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Ombudsman Report to the Industry

   •  Message from the FDIC Ombudsman
   •  What You Told Us
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Vol. 5, No. 1
March 2008
Ombudsman Report to the Industry
Message from Cottrell L. Webster, FDIC Ombudsman

I am pleased to present the latest in our series of online reports to the financial services industry about issues and concerns raised to the FDIC Office of the Ombudsman (OO). This report covers the period July 1 through December 31, 2007.

OO outreach efforts focused on minority and de novo institutions during this period. Representatives of minority depository institutions continued to express concern that the markets they serve present challenges in loan underwriting and BSA compliance. I have conveyed this concern to FDIC examiners and management. Unique markets often require unique solutions, and I continue to ask examiners to be open to bankers’ suggestions in the supervisory area.

Although most bankers expressed overall satisfaction with the FDIC, some bankers were troubled by a lack of communication during the application and examination process. In the regulation area, bankers’ concerns remained essentially the same as in our last report, but included a new fear that Congress will overreact to the subprime mortgage crisis. This report discusses the FDIC’s response to the subprime mortgage crisis as well as updates on Suspicious Activity Reports.

In each of the OO’s last three reports, we introduced one of our Regional Ombudsmen. Their assigned regions and contact information are summarized below. I encourage readers to contact our Regional Ombudsmen on any matter that would benefit from a neutral, independent and confidential ear.

Ombudsman Regions Phone E-mail
Linda Beavers Atlanta and New York (plus the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee) (678) 916-2385 LBeavers@fdic.gov
Sandy Jesberger Kansas City and Dallas (excluding Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi and Tennessee) (972) 761-2301 SJesberger@fdic.gov
Richard Schmalzer San Francisco and Chicago (415) 808-8114 RSchmalzer@fdic.gov

We welcome institutions’ suggestions and concerns about the FDIC in its supervisory role. The OO summarizes these comments for FDIC senior management’s review without attribution to the institutions to eliminate the possibility of retaliation. In addition to Regional Ombudsmen, OO specialists in Washington, D.C., are available to assist on any matter, regardless of your location. Please visit our Ombudsman web site for more information

  Cottrell L. Webster
Director
Office of the Ombudsman

What You Told Us:

During the second half of the year, 448 bankers contacted the OO requesting assistance. In addition, OO staff spoke with 160 financial industry representatives through outreach visits, telephone calls and industry-sponsored conferences.

Subprime Mortgage Crisis: Several bankers expressed concern about possible government overreaction to the subprime mortgage crisis, including creating additional laws and increasing the regulatory burden on FDIC-supervised banks. While new regulation is possible, the FDIC has been working with other government entities and the industry on market-based ways to refinance and restructure performing subprime mortgages.

Last October, FDIC Chairman Bair proposed that the financial services industry systematically address subprime adjustable-rate mortgage loans for owner-occupied properties in which the borrowers are current on payments but unable to maintain higher payments following reset. Three common misconceptions expressed to the OO about Chairman Bair’s proposal and the FDIC’s responses are summarized below.

  • Misconception: Restructuring is a bailout of subprime borrowers or investors.
    This proposal is not a government bailout. Servicers voluntarily attempt to restructure eligible loans in the interest of borrowers and investors. Such efforts are consistent with existing contracts and servicer practices in mitigating losses from delinquencies.
  • Misconception: Restructuring violates the contractual rights of investors.
    Pooling and servicing agreements allow servicers to pursue streamlined restructuring strategies in the interest of investors. Such strategies also are consistent with generally accepted accounting practices and the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) tax requirements. Given the significant deterioration in mortgage performance and housing market conditions, Chairman Bair’s proposal could maximize the total net present value (NPV) of securitized subprime mortgages. As long as servicers can demonstrate that their strategy is designed to maximize the total NPV of the pool, it is difficult to argue that the Chairman’s proposal violates contractual rights.
  • Misconception: Restructuring will create a windfall for subprime borrowers.
    The starter rates for subprime loans were well above rates for prime fixed-rate loans. In the first quarter of 2006, the average starter rate of subprime hybrid mortgages was 8.28 percent. During that same period, the weighted-average rate on subprime fixed-rate loans was 7.93 percent. Even after restructuring to eliminate the upward rate adjustment, subprime borrowers would continue to pay subprime rates well exceeding prime.
  • The Chairman’s subprime proposal, including industry and public misconceptions, is discussed in detail in documents available through the following links.

  • http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2007_vol1_3/2007_Quarterly_Vol1No3.html
  • http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjan1708.html
  • http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjan3108.html

  • Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering (BSA/AML): BSA/AML remains the subject of comments and complaints. Bankers continue to express concern about BSA in terms of burden and the high costs of training and implementation. Bankers also complain of not receiving feedback about Suspicious Activity Report filings, which gives the impression that the data are not used. Since the OO’s last Report to the Industry, the FDIC published a relevant article in its Supervisory Insights journal, which is linked and summarized below.

  • Connecting the Dots…The Importance of Timely and Effective Suspicious Activity Reports “There is often a financial connection to crime, and Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) play a critical role in exposing the financial links to illicit activities and fighting financial crimes. For the suspicious activity reporting system to be effective, SARs must be complete, accurate, and timely. This article highlights the importance of SARs, provides examples of how various agencies use SARs, discusses common deficiencies in SAR filings, and provides tips on what makes an effective SAR.”
  • NOTE: If you have comments or suggestions about this semiannual report, please contact FDIC Ombudsman Cottrell Webster at (703) 562-6040, or by e-mail at cwebster@fdic.gov. To receive e-mail notifications of future OO semiannual reports as soon as they are posted to the FDIC's Web site, follow the instructions at www.fdic.gov/about/subscriptions/index.html .





    Last Updated 03/30/2007 ombudsman@fdic.gov

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