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Home > News & Events > Financial Institution Letters




Financial Institution Letters


[Federal Register: August 2, 1995 (Volume 60, Number 148)]
[Rules and Regulations]               
[Page 39489-39494]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]



[[Page 39489]]

_______________________________________________________________________

Part II

Department of the Treasury
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency



12 CFR Part 3

Federal Reserve System



12 CFR Part 208

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation



12 CFR Part 325



_______________________________________________________________________



Risk-Based Capital Standards; Interest Rate Risk; Final Rule and 
Proposed Rule


[[Page 39490]]


DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Part 3

[Docket No. 95-17]

FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

12 CFR Part 208

[Docket No. R-0802]

FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION

12 CFR Part 325

RIN 3064-AB22

 
Risk-Based Capital Standards: Interest Rate Risk

agencies: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Treasury; 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board); and Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).

action: Final rule.

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summary: The OCC, the Board, and the FDIC (collectively referred to as 
the banking agencies) are issuing this final rule to implement the 
portion of Section 305 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) that requires the banking agencies to 
revise their risk-based capital standards to ensure that those 
standards take adequate account of interest rate risk. This final rule 
amends the capital standards to specify that the banking agencies will 
include, in their evaluations of a bank's capital adequacy, an 
assessment of the exposure to declines in the economic value of the 
bank's capital due to changes in interest rates.
    Concurrent with the publication of this final rule, the banking 
agencies are issuing for comment, a joint policy statement that 
describes the process the banking agencies will use to measure and 
assess the exposure of a bank's net economic value to changes in 
interest rates. After the banking agencies and banking industry gain 
sufficient experience with the proposed measurement process, the 
banking agencies intend, through a subsequent rulemaking process, to 
issue a proposed rule that would establish an explicit capital charge 
for interest rate risk that will be based upon the level of a bank's 
measured interest rate risk exposure.

effective date: September 1, 1995.

for further information contact:
    OCC: Christina Benson, Capital Markets Specialist, or Lisa 
Lintecum, National Bank Examiner (202/874-5070), Office of the Chief 
National Bank Examiner; Michael Carhill, Financial Economist, Risk 
Analysis Division (202/874-5700); and Ronald Shimabukuro, Senior 
Attorney, Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division (202/874-
5090), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 250 E Street SW., 
Washington, DC 20219.
    Board of Governors: James Houpt, Assistant Director (202/452-3358), 
William F. Treacy, Supervisory Financial Analyst (202/452-3859), 
Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation; Gregory Baer, Managing 
Senior Counsel (202/452-3236), Legal Division, Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve System. For the hearing impaired only, 
Telecommunication Device for the Deaf (TDD), Dorothea Thompson (202/
452-3544), Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 20th and C 
Streets NW., Washington, DC 20551.
    FDIC: William A. Stark, Assistant Director (202/898-6972) or 
Phillip J. Bond, Senior Capital Markets Specialist (202/898-3519), 
Division of Supervision, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 
17th Street NW., Washington, DC 20429.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

    Interest rate risk is the exposure of a bank's current and future 
earnings and equity capital arising from adverse movements in interest 
rates. This risk results from the possibility that changes in interest 
rates may have an adverse impact on a bank's earnings and its 
underlying economic value. Changes in interest rates affect a bank's 
earnings by changing its net interest income and the level of other 
interest-sensitive income and operating expenses. The underlying 
economic value of the bank's assets, liabilities, and off-balance sheet 
items also are affected by changes in interest rates. These changes 
occur because the present value of future cash flows, and in some cases 
the cash flows themselves, change when interest rates change. The 
combined effects of the changes in these present values reflect the 
change in the underlying economic value of the bank's capital as well 
as provide an indicator of the expected change in the bank's future 
earnings arising from the change in interest rates.
    Interest rate risk is inherent in the role of banks as financial 
intermediaries. Interest rate risk, however, introduces volatility to 
bank earnings and to the economic value of the bank. A bank that has an 
excessive level of interest rate risk can face diminished future 
earnings, impaired liquidity and capital positions, and, ultimately, 
may jeopardize its solvency.
    Section 305 of FDICIA, Pub. L. 102-242 (12 U.S.C. 1828 note), 
requires the banking agencies to revise their risk-based capital 
guidelines to take adequate account of interest rate risk. Section 305 
of FDICIA also requires the banking agencies to publish final 
implementing regulations by June 19, 1993, and to establish transition 
rules to facilitate compliance with those regulations.
    The banking agencies have not met the June 19, 1993, statutory date 
for publishing a final rule for this section of FDICIA. This delay 
reflects the difficult tradeoffs the banking agencies have faced in 
developing and implementing a rule that provides a sufficiently 
accurate basis for estimating banks' interest rate risk exposures and 
their need for capital, yet maintains enough transparency and 
simplicity to allow bank management to readily determine their 
regulatory capital requirements. The banking agencies also are mindful 
of the need to avoid unnecessary regulatory burdens associated with 
this rule, consistent with Section 335 of the Reigle Community 
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-325 (12 
U.S.C. 1828 note).

