



June 2, 2022

James P. Sheesley
Assistant Executive Secretary
Attention: Comments—RIN 3064-ZA32
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
550 17th Street NW
Washington, DC 20429

Re: Principles for Climate-Related Financial Risk Management for Large Financial Institutions
(RIN 3064-ZA32)

Dear Ladies and Gentlemen:

Better Markets¹ appreciates the opportunity to comment on the draft principles captioned above (“proposed principles”),² issued by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”), regarding the principles it has outlined for both banks and supervisors to consider in the management and supervision of climate-related financial risks (“climate risks”).

Better Markets applauds the publication of these principles as an important step in addressing climate risks, which can have serious effects on the safety and soundness of banks as well as overall financial stability. Considering the broad range of risks that climate change can pose, we welcome the FDIC’s approach of largely integrating climate risks into existing risk management principles with some additions that capture unique aspects of climate risks. In particular, the additions unique to climate risks are: the use of scenario analysis to identify and size risks, the consideration of longer time horizons, and the recognition that climate risks and their management are an evolving process. This is similar to the approaches taken by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency³ and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision⁴ in the draft principles they each published late last year.

¹ Better Markets is a non-profit, non-partisan, and independent organization founded in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis to promote the public interest in the financial markets, support the financial reform of Wall Street, and make our financial system work for all Americans again. Better Markets works with allies— including many in finance—to promote pro-market, pro-business, and pro-growth policies that help build a stronger, safer financial system, one that protects and promotes Americans’ jobs, savings, retirements, and more.

² 87 Fed. Reg. 19507

³ Available at <https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2021/bulletin-2021-62a.pdf>

⁴ Available at <https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d530.htm>

We urge the FDIC to finalize these principles with some enhancements as discussed below and to fully incorporate them into the supervisory assessment process. First, considering the evolving nature of climate risks and the current absence of mandated measurements or metrics, and the development of so-called best practices being in early stages, the FDIC should encourage banking institutions to look to available internationally agreed-upon metrics and best practices for use as a benchmark to, or even direct use in, their own internally developed risk management practices. This includes data collection and metrics, risk measurement, risk management thresholds, modeling, and reporting. It also includes scenario analysis, for which the principles similarly should include the promotion of banking institutions' use of internationally agreed-upon scenarios and scientific projections to ensure plausibility and a minimum level of severity of their own scenarios.

Second, while issuing principles-based guidance is a necessary step in including climate risks in the supervisory assessment process, given actions taken in the recent past, guidance alone is unlikely to suffice to prompt banks to adopt suitable practices to address climate risks. Indeed, a rule proposed⁵ by the FDIC, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the National Credit Union Administration, and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (“the Agencies”) in 2020 and adopted by the FDIC in March of last year⁶ seriously undermined supervisors' effectiveness by limiting the role of supervisory guidance in issuing supervisory findings and by extension informing supervisory ratings. As such, we urge the FDIC to work with the other regulatory agencies to rescind this rule to better ensure that guidance can achieve its intended effect of getting banks to develop and use better practices with respect to managing the risks from climate change.

The Proposed Principles Take the Appropriate Approach of Largely Integrating Climate Risks into Existing Risk Management Principles

Banks themselves are the “first line” in identifying, sizing, and managing risks, and so it is necessary for banks to ensure banks have strong and robust risk management and governance processes in place. It is the responsibility of prudential regulators to assess banks' processes and hold banks accountable when they are not effective. Put another way, it is the responsibility of banks to design and execute processes that are necessary to effectively manage their risks on a day-to-day basis. The responsibility of prudential regulators is to assess the risk management and governance processes at banks and to take supervisory actions to require banks to fix weaknesses in those processes that are identified through supervisory assessments.

Climate risks have been recognized in the U.S. and internationally as risks that pose a threat to the safety and soundness of banks as well as overall financial stability. Numerous global regulatory authorities and organizations have made this recognition – the central banks of Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, the Netherlands, the United States, and others as well as inter-agency and international bodies such as the U.S. Financial Stability Oversight Council, the Bank for International Settlements, and the Financial Stability Board. As a broadly recognized and clearly material risk, climate risks must be a part of banks' risk management and governance practices and assessing those must be part of the supervisory assessment processes of bank

⁵ 85 Fed. Reg. 70512

⁶ 86 Fed. Reg. 12079

regulatory authorities. An integral part of that incorporation is including climate risks in supervisory guidance. More important still is including it in supervisors' assessment criteria that feeds into the final supervisory ratings.

