tau, \quad (\text{A9})$$

starting with $V_0 = v_0 = P$. The total realized loan return in month τ is then found as:

$$\hat{R}_\tau = V_\tau / V_{\tau-1}. \quad (\text{A10})$$

The equivalent realized return over the life of the loan is the geometric average of its monthly returns. It can also be computed simply as:

$$\hat{R} = (V_T / P)^{1/T}. \quad (\text{A11})$$

A practical problem for a study of P2P loans is that a large fraction of them have not yet matured at the time of the study. For such loans we assume that their future performance will be similar to that observed to date. Specifically, if τ' is the age of the loan at the time of the study, we compute the realized return on the loan as

$$\hat{R} = (V_{\tau'}/P)^{1/\tau'}. \quad (\text{A12})$$

Appendix B:. Implementation

B.1. Default and recovery data

We designate a loan as defaulted if Prosper reports its status as ‘Defaulted’ or ‘Charge-off’ but the loan is not marked as ‘Paid-in-full’ or ‘Settled-in-full’, because investors’ losses on repaid loans are small or zero, and because we cannot recover the timing of default for such loans. For defaulted loans, we approximate loan age at default, τ_d , as one plus the integer part of the sum of principal and interest repaid divided by the monthly payment, C . Upon default, we calculate the residual cash flow in the last period as the amount withdrawn to cover the interest and principal plus fees attributable to investors, plus proceeds from the sale of the loan or other recovery of principal (if any). This cash flow is received with a substantial delay following default. We assume that the value of the recovery payment at τ_d , which we denote $\alpha_i C_i$, can be found by discounting this residual cash flow over 12 months at the rate R . We then use the average α across all loans in our calculations of the expected recovery payment, $\bar{\alpha}C$. We approximate the net interest rate y as the borrower’s rate minus the loan servicing fee. The servicing fee is equal to 1% per annum for loans originated before August 1, 2016, and 1.075% pa for those originated thereafter.

We disregard any prepayments or late fees paid on nondefaulting loans, because we have no information on their timing. We assume no prepayments on defaulting loans. Any additional fees, such as the late payment fee, are infrequent and we do not expect them to affect our calculations significantly.

B.2. Hazard model of default

We model default using tools of survival analysis; see Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) for a detailed exposition. Non-parametric examination of the P2P loan data suggests that the hazard rate of default is first increasing and then decreasing with loan age. The baseline hazard also appears to depend on loan maturity. To accommodate these features of the data, we estimate the hazard function using the lognormal regression model. Under this parameterization, the loan’s survival function $S_\tau \equiv S(\tau|\mathbf{x}_i)$, which gives the probability that the loan survives for at least τ months given the vector of covariates \mathbf{x}_i , takes the following form:

$$S(\tau|\mathbf{x}_i) = 1 - \Phi \left\{ \frac{\ln \tau + (\beta_0 + \mathbf{x}_i \beta_x)}{\sigma_0 + \sigma_D D_i} \right\}, \quad (\text{B13})$$

where D_i is the dummy variable that equals 1 for 5-year loans, and Φ is the cumulative normal distribution function. The parameters β and σ are estimated with maximum likelihood using all loan performance data in the sample. The full model uses 22 borrower and loan characteristics; the details are available from the authors upon request.




Fig 1. Timeline

This graph shows the evolution of Prosper's P2P lending platform from its launch on November 1, 2005 to present. The timeline highlights three periods in the platform's evolution (top), significant changes in the operation of the market (middle), and major credit model changes (bottom).




Fig 2. Investment pools on Prosper

This graph illustrates the evolution of the three investment pools on Prosper, as well as the proportion of loan applications that failed to attract sufficient funding.




Fig 3. Evolution of loan screening: platform vs. investors

This graph illustrates the evolution of loan screening and compares loan rejection rates by the P2P lending platform to rejection rates by investors (left axis). The average binned SCOREX score is used to proxy for the quality of the borrower pool (right axis).




Fig 4. Quality of Prosper's credit scoring over time

This graph shows the ability of Prosper's Estimated Loss Rate (ELR) to discriminate between defaulting and nondefaulting loans. For each month, the area under the ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve is calculated using all loans originated in the passive investment pool in that month. This number would be equal to 1 for a variable that perfectly discriminates between defaulting and nondefaulting loans, with no type-I or type-II errors. Also shown are the linear time trend for the series and the 95% confidence intervals.




Fig 5. P2P loan returns

This graph shows monthly realized returns and default rates on Prosper loans. The effective yield on the BofA Merrill Lynch US High Yield Index is shown for comparison.




