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FDIC Federal Register Citations

[Federal Register: September 12, 1997 (Volume 62, Number 177)]
[Proposed Rules]               
[Page 47969-48025]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr12se97-16]
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Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________
This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.
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[[Page 47969]]
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FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
12 CFR Parts 303, 337 and 362
RIN 3064-AC12
 
Activities of Insured State Banks and Insured Savings 
Associations
AGENCY: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
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SUMMARY: As part of the FDIC's systematic review of its regulations and 
written policies under section 303(a) of the Riegle Community 
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 (CDRI), the FDIC is 
seeking public comment on its proposal to revise and consolidate its 
rules and regulations governing activities and investments of insured 
state banks and insured savings associations. The FDIC proposes to 
combine its regulations governing the activities and investments of 
insured state banks with those governing insured savings associations. 
In addition, the proposal updates the FDIC's regulations governing the 
safety and soundness of securities activities of subsidiaries and 
affiliates of insured state nonmember banks. The FDIC's proposal 
modernizes this group of regulations and harmonizes the provisions 
governing activities that are not permissible for national banks with 
those governing the securities activities of state nonmember banks. The 
proposed regulation will make a number of substantive changes and will 
revise the regulations by deleting obsolete provisions, rewriting the 
regulatory text to make it more readable, conforming the treatment of 
state banks and savings associations to the extent possible given the 
underlying statutory and regulatory scheme governing the different 
charters. The proposal establishes a number of new exceptions and will 
allow institutions to conduct certain activities after providing the 
FDIC with notice rather than filing an application. The proposal also 
will revise these regulations by deleting obsolete provisions, 
rewriting the regulatory text to make it more readable, removing a 
number of the current restrictions on those activities and conforming 
the disclosures required under the current regulation to an existing 
interagency statement concerning the retail sales of nondeposit 
investment products.
DATES: Comments must be received by December 11, 1997.
ADDRESSES: Send written comments to Robert E. Feldman, Executive 
Secretary, Attention: Comments/OES, Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, 550 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20429. Comments 
may be hand delivered to the guard station at the rear of the 17th 
Street Building (located on F Street), on business days between 7:00 
a.m. and 5:00 p.m. (Fax number (202) 898-3838; Internet Address: 
comments@fdic.gov). Comments may be inspected and photocopied in the 
FDIC Public Information Center, Room 100, 801 17th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20429, between 9:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. on business 
days.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Curtis Vaughn, Examination Specialist, 
(202/898-6759) or John Jilovec, Examination Specialist, (202/898-8958) 
Division of Supervision; Linda L. Stamp, Counsel, (202/ 898-7310) or 
Jamey Basham, Counsel, (202/ 898-7265), Legal Division, FDIC, 550 17th 
Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20429.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Background
    Section 303 of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 1994 (RCDRIA) requires that the FDIC review its 
regulations for the purpose of streamlining those regulations, reducing 
any unnecessary costs and eliminating unwarranted constraints on credit 
availability while faithfully implementing statutory requirements. 
Pursuant to that statutory direction the FDIC has reviewed part 362 
``Activities and Investments of Insured State Banks,'' Sec. 303.13 
``Applications and Notices by Savings Associations,'' and Sec. 337.4 
``Securities Activities of Subsidiaries of Insured State Banks: Bank 
Transactions with Affiliated Securities Companies' and proposes to make 
a number of changes to those regulations. The proposal is described in 
more detail below. In brief, however, the proposal would restructure 
existing part 362, placing the substance of the text of the current 
regulation into new subpart A. Subpart A would address the Activities 
of Insured State Banks which implements section 24 of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act). 12 U.S.C. 1831a. Section 24 restricts 
and prohibits insured state banks and their subsidiaries from engaging 
in activities and investments of a type that are not permissible for 
national banks and their subsidiaries. In addition, the proposal would 
move the FDIC's regulations governing the securities activities of 
subsidiaries of insured state nonmember banks (currently at 12 CFR 
337.4) into subpart A of part 362 and revise those regulations by 
deleting obsolete provisions, rewriting the regulatory text to make it 
more readable, removing a number of the obsolete current restrictions 
on those activities, and removing the disclosures required under the 
current regulation to conform the required disclosures to the 
Interagency Statement on the Retail Sale of Nondeposit Investment 
Products (Interagency Statement).
    Safety and Soundness Rules Governing Insured State Nonmember Banks 
would be set out in new subpart B. Subpart B would establish modern 
standards for insured state nonmember banks to conduct real estate 
investment activities through a subsidiary and for those insured state 
nonmember banks that are not affiliated with a bank holding company 
(nonbank banks) to conduct securities activities in an affiliated 
organization. The existing restrictions on these securities activities 
are found in Sec. 337.4 of this chapter.
    Existing Sec. 303.13 of this chapter which relates to activities of 
state savings associations and filings by all savings associations 
would be revised in a number of ways and primarily placed in new 
subpart C of part 362. Procedures to be used by all savings 
associations when Acquiring, Establishing, or Conducting New Activities 
through a Subsidiary would be placed in new subpart D. Subpart E would 
contain the revised provisions concerning application and notice 
procedures as well as delegations for insured state banks. Subpart F 
would contain the revised provisions concerning application and notice 
procedures as well as delegations for insured savings associations.
[[Page 47970]]
    In addition, the FDIC is processing a complete revision of part 303 
of the FDIC's rules and regulations. Part 303 contains the FDIC's 
applications procedures and delegations of authority. As a part of that 
process and for ease of reference, the FDIC is proposing to remove the 
applications procedures relating to activities and investments of 
insured state banks from part 362 and place them in subpart G of part 
303. The procedures applicable to insured savings associations will be 
consolidated in subpart H of part 303. We anticipate that the proposed 
changes to part 303 will be published for comment within 90 days of 
today's publication. At that time, subparts G and H of part 303 will be 
designated as the place where the text of subparts E and F of this 
proposed rule eventually will be located.
    Part 362 of the FDIC's regulations implements the provisions of 
section 24 of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1831a). Section 24 was added to 
the FDI Act by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act of 1991 (FDICIA). With certain exceptions, section 24 limits the 
direct equity investments of state chartered insured banks to equity 
investments of a type permissible for national banks. In addition, 
section 24 prohibits an insured state bank from directly, or indirectly 
through a subsidiary, engaging as principal in any activity that is not 
permissible for a national bank unless the bank meets its capital 
requirements and the FDIC determines that the activity will not pose a 
significant risk to the appropriate deposit insurance fund. The FDIC 
may make such determinations by regulation or order. The statute 
requires institutions that held equity investments not conforming to 
the new requirements to divest no later than December 19, 1996. The 
statute also requires that banks file certain notices with the FDIC 
concerning grandfathered investments.
    Part 362 was adopted in two stages. The provisions of the current 
regulation concerning equity investments appeared in the Federal 
Register on November 9, 1992, at 57 FR 53234. The provisions of the 
current regulation concerning activities of insured state banks and 
their majority-owned subsidiaries appeared in the Federal Register on 
December 8, 1993, at 58 FR 64455.
    Section 303.13 of the FDIC's regulations (12 CFR 303.13) implements 
sections 28 and 18(m) of the FDI Act. Both sections were added to the 
FDI Act by the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement 
Act of 1989 (FIRREA). While section 28 of the FDI Act and section 24 of 
the FDI Act are similar, there are a number of fundamental differences 
in the two provisions which caused the implementing regulations to 
differ in some respects.
    Section 18(m) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1828(m)) requires state and 
federal savings associations to provide the FDIC with notice 30 days 
before establishing or acquiring a subsidiary or engaging in any new 
activity through a subsidiary. Section 28 (12 U.S.C. 1831e) governs the 
activities and equity investments of state savings associations and 
provides that no state savings association may engage as principal in 
any activity of a type or in an amount that is impermissible for a 
federal savings association unless the FDIC determines that the 
activity will not pose a significant risk to the affected deposit 
insurance fund and the savings association is in compliance with the 
fully phased-in capital requirements prescribed under section 5(t) of 
the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA, 12 U.S.C. 1464(t)). Except for its 
investment in service corporations, a state savings association is 
prohibited from acquiring or retaining any equity investment that is 
not permissible for a federal savings association. A state savings 
association may acquire or retain an investment in a service 
corporation of a type or in an amount not permissible for a federal 
savings association if the FDIC determines that neither the amount 
invested in the service corporation nor the activities of the service 
corporation pose a significant risk to the affected deposit insurance 
fund and the savings association continues to meet the fully phased-in 
capital requirements. A savings association was required to divest 
itself of prohibited equity investments no later than July 1, 1994. 
Section 28 also prohibits state and federal savings associations from 
acquiring any corporate debt security that is not of investment grade 
(commonly known as ``junk bonds'').
    Section 303.13 of the FDIC's regulations was adopted as an interim 
final rule on December 29, 1989 (54 FR 53548). The FDIC revised the 
rule after reviewing the comments and the regulation as adopted 
appeared in the Federal Register on September 17, 1990 (55 FR 38042). 
The regulation establishes application and notice procedures governing 
requests by a state savings association to directly, or through a 
service corporation, engage in activities that are not permissible for 
a federal savings association; the intent of a state savings 
association to engage in permissible activities in an amount exceeding 
that permissible for a federal savings association; or the intent of a 
state savings association to divest corporate debt securities not of 
investment grade. The regulation also establishes procedures to give 
prior notice for the establishment or acquisition of a subsidiary or 
the conduct of new activities through a subsidiary.
    Section 337.4 of the FDIC's regulations (12 CFR 337.4) governs 
securities activities of subsidiaries of insured state nonmember banks 
as well as transactions between insured state nonmember banks and their 
securities subsidiaries and affiliates. The regulation was adopted in 
1984 (49 FR 46723) and is designed to promote the safety and soundness 
of insured state nonmember banks that have subsidiaries which engage in 
securities activities that are impermissible for national banks under 
section 16 of the Banking Act of 1933 (12 U.S.C. section 24 seventh), 
commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act. It requires that these 
subsidiaries qualify as bona fide subsidiaries, establishes transaction 
restrictions between a bank and its subsidiaries or other affiliates 
that engage in securities activities that are prohibited for national 
banks, requires that an insured state nonmember bank give prior notice 
to the FDIC before establishing or acquiring any securities subsidiary, 
requires that disclosures be provided to securities customers in 
certain instances, and requires that a bank's investment in a 
securities subsidiary engaging in activities that are impermissible for 
a national bank be deducted from the bank's capital.