Principles-based guidance does not explicitly outline all aspects of supervisory expectations, and so the principles themselves must be well-founded and specific enough to make the intention of the expectation clear and to promote safe and sound practices, but also general enough to allow for evolution and innovation in the development of current best practices. The proposed principles largely achieve this goal by integrating climate risks into the existing principles framework for the risk management and governance of more "traditional" risks – such as credit, market or operational risks – as a starting point and adding components to the principles to capture certain aspects that are unique to climate risks.

Indeed, nearly all the proposed principles for climate risks align one-for-one with those of traditional risks. This is sensible and appropriate because climate risks are a risk to safety and soundness just as with more traditional risks and can manifest as more traditional risks. For example, changes in weather patterns could significantly decrease the output of farmland that collateralizes a loan, thereby harming the farmland's income and its inherent value. This would have the effect of increasing both the probability of default on the loan and the loss given default.

Importantly, the proposed principles focus on the governance of climate risks and the responsibility of boards of directors and senior management. Senior management is responsible for the day-to-day management of all risks to a bank, and boards of directors are ultimately responsible for overseeing the risk management and governance processes as well as holding senior management accountable for ensuring sufficient and effective risk management and governance processes. Both parties must have sufficient knowledge and understanding of climate risks to fulfill those responsibilities. Key to the proposed principles around governance is the emphasis on a bank ensuring that their board and senior management has sufficient knowledge and understanding of climate risks and the impact on a bank's strategic direction, business model, and risk appetite. Considering the evolving nature of climate risks and that they are likely new and less understood risks to boards and senior management, without this emphasis there may be an incentive to pass on responsibility of the management of climate risks to lower-level employees and claim ignorance.

In this regard, the principles also sensibly discuss the assignment of climate risks by board members and senior management to specific members and committees. This targeted assignment can help ensure that climate risks are being managed and that assigned parties have the necessary knowledge and understanding and can be held accountable for any issues that arise. Additionally, with clearly defined responsibilities, identified risks can be escalated more easily and efficiently and understood by each responsible party along the chain of escalation.

The measurement of climate risks is appropriately a central theme throughout the principles. Measurement and analysis of risks are foundational to their identification, sizing, management, and mitigation. In the spirit of largely treating climate risks similar to other more traditional risks, the principles reasonably promote the measurement and tracking of climate risks just as with other risks through risk management processes such as: data aggregation;

qualitative or quantitative metrics or indicators to assess, monitor, and report climate risks; materiality thresholds; key risk indicators that align with their regular monitoring and escalation arrangements; and internal risk limits for the various types of material climate risks. However, the language around data and measurement should be more instructive, as discussed in more detail below.

Outside of the more standard risk management principles, the FDIC has made some welcome additions. The FDIC recognizes the key point that risks arising from climate change are as evolving as climate change itself, a point that defines a major distinguishing factor of climate risks and one that is the basis for two additions specific to climate risks that are beyond existing risk management principles. First, the FDIC recognizes climate risks can materialize over longer time horizons as compared to more traditional risks and that banks must consider this in their management of climate risks. This is true for both physical and transition risks. Such recognition is necessary for climate risks to be properly considered and managed and encourages banks to think about how the risks will evolve over time and take or plan for actions accordingly. Second, the FDIC specifically promotes the use of scenario analysis as a critical tool for sizing and identifying climate risks. Scenario analysis is widely recognized as an important tool for assessing evolving risks that can take many different paths over varying time horizons. These additions will promote banks to be both nimble and forward-looking, necessary aspects of managing climate risks.

Additionally, the FDIC has sensibly recognized that many banks have made significant public commitments regarding modifying their business practices to facilitate the transition to a low-carbon economy and that these commitments should align with their internal climate risk management practices, such as internal risk limits. Indeed, if there is no alignment, supervisors and the public are left to wonder if the commitments are valid and, by extension, if banks are effectively managing their risk.