Fig 6. Market growth around the 2016 crisis

This graph shows the volume of new loans originated monthly through Prosper and Lending Club (left axis), as well as the fraction of originated Prosper loans that were funded through the institutional investor pool (right axis).




Fig 7. Predicted and realized returns by month of origination

This graph compares Prosper’s ex ante estimated lenders’ returns with realized loan returns for loans originated in different calendar months (left axis). It also shows the monthly value of newly originated loans (right axis).

Table 1
Descriptive statistics

This table reports loan and borrower characteristics for loan applications and for originated P2P loans. The sample is 2007–2018. *Loan amount* is the loan amount requested by the borrower. *Loan maturity* is the number of months over which the loan amortizes. *Interest rate* is the interest rate on the loan set by the platform. *Estimated Loss Rate (ELR)* is the amount of principal that would be lost due to defaults and charge-offs on the loan estimated by Prosper. *FICO score* is the midpoint value of the FICO credit score, as binned by Prosper. *SCOREX score* is the midpoint value of the Scorex Plus credit score binned by Prosper. *Rating/grade (1-7)* is a proprietary rating developed by Prosper/LC allowing to analyze an application’s level of risk that ranges from 1 (rating HR/grade G) to 7 (rating AA/grade A), 7 having the lowest risk. *Employed* is an indicator for the borrower being employed at the time of application. *Self-employed* is an indicator for the borrower being self-employed at the time of application. *Years employed* is the length of employment with the current employer, measured in years. *Delinquent* is an indicator of the borrower being currently late on any of their accounts, including accounts with charged-off balances. *Mortgage* is an indicator for the positive balance on real estate trades of the borrower. *Monthly income* is the borrower’s monthly income. *Debt-to-income* is the ratio of the monthly debt of the borrower to their stated monthly income. *Credit lines* is the number of open or closed accounts in the borrower’s name that the borrower is paying on time. *Credit cards avl.* is the aggregate available credit on all open bankcard trades reported within the last 6 months, measured in thousands. *Prior loan* is an indicator for the borrower having at least one prior Prosper loan. *Realized return* is the annual realized return on a loan calculated based the approach in the Appendix. *Realized default rate* is the annualized probability of loan becoming delinquent, averaged over the life of the loan.

	Prosper Marketplace (Prosper)						Lending Club (LC)		
	Applications (N=1,242,278)			Matched loans (N=423,065)			All loans (N=1,727,272)		
	mean	median	sd	mean	median	sd	mean	median	sd
Panel A: Loan characteristics									
Loan amount	13,186	12,000	8,017	12,408	10,000	8,257	14,755	12,600	8,857
Loan maturity (mos.)	42.99	36	10.90	43.99	36	11.31	42.79	36	10.81
Interest rate	15.8%	14.3%	6.8%	15.4%	14.3%	6.3%	13.2%	12.7%	4.7%
Estimated Loss Rate	7.05%	6.24%	4.32%	6.75%	6.24%	3.92%	N/A	N/A	N/A
Panel B: Borrower characteristics									
FICO score	701.4	689.5	39.1	703.1	689.5	39.5	698.8	689.5	31.4
SCOREX score	707.7	712.5	60.5	710.5	712.5	59.2	N/A	N/A	N/A
Rating/grade (1-7)	4.41	4	1.55	4.50	4	1.47	5.26	5	1.27
Employed	0.81	1	0.40	0.83	1	0.37	0.92	1	0.28
Self-employed	0.08	0	0.27	0.06	0	0.24	0.02	0	0.14
Years employed	9.08	6.17	11.19	9.18	6.42	11.03	5.97	6.00	3.71
Delinquent	0.16	0	0.37	0.15	0	0.36	0.01	0	0.07
Mortgage	0.38	0	0.49	0.41	0	0.49	0.49	0	0.50
Monthly income	7,108	5,083	187,678	6,368	5,000	83,266	6,447	5,417	9,922
Debt-to-income	0.19	0.17	0.10	0.19	0.18	0.10	0.19	0.18	0.12
Credit lines	11.04	10	5.29	11.08	10	5.26	11.69	11	5.55
Credit card avl.	14.13	7.44	21.31	13.68	7.23	19.21	22.11	15.50	21.94
Prior loan	0.15	0	0.36	0.21	0	0.41	N/A	N/A	N/A
Panel C: Loan performance									
Realized return	N/A			6.32%	10.5%	18.0%	N/A		
Realized default rate	N/A			6.23%			6.04%		

Table 2
Loan funding, screening, and returns

This table summarizes the evolution of loan funding, screening, and returns on Prosper’s lending platform. The sample is 2007–2018. *Annual loan volume* is the average annual dollar volume of originated loans in each period, measured in million. *Funding rate* is the percent of loan applications funded by investors. *Cancellation rate* is the percent of loan applications canceled by the platform. *SCOREX score* is the midpoint value of the Scorex Plus credit score binned by Prosper. *Interest rate* is the interest rate on the loan set by the platform. *Estimated Loss Rate (ELR)* is the amount of principal that would be lost due to defaults and charge-offs on the loan estimated by Prosper. *Realized return* is the annual realized return on a loan calculated based the approach in the Appendix. *Realized default rate* is the annualized probability of loan becoming delinquent, averaged over the life of the loan.