    On August 23, 1996, the FDIC published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking (61 FR 43486, August 23, 1996) (August proposed rule) to 
amend part 362. Under the proposed rule a notice procedure would have 
replaced the application currently required in the case of real estate 
investment, life insurance and annuity investment activities provided 
certain conditions and restrictions were met. The proposed rule set 
forth notice processing procedures for real estate, life insurance 
policies and annuity contract investments for well-capitalized, well-
managed insured state banks. Under the proposal, all real estate 
activities would be required to be conducted in a majority-owned 
subsidiary, while life insurance policies and annuity contracts could 
be held directly or through a majority-owned subsidiary. Notices would 
have been filed with the appropriate FDIC regional office. The FDIC 
regional office would have had 60 days to process a notice under the 
proposal, with a possible extension of 30 days. If the FDIC did not 
object to the
[[Page 47971]]
notice prior to the expiration of the notice period (or any extension), 
the bank could have proceeded with the investment activity. In the 
event a bank fell out of compliance with any of the eligibility 
conditions after starting the activity, it would have been required to 
report the noncompliance to the appropriate FDIC regional office within 
10 business days of the occurrence.
    With respect to investments in real estate activities, the August 
proposed rule set forth 9 conditions which banks would have had to meet 
to be ``eligible'' for the notice procedure. These 9 conditions 
addressed the bank's capital levels and financial condition (must be 
well-capitalized after deducting investment in real estate and must 
have a Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System (UFIRS) rating of 1 
or 2), how the real estate activity would be conducted (a ``bona fide'' 
subsidiary which only engages in real estate activities), management 
experience and independence of the real estate subsidiary (subsidiary 
must have management with real estate experience, a written business 
plan, and at least one director with real estate experience who is not 
an employee, officer or director of the bank), and placed limits on 
bank transactions with the subsidiary and customers (sections 23A and 
23B of the Federal Reserve Act applied to transactions between the bank 
and its subsidiary and tying and insider transactions were prohibited). 
The August proposed rule also set forth the contents of the notice that 
was to be sent to the FDIC regional office. The required information 
included 7 items; information regarding the proposed activity (general 
description of proposed real estate activity, a copy of the written 
business plan, and a description of the subsidiary's operations 
including management's expertise), the amount of investment and impact 
on bank capital (aggregate amount of investment in activity and pro 
forma effect of deducting such investments on the bank's capital 
levels) and the bank's authority to engage in such activity (copy of 
the board of directors' resolution authorizing activity and 
identification of state law permitting the activity). Under the August 
proposal, the regional office could have requested additional 
information.
    After considering the comments to the August proposed rule and 
reconsidering the issues underlying the current regulation, we have 
restructured the approach we are taking under part 362. As a result, 
the FDIC withdrew the August proposed rule, which is published 
elsewhere in today's Federal Register in favor of the more 
comprehensive approach presently proposed.
    While the August proposed rule amended existing part 362, the 
current proposal would replace existing part 362. Unlike the rule 
proposed in August, the current proposal is not limited to considering 
the notice procedure used under part 362. In drafting the current 
proposal, we have deleted items that are either duplicative, 
unnecessary due to the passage of time, or have proven unwarranted 
given our experience in implementing section 24 over the last five 
years. In addition, we have refined the notice procedure that was 
proposed in August. We are no longer recommending a life insurance 
policy and annuity contract investment notice due to recent guidance 
provided by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC). The 
OCC's guidance appears to eliminate the necessity for an application 
with respect to virtually all of the life insurance and annuity 
investments received by the FDIC in the past. While Section 24 and the 
part 362 application process would continue to apply to those life 
insurance and annuity investments which are impermissible for national 
banks, the FDIC has decided that there is no need to adopt a notice 
process that specifically addresses what we expect to be an extremely 
small number of situations. We invite comment on whether we are correct 
in concluding that there is no longer a need for a notice process for 
life insurance and annuity investments which are impermissible for 
national banks.
II. Description of Proposal
    The FDIC proposes to divide part 362 into six subparts. Before 
describing the reorganization of part 362, we would like to make a few 
general comments concerning the proposal. First, we moved substantive 
aspects of the regulation that were formerly found in the definitions 
of terms like ``bona fide subsidiary'' to the applicable regulation 
text. This reorganization should assist the reader in understanding and 
applying the regulation. Second, current part 362 contains a number of 
provisions relating to divesture. We have deleted any divestiture 
provisions in the current proposal that we found to be unnecessary due 
to the passage of time. Third, we are proposing to combine the rules 
covering the equity investments of banks and savings associations into 
part 362 and to regulate these investments as consistently as possible 
given the limitations imposed by statute. Fourth, unlike the 
regulations promulgated by the Office of Thrift Supervision we do not 
distinguish between activities carried out by a first tier subsidiary 
of a savings association versus a lower-tier subsidiary. Finally, 
although the FDIC agrees with the principles applicable to transactions 
between insured depository institutions and its affiliates contained in 
sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 371c and 
371c-1), our experience over the last five years in applying section 24 
has led us to conclude that extending 23A and 23B by reference to bank 
subsidiaries is inadvisable. For that reason, the proposed regulation 
does not incorporate sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act by 
cross-reference; rather, the proposal adapts the principles set forth 
in sections 23A and 23B to the bank/subsidiary relationship as 
appropriate. In drafting the proposed revision to part 362, we have 
considered each of the requirements contained in sections 23A and 23B 
in the context of transactions between an insured institution and its 
subsidiary and refined the restrictions appropriately. The FDIC 
requests comment on whether these proposals assist in the application 
of the principles of 23A and 23B to the subsidiaries of insured 
depository institutions. We also request comment on all aspects of 
these restrictions including whether this approach strikes a better 
balance between caution and commercial reality by harmonizing the 
capital deductions and the principles of 23A and 23B.
    Subpart A of the proposed regulation would deal with the activities 
and investments of insured state banks. Except for those sections 
pertaining to the applications, notices and related delegations of 
authority (procedural provisions), existing part 362 would essentially 
become subpart A under the current proposal. The procedural provisions 
of existing part 362 have been transferred to subpart E. As proposed, 
subpart A addresses the activities of the insured state bank in 
Sec. 362.3. The activities carried on in a subsidiary of the insured 
state bank are addressed in a separate section (see Sec. 362.4 in the 
proposed regulation). We are soliciting comment on whether this 
reorganization of part 362 is helpful.
    The ability of insured state banks to engage in activities as 
principal is directly linked to the ability of a national bank to 
engage in the same type of activity. National banks have a limited 
ability to hold equity investments in real estate. Even so, if a 
particular real estate investment has been determined to be permissible 
for a national bank, an insured state bank only needs to document that 
determination to undertake the
[[Page 47972]]
investment. Insured state banks that want to undertake a real estate 
investment which is impermissible for a national bank (or continue to 
hold the real estate investment in the case of investments acquired 
before enactment of section 24 of the FDI Act), must file an 
application with the FDIC for consent. The FDIC may approve such 
applications if the investment is made through a majority-owned 
subsidiary, the institution meets the applicable capital standards set 
by the appropriate Federal banking agency and the FDIC determines that 
the activity does not pose a significant risk to the appropriate 
deposit insurance fund.
    The FDIC has determined that real estate investment activities may 
pose significant risks to the deposit insurance funds. For that reason, 
the FDIC is proposing to establish standards that an insured state 
nonmember bank must meet before engaging in real estate investment 
activities that are not permissible for a national bank. Under a safety 
and soundness standard, subpart B of the proposed regulation requires 
insured state nonmember banks to meet the standards established by the 
FDIC, even if the Comptroller of the Currency determines that those 
activities are permissible for a national bank subsidiary. Subpart B 
also would establish modern standards for insured state nonmember banks 
to govern transactions between those insured state nonmember banks that 
are not affiliated with a bank holding company (nonbank banks) and 
affiliated organizations conducting securities activities. The existing 
restrictions on these securities activities are found in Sec. 337.4 of 
this chapter. The new rule will only cover those entities not covered 
by orders issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (FRB) governing the securities activities of those banks that 
are affiliated with a bank holding company or a member bank.
    Subpart B prohibits an insured state nonmember bank not affiliated 
with a company that is treated as a bank holding company (see section 
4(f) of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. 1843(f)), from becoming 
affiliated with a company that directly engages in the underwriting of 
securities not permissible for a national bank unless the standards 
established under the proposed regulation are met.
    Subpart C of the proposed regulation concerns the activities and 
investments of insured state savings associations. The provisions 
applicable to activities of savings associations currently appearing in 
Sec. 303.13 would be revised in a number of ways and placed in new 
subpart C. To the extent possible, activities and investments of 
insured state savings associations would be treated consistently with 
the treatment provided insured state banks. Thus, we revised a number 
of definitions currently contained in Sec. 303.13 to track the 
definitions used in subpart A. We request comment on whether the 
revisions made in subpart C contribute to the efficient operation of 
savings associations and their service corporations while continuing to 
implement the statutory requirements.
    Subpart D of the proposal requires that an insured savings 
association provide a 30 day notice to the FDIC whenever the 
institution establishes or acquires a subsidiary or conducts a new 
activity through a subsidiary. This provision does not alter the notice 
required by statute. We moved this requirement to a new subpart to 
accommodate Federally chartered savings associations by limiting the 
amount of regulation text they would have to read to comply with this 
statutory notice. Comment is invited on whether this separation avoids 
confusion, enhances readability and simplifies compliance.
    Subparts E and F of the proposal each contain the notice and 
application requirements and the delegations of authority for the 
substantive matters covered by the proposal for insured state banks and 
state savings associations, respectively.
    The FDIC requests comments about all aspects of the proposed 
revision to part 362. In addition, the FDIC is raising specific 
questions for public comment as set out in connection with the analysis 
of the proposal below.
III. Section by Section Analysis
A. Subpart A--Activities of Insured State Banks
Section 362.1 Purpose and Scope
    The purpose and scope of subpart A is to ensure that the activities 
and investments undertaken by insured state banks and their 
subsidiaries do not present a significant risk to the deposit insurance 
funds, are not unsafe and are not unsound, are consistent with the 
purposes of federal deposit insurance and are otherwise consistent with 
law. This subpart implements the provisions of section 24 of the FDI 
Act that restrict and prohibit insured state banks and their 
subsidiaries from engaging in activities and investments of a type that 
are not permissible for national banks and their subsidiaries. The 
phrase ``activity permissible for a national bank'' means any activity 
authorized for national banks under any statute including the National 
Bank Act (12 U.S.C. 21 et seq.), as well as activities recognized as 
permissible for a national bank in regulations, official circulars, 
bulletins, orders or written interpretations issued by the OCC. This 
subpart governs activities conducted ``as principal'' and therefore 
does not govern activities conducted as agent for a customer, conducted 
in a brokerage, custodial, advisory, or administrative capacity, or 
conducted as trustee. We moved this language from Sec. 362.2(c) of the 
current version of part 362 where the term ``as principal'' is defined 
to mean acting other than as agent for a customer, acting as trustee, 
or conducting an activity in a brokerage, custodial or advisory 
capacity. The FDIC previously described this definition as not 
covering, for example, acting as agent for the sale of insurance, 
acting as agent for the sale of securities, acting as agent for the 
sale of real estate, or acting as agent in arranging for travel 
services. Likewise, providing safekeeping services, providing personal 
financial planning services, and acting as trustee were described as 
not being ``as principal'' activities within the meaning of this 
definition. In contrast, real estate development, insurance 
underwriting, issuing annuities, and securities underwriting would 
constitute ``as principal'' activities. Further, for example, travel 
agency activities have not been brought within the scope of part 362 
and would not require prior consent from the FDIC even though a 
national bank is not permitted to act as travel agent. This result 
obtains from the fact that the state bank would not be acting ``as 
principal'' in providing those services. Thus, the fact that a national 
bank may not engage in travel agency activities would be of no 
consequence. Of course, state banks would have to be authorized to 
engage in travel agency activities under state law. We intend to 
continue to interpret section 24 and part 362 as excluding any coverage 
of activities being conducted as agent. To highlight this issue, 
provide clarity and alert the reader of this rule that activities being 
conducted as agent are not within the scope of section 24 and part 362, 
we have moved this language to the purpose and scope paragraph. We
[[Page 47973]]
request comment on whether moving this language to the purpose and 
scope paragraph assists users of this rule in interpreting its 
parameters. We also invite comment on whether the ``as principal'' 
definition still would be necessary.