II. September 1993 Proposal

A. Proposal

    In September 1993, the banking agencies issued a proposed rule that 
solicited comments on a framework for measuring banks' interest rate 
risk exposures and determining the amount of capital needed by a bank 
to account for interest rate risk. See 58 FR 48206 (September 14, 
1993).
    The framework outlined by the banking agencies in the September 
1993 proposed rule incorporated the use of a three-level measurement 
process to evaluate banks' interest rate risk exposures. The first 
measure was a quantitative screen, based on existing Consolidated 
Report of Condition and Income (Call Report) information, that would 
exempt potential low risk banks from additional reporting requirements. 
The exemption screen was based on two criteria: (1) the amount of a 
bank's off-balance sheet interest rate contracts in relation to its 
total assets, and (2) the relation between a bank's fixed- and 
floating-rate loans and securities that mature or reprice beyond five 
years and its total capital.
    Banks not meeting the proposed exemption test would have been 
required to calculate their economic exposure by either: (1) a 
supervisory 

[[Page 39491]]
model that measured the change in the economic value of the bank for a 
specified change in interest rates; or (2) the bank's own interest rate 
risk model, provided that the model was deemed adequate by examiners 
for the nature and scope of the bank's activities and that it measured 
the bank's economic exposure using the interest rate scenarios 
specified by the banking agencies.
    The September 1993 proposed rule also sought comment on two 
alternative methods for determining the amount of capital a bank may 
need for interest rate risk. Both approaches proposed to focus 
supervisory attention and need for capital on those banks whose 
measured exposure exceeded a proposed supervisory threshold level.\1\ 
One method (Minimum Capital Standard) proposed to establish an explicit 
minimum capital standard for interest rate risk. This approach would 
have relied on the results of either the supervisory model or banks' 
own models and would have required banks to have capital sufficient to 
cover the amount by which their measured exposure exceeded a 
supervisory threshold level. The second approach (Risk Assessment) 
proposed to use model results as one of several factors that examiners 
would consider when determining a bank's capital needs for interest 
rate risk. Under this approach, a bank's need for capital would be 
determined on a case-by-case basis as part of each banking agency's 
examination process. In determining the need for capital, examiners 
would consider the quality of the bank's interest rate risk management, 
internal controls and the overall financial condition of the bank. 
Banks that had measured exposures in excess of the supervisory 
threshold and weak interest rate risk management systems would 
generally be required to hold additional capital for interest rate 
risk.