	Disintermediation		Transition	Reintermediation	All periods
	(2007–2008)	(2009–2010)	(2011–2012)	(2013–2018)	(2007–2018)
Panel A: Loan screening					
Annual loan volume (\$'mln)*	49.5	39.6	146.6	2,566	1,408
Funding rate	N/A	24.9%	73.2%	98.5%	95.4%
Cancellation rate	N/A	5.0%	21.9%	26.9%	25.9%
Panel B: Determinants of loan returns					
SCOREX score	714.4	716.4	712.2	707.1	707.1
Interest rate	14.2%	20.3%	22.1%	15.3%	15.3%
Estimated Loss Rate (ELR)	12.1%	8.4%	9.1%	6.7%	6.7%
Realized return	1.7%	14.1%	12.2%	6.0%	6.0%
Realized default rate	8.68%	4.75%	5.31%	6.24%	6.23%

* Adjusted for the “quiet period” closure

Table 3
Historical funding and cancelation rates by Prosper rating

This table reports historical funding, cancelation, and loan origination rates by Prosper rating, a proprietary rating developed by Prosper allowing to analyze a listing's level of risk that ranges from HR to AA, AA having the lowest risk. The sample is 2007–2018. *Number of applications* is the number of loan applications. *FICO score* is the midpoint value of the FICO credit score binned by Prosper. *SCOREX score* is the midpoint value of the Scorex Plus credit score binned by Prosper. *Funding rate* is the percent of loan applications funded by investors. *Cancelation rate* is the percent of loan applications canceled by the platform. *Loan origination rate* is the percent of loan applications that result in loan origination.

	Rating AA	Rating A	Rating B	Rating C	Rating D	Rating E	Rating HR	All
Panel A: Loan applications								
Number of applications	107,764 (8.7%)	225,620 (18.2%)	273,505 (22.0%)	309,985 (25.0%)	173,168 (13.9%)	95,168 (7.7%)	57,068 (4.6%)	1,242,278 (100%)
Interest rate	6.9%	9.6%	12.5%	16.6%	22.3%	27.5%	29.6%	15.8%
FICO score	750.8	718.2	703.1	690.5	679.1	669.4	661.8	701.4
SCOREX score	766.8	734.8	714.6	695.7	677.9	656.6	665.3	707.7
Panel B: Application status								
Funding rate	96.4%	96.4%	97.7%	97.5%	93.8%	95.4%	72.4%	95.4%
Cancelation rate	23.1%	26.5%	27.2%	26.8%	26.6%	24.5%	17.2%	25.9%
Funded applications	23.1%	26.6%	27.2%	26.9%	27.3%	24.9%	22.0%	26.3%
Unfunded applications	23.1%	24.9%	26.4%	23.4%	14.8%	16.2%	4.7%	16.6%
Loan origination rate	73.9%	70.6%	71.0%	71.1%	67.9%	71.4%	56.4%	70.1%

Table 4
FICO scores and default rates

This table compares defaults on Prosper loans to defaults on credit card debt and Lending Club loans for different FICO scores. Panel A reports the probability of a consumer loan becoming delinquent within the first year for credits originated in 2014 and 2015, by FICO bucket. Statistics on credit card delinquencies are from Jagtiani and Lemieux (2017). Panel B reports annualized probabilities of a Prosper loan becoming delinquent, averaged over the life of the loan, for different combinations of FICO scores and Prosper ratings, where Prosper rating is a proprietary rating developed by Prosper allowing to analyze a listing's level of risk that ranges from HR to AA, AA having the lowest risk. Panel C reports annualized probabilities of a Lending Club loan becoming delinquent, averaged over the life of the loan, for different combinations of FICO scores and LC grades, where LC grade is a proprietary rating developed by LC allowing to analyze a listing's level of risk that ranges from G to A, A having the lowest risk. The sample period is 2013–2017 (reintermediation period).