    Equity investments acquired in connection with debts previously 
contracted (DPC) that are held within the shorter of the time limits 
prescribed by state or federal law are not subject to the limitations 
of this subpart. The exclusion of equity investments acquired in 
connection with DPC has been moved from the definition of ``Equity 
investment'' to the purpose and scope paragraph to highlight this 
issue, provide clarity and alert the reader of this rule that these 
investments are not within the scope of section 24 and part 362. 
However, the intent of the insured state bank in holding equity 
investments acquired in connection with DPC continues to be relevant to 
the analysis of whether the equity investment is permitted. Interests 
taken as DPC are excluded from the scope of this regulation provided 
that the interests are not held for investment purposes and are not 
held longer than the shorter of any time limit on holding such 
interests (1) set by applicable state law or regulation or (2) the 
maximum time limit on holding such interests set by applicable statute 
for a national bank. The result of the modification would be to make it 
clear, for example, that real estate taken DPC may not be held for 
longer than 10 years (see 12 U.S.C. 29) or any shorter period of time 
set by the state. In the case of equity securities taken DPC, the bank 
must divest the equity securities ``within a reasonable time'' (i.e, as 
soon as possible consistent with obtaining a reasonable return) (see 
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 395, August 24, 1987, (1988-89 Transfer 
Binder) Fed Banking L. Rep. (CCH) p. 85,619, which interprets and 
applies the National Bank Act) or no later than the time permitted 
under state law if that time period is shorter.
    In addition, any interest taken DPC may not be held for investment 
purposes. For example, while a bank may be able to expend monies in 
connection with DPC property and/or take other actions with regard to 
that property, if those expenditures and actions are speculative in 
nature or go beyond what is necessary and prudent in order for the bank 
to recover on the loan, the property will not fall within the DPC 
exclusion. The FDIC expects that bank management will document that DPC 
property is being actively marketed and current appraisals or other 
means of establishing fair market value may be used to support 
management's decision not to dispose of property if offers to purchase 
the property have been received and rejected by management.
    Similarly to highlight this issue, provide clarity and alert the 
reader of this rule, we have moved to the purpose and scope paragraph 
the language governing any interest in real estate in which the real 
property is (a) used or intended in good faith to be used within a 
reasonable time by an insured state bank or its subsidiaries as offices 
or related facilities for the conduct of its business or future 
expansion of its business or (b) used as public welfare investments of 
a type permissible for national banks. In the case of real property 
held for use at some time in the future as premises, the holding of the 
property must reflect a bona fide intent on the part of the bank to use 
the property in the future as premises. We are not aware of any 
statutory time frame that applies in the case of a national bank which 
limits the holding of such property to a specific time period. 
Therefore, the issue of the precise time frame under which future 
premises may be held without implicating part 362 must be decided on a 
case-by-case basis. If the holding period allowed for under state law 
is longer than what the FDIC determines to be reasonable and consistent 
with a bona fide intent to use the property for future premises, the 
bank will be so informed and will be required to convert the property 
to use, divest the property, or apply for consent to hold the property 
through a majority-owned subsidiary of the bank. We note that the OCC's 
regulations indicate that real property held for future premises should 
``normally'' be converted to use within five years after which time it 
will be considered other real estate owned and must be actively 
marketed and divested in no later than ten years. (12 CFR 34). We 
understand that the time periods set forth in the OCC's regulation 
reflect safety and soundness determinations by that agency. As such, 
and in keeping with what has been to date the FDIC's posture with 
regard to safety and soundness determinations of the OCC, the FDIC will 
substitute its own judgment to determine when a reasonable time has 
elapsed for holding the property.
    A subsidiary of an insured state bank may not engage in real estate 
investment activities not permissible for a subsidiary of a national 
bank unless the bank is in compliance with applicable capital standards 
and the FDIC has determined that the activity poses no significant risk 
to the deposit insurance fund. Subpart A provides standards for real 
estate investment activities that are not permissible for a subsidiary 
of a national bank. Because of safety and soundness concerns relating 
to real estate investment activities, subpart B reflects special rules 
for subsidiaries of insured state nonmember banks that engage in real 
estate investment activities of a type that are not permissible for a 
national bank but may be otherwise permissible for a subsidiary of a 
national bank.
    The FDIC intends to allow insured state banks and their 
subsidiaries to undertake safe and sound activities and investments 
that do not present a significant risk to the deposit insurance funds 
and that are consistent with the purposes of federal deposit insurance 
and other applicable law. This subpart does not authorize any insured 
state bank to make investments or to conduct activities that are not 
authorized or that are prohibited by either state or federal law.
Section 362.2  Definitions
    Revised subpart A Sec. 362.2 contains--definitions. We have left 
most of the definitions unchanged or edited them to enhance clarity or 
readability without changing the meaning.
    To standardize as many definitions as possible, we have 
incorporated several definitions from section 3 of the FDI Act (12 U.S. 
C. 1813). These definitions are ``Bank,'' ``State bank,'' ``Savings 
association,'' ``State savings association,'' ``Depository 
institution,'' ``Insured depository institution,'' ``Insured state 
bank,'' ``Federal savings association,'' and ``Insured state nonmember 
bank.'' This standardization required that we delete the definitions of 
``depository institution'' and ``insured state bank''currently found in 
part 362. No substantive change was intended by this change. The 
definitions that were added by this change are ``Bank,'' ``State 
bank,'' ``Savings association,'' ``State savings association,'' 
``Insured depository institution,'' ``Federal savings association,'' 
and ``Insured state nonmember bank.'' These definitions were added to 
provide clarity throughout the proposed part 362 because we are 
incorporating so many definitions from subpart A into subpart B 
governing safety and soundness concerns of insured state nonmember 
banks, subpart C governing the activities of state savings 
associations, and subpart D governing subsidiaries of all savings 
associations. We invite comment on whether readers view these 
definitions as needing further changes to enhance clarity and 
readability. We also invite comment on whether any of
[[Page 47974]]
the changes we have made may have changed the substance of the 
regulation in ways that we may not have intended.
    The definitions that have been left unchanged or edited to enhance 
clarity or readability without changing the meaning are the following: 
``Control,'' ``Extension of credit,'' ``Executive officer,'' 
``Director,'' ``Principal shareholder,'' ``Related interest,'' 
``National Securities exchange,'' ``Residents of state,'' 
``Subsidiary,'' and ``Tier one capital.'' We invite comment on whether 
readers view these definitions as needing further changes to enhance 
clarity and readability. We also invite comment on whether any of the 
changes we have made may have changed the substance of the regulation 
in ways that we may not have intended.
    The name of one definition has been simplified without 
substantively changing the meaning of the definition. That definition 
is currently found in Sec. 362.2(g) and is described as follows ``An 
insured state bank will be considered to convert its charter.'' We 
moved this definition to Sec. 362.2(e) and call this definition, 
``Convert its charter.'' The substance of the definition is intended to 
remain unchanged by this revised language. We invite comment on whether 
readers view the change in this definition as needing any further 
changes to enhance clarity and readability. We also invite comment on 
whether any of the changes we have made to this definition may have 
changed the substance of the regulation in ways that we may not have 
intended.
    Although most of the definitions as set out in the proposal are the 
same or virtually unchanged, a few of the definitions in the proposal 
have been substantively revised. The proposed changes to these 
definitions are discussed below.
    We deleted the definitions of ``Activity permissible for a national 
bank,'' ``An activity is considered to be conducted as principal,'' and 
``Equity investment permissible for a national bank.'' We moved the 
substance of the information that was contained in these definitions 
into the scope paragraph in Sec. 362.1. We thought that including the 
information that was in these definitions in the scope paragraph made 
the coverage of the rule clearer to the reader and was consistent with 
the purpose of the scope paragraph. We expect that some readers may 
save time by realizing sooner that the regulation may be inapplicable 
to conduct contemplated by a particular bank. We also thought that the 
reader might be more likely to consider the scope paragraph than to 
consider the definition section when reading the rule to determine its 
applicability. We concluded that it would be unnecessary to duplicate 
this same information in the definition section. We invite comment on 
whether readers prefer to see these concepts in the scope paragraph and 
whether readers also would prefer to see these concepts defined.
    We deleted the definition of ``Equity interest in real estate'' and 
moved the recitation of the permissibility of owning real estate for 
bank premises and future premises, owning real estate for public 
welfare investments and owning real estate from DPC to the scope 
paragraph for the reasons stated in the preceding paragraph. These 
activities are permissible for national banks and we thought that it 
was unnecessary to continue to restate this information in the 
definition section of the regulation. No substantive change is intended 
by this simplification of the language. In addition, we determined that 
the remainder of the definition of ``Equity interest in real estate'' 
did little to enhance clarity or understanding; therefore, we are 
relying on the language defining ``Equity investment'' to cover real 
estate investments. We conformed the definition of ``Equity 
investment'' by deleting the reference to the deleted definition of 
``Equity interest in real estate.'' No substantive change is intended 
by shortening this language. We invite comment on whether the readers 
view the definition of ``Equity interest in real estate'' as necessary 
to enhance clarity and readability on these issues as well as whether 
readers prefer seeing these concepts in the scope paragraph.
    The remainder of the definition of ``Equity investment'' has been 
shortened and edited to enhance readability. We intend no substantive 
change by shortening this language. This concept is intended to 
encompass an investment in an equity security or real estate as it does 
in the current definition. We invite comment on the changes to this 
definition and whether any further changes are needed.
    With regard to the definition of ``Equity security,'' we modified 
this definition by deleting the references to permissible national bank 
holdings such as equity securities being held as a result of a 
foreclosure or other arrangements concerning debt previously 
contracted. Language discussing the exclusion of DPC and other 
investments that are permissible for national banks has been relocated 
to the scope paragraph for the reasons stated above. Thus, the equity 
investment definitions no longer include these references. We intend no 
substantive change through the deletion of this redundant language. We 
invite comment on whether any ambiguity or unintended change in the 
meaning may be created by removing this language from the definition.