    \1\ A threshold level representing a decline in economic value 
equal to 1.0 percent of assets was proposed by the banking agencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Comments
    The banking agencies collectively received a total of 133 comments 
on the September 1993 proposed rule. The majority of commenters were 
banks. Thrifts, trade associations, bank consultants, other government-
sponsored agencies and other regulators also commented. The majority of 
commenters responded favorably to modifications that the banking 
agencies made from the earlier advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
published in the Federal Register on August 10, 1992. See 57 FR 35507 
(August 10, 1992). In particular, most commenters expressed strong 
support for using the results of banks' own interest rate risk models 
to determine their levels of exposure and corresponding need for 
capital. Commenters noted the potential inaccuracies of standardized 
regulatory models, such as the proposed supervisory model, as one 
reason for allowing the use of internal models. Internal models, they 
believed, would better capture the unique characteristics of individual 
bank portfolios. Many commenters also stated that permitting the use of 
internal models would provide banks with incentives to improve their 
internal risk measurement systems.
    The vast majority of commenters also urged the banking agencies to 
adopt a ``Risk Assessment'' approach for determining capital adequacy. 
Among the reasons cited for this approach were concerns about the 
accuracy of the proposed supervisory model and the need to consider 
qualitative factors, such as the quality of a bank's risk management 
process and its ability to respond to changing market conditions, in 
evaluating capital. Many commenters believed that by considering such 
factors, the banking agencies would reward banks that have superior 
risk management capabilities.
    Some commenters believed that the banking agencies' primary focus 
when evaluating the level of a bank's interest rate risk exposure 
should be on the exposure of the bank's near-term (one- to two-year) 
reported earnings, rather than on its exposure to economic value. While 
recognizing the importance of understanding the degree to which a 
bank's reported earnings are vulnerable to changing interest rates, the 
banking agencies have concluded that the economic value perspective 
more effectively identifies the risks that the bank's current business 
activities pose to its financial condition, its longer-term earnings 
and solvency, and hence the adequacy of its capital levels. Economic 
value measures the effect of a change in interest rates on the value of 
all future cash flows generated by a bank's current financial 
instruments, not just those that affect earnings over the next few 
months or quarters. Indeed, an earnings analysis provides information 
only on positions repricing within the forecast horizon, and thus would 
not take account of the full magnitude of risk. As a result, the effect 
of embedded and explicit options can be significantly understated by 
such an analysis. In contrast, an economic value perspective captures 
the effect of changing interest rates for all time periods, and offers 
a superior vehicle for assessing the effect of those rate changes on 
positions that have option characteristics. In addition, an economic 
value perspective offers important insights into the effect of changing 
interest rates on the liquidity of a bank's assets.
    Many commenters also raised common concerns about various elements 
of the measurement process outlined in the September 1993 proposed 
rule. Most commenters believe that the proposed treatment of non-
maturity deposits understate their effective maturity. Others raised 
concerns about the accuracy of the proposed supervisory model and the 
appropriateness of the proposed exemption test criteria. The 
measurement system, proposed in today's joint policy statement, 
includes a discussion of these comments and incorporates a number of 
changes to the September 1993 proposed rule in response to commenters' 
concerns.

III. Final Rule and Two-Step Process for Establishing Minimum Capital 
Standards

    After careful consideration of all the comments, the banking 
agencies have decided to implement minimum capital standards for 
interest rate risk exposures in a two-step process.
    This final rule implements the first step of that process by 
revising the capital standards of the banking agencies to explicitly 
include a bank's exposure to declines in the economic value of its 
capital due to changes in interest rates as a factor that the banking 
agencies will consider in evaluating a bank's capital adequacy.\2\ This 
final rule does not codify a measurement framework for assessing the 
level of a bank's interest rate risk exposure. The information and 
exposure estimates collected through a new proposed supervisory 
measurement process, described in the banking agencies' joint policy 
statement on interest rate risk, would be one quantitative factor used 
by examiners to determine the adequacy of an individual bank's capital 
for interest rate risk. The focus of that proposed process is on a 
bank's economic value exposure. Other quantitative factors that 
examiners will consider include the bank's historical financial 
performance and its earnings exposure to interest rate movements. 
Examiners also will consider qualitative 

[[Page 39492]]
factors, including the adequacy of the bank's internal interest rate 
risk management. Consistent with each banking agency's safety and 
soundness guidelines, the banking agencies expect a bank to properly 
manage all of its risks, including its interest rate risk, in a manner 
commensurate with its risk profile. Nothing in this rule is intended to 
diminish the importance or need for a bank to have an effective risk 
management system.