Panel A: Delinquency rates for credit card debt and P2P loans							
		781+	741–780	701–740	681–700	661–680	600–660
Credit card balances*		1.70%	2.56%	3.50%	4.49%	5.20%	9.47%
Lending Club loans**		1.96%	2.63%	3.97%	5.70%	6.85%	N/A
Prosper loans**		2.11%	3.17%	5.15%	6.65%	7.13%	8.19%
Panel B: Default rates for Prosper loans by FICO and Prosper rating							
	All	780+	760–779	700–739	680–699	660–679	<660
AA	1.59%	0.95%	1.49%	2.02%	2.19%	2.68%	
A	3.35%	2.52%	2.65%	3.48%	3.93%	3.53%	3.27%
B	5.24%	4.30%	4.38%	5.19%	5.86%	5.42%	4.51%
C	7.88%	8.13%	6.84%	7.80%	8.54%	7.99%	7.08%
D	10.29%	15.02%	10.14%	10.22%	10.85%	10.49%	9.59%
E	11.97%	9.26%	13.68%	11.75%	12.38%	12.58%	11.22%
HR	13.95%			12.94%	13.12%	13.89%	14.22%
All	6.31%	2.12%	3.52%	5.58%	7.21%	7.86%	8.40%
Panel C: Default rates for Lending Club loans by FICO and LC grade							
	All	780+	760–779	700–739	680–699	660–679	<660
A	1.85%	1.01%	1.44%	1.95%	2.37%	2.76%	N/A
B	3.92%	2.79%	3.07%	3.57%	4.12%	4.45%	N/A
C	6.47%	5.41%	5.61%	5.65%	6.49%	7.04%	N/A
D	9.25%	9.77%	9.00%	8.39%	9.01%	9.75%	N/A
E	11.83%	13.88%	12.79%	10.86%	11.42%	12.35%	N/A
F	14.61%	20.51%	16.21%	14.32%	14.26%	14.80%	N/A
G	17.24%		23.05%	17.75%	17.78%	16.85%	N/A
All	6.04%	2.04%	2.98%	4.63%	6.44%	7.88%	N/A

*We thank Julapa Jagtiani for providing these data. See Jagtiani and Lemieux (2017)

**FICO buckets for Prosper and Lending Club loans are the same as in Panel B

Table 5
Determinants of ELR and predictors of default

This table studies the determinants of the Estimated Loss Rate and their ability to predict default hazard. It also shows additional ELR determinants that are not consistent predictors of default hazard. The sample period is 2013–2017 (reintermediation period) and consists of matched observations. i.e. observations with non-missing loan outcome data. *Estimated Loss Rate (ELR)* is the amount of principal that would be lost due to defaults and charge-offs on the loan estimated by Prosper. *Default hazard* is the risk of the borrower defaulting in each month from loan origination to maturity. *Log of income* is the natural logarithm of the borrower's monthly income. *Debt-to-income* is the ratio of the monthly debt to the borrower's monthly income. *Self-employed* is an indicator for the self-employed borrower. *Credit lines* is the number of open or closed accounts in the borrower's name that the borrower is paying on time. *Credit cards avl.* is the aggregate available credit on all open bankcard trades reported within the last 6 months, measured in thousands. *Activity last 6 m.* is the number of trades opened by the borrower within the last 6 months. *Delinquent trades* is the average number of times the borrower was 60 days past due (DPD) or worse within the last 12 months. *Inquiries last 6 m.* is the number of times at least one bank or other business requested the borrower's credit profile from a consumer credit rating agency in the last 6 months. *Prior loan* is an indicator for the borrower having at least one prior Prosper loan. *Long-term loan* is an indicator of the 60-month loan. *SCOREX score* is the midpoint value of the Scorex Plus credit score binned by Prosper. *Mortgage* is an indicator for the positive balance on real estate trades of the borrower. *Card utilization* is the ratio of credit balances to credit limits on all bank cards held by the borrower. The estimates of the intercept and fixed effects are omitted for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the listing month level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-statistics are presented in parentheses.