    We added a shorter definition of ``Real estate investment 
activity'' meaning any interest in real estate held directly or 
indirectly that is not permissible for a national bank. This term is 
used in Sec. 362.4(b)(5) of subpart A and in Sec. 362.7 of subpart B 
which contains safety and soundness restrictions on real estate 
activities of subsidiaries of insured state nonmember banks that may be 
deemed to be permissible for operating subsidiaries of national banks 
that would not be permissible for a national bank, itself. We invite 
comment on this definition, including its meaning and clarity as well 
as the underlying safety and soundness proposal in subpart B. We 
specifically invite comment on the exclusion of real estate leasing 
from the definition of real estate investment activity. The proposal 
has eliminated real estate leasing from the definition of real estate 
investment activity in order to assure that banks using the notice 
procedure are not getting involved in a commercial business. The notice 
procedures are designed for institutions that wish to hold parcels of 
real estate for ultimate sale. If an institution wishes to hold the 
property to lease it for ongoing business purposes, we believe the 
proposal should be considered under the application process.
    We deleted the definitions of ``Investment in department'' and 
``Department'' because we thought they were no longer needed in the 
revised regulation text. The core standards applicable to a department 
of a bank are set out in detail in Sec. 362.3(c) and defining the term 
``Department'' no longer seems to be necessary. Regarding the 
definition of ``Investment in department,'' we also considered this 
definition unnecessary. We believe that if a calculation of 
``Investment in department'' needs to be made, we will defer to state 
law on this issue. We invite comment on whether the readers view these 
definitions as necessary to enhance clarity and readability on these 
issues. We also request comment on whether deference to state law on 
this investment issue would cause any unintended consequences that we 
have not foreseen.
    Similarly, we deleted the definition of ``Investment in 
subsidiary'' because the definition is no longer needed in the revised 
regulation text. The core standards applicable to an insured state bank 
and its subsidiary make a
[[Page 47975]]
definition of ``Investment in subsidiary'' superfluous. The core 
standards contained in Sec. 362.4(c) set out the requirements in 
detail. Therefore, defining the term ``Investment in subsidiary'' no 
longer seems to be necessary. We invite comment on whether the readers 
view this definition or a similar definition as necessary to enhance 
clarity and readability on these issues.
    We deleted the definition of ``bona fide subsidiary'' and chose to 
make similar characteristics part of the eligible subsidiary criteria 
in Sec. 362.4(c)(2). We thought that including these criteria as a part 
of the substantive regulation text in that subsection, rather than as a 
definition, makes reading the rule easier and the meaning clearer. We 
invite comment on whether readers prefer to see this concept set forth 
in the substantive section of the rule or the definition section and 
whether readers believe any additional definition is necessary to 
enhance clarity and readability.
    The proposal substitutes the current definition of ``Lower income'' 
with a cross reference in Sec. 362.3(a)(2)(ii) to the definition of 
``low income'' and ``moderate income'' as used for purposes of part 345 
of the FDIC's regulations (12 CFR 345) which implements the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA). 12 U.S.C. 2901, et seq. Under part 345, ``low 
income'' means an individual income that is less than 50 percent of the 
area median income or a median family income that is less than 50 
percent in the case of a census tract or a block numbering area 
delineated by the United States Census in the most recent decennial 
census. ``Moderate income'' means an individual income that is at least 
50 percent but less than 80 percent of the area median or a median 
family income that is at least 50 but less than 80 percent in the case 
of a census tract or block numbering area.
    The definition ``Lower income'' is relevant for purposes of 
applying the exception in the regulation which allows an insured state 
bank to be a partner in a limited partnership whose sole purpose is 
direct or indirect investment in the acquisition, rehabilitation, or 
new construction of qualified housing projects (housing for lower 
income persons). As we anticipate that insured state banks would seek 
to use such investments in meeting their community reinvestment 
obligations, the FDIC is of the opinion that conforming the definition 
of lower income to that used for CRA purposes will benefit banks. We 
note that the change will have the effect of expanding the housing 
projects that qualify for the exception. We invite comment on this 
change.
    We have simplified the definition of the term ``Activity.'' As 
modified the definition includes all investments. Where equity 
investments are intended to be excluded, we expressly exclude those 
investments in the regulation text. We invite comment on whether the 
modification to the definition enhances clarity or whether the longer 
definition found in the current regulation should be reinstated. In 
particular, we invite comment on whether the definition should be 
modified to take into account in some fashion a recent interpretation 
by the agency under which it was determined that the act of making a 
political campaign contribution does not constitute an ``activity'' for 
purposes of part 362. The interpretation uses a three prong test to 
help determine whether particular conduct should be considered an 
activity and therefore subject to review under part 362 if the conduct 
is not permissible for a national bank. If at least two of the tests 
yield a conclusion that the conduct is part of the authorized conduct 
of business by the bank, the better conclusion is that the conduct is 
an activity. First, any conduct that is an integral part of the 
business of banking as well as any conduct which is closely related or 
incidental to banking should be considered an activity . In applying 
this test it is important to focus on what banks do that makes them 
different from other types of businesses. For example, lending money is 
clearly an ``activity'' for purposes of part 362. The second test asks 
whether the conduct is merely a corporate function as opposed to a 
banking function. For example, paying dividends to shareholders is 
primarily a general corporate function and not one associated with 
banking because of some unique characteristic of banking as a business. 
Generally, activities that are not general corporate functions will 
involve interaction between the bank and its customers rather than its 
employees or shareholders. The third test asks whether the conduct 
involves an attempt by the bank to generate a profit. For example, 
banks make loans and accept deposits in an effort to make money. 
However, contracting with another company to generate monthly customer 
statements should not be considered to be an activity unto itself as it 
simply is entered into in support of the ``activity'' of taking 
deposits. We also invite any other comments that would make this 
definition easier to understand and apply.
    The proposal modifies the definition of ``Company'' to add limited 
liability companies to the list of entities that will be considered a 
company. This change in the definition is being proposed in recognition 
of the creation of limited liability companies and their growing 
prevalence in the market place. We invite comment on whether this 
addition to the list of forms of business enterprise is appropriate and 
whether we should add any more forms of business enterprise.
    The FDIC has changed the definition of ``Significant risk to the 
fund'' by adding the second sentence that clarifies that this 
definition includes the risk that may be present either when an 
activity or an equity investment contributes or may contribute to the 
decline in condition of a particular state-chartered depository 
institution or when a type of activity or equity investment is found by 
the FDIC to contribute or potentially contribute to the deterioration 
of the overall condition of the banking system. We invite comment on 
whether the definition should be modified in some other manner and if 
so how. Our interpretation of the definition remains unchanged. 
Significant risk to the deposit insurance fund shall be understood to 
be present whenever there is a high probability that any insurance fund 
administered by the FDIC may suffer a loss. The preamble accompanying 
the adoption of this definition in final indicated that the FDIC 
recognized that no investment or activity may be said to be without 
risk under all circumstances and that such fact alone will not cause 
the agency to determine that a particular activity or investment poses 
a significant risk of loss to the fund. The emphasis rather is on 
whether there is a high degree of likelihood under all of the 
circumstances that an investment or activity by a particular bank, or 
by banks in general or in a given market or region, may ultimately 
produce a loss to either of the funds. The relative or absolute size of 
the loss that is projected in comparison to the fund will not be 
determinative of the issue. The preamble indicated that the definition 
is consistent with and derived from the legislative history of section 
24 of the FDI Act. Previously, the FDIC rejected the suggestion that 
risk to the fund only be found if a particular activity or investment 
is expected to result in the imminent failure of a bank. The suggestion 
was rejected as the FDIC determined at that time that it was 
appropriate to approach the issue conservatively. We think that this 
conservatism is more clearly articulated in this modification to the 
definition. We invite comments on whether this
[[Page 47976]]
additional language is necessary and whether any other language should 
be added.
    We re-defined the term ``Well-capitalized'' to incorporate the same 
meaning set forth in part 325 of this chapter for an insured state 
nonmember bank. For other state-chartered depository institutions, the 
term ``well-capitalized'' has the same meaning as set forth in the 
capital regulations adopted by the appropriate Federal banking agency. 
We decided that it would simplify the calculations for the various 
state-chartered depository institutions if the capital definition 
imported the definitions used by those institutions when they deal with 
their appropriate Federal banking agency. We deleted the other terms 
defined under Sec. 362.2(x) as unnecessary due to the changes in the 
regulation text. We invite comment on whether we have missed an item 
that still needs to be included in this definition.
    We added definitions of the following terms: ``Change in control,'' 
``Institution,'' ``Majority-owned subsidiary,'' ``Security'' and 
``State-chartered depository institution.''
    Under section 24 of the FDI Act, the grandfather with respect to 
common or preferred stock listed on a national securities exchange and 
shares of registered investment companies ceases to apply if the bank 
undergoes a change in control. The phrase ``Change in control'' is 
defined for the purposes of part 362 in what is currently 
Sec. 362.3(b)(4)(ii) of the regulation. Under the proposal, the 
definition is relocated into the definitions section and modified.
    Under the current regulation a ``Change in control'' that will 
result in the loss of the grandfather is defined to mean a transaction 
in which the bank converts its charter, undergoes a transaction which 
requires a notice to be filed under section 7(j) of the FDI Act (12 
U.S.C. 1817(j)) except a transaction which is presumed to be a change 
in control for the purposes of that section under FDIC's regulations 
implementing section 7(j), any transaction subject to section 3 of the 
Bank Holding Company Act ( 12 U.S.C. 1842) other than a one bank 
holding company formation, a transaction in which the bank is acquired 
by or merged into a bank that is not eligible for the grandfather, or a 
transaction in which control of the bank's parent company changes. The 
proposal would narrow the definition of ``Change in control'' by 
defining the phrase to only encompass transactions subject to section 
7(j) of the FDI Act (except for transactions which trigger the 
presumptions under FDIC's regulations implementing section 7(j) or the 
FRB's regulations implementing section 7(j)) and transactions in which 
the bank is acquired by or merged into a bank that is not eligible for 
the grandfather. This definition change will narrow the instances in 
which a bank may lose its grandfathered ability to invest in common or 
preferred stock listed on a national securities exchange and shares of 
registered investment companies. It is our belief that the revised 
definition, if adopted, will more closely approximate when a true 
change in control has occurred.
    We added a definition of ``Institution'' and defined it to mean the 
same as a ``state-chartered depository institution'' to shorten the 
drafting of the rule, particularly for those items that are applicable 
to both insured state banks and insured state savings associations. 
This definition is intended to enhance readability. We invite comment 
on whether this definition creates any confusion or ambiguity.