    \2\ The exposure of a bank's economic value is generally the 
change in the present value of its assets, less the change in the 
present value of its liabilities, plus the change in the value of 
its interest rate off-balance-sheet contracts. It represents the 
change in the underlying economic value of the bank's capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    This final rule represents the banking agencies' adoption of the 
Risk Assessment approach described in the September 1993 proposed rule 
with the exception that, unlike that proposed rule, this final rule 
does not establish an explicit supervisory threshold that defines 
whether a bank had an above ``normal'' level of interest rate risk 
exposure. The banking agencies have concluded that it is appropriate to 
first collect industry data and to evaluate the level of interest rate 
risk exposure in the banking industry before establishing an explicit 
supervisory threshold above which capital would be required. It is 
important to note, however, that the banking agencies intend for this 
case-by-case approach for assessing a bank's capital adequacy for 
interest rate risk to be a transitional arrangement.
    The second step of the banking agencies' process will be to issue a 
proposed rule that would establish an explicit minimum capital charge 
for interest rate risk, based on the level of bank's measured interest 
rate risk exposure. The banking agencies anticipate that the proposed 
policy statement on the supervisory assessment of interest rate risk 
will provide the foundation for the proposed rule that would propose 
the establishment of an explicit minimum capital requirement. The 
banking agencies will implement this second step at some future date, 
through a subsequent and separate proposed rule after the banking 
agencies and the banking industry have gained more experience with the 
proposed supervisory measurement and assessment process.
    During the transitional period before the second rulemaking process 
is initiated, the banking agencies will work with the industry to 
determine what, if any, further modifications to the proposed 
measurement process are warranted. Such modifications may include 
further refinements to the supervisory model and to other criteria used 
by examiners to evaluate the adequacy of banks' internal models. The 
transition period also allows the banking agencies to collect and 
monitor more rigorous and consistent information on the level of banks' 
interest rate risk exposures. This experience and information will 
assist the banking agencies in formulating a proposed rule for explicit 
minimum capital standards for interest rate risk.
    Second 305(b)(2) of FDICIA requires the banking agencies to discuss 
the development of comparable standards with members of the supervisory 
committee of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The Basle 
Committee on Banking Supervision, under the auspices of the BIS, has 
been working on ways to incorporate interest rate risk into the Basle 
Accord on risk-based capital standards. See International Convergence 
of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (July 1988). The banking 
agencies are participating actively in that international effort. 
However, the timing of any international standard for monitoring and 
assessing capital for interest rate risk is uncertain. Given the 
importance of interest rate risk to the safety and soundness of the 
banking industry and the mandate of section 305 of FDICIA, the banking 
agencies have concluded that they should not delay the implementation 
of this rule and measurement process until an international standard is 
achieved. The banking agencies will continue to work with international 
organizations to develop consistent international capital standards. At 
the time that an international agreement emerges on either a 
measurement system or explicit minimum capital standard, the banking 
agencies will revisit their rules in light of the international 
standard.

IV. Regulatory Flexibility Act Statement

    Each banking agency has concluded after reviewing the final 
regulations that the regulations, if adopted, will not impose a 
significant economic hardship on small institutions. The final rules do 
not necessitate the development of sophisticated recordkeeping or 
reporting systems by small institutions nor will small institutions 
need to seek out the expertise of specialized accountants, lawyers, or 
managers in order to comply with the regulation. Each banking agency 
therefore hereby certifies pursuant to section 605b of the Regulatory 
Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 605b) that the final rule will not have a 
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities 
within the meaning of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et 
seq.).

V. Executive Order 12866

    The Comptroller of the Currency has determined that this final rule 
is not a significant regulatory action under Executive Order 12866.

VI. OCC Response to Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995

    Section 202 of the Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995 (Unfunded Mandates 
Act) (signed into law on March 22, 1995) requires that an agency 
prepare a budgetary impact statement before promulgating a rule that 
includes a Federal mandate that may result in the expenditure by state, 
local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the private 
sector, of $100 million or more in any one year. If a budgetary impact 
statement is required, section 205 of the Unfunded Mandates Act also 
requires an agency to identify and consider a reasonable number of 
regulatory alternatives before promulgating a rule. Because the OCC has 
determined that this final rule will not result in expenditures by 
state, local and tribal governments, or by the private sector, of more 
than $100 million in any one year, the OCC has not prepared a budgetary 
impact statement or specifically addressed the regulatory alternatives 
considered. As discussed in the preamble, this final rule will clarify 
the authority of the OCC to require additional capital for any 
significant exposure to declines in the economic value due to changes 
in interest rates. Under the proposed joint policy statement, the 
supervisory model and internal bank models will serve as supervisory 
tools to assist examiners in assessing capital adequacy. Any decision 
to require additional capital will be made on a case-by-case basis as 
prescribed under the current capital procedures.