	ELR	Default hazard	Default hazard	ELR	Default hazard
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ELR			0.084*** (38.0)		
Log of income	-0.080** (-2.44)	-0.22*** (-15.1)	-0.20*** (-13.6)	-0.35*** (-11.5)	-0.21*** (-15.0)
Debt-to-income	9.25*** (55.0)	1.85*** (34.6)	1.04*** (18.5)	8.53*** (51.9)	1.86*** (34.1)
Self-employed	1.42*** (24.1)	0.41*** (20.6)	0.30*** (13.8)	1.46*** (25.3)	0.41*** (20.3)
Credit lines	-0.055*** (-17.2)	-0.0071*** (-4.86)	-0.0020 (-1.54)	-0.14*** (-24.8)	-0.0065** (-2.35)
Credit cards avl.	-0.027*** (-35.8)	-0.0022*** (-4.53)	0.00034 (0.89)	-0.018*** (-25.5)	-0.0024*** (-4.29)
Activity last 6 m.	0.22*** (21.0)	0.085*** (18.8)	0.066*** (14.6)	0.28*** (27.8)	0.085*** (18.3)
Delinquent trades	2.08*** (15.8)	0.34*** (5.93)	0.18*** (3.42)	2.10*** (16.8)	0.36*** (6.19)
Inquiries last 6 m.	0.46*** (14.8)	0.094*** (17.3)	0.057*** (12.2)	0.51*** (16.5)	0.095*** (17.1)
Prior loan	-0.90*** (-11.4)	-0.045*** (-3.05)	0.0085 (0.63)	-0.80*** (-10.6)	-0.046*** (-3.10)
Long-term loan	1.76*** (47.1)	0.39*** (16.6)	0.26*** (12.1)	1.75*** (45.4)	0.40*** (16.6)
SCOREX score	-0.024*** (-43.3)	-0.0045*** (-39.7)	-0.0026*** (-19.8)	-0.022*** (-40.5)	-0.0043*** (-34.1)
Mortgage				0.32*** (14.4)	-0.066*** (-5.35)
Card utilization ²				1.56*** (32.8)	0.018 (0.64)
Credit lines ²				0.0031*** (15.5)	0.000019 (0.21)
Month FEs	YES	NO	NO	YES	NO
No.obs.	306,175	306,175	306,175	306,175	306,175
R ² /Log-likelihood	0.436	-147094	-145586	0.452	-147074

Table 6
ELR vs. FICO as default predictors

This table compares the ability of Prosper’s Estimated Loss Rate to predict defaults on Prosper loans (Panel A) to the predictive ability of the FICO score (Panel B). Panel C provides the respective results for Lending Club, for comparison. The sample period is 2013–2017 (reintermediation period). *Estimated Loss Rate (ELR)* is the amount of principal that would be lost due to defaults and charge-offs on the loan estimated by Prosper. *FICO score* is the midpoint value of the FICO credit score binned by Prosper. *Subgrade* is a subgrade assigned by Lending Club to a loan listing, where each LC grade, a proprietary rating developed by LC allowing to analyze a listing’s level of risk that ranges from G to A, is divided into 5 subgrades. The subgrades are increasing in the expected default risk of the loan and are coded as 1 for A1 subgrade, 2 for A2 subgrade, ..., and 35 for G5 subgrade. *ROC area* is the area under the ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve calculated annually using all loans originated in the passive investment pool in that year for Prosper loans and all loans originated in all investment pools for Lending Club loans. The ROC area is also calculated for the entire sample. This number would be equal to 1 for a variable that perfectly discriminates between defaulting and nondefaulting loans, with no type-I or type-II errors. *95% CI upper bound* is the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval for the ROC area. *95% CI lower bound* is the lower bound of the 95% confidence interval for the ROC area.

	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	All
Panel A: ELR as default predictor for Prosper loans						
ROC area	0.640	0.638	0.658	0.680	0.717	0.651
95% CI upper bound	0.675	0.645	0.662	0.687	0.726	0.655
95% CI lower bound	0.604	0.631	0.653	0.673	0.707	0.648
No.obs.	1,831	44,435	81,465	56,341	88,270	203,939
Panel B: FICO score as default predictor for Prosper loans						
ROC area	0.578	0.566	0.591	0.615	0.610	0.596
95% CI upper bound	0.614	0.573	0.596	0.622	0.627	0.599
95% CI lower bound	0.543	0.559	0.586	0.608	0.594	0.592
No.obs.	1,831	44,435	81,465	56,328	19,889	203,948
Panel C: Subgrade as default predictor for Lending Club loans						
ROC area	0.668	0.670	0.686	0.689	0.708	0.686
95% CI upper bound	0.672	0.673	0.688	0.692	0.713	0.688
95% CI lower bound	0.664	0.667	0.684	0.687	0.703	0.685
No.obs.	134,814	235,629	421,095	434,407	405,425	1,631,370