    We added a definition of ``Majority-owned subsidiary'' and defined 
it to mean any corporation in which the parent insured state bank owns 
a majority of the outstanding voting stock. We added this definition to 
clarify our intention that the expedited notice procedures only be 
available when an insured state bank interposes an entity that gives 
limited liability to the parent institution. We interpret Congress's 
intention in imposing the majority-owned subsidiary requirement in 
section 24 of the FDI Act to generally require that such a subsidiary 
provide limited liability to the insured state bank. Thus, except in 
unusual circumstances, we have and will require majority-owned 
subsidiaries to adopt a form of business that provides limited 
liability to the parent bank. In assessing our experience with 
applications, we have determined that the notice procedure will be 
available only to banks that engage in activities through a majority-
owned subsidiary that takes the corporate form of business. We welcome 
applications that may take a different form of business such as a 
limited partnership or limited liability company, but would like to 
develop more experience with appropriate separations to protect the 
bank from liability under these other forms of business enterprise 
through the application process before including these entities in a 
notice procedure. We have decided that there may have been an ambiguity 
in the notice provisions we proposed for comment and published August 
23, 1996, in the Federal Register at 61 FR 43486. We intended that an 
entity eligible for the notice procedure be in corporate form and 
implied that requirement by incorporating the bona fide subsidiary 
requirements that included references to a board of directors. The 
addition of this definition should make our intention clear that the 
notice procedure requires a majority-owned subsidiary to take the 
corporate form. We invite comment on this definition, our substantive 
decision to require the corporate form for a majority-owned subsidiary 
of an insured state bank using the notice procedures, and our decision 
to exclude other limited liability business forms from the notice 
procedure. We also invite comment on any ambiguities or questions that 
this definition may create.
    We adopted the definition of ``Security'' from part 344 of this 
chapter to eliminate any ambiguity over the coverage of this rule when 
securities activities and investments are contemplated. We invite 
comment on any ambiguities or questions that this definition may 
create.
    We defined ``State-chartered depository institution'' to mean any 
state bank or state savings association insured by the FDIC to 
eliminate confusion and ambiguity. We invite comment on any ambiguities 
or questions that this definition may create.
    We invite any general comment on the proposed definitions and 
invite any suggestions for additional definitions that would be helpful 
to the reader of the regulatory text.
Section 362.3  Activities of Insured State Banks
Equity Investment Prohibition
    Section 362.3(a) of the proposal restates the statutory prohibition 
on insured state banks making or retaining any equity investment of a 
type that is not permissible for a national bank. The prohibition does 
not apply if one of the statutory exceptions contained in section 24 of 
the FDI Act (restated in the current regulation and carried forward in 
the proposal) applies. The provision is being retained. The proposal 
eliminates the reference to amount that is contained in the current 
version of Sec. 362.3(a). We have reconsidered our interpretation of 
the language of section 24 where paragraph (c) prohibits an insured 
state bank from acquiring or retaining any equity investment of a type 
that is impermissible for a national bank and paragraph (f) prohibits 
an insured state bank from acquiring or retaining any equity investment 
of a type or in an amount that is impermissible for a national bank. We
[[Page 47977]]
previously interpreted the language of paragraph (f) as controlling and 
read that language into the entire statute. We reconsidered this 
approach, decided that it was not the most reasonable construction of 
this statute and determined that the language of paragraph (c) is 
controlling. Thus, the language of paragraph (c) controls when any 
other equity investment is being considered. Therefore, we deleted the 
amount language from prohibition in the regulation. We request comment 
on this change.
Exception for Majority-Owned Subsidiary
    The FDIC proposes to retain the exception which allows investment 
in majority-owned subsidiaries as currently in effect without any 
substantive change. However, the FDIC has modified the language of this 
section to remove negative inferences and make the text clearer. Rather 
than stating that the bank may do what is not prohibited, the FDIC is 
affirmatively stating that an insured state chartered bank may acquire 
or retain investments through a majority-owned subsidiary. If an 
insured state bank holds less than a majority interest in the 
subsidiary, and that equity investment is of a type that would be 
prohibited to a national bank, the exception does not apply and the 
investment is subject to divestiture.
    Majority ownership for the exception is understood to mean 
ownership of greater than 50 percent of the outstanding voting stock of 
the subsidiary. It is our understanding that national banks may own a 
minority interest in certain types of subsidiaries. (See 12 CFR 
5.34(1997)). Therefore, an insured state bank may hold a minority 
interest in a subsidiary if a national bank could do so. Thus, the 
statute does not necessarily require a state bank to hold at least a 
majority of the stock of a company in order for the equity investment 
in the company to be permissible under the regulation. Only investments 
that would not be permissible for a national bank must be held through 
a majority-owned subsidiary.
    The regulation defines the business form of a majority-owned 
subsidiary to be a corporation. There may be other forms of business 
organization that are suitable for the purposes of this exception such 
as partnerships or limited liability companies. The FDIC does not wish 
to give blanket authorization to a non-corporate form of organization 
since these forms may not provide for the same separations the FDIC 
believes to be necessary to protect the insured bank from assuming the 
liabilities of its subsidiary. The proposal anticipates that the Board 
will review alternate forms of organization to assure that appropriate 
separation between the insured depository institution and the 
subsidiary is in place. We are soliciting comment on other forms of 
business organization which the FDIC may allow. Please provide a 
discussion of the separations inherent in alternate forms of business 
organization.
    To qualify for this exception, the majority-owned subsidiary must 
engage in activities that are described in Sec. 362.4(b). The allowable 
activities include both statutory and regulatory exceptions to the 
general prohibitions of the regulation.
Investments in Qualified Housing Projects
    The FDIC proposes to combine the language found in two paragraphs 
of the current regulation. The FDIC proposes to retain the combined 
paragraphs of the regulation with substantially the same language as 
currently in effect. The changes that have been made reflect practical 
clarifications resulting from the implications of the technical way the 
qualified housing rules work and are not intended to be substantive. In 
addition, the FDIC has modified the language of the text to remove 
negative inferences and make the text clearer. Section 362.3(a)(2)(ii) 
of the proposal provides an exception for qualified housing projects. 
Under the exception, an insured state bank is not prohibited from 
investing as a limited partner in a partnership, the sole purpose of 
which is direct or indirect investment in the acquisition, 
rehabilitation, or new construction of a residential housing project 
intended to primarily benefit lower income persons throughout the 
period of the bank's investment. The bank's investments, when 
aggregated with any existing investment in such a partnership or 
partnerships, may not exceed 2 percent of the bank's total assets. The 
FDIC expects that banks use the figure reported on the bank's most 
recent consolidated report of condition prior to making the investment 
as the measure of their total assets. If an investment in a qualified 
housing project does not exceed the limit at the time the investment 
was made, the investment shall be considered to be a legal investment 
even if the bank's total assets subsequently decline.
    The current exception is limited to instances in which the bank 
invests as a limited partner in a partnership. Comment is invited on 
(1) whether the FDIC should expand the exception to include limited 
liability companies and (2) whether doing so is permissible under the 
statute. (Section 24(c)(3) of the FDI Act provides that a state bank 
may invest ``as a limited partner in a partnership.'')
Grandfathered Investments in Listed Common or Preferred Stock and 
Shares of Registered Investment Companies
    The current regulation restates the statutory exception for 
investments in common or preferred stock listed on a national 
securities exchange and for shares of investment companies registered 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 that is available to certain 
state banks if they meet the requirements to be eligible for the 
grandfather. The statute requires, among other things, that a state 
bank file a notice with the FDIC before relying on the exception and 
that the FDIC approve the notice. The notice requirement, content of 
notice, presumptions with respect to the notice, and the maximum 
permissible investment under the grandfather also are set out in the 
current regulation. The FDIC proposes to retain the regulatory language 
as currently in effect without any substantive change. The exception is 
found in Sec. 362.3(a)(2)(iii) of the proposal. Although there would be 
no substantive change, the FDIC has modified the language of this 
section to remove negative inferences and make the text clearer.
    We deleted the reference in the current regulation describing the 
notice content and procedure because we believe that most, if not all, 
of the banks eligible for the grandfather already have filed notices 
with the FDIC. Thus, we shortened the regulation by eliminating 
language governing the specific content and processing of the notices. 
Investment in common or preferred stock listed on a national securities 
exchange or shares of an investment company is governed by the language 
of the statute. Notices must conform to the statutory requirements 
whether filed previously or filed in the future. Any bank that has 
filed a notice need not file again. Comment is invited on whether the 
regulatory filing requirements should be retained and eventually moved 
into part 303 of this chapter.
    Section 362.3(a)(2)(iii)(A) of the proposal implements the 
grandfathered listed stock and registered shares provision found in 
section 24(f)(2) of the FDI Act. Paragraph (B) of this section of the 
proposal provides that the exception for listed stock and registered 
shares ceases to apply in the event that the bank converts its charter 
or the bank or its parent holding company undergoes a change in 
control. This language restates the statutory language governing when
[[Page 47978]]
grandfather rights terminate. State banks should continue to be aware 
that, depending upon the circumstances, the exception may be considered 
lost after a merger transaction in which an eligible bank is the 
survivor. For example, if a state bank that is not eligible for the 
exception is merged into a much smaller state bank that is eligible for 
the exception, the FDIC may determine that in substance the eligible 
bank has been acquired by a bank that is not eligible for the 
exception.
    The regulation continues to provide that in the event an eligible 
bank undergoes any transaction that results in the loss of the 
exception, the bank is not prohibited from retaining its existing 
investments unless the FDIC determines that retaining the investments 
will adversely affect the bank and the FDIC orders the bank to divest 
the stock and/or shares. This provision has been retained in the 
regulation without any change except for the deletion of the citation 
to specific authorities the FDIC may rely on to order divestiture. 
Rather than containing specific citations, the proposal merely 
references FDIC's ability to order divestiture under any applicable 
authority. State banks should continue to be aware that any inaction by 
the FDIC would not preclude a bank's appropriate banking agency (when 
that agency is an agency other than the FDIC) from taking steps to 
require divestiture of the stock and/or shares if in that agency's 
judgment divestiture is warranted.
    Finally, the FDIC has moved, simplified and shortened the limit on 
the maximum permissible investment in listed stock and registered 
shares. The proposal limits the investment in grandfathered listed 
stock and registered shares to a maximum of one hundred percent (100 
percent) of tier one capital as measured on the bank's most recent 
consolidated report of condition. The FDIC continues to use book value 
as the measure of compliance with this limitation. Language indicating 
that investments by well-capitalized banks in amounts up to 100 percent 
of tier one capital will be presumed not to present a significant risk 
to the fund is being deleted as is language indicating that it will be 
presumed to present a significant risk to the fund for an 
undercapitalized bank to invest in amounts that high. In addition, we 
deleted the language stating the presumption that, absent some 
mitigating factor, it will not be presumed to present a significant 
risk for an adequately capitalized bank to invest up to 100 percent of 
tier one capital. At this time we believe that it is not necessary to 
expressly state these presumptions in the regulation.