List of Subjects

OCC

12 CFR Part 3

    Administrative practice and procedure, Capital risk, National 
banks, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.

Board
12 CFR Part 208

    Accounting, Agriculture, Banks, banking, Confidential business 
information, Crime, Federal Reserve System, Mortgages, Reporting and 
recordkeeping requirements, Securities.

FDIC

12 CFR Part 325

    Bank deposit insurance, Banks, banking, Capital adequacy, Reporting 
and recordkeeping requirements, Savings associations, State nonmember 
banks.

[[Page 39493]]


Comptroller of the Currency

12 CFR Chapter I

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the joint preamble, part 3 of chapter 
I of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as set 
forth below.

PART 3--MINIMUM CAPITAL RATIOS; ISSUANCE OF DIRECTIVES

    1. The authority citation for part 3 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 93a, 161, 1818, 1828(n), 1828 note, 1831n 
note, 1835, 3907, and 3909.

    2. Section 3.10 is revised to read as follows:


Sec. 3.10  Applicability.

    The OCC may require higher minimum capital ratios for an individual 
bank in view of its circumstances. For example, higher capital ratios 
may be appropriate for:
    (a) A newly chartered bank;
    (b) A bank receiving special supervisory attention;
    (c) A bank that has, or is expected to have, losses resulting in 
capital inadequacy;
    (d) A bank with significant exposure due to the risks from 
concentrations of credit, certain risks arising from nontraditional 
activities, or management's overall inability to monitor and control 
financial and operating risks presented by concentrations of credit and 
nontraditional activities;
    (e) A bank with significant exposure to declines in the economic 
value of its capital due to changes in interest rates;
    (f) A bank with significant exposure due to fiduciary or 
operational risk;
    (g) A bank exposed to a high degree of asset depreciation, or a low 
level of liquid assets in relation to short term liabilities;
    (h) A bank exposed to a high volume or, or particularly severe, 
problem loans;
    (i) A bank that is growing rapidly, either internally or through 
acquisitions; or
    (j) A bank that may be adversely affected by the activities or 
condition of its holding company, affiliate(s), or other persons or 
institutions including chain banking organizations, with which it has 
significant business relationships.
    3. In appendix A to part 3, section 1, paragraph (b)(1) is revised 
to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 3--Risk-Based Capital Guidelines

* * * * *
    Section 1 * * * (b) * * * (1) The risk-based capital ratio 
derived from these guidelines is an important factor in the OCC's 
evaluation of a bank's capital adequacy. However, since this measure 
addresses only credit risk, the 8% minimum ratio should not be 
viewed as the level to be targeted, but rather as a floor. The final 
supervisory judgment on a bank's capital adequacy is based on an 
individualized assessment of numerous factors, including those 
listed in 12 CFR 3.10. With respect to the consideration of these 
factors, the OCC will give particular attention to any bank with 
significant exposure to declines in the economic value of its 
capital due to changes in interest rates. As a result, it may differ 
from the conclusion drawn from an isolated comparison of a bank's 
risk-based capital ration to the 8% minimum specified in these 
guidelines. In addition to the standards established by these risk-
based capital guidelines, all national banks must maintain a minimum 
capital-to-total assets ratio in accordance with the provisions of 
12 CFR part 3.
* * * * *

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

    Dated: June 29, 1995.
Eugene A. Ludwig,
Comptroller of the Currency.
Federal Reserve System

12 CFR Chapter II

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the preamble, part 208 of chapter II 
of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as set forth 
below:

PART 208--MEMBERSHIP OF STATE BANKING INSTITUTIONS IN THE FEDERAL 
RESERVE SYSTEM (REGULATION H)

    1. The authority citation for Part 208 revised to read as follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 36, 248(a), 248(c), 321-338a, 371d, 461, 
481-486, 601, 611, 1814, 1823(j), 1828)(o), 1831o, 1831p-1, 3105, 
3310, 3331-3351, and 3906-3909; 15 U.S.C. 78b, 781(b), 781(g), 
781(i), 78o-4(c)(5), 78q, 78q-1, and 78w; 31 U.S.C. 5318.