Finally, it is important that the FDIC has included the consideration of potential disproportionate impacts on low-to-moderate income and other disadvantaged households and communities. These communities do indeed experience disproportionate effects from the fallout of more traditional risks, as they did during and after the 2008 global financial crisis. Not only could a similar impact on these communities result from climate risks but there are other impacts that could also result from climate risks, such as the closing of branches due to weather related events. More directly, it has been shown that climate shocks and stresses disproportionately impact low-income communities and economically marginalized communities of color.⁷

Measurement is the Linchpin to Effective Risk Management, and So the Principles Should Promote Minimum Standards for Measurement of Climate risks

Being able to measure climate risks and exposures is fundamental to almost all categories of principles in the proposal – capital and liquidity adequacy, the risk management process,

⁷ Elizabeth Mattiuzzi and Eileen Hodge, *Climate risks Faced by Low and Moderate-Income Communities and Communities of Color: Survey Results* (December 2021), Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, <https://www.frbsf.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/climate-related-risks-faced-by-low-and-moderate-income-communities-and-communities-of-color-survey-results.pdf>.

management monitoring and reporting, and the comprehensive management of credit, market, liquidity, operational, and other risks. The guidance principles appropriately cover the fundamental risk management processes: data aggregation; qualitative or quantitative metrics or indicators to assess, monitor, and report climate risks; materiality thresholds; key risk indicators that align with their regular monitoring and escalation arrangements; and internal risk limits for the various types of material climate risks.

Without sufficient measurement techniques and criteria, banks will not be able to properly execute on any of these risk management processes. For example, without reliable measurement techniques, the process of simply determining which climate risks rise to the level of being material could yield unreliable results or underestimate the amount of material climate risks to the bank. Similarly, in the process of setting risk limits and monitoring against them, if data and measurements are unreliable, then not only would the limits be unreliable but so would the measurements against them, potentially making the entire process a worthless exercise.

So, while it is beneficial that the principles encourage banks to have “effective risk data aggregation and reporting capabilities” recognize that “data, risk measurement, modeling methodologies, and reporting continue to evolve at a rapid pace,” they do not provide any guidance as to how banks should be managing the rapidly evolving nature. The continuous pace and scale of this evolution is unique to climate risks and makes risk management processes more difficult to establish and more uncertain in their execution. Banks are working to establish their data collection, risk measurement, modeling, and reporting processes, but an examination of their publicly disclosed materials around climate risks shows that they are each approaching these processes in vastly different ways. This unique issue should be addressed in the proposed principles by promoting the use of or comparison to current climate risk data collection and measurement “best practices.”

Considering the proposal is intended to support a principles-based approach to addressing climate risks, it is prudent not to be explicitly instructive as to which data to collect and which metrics to utilize. Discretion should be left to the banks so that they can collect data and design metrics and thresholds that are appropriate to the structure and risk profile of their business. That approach also allows for evolution and innovation within and among banks to create new best practices or improve upon existing practices.

However, given that climate risk management is in the early stages and that there are not currently any generally accepted or required climate risk metrics and data collections, banks should not be left entirely to their own discretion. The supervisory principles should explicitly promote the use of or comparison to some best practices around data collection and metrics that are being developed, especially on an international basis. That is, the guidance principles should state that as banks establish their risk management practices, they should be looking to, for example, international organizations such as the Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures (“TCFD”) or the United Nations International Panel on Climate Change for their recommendations on data collection, climate risk measurements, and risk management as examples of best practices.

In fact, many banks are already doing exactly that. All the U.S. Global Systemically Important Banks are disclosing information that is aligned with the TCFD recommendations, with plans to increase the amount of such information, and are registered supporters⁸ of the TCFD recommendations. The most recent TCFD annual report published by the FSB from October 2021⁹ shows that over 50% of firms disclosed climate risks and opportunities aligned with their recommendations. But just because some banks are voluntarily utilizing international recommendations does not mean there is no need to include the promotion of their use in the principles as examples of best practices. In fact, it is even more reason to do so.

Not only will the use of or comparison to measurements and data collection from broadly available best practices be beneficial to banks, but also it would be beneficial to supervisors, consumers, and market participants. It would help set minimum expectations for banks and promote broad-based general standards across the industry. Having baseline standards allows for comparison between banks, provides a consistent set of information for consumers and market participants, and allows for the aggregation of risks across banks.