    Language in the current regulation concerning the divestiture of 
stock and/or shares in excess of that permitted by the FDIC (as well as 
such investments in excess of 100 percent of the bank's tier one 
capital) is deleted under the proposal as no longer necessary due to 
the passage of time. In both instances the time allowed for such 
divestiture has passed.
    Comment is invited on whether this grandfather exception for 
investment in listed stock and registered shares should be applied by 
the FDIC as an exception that is separate and distinct from any other 
exception under the regulation that would allow a subsidiary of an 
insured state bank to hold equity securities. In short, should we allow 
this exception in addition to the exception for stock discussed below 
or should the FDIC consider any listed stock held by a subsidiary of 
the bank pursuant to an exception in the regulation toward the 100 
percent of tier one capital limit under this exception? We note that 
the statute does not itself impose any conditions or restrictions on a 
bank that enjoys the grandfather in terms of per issuer limits. Comment 
is sought on whether it is appropriate to impose restrictions under the 
regulation that would, for example, limit a bank to investing in less 
than a controlling interest in any given issuer. Is there some other 
limit or restriction the FDIC should consider imposing by regulation 
that is important to ensuring that the grandfathered investments do not 
pose a risk? Should this be done, if at all, solely through the notice 
and approval process?
Stock Investment in Insured Depository Institutions Owned Exclusively 
by Other Banks and Savings Associations
    The content of the proposed regulation reflects the statutory 
exception that an insured state bank is not prohibited from acquiring 
or retaining the shares of depository institutions that engage only in 
activities permissible for national banks, are subject to examination 
and are regulated by a state bank supervisor, and are owned by 20 or 
more depository institutions not one of which owns more than 15 percent 
of the voting shares. In addition, the voting shares must be held only 
by depository institutions (other than directors' qualifying shares or 
shares held under or acquired through a plan established for the 
benefit of the officers and employees). Section 24(f)(3)(B) of the FDI 
Act does not limit the exception to voting stock. We are not proposing 
to eliminate the reference to ``voting'' in the current regulation when 
referencing control of the insured depository institution. Any other 
reference to voting stock has been eliminated in the exception to allow 
holding of non-voting stock. The FDIC seeks comment concerning 
retaining the reference to ``voting'' stock when calculating the 15 
percent ownership limitation contained in the statute.
Stock Investments in Insurance Companies
    Section 362.3(b)(2)(v) of the proposal contains exceptions that 
permit state banks to hold equity investments in insurance companies. 
The exceptions are provided by statute and implemented in the current 
version of part 362. For the most part, we brought the exceptions 
forward into this proposal with no substantive editing. The exceptions 
are discussed separately below.
Directors and Officers Liability Insurance Corporations
    The first statutory exception permits insured state banks to own 
stock in corporations that solely underwrite or reinsure financial 
institution directors' and officers' liability insurance or blanket 
bond group insurance. A bank's investment in any one corporation is 
limited to 10 percent of the outstanding stock. We eliminated the 
present limitation of 10 percent of the ``voting'' stock and changed 
the present reference from ``company'' to ``corporation,'' conforming 
the language to the statutory exception.
    While the statute and regulation provide a limit on a bank's 
investment in the stock of any one insurance company, there is no 
statutory or regulatory ``aggregate'' investment limit in all insurance 
companies nor does the statute combine this equity investment with any 
other exception under which a state bank may invest in equity 
securities. In the past, the FDIC has addressed investment 
concentration and diversification issues on a case-by-case basis. The 
FDIC is not at this time proposing to impose aggregate investment 
limits on equity investments which have specific statutory carve outs 
nor are we proposing to combine those investments with other equity 
investments made under the exceptions to the regulation for which 
aggregate investments are being proposed. The FDIC would like to 
receive comment, however, on whether there should be an ``aggregate'' 
investment limit for equity investments in insurance companies.
[[Page 47979]]
Stock of Savings Bank Life Insurance Company
    The second statutory exception for equity investments in insurance 
companies permits any insured state bank located in the states of New 
York, Massachusetts and Connecticut to own stock in savings bank life 
insurance companies provided that consumer disclosures are made. Again, 
this regulatory provision mirrors the specific statutory carve out 
found in Section 24 and is contained in the present regulation. We have 
carried this provision forward into the proposal with some changes.
    The savings bank life insurance investment exception is broader 
than the director and officer liability insurance company exception 
discussed above. There are no individual or aggregate investment 
limitations for investments in savings bank life insurance companies. 
The proposed language is shorter than the existing regulation and makes 
a substantive change by clarifying what the required disclosures are 
for insured banks selling these products. As was indicated above, 
insured banks located in New York, Massachusetts and Connecticut are 
permitted to invest in the stock of a savings bank life insurance 
company as long as certain disclosure requirements are met. The FDIC 
proposes to amend the regulatory language to specifically require 
compliance with the Interagency Statement in lieu of the disclosures 
presently set out in the regulation. Insured banks selling savings bank 
life insurance policies, other insurance products and annuities will be 
required to provide customers with written disclosures that are 
consistent with the Interagency Statement which include a statement 
that the products are not insured by the FDIC, are not guaranteed by 
the bank, and may involve risk of loss. The last disclosure--that such 
products may involve risk of loss--is not currently required under the 
regulation.
    The FDIC would like to request comment regarding the disclosure 
obligations of insured banks. It is the FDIC's view that savings bank 
life insurance, other insurance products and annuities are ``nondeposit 
investment products'' as that term is used in the Interagency 
Statement. The FDIC is aware that insurance companies typically offer 
annuity products and that many states regulate annuities through their 
insurance departments. However, the FDIC agrees with the Comptroller of 
the Currency that annuities are financial products and not insurance. 
Nevertheless, annuities are nondeposit investment products and are 
therefore subject to the requirements found in the Interagency 
Statement when sold to retail customers on bank premises as well as in 
other instances. On this basis, all the requirements in the Interagency 
Statement should apply to the marketing and sale of annuities by a 
financial institution.
    While the existing regulatory language is similar to the 
Interagency Statement in what it requires to be disclosed, it is not 
identical. The FDIC believes the proposed changes will clarify the 
standards which are to be followed by insured state banks.
    It could be argued that the regulatory language in this part 
repeats existing guidance and is unnecessary. We note, however, that 
the statute requires that disclosures be made in order for the 
exception to be available. While the Interagency Statement is 
enforceable in the sense that noncompliance may constitute an unsafe or 
unsound banking practice that may give rise to a cease and desist 
action, the Interagency Statement is not itself a regulation with the 
force and effect of law.
    We seek comments on whether it would be preferable for the 
regulation to fully set out the disclosure requirements rather than 
cross referencing the Interagency Statement. Commenters should address 
these points, as well as discuss the differences between enforcing 
specific regulatory language versus enforcing a policy statement. We 
invite comments on the applicability of the Interagency Statement in 
the absence of the language referencing it in this regulation. We 
invite comment on whether using the Interagency Statement makes 
compliance easier for banks as it provides uniform standards applicable 
to multiple products. We also invite comment on any other issues that 
are of concern to the industry or the public in using these particular 
disclosures when selling insurance and annuity products.
Other Activities Prohibition
    Section 362.3(b) of the proposal restates the statutory prohibition 
on insured state banks directly or indirectly engaging as principal in 
any activity that is not permissible for a national bank. Activity is 
defined in this proposal as the conduct of business by a state-
chartered depository institution, including acquiring or retaining any 
investment. Because acquiring or retaining an investment is an activity 
by definition, language has been added to make clear that this 
prohibition does not supersede the equity investment exception of 
Sec. 362.3(b). The prohibition does not apply if one of the statutory 
exceptions contained in section 24 of the FDI Act (restated in the 
current regulation and carried forward in the proposal) applies. The 
FDIC has provided two regulatory exceptions to the prohibition on other 
activities.
Consent Through Application
    The limitation on activities contained in the statute states that 
an insured state bank may not engage as principal in any type of 
activity that is not permissible for a national bank unless the FDIC 
has determined that the activity would pose no significant risk to the 
appropriate deposit insurance fund, and the bank is and continues to be 
in compliance with applicable capital standards prescribed by the 
appropriate federal banking agency. Section 362.3(b)(2)(i) establishes 
an application process for the FDIC to make the determination 
concerning risk to the funds. The substance of this process is 
unchanged from the current regulation.
Insurance Underwriting
    This exception tracks the statutory exception in section 24 of the 
FDI Act which grandfathers (1) an insured state bank engaged in the 
underwriting of savings bank life insurance through a department of the 
bank; (2) any insured state bank that engaged in underwriting of 
insurance on or before September 30, 1991, which was reinsured in whole 
or in part by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation; and (3) well-
capitalized banks engaged in insurance underwriting through a 
department of a bank. The exception is carried over from the current 
regulation with a number of proposed modifications.
    To use the savings bank life insurance exception, an insured state 
bank located in Massachusetts, New York or Connecticut must engage in 
the activity through a department of the bank that meets core standards 
discussed below. The standards for conducting this activity are taken 
from the current regulation with the exception of disclosure standards 
which are discussed below. We have moved the requirements for a 
department from the definitions to the substantive portion of the 
regulation text.
    The exception for underwriting federal crop insurance reflects the 
statutory exception. This exception is unchanged from the current 
regulation, and there are no regulatory limitations on the conduct of 
the activity.
    An insured state bank that wishes to use the grandfathered 
insurance underwriting exception may do so only if the insured state 
bank was lawfully providing insurance, as principal, as of November 21, 
1991. Further, an insured
[[Page 47980]]
state bank must be well-capitalized if it is to engage in insurance 
underwriting, and the bank must conduct the insurance underwriting in a 
department that meets the core standards described below.
    Banks taking advantage of this grandfather provision only may 
underwrite the same type of insurance that was underwritten as of 
November 21, 1991 and only may operate and have customers in the same 
states in which it was underwriting policies on November 21, 1991. The 
grandfather authority for this activity does not terminate upon a 
change in control of the bank or its parent holding company.
    Both savings bank life insurance activities and grandfathered 
insurance underwriting must take place in a department of the bank 
which meets certain core standards. The core operating standards for 
the department require the department to provide customers with written 
disclosures that are consistent with those in the Interagency 
Statement. Consistent with the disclosure requirements of the current 
regulation, the proposed rule requires the department to inform its 
customers that only the assets of the department may be used to satisfy 
the obligations of the department. Note that this language does not 
require the bank to say that the bank is not obligated for the 
obligations of the department. The bank and the department constitute 
one corporate entity. In the event of insolvency, the insurance 
underwriting department's assets and liabilities would be segregated 
from the bank's assets and liabilities due to the requirements of state 
law.