Table 7
Loan screening by the platform and investor funding

This table examines the determinants of loan cancellations and contrasts them against the funding decisions of investors. The sample period is 2013–2017 (reintermediation period). *Canceled* is an indicator for the loan being canceled by the platform. *Funded* is an indicator for the loan being funded by investors. *Log of income* is the natural logarithm of the borrower's monthly income. *Debt-to-income* is the ratio of the monthly debt to the borrower's monthly income. *Self-employed* is an indicator for the self-employed borrower. *Credit lines* is the number of open or closed accounts in the borrower's name that the borrower is paying on time. *Credit cards avl.* is the aggregate available credit on all open bankcard trades reported within the last 6 months, measured in thousands. *Activity last 6 m.* is the number of trades opened by the borrower within the last 6 months. *Delinquent trades* is the average number of times the borrower was 60 days past due (DPD) or worse within the last 12 months. *Inquiries last 6 m.* is the number of times at least one bank or other business requested the borrower's credit profile from a consumer credit rating agency in the last 6 months. *Prior loan* is an indicator for the borrower having at least one prior Prosper loan. *Long-term loan* is an indicator of the 60-month loan. *Mortgage* is an indicator for the positive balance on real estate trades of the borrower. *Credit history* is an indicator of the length of the borrower's credit history being 6 years or more. *FICO score* is the midpoint value of the FICO credit score binned by Prosper. The estimates of the intercept and fixed effects are omitted for brevity. Standard errors are clustered at the listing month level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-statistics are presented in parentheses.

	Canceled			Funded		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Log of income	-0.0077* (-1.72)	-0.0078* (-1.75)	-0.0081* (-1.87)	0.00070 (0.66)	0.00073 (0.68)	0.00064 (0.61)
Debt-to-income	-0.28*** (-24.9)	-0.29*** (-25.2)	-0.39*** (-31.5)	0.014*** (4.51)	0.017*** (4.95)	0.0055** (2.16)
Self-employed	-0.037*** (-4.94)	-0.037*** (-4.94)	-0.051*** (-7.00)	0.0027*** (4.50)	0.0027*** (4.39)	0.00085 (1.16)
Credit lines	0.00086*** (5.32)	0.0010*** (6.82)	0.0016*** (9.75)	-8.2e-06 (-0.21)	-0.000072* (-1.90)	-7.8e-06 (-0.21)
Credit cards avl.	0.0014*** (18.3)	0.0012*** (21.9)	0.0013*** (25.5)	-0.00015*** (-5.23)	-0.000058*** (-3.67)	-0.000042*** (-3.02)
Activity last 6 m.	-0.0056*** (-11.9)	-0.0050*** (-11.5)	-0.0065*** (-15.7)	0.000085 (0.52)	-0.00015 (-0.98)	-0.00031** (-2.16)
Delinquent trades	0.049*** (8.18)	0.058*** (9.59)	0.052*** (8.58)	0.0034** (2.24)	-0.00014 (-0.097)	-0.00067 (-0.45)
Inquiries last 6 m.	0.020*** (23.4)	0.020*** (23.8)	0.015*** (20.2)	-0.0014*** (-3.13)	-0.0016*** (-3.51)	-0.0022*** (-4.76)
Prior loan	-0.18*** (-22.2)	-0.18*** (-22.0)	-0.17*** (-22.1)	0.0074*** (7.50)	0.0081*** (7.75)	0.0091*** (7.46)
Long-term loan	0.0054** (2.61)	0.0046** (2.19)	-0.021*** (-9.09)	-0.0025** (-2.18)	-0.0022* (-1.89)	-0.0059*** (-4.86)
Mortgage	-0.050*** (-30.8)	-0.053*** (-38.0)	-0.052*** (-38.2)	0.0020*** (3.62)	0.0033*** (5.34)	0.0034*** (5.34)
Credit history	-0.047*** (-15.8)	-0.046*** (-15.6)	-0.037*** (-12.6)	0.0018** (2.21)	0.0014 (1.59)	0.0023*** (2.88)
FICO score		0.00026*** (6.17)	0.00071*** (19.4)		-0.00010*** (-5.39)	-0.000053*** (-4.95)
ELR FEs	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Month FEs	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
No.obs.	887,595	887,591	887,590	887,595	887,591	887,590
R ²	0.019	0.019	0.020	0.037	0.038	0.041

Table 8
Resubmitted applications and default risk

This table studies default risk of borrowers whose applications were canceled, resubmitted, re-evaluated by the platform, and subsequently funded by investors. The sample period is 2013–2017 (reintermediation period). *Default hazard* is the risk of the borrower defaulting in each month from loan origination to maturity. *Resubmitted* is an indicator for an application resubmitted after loan cancellation. *Log of income* is the natural logarithms of the borrower’s monthly income. *Debt-to-income* is the ratio of the monthly debt of the borrower to their stated monthly income. *Employed* is an indicator for the borrower being employed at the time of application. *Self-employed* is an indicator for the borrower being self-employed at the time of application. *Long-term loan* is an indicator of the 60-month loan. The estimates of the intercept and fixed effects are omitted for brevity. *Estimated Loss Rate (ELR)* is the amount of principal that would be lost due to defaults and charge-offs on the loan estimated by Prosper. *Old ELR* refers to the ELR on the canceled loan application. *New ELR* refers to the ELR on the resubmitted loan application. Standard errors are clustered at the listing month level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-statistics are presented in parentheses.