As Governor Brainard stated in a speech last year, “Without harmonization of the definitions and methods underlying these disclosures, it will be challenging to make comparisons across firms and exposures.”¹⁰ Data and risk aggregation support the monitoring of systemic risk build-up, which is critical to examining the safety and soundness of the system as a whole and is a key component to assessing overall financial stability within a country and across countries through collaboration or international supervisory organizations. This is especially important for climate risks, which are truly global.

Similarly, the Principles Regarding Scenario Analysis Lack the Promotion of Plausible Scenarios with Minimum Levels of Severity

Similar to data collection and climate risk measurement, the principles leave too much discretion to banks regarding their scenario analysis. While it is positive that the principles identify scenario analysis as a key tool for banks to be using in sizing and assessing their climate risks, the principles fail to include language that promotes the use of plausible scenarios that have some minimum level of severity.

Again, discretion is an important component of a bank’s internal risk management practices. For scenario analysis, it allows a bank to design scenarios that are specific and unique to their business model and risk profile and to create new scenarios that may not have been imagined by their peers or regulatory authorities. However, allowing too much discretion can lead to banks ignoring certain important aspects of climate change or designing scenarios that may not be as severe as generally accepted by the scientific community.

⁸ See the full list of registered supporting institutions at <https://www.fsb-tcf.org/supporters/>.

⁹ Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures, *2021 Status Report* (October 2021), https://assets.bbhub.io/company/sites/60/2021/07/2021-TCFD-Status_Report.pdf.

¹⁰ Speech by Governor Lael Brainard At the 2021 Federal Reserve Stress Testing Research Conference, *Building Climate Scenario Analysis on the Foundations of Economic Research* (October 7, 2021), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, <https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20211007a.htm>.

Therefore, the principles should encourage banks to benchmark their scenarios against internationally created scenarios and scientific projections, such as those produced by the Network for Greening the Financial System or the climate projections created by the United Nations, to ensure some reasonable level of plausibility and severity. By looking to these scenarios and projections when designing their own scenarios, banks can determine a reasonable minimum level of severity. In fact, as pointed out in Governor Brainard’s speech, international regulatory organizations that have already conducted climate scenario analysis have followed this model of using the scenarios produced by the Network for Greening the Financial System as a starting point and tailoring them to capture local conditions, including the European Central Bank and financial regulators in Canada, France, and the United Kingdom.¹¹

Of course, as noted, banks similarly must create scenarios that capture their unique risk profiles, but any material deviations from the benchmark scenarios that capture a bank’s unique risks can be explained in a summary of its scenario analysis to note why the deviations were made. This is similar to how the current stress tests are designed and conducted and should be a practice that is utilized with climate scenario analysis as well. That is, in the U.S. the federal banking agencies expect the scenarios that banks use for their internal stress tests to be plausible and be of a similar severity as the scenarios that the agencies use themselves while being tailored to their unique risks.

The FDIC Must Rescind the Rule Limiting the Role of Supervisory Guidance in the Supervisory Process

Supervisory criticisms, and the guidance that often informs them, are valuable tools that help prevent unsafe or abusive bank conduct from ripening into outright violations of law, dangerous instability, and consumer harm. The rule proposed by the Agencies in 2020 and finalized by the FDIC in March of last year has limited the role of supervisory guidance in the final stage of issuing supervisory assessments of banks for unsafe or unsound practices. It is now more difficult for bank supervisors to hold banks—including the largest banks, which can pose a direct threat to financial stability and the economic wellbeing of the public when badly managed—accountable for dangerous practices, poor management, and ineffective oversight by bank boards of directors in a principles-based supervisory approach. This applies as well to these proposed principles for climate risks.

As such, the FDIC – along with the other regulatory agencies – must rescind the rule so that these principles, as well as all other principles that are part of supervisory guidance, would have their intended impact.


Conclusion

Better Markets is supportive of the FDIC fully incorporating climate risks into the supervisory assessment process. The proposed principles are a significant and positive step in

¹¹ Speech by Governor Lael Brainard At the 2021 Federal Reserve Stress Testing Research Conference, *Building Climate Scenario Analysis on the Foundations of Economic Research* (October 7, 2021), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, <https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/brainard20211007a.htm>.

doing so, and we urge the FDIC to finalize these principles as soon as possible and incorporate the enhancements we discuss above.

Sincerely,



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