    The FDIC views any financial product that is not a deposit and 
entails some investment component to be a ``nondeposit investment 
product'' subject to the Interagency Statement. Part 362 was 
promulgated in 1992 before the Interagency Statement was issued in 
February of 1994. While the disclosures currently required by part 362 
are similar to the disclosures set out in the Interagency Statement, 
they are not identical. Banks that engage in insurance underwriting are 
thus covered by the Interagency Statement and part 362 and must comply 
with similar but somewhat different requirements. We are proposing to 
cross reference the Interagency Statement in part 362 to make 
compliance clearer. We believe that using the uniform standards set 
forth in the Interagency Statement will make compliance easier.
    In the case of insurance underwriting activities conducted by a 
department of the bank, the disclosure required by the Interagency 
Statement that the product is not an obligation of the bank is not 
correct as noted above, and the suggested language in the regulation 
does not require this disclosure. This clarification is consistent with 
other interpretations of the Interagency Statement which stated that 
disclosures should be consistent with the types of products offered. 
The FDIC would like to receive comment on whether such clarification is 
necessary or whether the regulation language is seen as duplicating 
other guidance.
    The FDIC notes that the consumer disclosures are statutorily 
required for savings bank life insurance. The Interagency Statement is 
joint supervisory guidance issued by the Federal Banking Agencies, not 
a regulation. The FDIC requests comment regarding the enforceability of 
the Interagency Statement versus a regulation promulgated under the 
rulemaking requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act.
    The core separation standards restate the requirements currently 
found in the definition of department. These standards require that the 
department (1) be physically distinct from the remainder of the bank, 
(2) maintain separate accounting and other records, (3) have assets, 
liabilities, obligations and expenses that are separate and distinct 
from those of the remainder of the bank; and (4) be subject to state 
statutes that require the obligations, liabilities and expenses be 
satisfied only with the assets of the department. The standards in the 
proposed regulation are not changed from the current regulation, but 
have been moved from the definitions section of the regulation to 
ensure that requirements of the rule are shown in connection with the 
appropriate regulatory exception.
Acquiring and Retaining Adjustable Rate and Money Market Preferred 
Stock by the Bank
    The proposal provides an exception that allows a state bank to 
invest in up to 15 percent of the bank's tier one capital in adjustable 
rate preferred stock and money market (auction rate) preferred stock 
without filing an application with the FDIC. The exception was adopted 
when the 1992 version of the regulation was adopted in final form. At 
that time after reviewing comments, the FDIC found that adjustable rate 
preferred stock and money market (auction rate) preferred stock were 
essentially substitutes for money market investments such as commercial 
paper and that their characteristics are closer to debt than to equity 
securities. Therefore, money market preferred stock and adjustable rate 
preferred stock were excluded from the definition of equity security. 
As a result, these investments are not subject to the equity investment 
prohibitions of the statute and of the regulation and are considered to 
be an ``other activity'' for the purposes of this regulation.
    This exception focuses on two categories of preferred stock. This 
first category, adjustable rate preferred stock refers to shares where 
dividends are established by contract through the use of a formula 
based on Treasury rates or some other readily available interest rate 
levels. Money market preferred stock refers to those issues where 
dividends are established through a periodic auction process that 
establishes yields in relation to short term rates paid on commercial 
paper issued by the same or a similar company. The credit quality of 
the issuer determines the value of the security, and money market 
preferred shares are sold at auction.
    We have modified the exception under the proposal by limiting the 
15 percent measurement to tier one capital, rather than total capital. 
Throughout the current proposal, we have measured capital-based 
limitations against tier one capital. We changed the base in this 
provision to increase uniformity within the regulation. We recognize 
that this change may lower the permitted amount of these investments 
held by institutions already engaged in the activity. An insured state 
bank that has investments exceeding the proposed limit, but within the 
total capital limit, may continue holding those investments until they 
are redeemed or repurchased by the issuer. The 15 percent of tier one 
capital limitation should be used in determining the allowable amount 
of new purchases of money market preferred and adjustable rate 
preferred stock. Of course, any institution that wants to increase its 
holding of these securities may submit an application to the FDIC.
    The FDIC seeks comment on whether this treatment of money market 
preferred stock and adjustable rate preferred stock is still 
appropriate. Comment is requested concerning whether other similar 
types of investments should be given similar treatment. Comments also 
are requested on whether the reduced capital base affects any 
institution currently holding these investments or is likely to affect 
the investment plans of any institution.
Activities That Are Closely Related to Banking Conducted by Bank or Its 
Subsidiary
    The proposed regulation continues the language found in the current 
regulation titled, ``Activities that are
[[Page 47981]]
closely related to banking.'' This section permits an insured state 
bank to engage as principal in any activity that is not permissible for 
a national bank provided that the FRB by regulation or order has found 
the activity to be closely related to banking for the purposes of 
section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1843(c)(8)). 
This exception is subject to the statutory prohibition that does not 
allow the FDIC to permit the bank to directly hold equity securities 
that a national bank may not hold and which are not otherwise 
permissible investments for insured state banks pursuant to 
Sec. 362.3(b).
    Additional language has been added to clarify that this subsection 
does not authorize an insured state bank engaged in real estate leasing 
to hold the leased property for more than two years at the end of the 
lease unless the property is re-leased. This language is added to 
ensure that this provision does not allow an insured state bank to hold 
an equity interest in real estate after the end of the lease period. 
The FDIC has decided to provide a two-year period for the bank to 
divest the property if the bank cannot lease the property again. 
Comment is invited on the reasonableness of this approach. Should the 
FDIC consider an alternative approach that a bank may not enter a non-
operating lease unless title reverts to the lessee at the end of the 
lease period? Are there other standards that the FDIC should consider 
in this matter?
    As does the current regulation, these provisions allow a state bank 
to directly engage in any ``as principal'' activity included on the 
FRB's list of activities that are closely related to banking (found at 
12 CFR 225.28) and ``as principal'' in any activity with respect to 
which the FRB has issued an order finding that the activity is closely 
related to banking.
    However, the consent to engage in real estate leasing directly by 
an insured state bank has been modified. Comment is requested on 
whether there are any additional activities permitted under the 
proposed language that should be modified. Comment is requested on the 
effect of the proposed treatment of real estate leasing activities on 
banks that may want to engage in this activity in the future. Comment 
also is requested on the perceived risks of leasing activities and 
whether we should impose standards to address those risks. Comment is 
requested on whether we should consider any other approach, including 
returning to the language in the current regulation or deleting the 
references to the Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. 1843(c)(8) and 
the activities that the FRB by regulation or order has found to be 
closely related to banking for the purposes of section 4(c)(8).
Guarantee Activities by Banks
    The current regulation contains a provision that permits a state 
bank with a foreign branch to directly guarantee the obligations of its 
customers as set out in Sec. 347.3(c)(1) of the FDIC's regulations 
without filing any application under part 362. It also permits a state 
bank to offer customer-sponsored credit card programs in which the bank 
guarantees the obligations of its retail banking deposit customers. 
This provision has been deleted as unnecessary since we understand that 
these activities are permissible for a national bank. In its current 
rule, the FDIC added this provision to clarify that part 362 does not 
prohibit these activities; however to shorten the regulation, such 
clarifying language has been deleted since the activity is permissible 
for a national bank. The FDIC seeks comment as to whether the deletion 
of this language has an adverse impact on insured state depository 
institutions and if there are specific activities that this provision 
allowed that are not permissible for a national bank.
    In the FDIC's proposal regarding the consolidation and 
simplification of its international banking regulations found in the 
Federal Register on July 15, 1997, at 62 FR 37748, a technical 
amendment to the current version of part 362 is found. This amendment 
updates the reference to Sec. 347.103(a)(1) of this chapter in 
Sec. 362.4(c)(3)(I)(A). This amendment may become final as a part of 
the consolidation and simplification of the FDIC's international 
banking regulations to reflect the correct citation in the current 
version of part 362. Nevertheless, we propose to eliminate the 
references to guarantee activities in this proposal because we consider 
them unnecessary as they duplicate powers granted to national banks. As 
previously stated, we invite comment on the necessity of including 
specific language dealing with the power to guarantee customer 
obligations in the regulatory text of part 362.
Section 362.4  Subsidiaries of Insured State Banks
General Prohibition
    The regulatory language implementing the statutory prohibition on 
``as principal'' activities that are not permissible for a subsidiary 
of a national bank has been separated from the prohibition on 
activities which are not permissible for a national bank conducted in 
the bank. By separating bank and subsidiary activities, Sec. 362.4 now 
deals exclusively with activities that may be conducted in a subsidiary 
of an insured state bank. We believe that separating the activities 
that may be conducted at the bank level from the activities that must 
be conducted by a subsidiary makes it easier for the reader to 
understand the intent of the regulation. We invite comment on whether 
this structure is more useful to the reader. We also invite comment on 
whether any additional changes would make it easier for the reader to 
interpret the regulation text.
Exceptions
    Prohibited activities may not be conducted unless one of the 
exceptions in the regulation applies. This language is similar to the 
current part 362 and results in no substantive change to the 
prohibition.
Consent Obtained Through Application
    The proposal continues to allow approval by individual application 
provided that the insured state bank meets and continues to meet the 
applicable capital standards and the FDIC finds there is no significant 
risk to the fund. The proposal would delete the language expressly 
providing that approval is necessary for each subsidiary even if the 
bank received approval to engage in the same activity through another 
subsidiary. Deleting this language will not automatically permit a 
state bank to establish a second subsidiary to conduct the same 
activity that was approved for another subsidiary of the same bank. 
Deleting the language leaves the issue to be handled on a case-by-case 
basis by the FDIC pursuant to order. For example, if the FDIC approves 
an application by a state bank to establish a majority-owned subsidiary 
to engage in real estate investment activities, the order may (in the 
FDIC's discretion) be written to allow additional such subsidiaries or 
to require that any additional real estate subsidiaries must be 
individually approved.
    The notice procedures described herein requires that the subsidiary 
must take the corporate organizational form. Insured state banks that 
organize subsidiaries in a form other than a corporation may make 
application under this section. Any bank that does not meet the notice 
criteria or that desires relief from a limit or restriction included in 
the notice criteria may also file an application under this section and 
are encouraged to do so.
[[Page 47982]]
Application instructions have been moved to subpart E.
    Language has been eliminated that prohibited an insured state bank 
from engaging in insurance underwriting through a subsidiary except to 
the extent that such activities are permissible for a national bank. 
Eliminating this language does not result in any substantive change as 
section 24 of the FDI Act clearly provides that the FDIC may not 
approve an application for a state bank to directly or indirectly 
conduct insurance underwriting activities that are not permissible for 
a national bank. We invite comment on whether the language should be 
retained in the regulation to make it clear to state banks that 
applications to conduct such activities will not be approved.
    The current part 362 allows state banks that do not meet their 
minimum capital requirements to gradually phase out otherwise 
impermissible activities that were being conducted as of December 19, 
1992. These provisions are eliminated under the proposal due to the 
passage of time. The relevant outside dates to complete the phase out 
of those activities have passed (December 19, 1996, for real estate 
activities and December 8, 1994, for all other activities).