    2. Appendix A to part 208 is amended by revising the fifth and 
sixth paragraphs under ``I. Overview'' to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 1208--Capital Adequacy Guidelines for State 
Member Banks: Risk-Based Measure

I. Overview

* * * * *
    The risk-based capital ratio focuses principally on broad 
categories of credit risk, although the framework for assigning 
assets and off-balance-sheet items to risk categories does 
incorporate elements of transfer risk, as well as limited instances 
of interest rate and market risk. The framework incorporates risks 
arising from traditional banking activities as well as risks arising 
from nontraditional activities. The risk-based ratio does not, 
however, incorporate other factors that can affect an institution's 
financial condition. These factors include overall interest-rate 
exposure; liquidity, funding and market risks; the quality and level 
of earnings; investment, loan portfolio, and other concentrations of 
credit; certain risks arising from nontraditional activities; the 
quality of loans and investments; the effectiveness of loan and 
investment policies; and management's overall ability to monitor and 
control financial and operating risks, including the risks presented 
by concentrations of credit and nontraditional activities.
    In addition to evaluating capital ratios, an overall assessment 
of capital adequacy must take account of those factors, including, 
in particular, the level and severity of problem and classified 
assets as well as a bank's exposure to declines in the economic 
value of its capital due to changes in interest rates. For this 
reason, the final supervisory judgment on a bank's capital adequacy 
may differ significantly from conclusions that might be drawn solely 
from the level of its risk-based capital ratio.
* * * * *
    By Order of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System.

    Dated: July 7, 1995.
William W. Wiles,
Secretary of Board.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

12 CFR Chapter III

Authority and Issuance

    For the reasons set forth in the joint preamble, part 325 of 
chapter III of title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended 
as set forth below:

PART 325--CAPITAL MAINTENANCE

    1. The authority citation for part 325 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: 12 U.S.C. 1815(a), 1815(b), 1816, 1818(a), 1818(b), 
1818(c), 1818(t), 1819(Tenth), 1828(c), 1828(d), 1828(i), 1828(n), 
1828(o), 1831o, 3907, 3909, 4808; Pub. L. 102-233, 105 Stat. 1761, 
1789, 1790 (12 U.S.C. 1831n note); Pub. L. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, 
2355, 2386 (12 U.S.C. 1828 note).

    2. In appendix A to part 325, the fifth undesignated paragraph of 
the introductory text is revised to read as follows:

Appendix A to Part 325--Statement of Policy on Risk-Based Capital

* * * * *
    The risk-based capital ratio focuses principally on broad 
categories of credit risk, however, the ratio does not take account 
of many other factors that can affect a bank's financial condition. 
These factors include 

[[Page 39494]]
overall interest rate risk exposure, liquidity, funding and market 
risks; the quality and level of earnings; investment, loan 
portfolio, and other concentrations of credit risk, certain risks 
arising from nontraditional activities; the quality of loans and 
investments; the effectiveness of loan and investment policies; and 
management's overall ability to monitor and control financial and 
operating risks, including the risk presented by concentrations of 
credit and nontraditional activities. In addition to evaluating 
capital ratios, an overall assessment of capital adequacy must take 
account of each of these other factors, including, in particular, 
the level and severity of problem and adversely classified assets as 
well as a bank's interest rate risk as measured by the bank's 
exposure to declines in the economic value of its capital due to 
changes in interest rates. For this reason, the final supervisory 
judgment on a bank's capital adequacy may differ significantly from 
the conclusions that might be drawn solely from the absolute level 
of the bank's risk-based capital ratio.

    By order of the Board of Directors.

    Dated at Washington, D.C. this 27th day of June, 1995.

Federal deposit Insurance Corporation.
Jerry L. Langley,
Executive Secretary.
[FR Doc. 95-18098 Filed 8-1-95; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODES 4810-33-M, 6210-01-M, 6714-01-M
Last Updated 07/17/1999 communications@fdic.gov