	Default hazard			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Resubmitted	0.31*** (24.9)	0.27*** (21.3)	0.20*** (15.9)	0.16*** (13.0)
Log of income		-0.17*** (-12.3)		-0.17*** (-12.4)
Debt-to-income		0.67*** (12.8)		0.63*** (12.0)
Employed		-0.21*** (-14.6)		-0.21*** (-14.5)
Self-employed		0.063** (2.55)		0.048* (1.93)
Long-term loan		0.15*** (6.69)		0.14*** (6.63)
Old ELR FEs	YES	YES	NO	NO
New ELR FEs	NO	NO	YES	YES
Month FEs	NO	NO	NO	NO
No.obs.	376,489	299,435	376,489	299,435
Log-likelihood	-149487	-142216	-149485	-142249

Table 9
Pricing precision and screening trade-off

This table illustrates the trade-off between decreasing cancellations (extensive margin of loan screening) and increasing pricing precision (intensive margin of loan screening). The sample period is 2013–2017 (reintermediation period). *Canceled* is an indicator for the loan being canceled by the platform. *ROC area* is the area under the ROC (receiver operating characteristic) curve calculated monthly using all loans originated in the passive investment pool in that month. This number would be equal to 1 for a variable that perfectly discriminates between defaulting and nondefaulting loans, with no type-I or type-II errors. *Passive* is an indicator for the loan originated in the passive institutional loan pool. *Funded* is an indicator for the loan being funded by investors. *FICO* is the FICO credit score bucket. FICO buckets for Prosper loans are the same as in Table 4. Standard errors are Huber-White robust standard errors. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-statistics are presented in parentheses.

	Canceled					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ROC area	-0.84*** (-37.9)	-0.84*** (-38.0)	-0.84*** (-38.1)	-0.84*** (-37.7)	-0.84*** (-38.0)	-0.84*** (-38.0)
Passive				-0.0020* (-1.81)	0.00037 (0.34)	0.00033 (0.30)
Funded		-0.072*** (-16.1)	-0.015 (-0.97)		-0.072*** (-16.0)	-0.015 (-0.98)
FICO 760–779	-0.061*** (-21.7)	-0.060*** (-21.3)	0.0080 (0.37)	-0.061*** (-21.7)	-0.060*** (-21.3)	0.0079 (0.37)
FICO 700–739	-0.063*** (-23.9)	-0.062*** (-23.4)	0.0047 (0.25)	-0.063*** (-23.9)	-0.062*** (-23.4)	0.0047 (0.25)
FICO 680–699	-0.061*** (-22.9)	-0.060*** (-22.5)	-0.0096 (-0.53)	-0.061*** (-22.9)	-0.060*** (-22.5)	-0.0097 (-0.53)
FICO 660–679	-0.068*** (-26.2)	-0.067*** (-25.8)	-0.0018 (-0.10)	-0.068*** (-26.2)	-0.067*** (-25.8)	-0.0018 (-0.10)
FICO <660	-0.061*** (-21.6)	-0.060*** (-21.3)	-0.0036 (-0.19)	-0.061*** (-21.5)	-0.060*** (-21.3)	-0.0036 (-0.19)
FICO 760–779 * Funded			-0.070*** (-3.24)			-0.070*** (-3.24)
FICO 700–739 * Funded			-0.069*** (-3.62)			-0.068*** (-3.61)
FICO 680–699 * Funded			-0.052*** (-2.81)			-0.052*** (-2.81)
FICO 660–679 * Funded			-0.067*** (-3.89)			-0.067*** (-3.89)
FICO <660 * Funded			-0.058*** (-3.07)			-0.058*** (-3.07)
No.obs.	856,578	856,578	856,578	856,578	856,578	856,578
R^2	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003

Table 10
Loan performance: passive vs. active investment

This table summarizes the investment performance of active vs. passive loan-picking strategies for all originated loans and their subsamples based on Prosper rating. The sample period is 2013–2017 (reintermediation period). *Prosper rating* is a proprietary rating developed by Prosper allowing to analyze a listing’s level of risk that ranges from HR to AA, AA having the lowest risk. *Number of loans* is the number of loans that received investor commitments necessary for the loan to originate and were not canceled by the platform. *Share of passive pool* is the percent of loans originated in the passive institutional pool. *Interest rate* is the interest rate on the loan set by the platform. *Estimated Loss Rate (ELR)* is the amount of principal that would be lost due to defaults and charge-offs on the loan estimated by Prosper. *Realized return* is the annual realized return on a loan calculated based the approach in the Appendix. *Realized default rate* is the annualized probability of loan becoming delinquent, averaged over the life of the loan.