Grandfathered Insurance Underwriting
    The proposed regulation provides for three statutory exceptions 
that allow subsidiaries to engage in insurance underwriting. 
Subsidiaries may engage in the same grandfathered insurance 
underwriting as the bank if the bank or subsidiary was lawfully 
providing insurance as principal on November 21, 1991.
    The limitations under which this subsidiary may operate have been 
changed. Under the current regulation, the bank must be well-
capitalized. Under the proposal, the bank must be well-capitalized 
after deducting its investment in the insurance subsidiary. The FDIC 
believes that the capital deduction is an important element in 
separating the operations of the bank and the subsidiary. This 
deduction clearly delineates the capital that is available to support 
the bank and the capital that is available to support the subsidiary. 
Capital standards for insurance companies are based on different 
criteria from bank capital requirements. Most states have minimum 
capital requirements for insurance companies. The FDIC believes that a 
bank's investment in an insurance underwriting subsidiary is not 
actually ``available'' to the bank in the event the bank experiences 
losses and needs a cash infusion. As a result, the bank's investment in 
the insurance subsidiary should not be considered when determining 
whether the bank has sufficient capital to meet its needs. Comment is 
invited on whether the capital deduction is appropriate or necessary. 
If the FDIC requires a capital deduction, should it be required in the 
case of any insurance underwriting subsidiary that is given a statutory 
grandfather, e.g., should title insurance subsidiaries also be subject 
to the capital deduction? Should the capital deduction treatment depend 
upon what type of insurance is underwritten (if there is a greater risk 
associated with the insurance, should the capital deduction be 
required)? Is the phase-in period appropriate and clearly written?
    The proposed regulation requires a subsidiary engaging in 
grandfathered insurance underwriting to meet the standards for an 
``eligible subsidiary'' discussed below. This standard replaces the 
``bona fide'' subsidiary standard in the current regulation. The 
``eligible subsidiary'' standard generally contains the same 
requirements for corporate separateness as the ``bona fide'' subsidiary 
definition but adds the following provisions: (1) the subsidiary has 
only one business purpose; (2) the subsidiary has a current written 
business plan that is appropriate to its type and scope of business; 
(3) the subsidiary has adequate management for the type of activity 
contemplated, including appropriate licenses and memberships, and 
complies with industry standards; and (4) the subsidiary establishes 
policies and procedures to ensure adequate computer, audit and 
accounting systems, internal risk management controls, and the 
subsidiary has the necessary operational and managerial infrastructure 
to implement the business plan. The FDIC requests comment on the effect 
of these additional requirements on banks engaged in insurance 
underwriting. We invite comment on whether these requirements 
appropriately separate the subsidiary from the bank. We request comment 
on whether the restrictions are appropriate to the identified risks 
being undertaken by these banks.
    In lieu of the prescribed disclosures contained in the current 
regulation, the proposal prescribes that disclosures consistent with 
the Interagency Statement be made. The proposal also eliminates the 
acceptance of disclosures that are required by state law. While the 
current regulation requires disclosures, those disclosures are similar 
but not identical to the disclosures required by the Interagency 
Statement. Again, this proposed change is intended to make compliance 
with the Interagency Statement and the regulation easier. Comment is 
sought on whether the disclosure requirements in the regulation are 
necessary now that the Interagency Statement has been adopted. Any 
retail sale of nondeposit investment products to bank customers is 
subject to the Interagency Statement. The FDIC recognizes that some 
grandfathered insurance underwriting subsidiaries may have a line of 
business and customer base which is completely separate from the bank's 
operations. The Interagency Statement would not normally apply as the 
Statement does not technically apply unless there is a ``retail sale'' 
to a ``bank customer.'' If the FDIC were to rely wholly upon the 
Interagency Statement there would be a gap from the current coverage of 
the disclosure requirements. Should that be of concern to the FDIC?
    Banks with subsidiaries engaged in grandfathered insurance 
underwriting activities are expected to meet the new requirements of 
this proposal. Banks which are not in compliance with the requirements 
should provide a notice to the FDIC pursuant to Sec. 362.5(b). The FDIC 
will consider the notices on a case-by-case basis.
    The regulation provides that a subsidiary may continue to 
underwrite title insurance based on the specific statutory authority 
from section 24. This provision is currently in part 362 and is carried 
forward into the proposal with no substantive change. The insured state 
bank is only permitted to retain the investment if the insured state 
bank was required, before June 1, 1991, to provide title insurance as a 
condition of the bank's initial chartering under state law. The 
authority to retain the investment terminates if a change in control of 
the grandfathered bank or its holding company occurs after June 1, 
1991. There are no statutory or regulatory investment limits on banks 
holding these types of grandfathered investments.
    The exception for subsidiaries engaged in underwriting crop 
insurance is continued. Under section 24, insured state banks and their 
subsidiaries are permitted to continue underwriting crop insurance 
under two conditions: (1) they were engaged in the business on or 
before September 30, 1991, and (2) the crop insurance was reinsured in 
whole or in part by the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation. While this 
grandfathered insurance underwriting authority requires that the bank 
or its subsidiary had to be engaged in the activity as of a certain 
date, the authority does not
[[Page 47983]]
terminate upon a change in control of the bank or its parent holding 
company.
Majority-owned Subsidiaries Which Own a Control Interest in Companies 
Engaged in Permissible Activities
    The FDIC has found that it is not a significant risk to the deposit 
insurance funds if a majority-owned subsidiary holds stock of a company 
that engages in (1) any activity permissible for a national bank; (2) 
any activity permissible for the bank itself (except engaging in 
insurance underwriting and holding grandfathered equity investments); 
(3) activities that are not conducted ``as principal;'' or (4) activity 
that is not permissible for a national bank provided the Federal 
Reserve Board by regulation or order has found the activity to be 
closely related to banking, if the majority-owned subsidiary exercises 
control over the issuer of the stock purchased by the subsidiary. These 
exceptions are found in the current regulation but do not contain the 
provision that the majority-owned subsidiary must exercise 
control.1 This change clarifies that this exception is 
intended only for subsidiaries that are operating a business that is 
either permissible for the bank itself or is considered to be operated 
other than ``as principal.'' As rewritten, the proposal differentiates 
between the types of stock held by a majority-owned subsidiary--having 
a controlling interest and simply investing in the shares of a company. 
The FDIC intends that this provision cover lower level subsidiaries 
that are engaged in activities that the FDIC has found present no 
significant risk to the fund. The FDIC expects lower level subsidiaries 
that engage in other activities to conform to the application or notice 
procedures of this regulation. The FDIC recognizes that changing the 
level of ownership permissible for these activities may adversely 
affect some insured state bank. We invite comment on the effect of this 
change. The FDIC invites comment on whether this language change was 
necessary, whether it should be concerned about lower level 
subsidiaries, whether this approach is appropriate to the risks 
inherent in the activities and whether any other approach, including 
returning to the language in the current regulation should be 
considered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The current regulatory exception for activities conducted 
not as principal provides for a test of 50% or less of the stock of 
a corporation which engages solely in activities which are not 
considered to be as principal. The term ``corporation'' is being 
changed to ``company'' to accommodate the other forms of business 
enterprise listed in the definition. The reference to 50% or less is 
being deleted in order to avoid the confusion generated by that 
limitation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We deleted one other form of stock ownership at the majority 
subsidiary level from the current regulation by deleting the language 
now found in Sec. 362.4(c)(3)(iv)(C) of the current regulation titled, 
``Stock of a corporation that engages in activities permissible for a 
bank service corporation.'' Through a majority-owned subsidiary, this 
section of the current regulation allows an insured state bank to 
invest in 50% or less of the stock of a corporation which engages 
solely in any activity that is permissible for a bank service 
corporation. Since bank service corporations may engage in any activity 
that is closely related to banking, this exception also allowed 
majority-owned subsidiaries to own stock in those entities that solely 
engaged in activities that were closely related to banking. This 
exception has been deleted in this proposal because the coverage of the 
proposed exceptions in Sec. 362.4(b)(3) would duplicate the coverage of 
the existing exception.
    Comment is requested on whether the proposed language clearly sets 
forth the coverage of these exceptions. Comment is requested on whether 
the proposed language clearly allows the same activities that the 
current exception allows by permitting majority-owned subsidiaries to 
hold stock of a company engaged in activities permissible for a bank 
service corporation. The FDIC seeks comment on whether any inadvertent 
substantive change has been made by eliminating the specific references 
permitting the ownership of bank service company stock. We seek comment 
on the use of the control test for defining activities for lower level 
subsidiaries. We invite comment on whether any other approach, 
including returning to the language in the current regulation should be 
reconsidered. Should the FDIC use a majority-owned test for defining 
when a lower level subsidiary exists?
    We added clarifying language to the exception governing activities 
closely related to banking. The first exception states that this 
section does not authorize a subsidiary engaged in real estate leasing 
to hold the leased property for more than two years at the end of the 
lease unless the property is re-leased. This provision is the same at 
the bank level. The second provision is that this section does not 
authorize a subsidiary to acquire or hold the stock of a savings 
association other than as allowed in Sec. 362.4(b)(4). As is discussed 
below, this subsection does not allow a majority-owned subsidiary to 
have a control interest in a savings association. Comment is requested 
concerning the effect of this change.
Majority-Owned Subsidiaries Ownership of Equity Securities That Do Not 
Represent a Control Interest
    The proposed regulation significantly changes the exception in the 
current regulation involving the holding of equity securities that do 
not represent a control interest. The FDIC has determined that the 
activity of holding the equity securities at the majority-owned 
subsidiary level, subject to certain limitations, does not present a 
significant risk to the deposit insurance funds.
    This provision replaces two exceptions contained in the current 
regulation: (1) grandfathered investments in common or preferred stock 
and shares of investment companies, and (2) stock of insured depository 
institutions. The proposed regulation adds an expanded exception 
allowing the holding of other corporate stock.
    The current regulation provides that an insured state bank that has 
obtained approval to hold listed common or preferred stock and/or 
shares of registered investment companies under the statutory 
grandfather (discussed above) may hold the stock and/or shares through 
a majority-owned subsidiary provided that any conditions imposed in 
connection with the approval are met. The FDIC previously determined 
that a majority-owned subsidiary could be accorded the same treatment 
under the grandfather provided for by section 24(f) of the FDI Act 
without risk to the fund. Thus, the bank should be permitted to invest 
in those securities and investment company shares through a majority-
owned subsidiary.
    The current regulation requires that each bank file a notice with 
the FDIC of the bank's intent to make such investments and that the 
FDIC determine that such investments will not pose a significant risk 
to the deposit insurance fund before any insured state bank may take 
advantage of the ``grandfather'' allowing investments in common or 
preferred stock listed on a national securities exchange and shares of 
an investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (15 U.S.C. 80a-1, et seq.). In no event may the bank's investments 
in such securities and/or investment company shares, plus those of the 
subsidiary, exceed one