	Rating AA	Rating A	Rating B	Rating C	Rating D	Rating E	Rating HR	All
Panel A: Originated loans								
Number of loans	75,990 (9.2%)	152,532 (18.5%)	188,365 (22.9%)	212,812 (25.9%)	107,712 (13.1%)	62,373 (7.6%)	22,582 (2.7%)	822,366 (100%)
Share of passive pool	73.7%	74.0%	73.8%	73.7%	72.0%	72.5%	71.7%	75.5%
Interest rate	6.8%	9.5%	12.4%	16.6%	22.1%	27.4%	30.5%	15.1%
Panel B: Estimated Loss Rates (ELRs)								
Institutional loan ELRs	1.45%	3.19%	5.13%	7.53%	10.44%	13.45%	16.64%	6.50%
Passive institutional	1.44%	3.18%	5.13%	7.53%	10.44%	13.45%	16.65%	6.52%
Active institutional	1.48%	3.21%	5.13%	7.54%	10.44%	13.45%	16.50%	6.45%
All ELRs	1.45%	3.18%	5.13%	7.54%	10.44%	13.45%	16.65%	6.54%
Panel C: Realized default rates								
Institutional loan defaults	1.55%	3.31%	5.20%	7.80%	10.43%	12.18%	13.78%	6.29%
Passive institutional	1.53%	3.35%	5.21%	7.91%	10.69%	12.48%	14.19%	6.40%
Active institutional	1.64%	3.17%	5.16%	7.51%	9.67%	11.06%	11.23%	5.98%
All realized defaults	1.55%	3.28%	5.15%	7.74%	10.28%	11.96%	13.87%	6.25%
Panel D: Realized returns								
Institutional loan returns	4.13%	4.86%	5.31%	5.73%	7.32%	9.86%	11.80%	5.82%
Passive institutional	4.09%	4.67%	5.12%	5.47%	6.90%	9.47%	11.34%	5.60%
Active institutional	4.26%	5.46%	5.86%	6.47%	8.63%	11.44%	14.86%	6.49%
All realized returns	4.18%	4.91%	5.47%	5.88%	7.56%	10.25%	12.08%	6.00%

Table 11
Loan returns and risk by investment strategy

This table tests whether realized returns and default hazard are different between the passive and active institutional pools. The sample consists of all loans originated in the institutional loan pools in 2013–2017 (reintermediation period). *Realized return* is the annual realized return on a loan calculated based the approach in the Appendix. *Default hazard* is the risk of the borrower defaulting in each month from loan origination to maturity. *Passive* is an indicator for the loan originated in the passive institutional loan pool. *Prosper rating* is a proprietary rating developed by Prosper allowing to analyze a listing's level of risk that ranges from HR to AA, AA having the lowest risk. *Estimated Loss Rate (ELR)* is the amount of principal that would be lost due to defaults and charge-offs on the loan estimated by Prosper. Standard errors are clustered at the listing month level. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. t-statistics are presented in parentheses.

	Realized return				Default hazard		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Passive	-0.0091*** (-2.92)	-0.00084 (-0.96)	-0.0012 (-1.37)	-0.0011 (-1.31)	0.083*** (4.01)	0.071*** (3.43)	0.072*** (3.49)
Rating = A			0.0022** (2.13)			0.54*** (16.6)	
Rating = B			0.0027* (1.69)			0.94*** (28.4)	
Rating = C			0.0035 (1.18)			1.32*** (37.8)	
Rating = D			0.012** (2.40)			1.61*** (44.2)	
Rating = E			0.024*** (4.13)			1.79*** (50.6)	
Rating = HR			0.032*** (3.70)			1.89*** (35.4)	
ELR FEs	NO	NO	NO	YES	NO	NO	YES
Month FEs	NO	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
No.obs.	268,995	268,994	268,994	268,994	342,927	342,927	342,927
R^2 /Log-likelihood	0.00046	0.013	0.014	0.014	-140037	-134687	-134374